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Reasoning of the project and current state of affairs
Since the cloud has started gaining popularity, one of the catch-phrases
used about it by supporters and adversaries alike and which can indeed be
read in a positive or negative manner, depending on one’s predisposition,
has been: “There is no cloud. It’s just someone else’s computer.”1 Cloud
computing made its entry in the IT industry as a revolution which was
meant to profoundly alter the way most of IT and digital data business had
been done till then2. Indeed, despite the partial loss of control over data
that comes immediately with its use, cloud computing has been massively
successful and, apart from average users’ data, a great variety of critical
records are also being entrusted to it, generating ever-growing concerns
about their integrity, privacy and security.
In the face of these trends around the cloud and its uses, privacy and
security have grown into two somewhat competing forces attempting to
balance opposing needs: privacy focuses on the need to use information
against the need to protect personal data, while security is centered on the
need to provide access to records against the need to stop unauthorized ac-
cess3. The importance of these competing goals has led to a plethora of le-
gal and regulatory ventures to strike a balance and, ultimately, to achieve a
certain level of trust in digital records and their storage in the cloud4. A
particular challenge to the whole effort has come to be the fact that differ-
ent jurisdictions approach privacy in substantially different manners while
an in-depth understanding of what a jurisdiction’s laws may aim at, or un-
der the rules of what particular jurisdiction certain data may be governed,
CHAPTER 1.
a.
1 Tom Geller, In privacy law, it's the U.S. vs. the world, 59 Commun. ACM 21–23
(2016.)
2 See also Chapter 2.
3 Luciana Duranti, Trust in online records and data. Integrity in Government through
Records Management: Essays in Honour of Anne Thurston.
4 D. Hofman, Duranti L. & E. How, Trust in the Balance. Data Protection Laws as
Tools for Privacy and Security in the Cloud, 10 Algorithms 47 (2017.)
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requires a tremendous analytical effort. Nonetheless, in order to protect
privacy and enhance security, this effort is unavoidable.
Should one look for a single phrase to summarize why cloud computing
does make a difference in the way we are handling digital information and
why we should regulate all this information processing having cloud com-
puting in our focus, a suitable passage could be the following: …“preserv-
ing information in the cloud may be a black box process in which we
know, at least ideally, what we put in for preservation, and we know what
we want to access and retrieve—essentially the same things we put in—
but often we do not know what technology is used by cloud service
providers to manage, store, or process our information”5.
Even in the ideal case in which there was no intended malice by actors
involved in the cloud, data record keeping and processing done via cloud
computing poses a number of unanswered questions. As Duranti and
Rogers have most recently categorized them6, those challenges broadly re-
fer to: managing trans-jurisdictional data flows, attributing liability for and
resolving data breaches, and establishing the chain of custody when a
cloud service provider goes dark7. Given these risks, one might wonder
why people continue to trust the cloud so strongly and at such a growing
pace. The answer, as it will be demonstrated soon8, is that, from a techno-
logical efficiency point of view, there is no better option in the realm of
the internet-driven world right now and the cloud stands out by far from
all other available technologies. Of course, the greatest ally in dealing with
such risks is constant technological innovation itself, which tries hard to
keep pace with malicious and innocent challenges of the cloud alike and
ensure the trustworthiness of records stored on it. However, approaches
based solely on technical means cannot solve the problems that arise from
technology and its maluses; besides, there is no technical solution to deter-
mined human misuse of technology, to say the least9. In fact, technological
tools need support from legal, social, and business structures that set the
5 Luciana Duranti, Adam Jansen, Giovanni Michetti, Mumma Courtney, Daryll
Prescott, Corinne Rogers & Thibodeau Kenneth, Preservation as a Service for
Trust, in Security in the private cloud, 47–72 (John R. Vacca ed., 2017.)
6 Id.
7 This issue does not form part of this analysis which solely focuses on the public law
aspects of cloud computing regulation, leaving civil or criminal law issues aside for
future research.
8 See Chapter 2.
9 Luciana Duranti (note 3).
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bar for minimum expectations from cloud service providers. While some
users (particularly those heavily based on data storage and processing
from their core operation model already) might indeed thoroughly analyze
the “reputation, performance, competence, and confidence”10 of cloud ser-
vice providers to verify their trustworthiness and robustness, experience
and market data show that the majority continue to be quite instinctive
with the choice of whom they entrust with their data11. It is precisely for
those cases – which probably constitute the majority anyway – where con-
sumers rely upon a service without having sought assurances of its quality
beforehand that the law must step in to provide the certainty and trust
users cannot or did not bother to obtain on their own12. The typological
diversity of records kept in cloud environments is forcing the law to mod-
ernize existing regulatory tools and improvise on new ones. Combined to-
gether, these tools aim to strike the balance described earlier: between
long-standing concerns, namely access, control, security, and trust and a
world where data have got considerably detached from the physical bonds
that traditionally kept them within the borders of a single jurisdiction and
the control of an identified and trusted custodian.
Discussing “privacy” as a legal pursuit is challenging to say the least;
according to Solove, “Privacy seems to be about everything, and therefore
it appears to be nothing”13. The very conception of privacy is widely con-
textual; as it has been argued, “our conceptions of privacy result from our
juridified intuitions—intuitions that reflect our knowledge of, and commit-
ment to, the basic legal values of our culture”14.
On a broader basis, Americans’ use of the term ‘privacy’ typically
refers to “privacy as an aspect of liberty, the right to freedom from intru-
sions by the state”15. Consequently, American privacy laws tend to focus
on the freedom to determine who and to what extent has access to one’s
10 Luciana Duranti & Corinne Rogers, Trust in digital records. An increasingly clou-
dy legal area, 28 Computer Law & Security Review 522–531 (2012.)
11 Frank B. Cross, Law and trust, 93 The Georgetown Law Journal 1457–1545
(2005.)
12 Huaiqing Wang, Matthew K. O. Lee & Chen Wang, Consumer privacy concerns
about Internet marketing, 41 Commun. ACM 63–70 (1998.)
13 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 University of Pennsylvania law re-
view 477–560 (2006.)
14 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy. Dignity versus Liberty,
113 The Yale Law Journal 1151–1221 (2004.)
15 For further analysis, see Chapter 3.
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private life, particularly to the category of private information generally
quoted as “personally identifiable information”16. From that perspective,
gravity primarily lies with the possibility for a data subject to consent to
their loss of privacy, while in laws developed under this prism the need for
privacy is often juxtaposed by the need to use personally identifiable in-
formation for data subjects for countless different purposes. In contrast,
the European concept of privacy views the term “as an aspect of digni-
ty”17. The “juridified intuitions” on the foundations of European under-
standings of privacy cannot bear human dignity as a commodity. As a re-
sult, the American concept of ‘privacy’ coincides much better with the
European notion of ‘data protection’18. Both these policy areas on the two
sides of the Atlantic seek to draw boundaries around information and
records, putting up effective protection mechanisms for them from public
or unauthorized private scrutiny. Such laws set off from the predicament
that not all people can be trusted with all information19. In the pre-internet,
offline era, this was operatively translated in controlling access to and, if
necessary, retracting paper records containing sensitive information. How-
ever, under the profound impact of information and communications tech-
nologies on data and record keeping, along with an intensifying blur be-
tween “data” and “records,” personally identifiable information can today
be regarded as just a small subset of data20, about which it cannot be said
with certainty whether it is the original record or just an archived copy.
However, this is a precarious approach as it strips the data off its context;
an immediate effect is, for example, that we are no longer able to deter-
mine whether the data is ‘private’ for a particular purpose. Instead, by
moving the protection focus at record, rather than data level, we could
achieve better results. What is more, data mining and other big data tech-
niques are increasingly rendering data-level privacy protection ineffec-
tive21.
16 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Con-
cept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 New York University Law Review
1814–1894 (2011.)
17 James Q. Whitman (note 14).
18 Id.
19 Luciana Duranti (note 3).
20 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove (note 16).
21 Daniel J. Weitzner, Harold Abelson, Tim Berners-Lee, Chris Hanson, James Hend-
ler, Lalana Kagal, Deborah L. McGuinness, Gerald Jay Sussman & K. Krasnow
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Based on these two poles, i.e. the European versus the American legal
thinking about data protection and privacy, this study aims to take the de-
cisive step and look into the matter from the broader perspective of tech-
nologies facilitating data processing and archiving of all kinds instead of
the acts of processing and archiving per se. Those technologies are beyond
doubt those collectively termed as ‘cloud computing’. And because of the
fact that legal research which aims to build up on an existing regime and
provide better answers to tangible problems, which have nevertheless been
around for a long time (with several laws that have already tried to tackle
them thus making any new approach conditional to cohesion and not just
innovative spirit), cannot set off from nowhere but needs to have one firm
foot on actual acquis before it can take the leap forward, the starting point
of endeavors of this study will largely, though not exhaustively, be privacy
and data protection laws from Europe and the US.
The European state of affairs
The latest development out of deployment of cloud computing technolo-
gies, i.e. big data decision-making algorithms, are by nature meant to dis-
criminate, to make distinctions based on voluminous data of a wide vari-
ety. An immediate challenge of algorithmic discrimination is the loss of
judgment22. “The machine is incapable of determining whether a distinc-
tion is ethical or not. Unless we come up with a comprehensive theory of
discrimination that can be represented algorithmically, we have no rigor-
ous way of distinguishing between ethical and non-ethical machine-based
discrimination [... however,] some of our ethical and moral criteria are so
fragile, nuanced, and culturally dependent that it is not clear that the ma-
chine will ever be capable of appropriately weighing them”23. Still the da-
ta-driven approach to regulation of personally identifiable information
runs on the assumption that by redacting or pseudonymizing the most sen-
sitive kinds or parts of data set, we can prevent the algorithm from filling
in missing information using the vast amounts of other data, quite possibly
i.
Waterman, Transparent Accountable Data Mining: New Strategies for Privacy
Protection (2006.)
22 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the
Age of Big Data, 11 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 351–368 (2013.)
23 Id.
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even from the same data subject, that has at its disposal. However, sealing
certain bits of data which have been labeled as personally identifiable in-
formation while leaving all other data available and open to whatever
techniques resourceful data holders can devise, is a lost battle. The current
data-centric approach to privacy will be less and less effective in building
up or maintaining trust in cloud-based records24.
The brand new European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)25 explicitly recognizes these challenges, and seeks to establish a
higher standard of trust and security for EU citizens26. And while it does
not categorically solve all big data challenges to privacy, it does provide a
much firmer ground for European citizens to expect that their privacy will
not be breached by resourceful data processors. Furthermore, the Euro-
pean Union provides a second line of legal protection for its citizens, as
the GDPR directly cites Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union (CFREU)27 which has already been repeatedly in-
terpreted as providing robust protection for the online version of the right
to privacy28. However, the GDPR largely remains a technology agnostic
24 Jiahong Chen, How the best-laid plans go awry. The (unsolved) issues of applica-
ble law in the General Data Protection Regulation, 6 International Data Privacy
Law 310–323 (2017.)
25 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation); (OJ) L119, 4/5/2016, p.
1–88.
26 Recital 26 of the GDPR explicitly notes that, even though personal data may have
undergone pseudonymization, “account should be taken of all of the means rea-
sonably likely to be used […] to identify the natural person directly or indirectly,”
distinguishing between pseudonymized data and anonymous data.
27 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C
326/02.
28 Recital 73 of the GDPR reads: “Restrictions concerning specific principles and the
rights of information, access to and rectification or erasure of personal data, the
right to data portability, the right to object, decisions based on profiling, as well as
the communication of a personal data breach to a data subject and certain related
obligations of the controllers may be imposed by Union or Member State law, as
far as necessary and proportionate in a democratic society to safeguard public se-
curity, including the protection of human life especially in response to natural or
manmade disasters, the prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal of-
fences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against
and the prevention of threats to public security, or of breaches of ethics for regula-
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legislation29, one that follows on the long path of data-focused EU privacy
legislation, which is developed having specific existing or foreseeable ap-
plications of data-related technologies in sight instead of the specifica-
tions, present and foreseeable ones, of those technologies.
The US state of affairs
The regulatory plateau in the US regarding phenomena occurring in the
cloud, most prominently regarding the issue of how to gain access to data
hosted on cloud environments, is substantially different to the one in Euro-
pe; not so much as to the aims it pursues or the genre of protection it wish-
es to grant to data subjects but rather on the way it has developed over the
years and how it looks today30. Owing to the endemic differences of legal
tools between Europe and America, in the US there is no central legisla-
tion regarding cloud data but rather several legal resources (from provi-
sions of the US constitution, to Acts, to case law) which provide legal ba-
sis for regulating cloud-related phenomena. The global clouds on which
the greatest part of the IT world operates today pose challenging questions
regarding the scope of traditional legal tools governing these phenomena
and, most importantly, the issue of access to data stored in cloud facilities
outside the United States. The far from settled landscape on the issue can
be observed even through latest case law with regard to the Stored Com-
munications Act (SCA)31. Different decisions expose numerous unan-
ii.
ted professions, other important objectives of general public interest of the Union
or of a Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of
the Union or of a Member State, the keeping of public registers kept for reasons of
general public interest, further processing of archived personal data to provide spe-
cific information related to the political behavior under former totalitarian state re-
gimes or the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others,
including social protection, public health and humanitarian purposes. Those re-
strictions should be in accordance with the requirements set out in the Charter and
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.”.
29 For more extensive analysis on the GDPR and its shortcomings as well as the in-
novations it introduces refer to Chapter 4.
30 For a comparative analysis on the development of data protection and privacy law
in Europe and the US refer to Chapter 3.
31 The Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. Chapter 121 §§ 2701–2712.
For more refer to Chapter 3.
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swered questions about the conditions under which parties can obtain
cloud data. Specifically, in litigation involving extra-territorial data re-
quests under the SCA US courts have at times focused on where the re-
quested data is located, and on other instances on where the search or
seizure of it will take place32. In addition to the SCA, there are further
statutory authorities that grant government and private parties the permis-
sion to make extra-territorial data requests, creating additional unresolved
issues as well. What is more, American academia is also far from settled
about the meaning of territoriality for data access33. This scattered playing
field produces equally varying legal outcomes which themselves demon-
strate how disconcerted existing US laws applying to the cloud are, their
most alarming effect being that they powerfully incentivize international
data localization34. Mandatory data localization is already a legal require-
ment in a number of countries such as Brazil and Russia, while there is
additionally another important trend of voluntary data localization35. Both
of them are, to a significant degree, fueled by concerns about US rules for
data access, which make more and more non-US companies to choose to
bind themselves to national or regional protections which recognize or de-
mand data localization for cloud networks. However, in the long run, this
trend risks seriously disrupting the Internet and undermining one of its
fundamental characteristics, the lack of boundaries in the circulation of da-
32 For an overview of the latest trends and developments in US law and jurispru-
dence regarding data and access to them, especially in relation to the cloud and in-
formation hosted on facilities abroad, refer to: Jennifer C. Daskal, The Un-Territo-
riality of Data, 125 Yale Law Journal 326–398 (2015); Andrew Keane Woods,
Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 Stanford Law Review 729–789 (2016); Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 Stanford Law Review
285–329 (2014); Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act,
162 University of Pennsylvania law review 373–419 (2014); David Cole & Fed-
erico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders. iCourts Working Paper
Series, No. 33, 2015 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2015); Damon
C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the
Cloud, 73 Md. L. Rev. 313–388 (2013.)
33 Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to Cloud Information. Data Shards, Data Local-
ization, and Data Trusts.
34 For a thorough analysis on the issue of mandatory and voluntary data localization,
refer to: Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web. Data Localization vs.




ta and overall traffic36. Therefore, it is high time for the US to work with
other jurisdictions, primarily with the EU, towards developing internation-
ally harmonized rules for access to cloud information.
Current state of affairs in other countries
In response to growing concerns about security and privacy of data in the
cloud, regulators in jurisdictions around the world are turning to data lo-
calization measures37. These regulatory tools include laws, regulations,
and policies designed to make sure that data and records are accessed, pro-
cessed, and stored within a specific jurisdiction38. Data localization mea-
sures are conceptualized with the aim of fortifying the privacy rights of
data owners whose records cross jurisdictional borders39.
Briefly, data localization laws are based on the assumption that, if the
jurisdictions in which records and data can be accessed, processed, and
stored are limited, those records will be sealed against bad actors for
whom laws from other jurisdictions would provide no effective recourse.
Realistically speaking though, this is a problematic assumption40. Any
records and data made available at some point online can eventually be ac-
cessed and harmed by malicious actors in almost any jurisdiction. And, of
course, whether or not the jurisdiction in which the records are located can
provide effect remedy in such an instance depends on more than just local-
ization laws. Secondly, data localization laws assume that records hosted
locally are by default more secure41. However, there is no guarantee for
that; everything depends on adequate technical solutions and expertise be-
ing available within the jurisdiction where cloud services are provided. To
put it plainly, it should not be taken for granted that there are actual data
centers and hardware facilities by all cloud providers within the area of
every single jurisdiction. In addition, data localization laws assume that
local custody is a preferable means of protecting records and data and as-
iii.
36 Paul M. Schwartz (note 33).
37 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le (note 34).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Paul M. Schwartz (note 33).
41 Y. Tian, Current Issues of Cross-Border Personal Data Protection in the Context
of Cloud Computing and Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Join or Withdraw,
34 Wisconsin International Law Journal 367–408 (2016.)
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suring their trustworthiness. However, this predicament invalidates the
very important element of evaluation of trustworthiness that any cloud ser-
vice provider, regardless of their size, should undergo in order to survive
on the market according to internationally accepted market practice42. The
last assumption is that data localization laws provide augmented stability
should cloud services prove untrustworthy or insecure, because, at least,
they provide clarity as to which jurisdiction’s laws will apply in resolving
the disputes that may arise. In reality, however, there is no better safeguard
for security of records and data in the cloud than the trust mechanisms of
the international cloud market, only by taking part in which can a cloud
service provider, regardless of size, survive and remain competitive; thus,
all CSPs will do whatever it takes to make sure they remain part of it43.
Research question and structure of the project
Given the state of affairs described above, this project is going to look for
ways for achieving better coordinated regulation of the cloud and the is-
sues arising from using it. The stated aim will not be pursued though hav-
ing in mind the establishment of an international regulatory framework for
the cloud, let alone the introduction of some other type of supranational
jurisdiction for cloud and IT-related phenomena. Instead, in an attempt to
be realistic in the way the research question is approached in conjunction
with the regulatory state-of-the-art across jurisdictions, the project’s focus
will be on pinpointing and bringing together best practices regardless of
their origin which, if combined and taken into consideration as the founda-
tions for the future development of cloud regulation laws by law makers
from all legal orders will lead to a more coherent governance scheme for
cloud computing. Logically, some of the suggestions put forward in the
course of this analysis may not sound as ground-breaking for all readers,
depending on whether each one of them is more familiar with the Euro-
pean or US legal thinking on the matter. However, the originality of this
analysis lies precisely on drawing for the first time the best each and every
school of thought has to offer under the same roof.
b.
42 Nicholas Platten, Protectors of Privacy: Regulating Data in the Global Economy –




The forthcoming analysis should be read in light of the following un-
derstandings:
– Although from a technical point of view it is always easier to discern
between cloud computing per se and specific applications made possi-
ble thanks to the cloud, this distinction has not yet been unquestioning-
ly achieved on the regulatory front. Therefore, while the technical parts
of this research invariably refer to cloud computing generically, in the
parts of legal analysis it is mandatory to begin discourse from the laws
currently applicable in order to understand how the current status has
been consolidated and how steps forward could be taken. Therefore, in
parts of this project where the legal dimension of the research question
is dealt with the starting point is mostly, but not exclusively, existing
laws about privacy, data protection and data transfers on the cloud. It is
hoped that by applying the findings and suggestions presented through-
out this study, current laws will move forward towards a more generic
and less case-based direction, grasping the cloud phenomenon per se
and not limiting their understanding to specific cloud applications.
– With regard to the jurisdictions and the origins of scholarly opinion
that form part of this comparative analysis, it needs to be pointed out
right from the beginning that there is a similar distinction between re-
sources and literature of a technical and those of a legal nature. in par-
ticular, given that, from a technological perspective, the cloud is
viewed in the same manner worldwide, this study utilizes relevant re-
sources from a variety of origins (e.g. from European, American, Chi-
nese and Canadian academics, to name a few). However, due to the
greatly varied ways in which the cloud has been viewed so far from a
legal point of view, only the laws and regulations of the EU and the US
form part of this study. The two jurisdictions together account for the
biggest part of the ways in which law makers currently deal with the
cloud44. Moreover, this choice was also made due to practical factors,
namely ease of access to resources, linguistic capabilities of the re-
searcher (these two are the main reasons why the Chinese jurisdiction
is left out of the scope of the project altogether) as well as time con-
straints for the completion of the project.
44 For more on the significance EU and US laws and markets play with regard to
cloud computing refer to Chapter 3.
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With the above understandings in mind, the chapters of the analysis that
follow deal with these groups of challenges45 regarding the prospect of a
more consolidated regime on cloud computing regulation:
– The jurisdictional challenge, mainly dealt with in Chapter 6;
– The privacy and security challenge, mainly dealt with in Chapter 7;
– The convergence challenge, mainly dealt with in Chapters 8, 9 and 10.
45 Y. Tian (note 41).
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Cloud computing; a historical and technical
overview
Introduction – scope of this chapter
Cloud computing technologies have been rapidly expanding over the past
ten to fifteen years to be today the standard enabling technology for most
of the applications and aspects of the internet as we know it. Cloud-based
systems and cloud computing, as such, were not an invention, nor a pio-
neering discovery when they started to be widely commercialized in the
beginning of 2000s. They had actually been around long before, as techni-
cally feasible arrangements for the handling of data and the execution of
computational tasks. However, the growing appetite for processing power
that an increasing e-economy necessitated, the commoditization of more
and more internet-based services related to data handling and the equally
fast rate at which consumers adopted these services led to a rapid commer-
cialization of cloud technologies46. Yet, despite the fact that the cloud, as a
technical feasibility, had been around since long before, its true meaning
and the ways in which it did things differently than before had not been
adequately realized or examined for many years after its popularization as
a commodity. In order to understand what cloud computing is all about
and, eventually, demonstrate what it does differently in comparison to pre-
vious technical arrangements for data handling tasks, a review of the his-
tory of the cloud is the first step.
Getting familiar with the essence of the technical aspects of cloud com-
puting is the aim of this chapter of the study.
CHAPTER 2.
a.
46 For more information on the history and technical evolution of cloud computing
refer to: M. Arif, A history of cloud computing, available at: http://www.computer
weekly.com/feature/A-history-of-cloud-computing (18 February 2015); Hongji
Yang & Xiaodong Liu, Software reuse in the emerging cloud computing era
(2012); Thomas Erl, Richardo Puttini & Zaigham Mahmood, Cloud computing.
Concepts, technology, & architecture (2013); Antonio Regalado, Who Coined
'Cloud Computing'?, available at: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425970/w
ho-coined-cloud-computing/ (11 January 2017); Inc. Gartner, Cloud Computing
Confusion Leads to Opportunity (2008).
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A brief history of the cloud
Cloud computing has evolved to be the technology that we so extensively
use today through a number of phases that included concepts like client-
server arrangements47, grid48 and utility computing49, application service
provision (ASP)50 and, more recently, Software as a Service (SaaS)51.
On a visionary level, the idea of an "intergalactic computer net-
work"52 was for the first time formulated in the 1960s by Joseph Carl Rob-
b.
47 The client–server model of computing is a distributed application structure that
partitions tasks or workloads between the providers of a resource or service, called
servers, and service requesters, called clients. At most times, clients and servers
communicate over a computer network on separate hardware, but both client and
server may reside in the same system. (https://www.techopedia.com/definition/183
21/client-server-model; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
48 Grid computing is a collection of computer resources from multiple locations that
are dedicated to reaching a common goal. The grid can be thought of as a distribu-
ted system with non-interactive workloads that involve a large number of files.
(https://www.techopedia.com/definition/87/grid-computing; last accessed on
01/11/2017.)
49 Utility computing is a service provisioning model in which a service provider
makes computing resources and infrastructure management available to the custo-
mer as needed, and charges them for specific usage rather than a flat rate. (https://
www.techopedia.com/definition/14622/utility-computing; last accessed on
01/11/2017.)
50 Application Service Provisioning (ASP) is the business of providing computer-ba-
sed services to customers over a network, such as access to a particular software
application using a standard protocol (such as HTTP). (https://www.techopedia.co
m/definition/2476/application-service-provider-asp; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
51 Software as a service (SaaS) is a software licensing and delivery model in which
software is licensed on a subscription basis and is centrally hosted. (https://www.te
chopedia.com/definition/155/software-as-a-service-saas; last accessed on
01/11/2017.)
52 Intergalactic Computer Network or Galactic Network was a computer networking
concept similar to today's Internet. The term was used for the first time in the early
1960s to refer to a networking system as an electronic commons open to all, ‘the
main and essential medium of informational interaction for governments, institu-
tions, corporations, and individuals.’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergalactic_
Computer_Network; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
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nett Licklider53, who was responsible for facilitating the development of
ARPANET54 in 1969.
Licklider’s vision was for everyone to be interconnected and able to ac-
cess programs and data hosted at any site, from anywhere. "It is a vision
that sounds a lot like what we are calling cloud computing"55.
Another popular view is that the cloud concept was first envisaged by
computer scientist John McCarthy who proposed the idea of computation
being delivered as a public utility56.
From a technical point of view, several decades went by with the know-
how related to today’s cloud-based systems already existing. Literally,
cloud technologies were no invention and did not come as a result of a
ground-breaking discovery. They were simply the outcome of better or, at
least, different exploitation of existing knowledge related to IT systems57.
One of the first milestones in cloud computing history was the arrival of
53 Joseph Carl Robnett Licklider was an American psychologist and computer scien-
tist who is considered one of the most important figures in computer science and
general computing history. He is particularly remembered for being one of the first
to foresee modern-style interactive computing and its application to all kinds of
activities; and also as an Internet pioneer with an early vision of a worldwide com-
puter network long before it was built. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._C._R._Lic
klider; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
54 The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was an early pa-
cket switching network and the first network to implement the protocol suite
TCP/IP. Both technologies became the technical foundation of the Internet. ARPA-
NET was initially funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, la-
ter Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA) of the United States
Department of Defense. (https://www.techopedia.com/definition/2381/advanced-r
esearch-projects-agency-network-arpanet; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
55 J. Locke, The Roots of Cloud Computing, available at: http://www.servercloudcan
ada.com/2013/10/the-roots-of-cloud-computing/ (11 January 2017); last accessed
on 01/11/2017.
56 John McCarthy was an American computer scientist and cognitive scientist. Mc-
Carthy was one of the founders of the discipline of artificial intelligence. He coi-
ned the term "artificial intelligence" (AI), developed the Lisp programming lan-
guage family, significantly influenced the design of the ALGOL programming lan-
guage, popularized timesharing, and was very influential in the early development
of AI. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCarthy_(computer_scientist); last
accessed on 01/11/2017.)
57 M. Arif (note 46).
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Salesforce.com58 in 1999, which pioneered the concept of delivering en-
terprise applications via a simple website. The services firm paved the
way for both specialist and mainstream software firms to deliver applica-
tions over the internet.
The next important step was Amazon Web Services59 in 2002, which
provided a suite of cloud based services including storage, computation
and even human intelligence.
Another big milestone came in 2009, with the advent of Web 2.060,
when Google and others started to offer browser-based enterprise applica-
tions through services such as Google Apps61.
The NIST definition of cloud computing; a starting point
It has been so far impossible among stakeholders, namely, regulators, the
IT industry etc., to agree on a universally acceptable definition of cloud
computing. However, for the purposes of this study when reference is
made to ‘cloud computing’ this is to be understood under the definition
published in 2011 by the US National Institute of Standards and Technolo-
gy (NIST); so far, this definition is generally heralded as the most preva-
c.
58 Salesforce.com is a cloud computing company headquartered in San Francisco,
California. Though its profits come basically from a customer relationship ma-
nagement (CRM) product, Salesforce also tries capitalizing on commercial appli-
cations of social networking through acquisition. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa
lesforce.com; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
59 Amazon Web Services (AWS) is a collection of remote computing services, also
called web services, that make up a cloud computing platform offered by Ama-
zon.com. These services are based in 11 geographical regions across the world.
The most central and well-known of these services are Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud and Amazon S3. These products are marketed as a service to provide large
computing capacity more quickly and cheaper than a client company building an
actual physical server farm. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_Web_Service
s; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
60 Web 2.0 describes World Wide Web sites that emphasize user-generated content,
usability, and interoperability. Although Web 2.0 suggests a new version of the
World Wide Web, it does not refer to an update to any technical specification, but
rather to cumulative changes in the way Web pages are made and used. (https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
61 Google Apps is a suite of cloud computing productivity and collaboration software
tools and software offered by Google. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Apps
_for_Work; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
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lent62 in explaining the ‘cloud’ and it reads as follows: “Cloud computing
is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interac-
tion. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three
service models, and four deployment models”63.
The most essential characteristics of cloud computing technologies and
of the services developed based on them are64:
– On-demand self-service: A consumer can unilaterally calculate and
preorder or buy in real time computing capabilities, such as server time
and network storage, as needed, automatically without requiring hu-
man interaction with a salesperson or service provider;
– Broad network access: Services are available over the network and
accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by heteroge-
neous client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and work-
stations);
– Resource pooling: The provider’s computing resources are pooled to
serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different
physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned ac-
cording to consumer demand. There is an impression of location inde-
pendence owing to the fact that the customer generally has no control
or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources but
may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g.,
country, state, or datacenter). Examples of resources include storage,
processing, memory and network bandwidth;
– Rapid elasticity: Resources can be elastically provisioned and re-
leased, in some cases automatically, to scale rapidly outward and in-
ward in accordance with demand. To the consumer, the resources avail-
able for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can be appropri-
ated in any quantity at any time;
62 Bill Williams, The economics of cloud computing (2012.)
63 Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. Recom-
mendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf (4 November
2015.)
64 Thomas Erl, Richardo Puttini & Zaigham Mahmood (note 46).; Peter Mell & Tim-
othy Grance (note 63); Bill Williams (note 62).
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– Measured service: Cloud systems automatically control and optimize
use of resources by leveraging a metering capability at some level of
abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing,
bandwidth and active user accounts). Resource usage can be moni-
tored, controlled and reported, providing transparency for both
providers and consumers of the utilized service.
Cloud computing services come in several different genres. These broad
categories under which cloud-based applications fall are typically called
‘service models’ and they are the following65:
– Software as a Service (SaaS): The consumer can use the provider’s
applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are ac-
cessible from various client devices through either a thin client inter-
face, such as a web browser (e.g. web-based email), or a program inter-
face (e.g. a Dropbox installation on the user’s laptop). The consumer
does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure includ-
ing network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual ap-
plication capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-spe-
cific application configuration settings;
– Platform as a Service (PaaS): The capability provided to the con-
sumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or
acquired applications built using programming languages, libraries,
services, and tools supported by the provider. The consumer does not
manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including net-
work, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the
deployed applications and possibly configuration settings for the appli-
cation-hosting environment;
– Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The capability provided to the
consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks and other fun-
damental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy
and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and
applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying
cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage and
65 Christof Weinhardt, Arun Anandasivam, Benjamin Blau, Nikolay Borissov,
Thomas Meinl, Wibke Michalk & Jochen Stößer, Cloud Computing – A Classifi-
cation, Business Models, and Research Directions, 1 Bus. Inf. Syst. Eng. 391–399
(2009); Bill Williams (note 62); Norman Pelzl, Methodische Entwicklung von zu-
kunftsorientierten Geschäftsmodellen im Cloud-Computing, Band 88 (2016.)
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deployed applications; and possibly limited control of select network-
ing components (e.g., host firewalls).
According to the different types of users that use a given cloud infrastruc-
ture, these are the major cloud deployment models66:
– Private cloud: The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive
use by a single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., busi-
ness units). It may be owned, managed and operated by the organiza-
tion, a third party or some combination of them, and it may be situated
on or off premises;
– Community cloud: The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclu-
sive use by a specific community of consumers from organizations that
have shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and
compliance considerations). It may be owned, managed and operated
by one or more of the organizations in the community, a third party or
some combination of them, and it may be located on or off premises;
– Public cloud: The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by
the general public. It may be owned, managed and operated by a busi-
ness, academic or government organization or some combination of
them. It is located on the premises of the cloud provider;
– Hybrid cloud: The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or
more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community or public) that
remain unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or pro-
prietary technology that enables data and application portability (e.g.,
cloud bursting for load balancing between clouds).
The technologies that preceded cloud computing; a brief overview and
comparison
Cloud computing compared to traditional IT – Their main differences
and why the cloud matters
In attempting to answer whether cloud computing is fundamentally differ-
ent from IT technologies that had existed before, the prime question to an-
swer is what it means for an organization to “do” cloud computing. The
response to this question will give us in the end an estimate as to whether
d.
i.
66 Christof Weinhardt, Arun Anandasivam, Benjamin Blau, Nikolay Borissov,
Thomas Meinl, Wibke Michalk & Jochen Stößer (note 65).
d. The technologies that preceded cloud computing; a brief overview and comparison
39
the cloud is a revolution or simply a ‘version 2.0’ of a continuous series of
innovations.
In this debate, Oracle’s CEO Larry Ellison67 has a history of discount-
ing cloud computing as no more than a new name for what has already
been in place since long ago. Actually, in a 2009 interview that has be-
come somewhat of a web cult classic, he declared: “All the cloud is, is
computers in a network… Our industry is so bizarre. I mean, they just
change a term and they think they’ve invented technology.”68.
From certain aspects, this statement is correct. Many of cloud comput-
ing’s most common features – namely, virtualization, pay-as-you-go, re-
duced cost and moving IT responsibility to third parties – have been
around much longer than “the cloud”. Yet there are also those who argue
that despite the similarities to what had already existed before, cloud com-
puting is fundamentally different.
One of the most outright supporters of this opinion has been Sales-
force.com’s CEO Marc Benioff69. In a keynote speech at the Oracle Open-
World 2010 conference, Benioff outlined his own definition of cloud com-
puting: “Our definition of cloud computing is multi-tenant, it’s faster, half
the cost, pay as you go, it grows as you grow or shrinks as you shrink. It is
extremely efficient. We’re not going to show you computers taller than
you. We’re not going to show you a cloud in a box because clouds don’t
come in a box. They never have. That’s the whole idea”70.
67 Lawrence Joseph "Larry" Ellison (born August 17, 1944) is an American program-
mer, internet entrepreneur, businessman and philanthropist. He has been the chief
executive officer of the software company Oracle Corporation from its foundation
in 1977. (https:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Ellison; last accessed on
01/11/2017.)
68 Larry Ellison, Larry Ellison on cloud computing (2009.)
69 Marc Russell Benioff (born September 25, 1964) is an American internet entrepre-
neur, author and philanthropist. He is the founder, chairman and CEO of sales-
force.com, a cloud computing company. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Beni
off; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
70 C. Tuna, Ellison and Benioff Spar Over Cloud Credentials Wall Street Journal
(2010.)
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In the end, cloud computing offers a breakthrough in at least four main
areas in comparison to the past71:
– Virtualization, i.e. the ability to increase computing efficiency
– Democratization of computing, by bringing enterprise scale infrastruc-
ture to small and medium businesses
– Scalability and fast provisioning, by bringing web scale IT at a rapid
pace
– Commoditization of infrastructure, by enabling IT to focus on the stra-
tegic aspects of its role.
Although any of these areas may not qualify as a computing revolution by
itself, one could persuasively argue all of them, put together, have funda-
mentally changed computing.
Cloud computing environments compared to client-server systems
Client-server is a method where information processing is split between a
client and a server72. Back in the days, time share computers73 were used
that were accessed by terminals that only handled the display of informa-
tion without doing any processing.
An easy-to-grasp example of a client/server service is the email. The
email client74 processes incoming email and then presents it to the user.
The mail server75 processes email messages and figures out where they go
next.
ii.
71 2009 ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering Challenges of Cloud Computing.
72 M. Arif (note 46).
73 Time share computing: A technique permitting many users simultaneous access to
a central computer through remote terminals. (https://www.britannica.com/technol
ogy/time-sharing; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
74 An email client, email reader or more formally mail user agent (MUA) is a com-
puter program used to access and manage a user's email. (https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Email_client; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
75 A mail server, or e-mail server is a computer within a network that works as a vir-
tual post office. A mail server usually consists of a storage area where e-mail is
stored for local users, a set of user definable rules which determine how the mail
server should react to the destination of a specific message, a database of user ac-
counts that the mail server recognizes and will deal with locally, and communicati-
ons modules which are the components that actually handle the transfer of messa-
ges to and from other mail servers and email clients. (http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/E/e_mail_server.html; last accessed on 01/11/2017.)
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Cloud computing is a different story altogether. Cloud computing em-
bodies the ideas that you can abstract the software from the hardware,
have applications that can scale up and down based on factors such as de-
mand, time, etc. The act of services provisioning in the cloud is automated
and requires no user intervention. Cloud services are also on-demand and
can be metered meaning that you are only charged for the resources that
you eventually use. Ultimately, cloud computing can be more precisely
described as a consumption model76.
As it has been already demonstrated, a cloud can be a public one, where
someone else manages the hardware and infrastructure and the user just
puts his operating systems and apps into. There can also be a private
cloud, where the same entity owns the hardware and infrastructure and out
of them derives a scalable, automated, metered service. And, lastly, there
is hybrid cloud which is when one has apps that reside in both.
In other words, the ‘client server’ concept describes how applications
are modeled. Cloud computing, on the other hand, describes and focuses
on the environment that applications reside in.
Cloud computing compared to outsourcing – The key differences
Before the emergence of cloud computing, computational and data pro-
cessing needs of organizations and individual users were largely covered
through outsourcing77. As a result, initial IT laws envisaged traditional
outsourcing and the stand-alone databases that had been in use when they
were drafted. In addition, it needs to be pointed out that this inspiration
coming mainly from the outsourcing model still prevails across a wide
range of IT legislation given the difference in pace in which technical
standards have evolved compared to the respective evolutionary cycles of
IT legislation.
Traditional outsourcing of data processing involved commissioning
agents, who were provided with data and tasked with processing that data
actively for the user according to the user's mandate. The agent had the
possibility to engage sub-processors to assist with this processing78. With
iii.
76 Bill Williams (note 62).
77 W. Kuan Hon & C. Millard, Cloud Computing vs. Traditional Outsourcing – Key
Differences, 23 Computers & Law (2012.)
78 Id.
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today’s public cloud services79, users 'rent' pre-packaged IT resources
from providers and then process data themselves in a self-service manner,
using infrastructure and/or resources supplied by the provider.
With traditional outsourcing, a user would hire a processor to meet its
specific processing needs. The processor might then engage sub-proces-
sors to help fulfil this contract with the user. Successive contracts down
the chain of processors could therefore be easily tailored, from both timing
and control perspectives. With cloud computing, however, the sequence of
events and direction of travel of data are quite the opposite. Many cloud
services are pre-packaged standardized commoditized services, which
may be built on existing sub-provider services on the sub-provider’s stan-
dard terms. The sub-service in turn may be based on other existing ser-
vices. Users choose the provider and pre-built package that they think that
best meets their specific processing and other needs. Public cloud comput-
ing providers use standardized, shared infrastructure/environments, often
using relatively cheap commodity hardware, rather than tailoring to each
customer. Similarly, some traditional outsourced processing might have
used standardized infrastructure, sometimes at large scale, but it is unlike-
ly that it was shared to such a degree as in cloud computing80.
With traditional outsourcing, the user had control over its processor
through the contract and its instructions to the processor. With cloud com-
puting, while it is commonly thought cloud users lose control, much de-
pends on the type of service and exact nature and design of individual ser-
vices. A ‘one size fits all’ approach to cloud is common, but would not be
wise, because there are significant differences between services and, re-
spectively, many different cloud arrangement versions through which to
provide those services.
79 The same largely applies also for community and hybrid cloud arrangements. Pri-
vate clouds also share these characteristics but, due to their ‘secluded’ nature, they
also differentiate on certain aspects from what applies to public, community or hy-
brid cloud installations.
80 For more extensive analysis and comparison between cloud computing and tradi-
tional outsourcing of computational tasks, refer also to: Bill Williams (note 62)., as
well as to a comparative presentation of the two alternatives from a prominent tai-
lored cloud services provider, GetCloud Services, under http://www.getcloudservi
ces.com/blog/cloud-computing-vs-traditional-outsourcing/ (last accessed on
01/12/2017.)
d. The technologies that preceded cloud computing; a brief overview and comparison
43
Data handling needs and the parallel technological evolution – How
developing computational requirements led to technological progress
At this point, it is worth briefly summarizing the sequence of innovations
related to computing technologies parallel to the evolution of the volume
of computational needs. When widespread corporate computing initially
occurred, it was based on a shared resources model where massive com-
puter facilities took up acres of space within dingy warehouses and users
would book time for both the machines themselves and the skilled techni-
cians who knew how to operate them. Their standard use was narrow busi-
ness analysis and hence computing had a very limited sphere of influ-
ence81.
Later, the introduction of mini computers82 and the personal computer83
in the 1970s meant the ability to utilize the benefits of technology extend-
ed to a much broader audience. While still relatively expensive and func-
tionally basic machines, personal computers put computing onto (almost)
any desktop in a reasonably well resourced organization.
The arrival of the Internet, however, changed things for good, both
from the perspective of the network and that of individual computers. The
increased reliability and reduced cost of the internet (in comparison to old-
er proprietary networks) along with the decreasing cost of computers, led
to increased use of web based applications. This, along with the demand
for application access via multiple devices, led to a rapid growth for cloud
computing84 – at an infrastructure, a platform and an application level.
e.
81 M. Arif (note 46).
82 A minicomputer, or colloquially mini, is a class of smaller computers that were de-
veloped in the mid-1960s and sold for much less than mainframe and mid-size
computers from IBM and its direct competitors. In a 1970 survey, the New York
Times suggested a consensus definition of a minicomputer as a machine costing
less than 25,000 USD, with an input-output device such as a teleprinter and at least
four thousand words of memory, that is capable of running programs in a higher-
level language, such as Fortran or BASIC. The class formed a distinct group with
its own software architectures and operating systems. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
i/Minicomputer; last accessed on 01/12/2017.)
83 A personal computer is a general-purpose computer whose size, capabilities and
original sale price make it useful for individuals, and is intended to be operated
directly by an end-user with no intervening computer operator. (https://en.wikipedi
a.org/wiki/Personal_computer; last accessed on 01/12/2017.)
84 Bill Williams (note 62).
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Explaining cloud computing and its predecessors – what did the cloud
replace and what is now done different than before?
Having gone through the history and evolution of the cloud, through the
most predominant theory and policy approaches currently on the table
about it and the fields where it is mostly used, it is now time to examine
what cloud computing did actually replace. Further to that, it is also in or-
der now to explain what the technological and business differences be-
tween cloud computing and the precedent technological status quo actual-
ly are.
In a nutshell, one could say that the cloud itself is not an out-of-
nowhere invention nor did it come to replace anything in particular. As it
has already been demonstrated85 cloud computing was not invented or dis-
covered; it simply evolved out of pre-existing technologies that matured
over time as the possibilities they offered were better understood and been
taken advantage of. Naturally, cloud did not take over from one day to the
other but it gained ground, and at a faster and faster pace, because it was
becoming clearer that it offered competitive advantages over its predeces-
sors, mainly in the field of economies of scale and ease of use86. However,
as the economic aspects of the cloud phenomenon are beyond the scope of
this study, the overview that follows will focus on how the cloud evolved
from a technological point of view and what it does differently when ap-
plied and not so much on what differences it brings about in the economic
factors of the sectors where it is applied.
The technologies that cloud computing replaced could be generically
described as based on a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)87. In other
words, they were technological arrangements which had been primarily
developed not so much with efficiency or economies of scale in mind but
mostly with fulfilling particular service needs as primary goal. In layman’s
terms, what defined SOA-focused arrangements was not how to do the job
in the most economically and resources-efficient manner but, merely, how
to get the job done. Therefore, from the simplest SOA system [i.e. the Lo-




87 D. Linthicum, MSDN Documentation. Service Oriented Architecture (SOA),
available at: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb833022.aspx (4 Novem-
ber 2015.)
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based on the SOA perspective, one can always recognize the predominant-
ly linear connections between different building parts of the network, be
them servers, computers, printers etc.
A generic definition of service oriented architecture (SOA) would be:
“Loosely coupled services with well-defined interfaces that provide busi-
ness functionality and can be shared or reused across and beyond the net-
work’s constituting parts. These services can be discovered through a reg-
istry/repository or other directory, and can be assembled and disassembled
to meet current business process demands”88.
Generally observing the SOA logic, hereunder are the main technolo-
gies that pre-existed the cloud and whose revisited use led to what we
know nowadays as cloud computing technologies:
File hosting
“File hosting services provide a broad range of services to businesses, in-
cluding building an intranet and managing an overall internal network”89.
File hosting and the enabling technologies have existed for decades, ever
since businesses turned to the Internet for storage solutions and project
management. Yet, while file hosting is more localized and focused on an
internal aspect of getting everyone in an office or organizational complex
on the same page, cloud computing goes far beyond this.
Clustering
“A cluster is a group of independent IT resources that are interconnected




89 R. Peeva, File Hosting vs. Cloud Computing, available at: http://www.websitepuls
e.com/blog/file-hosting-vs-cloud-computing (4 November 2015.)
90 A cluster server is a group of independent servers working together as a single sys-
tem to provide high availability of services for clients. When a failure occurs on
one computer in a cluster, resources are redirected and the workload is redistribu-
ted to another computer in the cluster. You can use server clusters to ensure that
users have constant access to important server-based resources. Server clusters are
designed for applications that have long-running in-memory state or frequently up-
dated data. Typical uses for server clusters include file servers, print servers, data-
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duce system failure rates and, at the same time, increase availability and
reliability; these were made possible thanks to redundancy and failover
features inherent to clusters. In terms of hardware used to build cluster in-
stallations, a general prerequisite was that its component systems had rea-
sonably identical hardware and operating systems so that similar perfor-
mance levels could be achieved when one failed component was to be re-
placed by another. Component devices forming a cluster were kept contin-
uously synced through dedicated, high speed communication links.
Stemming from clusters, this basic concept of built-in redundancy and
failover was carried out today to be in the core of cloud platforms.
Grid Computing
“A computing grid (or ‘computational grid’) provides a platform in which
computing resources are organized into one or more logical pools. These
pools are collectively coordinated to provide a high performance distribut-
ed grid, sometimes referred to as a ‘super virtual computer’.”91 Grid com-
puting was different from clustering in that grid systems were much more
loosely coupled and distributed, already allowing for greater flexibility
and reallocation of resources of the network to ensure the best possible ef-
ficiency at all times. As a result, grid computing systems were the first to
involve computing resources of heterogeneous nature and geographically
dispersed, which was generally not possible with the preceding cluster
computing-based systems.
Grid computing was firstly conceptualized in the early 1990s and has
been constantly under review and further research ever since92. The tech-
nological advancements achieved through that research into grid comput-
ing projects have influenced various aspects of cloud computing platforms
and mechanisms, particularly in relation to feature sets such as networked
access, resource pooling, scalability and resiliency. These features were
iii.
base servers, and messaging servers. A more detailed description of the cluster
server is available at https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785197(v=ws.1
0).aspx; last accessed on 01/12/2017.
91 Thomas Erl, Richardo Puttini & Zaigham Mahmood (note 46).
92 Ian Foster, Yong Zhao, Ioan Raicu & Shiyong Lu, Cloud Computing and Grid
Computing 360-Degree Compared,” IEEE Grid Computing Environments
(GCE08) 2008, co-located with IEEE/ACM Supercomputing 2008 2012 ACM/
IEEE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GRID COMPUTING 1–10.
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initially introduced via grid computing systems. Today, they have been in-
corporated in cloud computing arrangements with updated distinctive ap-
proaches.
Virtualization
“Virtualization represents a technology platform used for the creation of
virtual instances of IT resources. A layer of virtualization software allows
physical IT resources to provide multiple virtual images of themselves so
that their underlying processing capabilities can be shared by multiple
users. Prior to the advent of virtualization technologies, software was limi-
ted to residing on and being coupled with static hardware environments.
The virtualization process made redundant this software-hardware depen-
dency, as hardware requirements can be simulated by emulation software
running in virtualized environments.”93
Elements of virtualization technologies can be traced in several cloud
computing mechanisms and they have also inspired many of the core fea-
tures of modern cloud systems. As cloud computing evolved, it brought
along a new generation of modern virtualization technologies, which,
based on the know-how from the past, have now managed to overcome the
performance, reliability and scalability limitations of traditional virtualiza-
tion platforms. In other words, lying at the foundations of contemporary
cloud technology, modern virtualization concepts provide a variety of vir-
tualization types and technology layers that have facilitated optimization
of cloud platforms to the flexible, adaptable systems we know today.
Cloud computing: its core philosophy and structural features
Bringing together features and functionalities of all main IT concepts that
preceded it, cloud computing rose to be today’s standard technology for
data handling. But before pointing out what it does differently from past
solutions and IT systems, it is essential to describe the founding features
upon which it has been built to become what we know and extensively use
today as possibly the most popular way of handling and processing data.
iv.
g.
93 Thomas Erl, Richardo Puttini & Zaigham Mahmood (note 46).
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The cloud’s business model
The prevalent cloud-based business model94 has the customer paying the
provider on a consumption basis. In effect, use of cloud solutions is
charged under the same principle applied by utility companies when they
charge for basic utilities such as electricity, gas, and water. This arrange-
ment relies on economies of scale in an effort to drive prices down for
users and maximize profits for providers95.
The architecture of cloud computing systems
Cloud-based technologies have been developed to be able to address Inter-
net-scale computing problems; this actually means that some of the key
assumptions of the data handling tasks clouds are expected to carry out are
essentially different from those of the technologies that the cloud succeed-
ed96. The term ‘clouds’ is usually understood to refer to “a large pool of
computing and/or storage resources, which can be accessed via standard
protocols via an abstract interface”97. Cloud systems have actually been
built on top of many pre-existing protocols such as Web Services98 or oth-
er advanced Web 2.0 technologies99.
In line with the observation that cloud computing is actually not an out-
of-nowhere technology but the result of continuous evolution of pre-exist-
ing IT tools, its architecture is not a linear one but, rather, includes ele-
ments of all technologies upon which the cloud is based. As a rule, the
cloud’s architecture is divided in four layers, in particular, the fabric, uni-
fied resource, platform, and application layers100.
i.
ii.
94 Christof Weinhardt, Arun Anandasivam, Benjamin Blau, Nikolay Borissov,
Thomas Meinl, Wibke Michalk & Jochen Stößer (note 65).
95 Bill Williams (note 62); Norman Pelzl (note 65).
96 Liang-Jie Zhang & Qun Zhou, CCOA: Cloud Computing Open Architecture
(2009.)
97 Ian Foster, Yong Zhao, Ioan Raicu & Shiyong Lu (note 92).
98 Thomas Erl, Richardo Puttini & Zaigham Mahmood (note 46).
99 Id.
100 In addition to this structural analysis of cloud’s architecture, in Chapter 8 there is
an analytical presentation of the internal organization of cloud networks, which,
combined, serve as the basis for the regulatory proposals contained in this study.
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The fabric layer contains all raw hardware level elements, such as com-
pute, storage and network resources. The unified resource layer contains
resources that have been abstracted/encapsulated (usually by virtualiza-
tion) so that they can be exposed to upper layer and end users as integrated
resources, for instance, a virtual computer/cluster, a logical file system, a
database system, etc101. The platform layer is where a collection of spe-
cialized tools, middleware and services on top of the unified resources are
categorized; for example, a Web hosting environment or a scheduling ser-
vice. These elements are necessary in order to facilitate the development
and/or deployment of the cloud platform. Finally, the application layer
contains the applications that would run on this cloud-based system102.
The resource management aspects of the cloud
The cloud’s compute model
The cloud’s compute model is fundamentally different from that of its pre-
ceding technologies, with resources in the cloud being dynamically shared
by all users at all times; in contrast to that, technologies previous to cloud
systems were governing resources in a queuing manner, assigning to them
the execution of computational tasks in the order that these tasks were giv-




102 One could easily recognize these layers if the architecture of a widely known ser-
vice such as Dropbox is brought to mind; a. fabric layer is Dropbox’s server
farms and infrastructure (either privately owned or sublet); b. the unified resource
layer corresponds to Dropbox’s way of organizing the content of its users’ folders
content, the way it arranges their files into parent folders, sub-folders etc.; c. the
platform layer is Dropbox’s backend, the environment from which Dropbox stuff
can control and make sure that their service runs smoothly towards the users; fi-
nally, d. the application layer, which contains all the editing tools and applicati-
ons that Dropbox makes available to users to work with the files they host on the
service.
103 Id.
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Virtualization104
Virtualization has preceded the cloud and was deeply incorporated in
cloud systems to become a quasi-indispensable ingredient for most of
them in order to enhance their abstraction and encapsulation. Virtualiza-
tion is the tool thanks to which clouds, which need to run vast numbers of
user applications, make it appear as if all these applications were running
simultaneously and had ready for use all the available resources in the
cloud facility105. Virtualization offers to the cloud all necessary abstraction
so that the underlying elements of a cloud system (storage, network re-
sources etc.) can be unified to resemble a pool of resources so that then
resource overlays (e.g. web hosting environments) can be built on top of
them. Virtualization also permits each cloud application to be encapsulat-
ed so that it can be configured, deployed, migrated, suspended, stopped,
etc., and thus provides better security, manageability, and isolation.
One can reasonably argue that virtualization is the technology from
which the cloud borrowed more features than any other from those that it
succeeded. There are indeed many valid reasons that support such a
claim106:
– virtualization offers to cloud systems the server and application consol-
idation they need in order to be able to run as many applications as
needed on the same server by making use of available resources in the
most efficient manner possible;
– high degree configurability is also possible thanks to virtualization: as
resource requirements for the various applications running on a cloud
facility differ significantly, virtualization is necessary in order to dy-
namically configure and aggregate resources for these varying needs,
given that this is not achievable at the hardware level;
– optimized application availability; virtualization permits quick recov-
ery from unplanned outages, as virtual environments can be backed up
and migrated without interruption in service;
– last but not least, virtualization has offered to the cloud improved re-
sponsiveness, as resource provisioning, monitoring and maintenance
ii.
104 Id.
105 Christof Weinhardt, Arun Anandasivam, Benjamin Blau, Nikolay Borissov,
Thomas Meinl, Wibke Michalk & Jochen Stößer (note 65).
106 Liang-Jie Zhang & Qun Zhou (note 96).
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can be automated, while common or residual resources can be cached
and reused.
Virtualization with all these features has actually been the basis for cloud
systems to meet the stringent requirements of the tasks they are carried out
through them.
Monitoring107
The extensive use of virtualization technology in cloud environments
caused as a side-effect the difficulty in maintaining control over the moni-
toring of resources of the system. When utilizing applications hosted on
the cloud, different levels of services can be offered to each end user; nev-
ertheless, every user is only exposed to a predefined API108 while lower
level resources are invisible to them. Apart from interacting with the stan-
dard API users do not have the liberty to deploy their own monitoring
mechanisms over the cloud resources of the platform, while the limited in-
formation returned to them most commonly does not provide adequate
level of details that would permit them to figure out what the resource sta-
tus is at any given moment109. Essentially, monitoring a cloud facility is a
quite complicated process requiring a fine balance of business application
monitoring, enterprise server management, virtual machine monitoring,
and hardware maintenance110. It is worth mentioning, however, that, as
technology evolves, it is already possible that, in the near future, user-end
monitoring might become less important as cloud systems become more
sophisticated, more self-maintained and self-healing111.
iii.
107 Id.
108 In computer programming, an application programming interface (API) is a set of
routines, protocols, and tools for building software applications. (https://en.wikip
edia.org/wiki/Application_programming_interface; last accessed on 01/12/2017.)
109 Larry Ellison (note 68).
110 Liang-Jie Zhang & Qun Zhou (note 96).
111 Benoit Dupont, Cybersecurity Futures: How Can We Regulate Emergent Risks?
Technology Innovation Management Review 6–11 (2013); Willcocks, Leslie P.,
Venters, Will and Whitley, Edgar A., Cloud and the future of business: from costs
to innovation: part two: challenges (2012.)
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Provenance
“Provenance refers to the derivation history of a data product, including
all the data sources, intermediate data products, and the procedures that
were applied to produce the data product. Provenance information is vital
in understanding, discovering, validating, and sharing a certain data prod-
uct as well as the applications and programs used to derive it”112. In some
disciplines, such as finance and medicine, this provenance path is also
mandatory to provide and it is called an ‘audit trail’ at all times so that a
thorough audition over the course the data has followed is at all times pos-
sible. Cloud platforms are becoming the new standard playground for
modern scientific research and, consequently, provenance management is
extremely important in order to track the processes and support the repro-
ducibility of scientific results. What is more, this provenance feature can
also serve as the key to overall efficient regulation of cloud computing:
when coupled with the teleological principle, provenance mechanisms can
very effectively serve the crucial issue of regulating cloud computing no
matter for what purpose it is utilized113.
The application model of the cloud
Cloud computing could in principle cater to the whole set of applications
most commonly needed by the average user who needs to perform data
computational processing. This is not of course to be understood as imply-
ing that all other technologies are bound to cease to exist. Most probably,
there will always be tasks and specific data processing queries that, for
reasons of security (or other similar grounds) will preferably continue to
run in non-cloud environments and on platforms based on the technologies
that pre-existed the cloud. However, given that already these exceptions
are an ever-dwindling minority and, also, due to the undeniable power of
the comparative advantages of the cloud, it should not come as a surprise
if, eventually, the cloud unquestionably prevails over all other options114.
Therefore, a timely regulation of the cloud is necessary as soon as possible
iv.
i.
112 Ian Foster, Yong Zhao, Ioan Raicu & Shiyong Lu (note 92).
113 See also Chapter 10.
114 Liang-Jie Zhang & Qun Zhou (note 96).
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if we are to be able to handle all issues that may arise out of it and call for
settlement.
The security model of the cloud
Cloud systems today usually comprise dedicated data centers belonging to
the same organization. In each of these data centers, hardware and soft-
ware configurations along with supporting platforms are in general more
homogeneous as compared with those in data environments built on tech-
nologies prior to cloud computing115. Interoperability is clearly one of the
most serious issues for cross-data center, cross-administration domain in-
teractions116. Currently, the security model for clouds typically relies on
Web forms (over SSL117) that allow creation and easy management of ac-
count information for end-users, whom they also permit to reset their old
and receive new elements of these accounts (such as passwords) even in
unsafe and unencrypted communication channels (for example, via
emails). As a rule, new users can use cloud-based services more easily and
almost instantly (most of the times, it is possible to create a profile just
with a credit card and/or an email address). On the contrary, data environ-
ments based on technologies prior to cloud computing were usually
stricter about security but, of course, at the same time, were readily ad-
dressed only to a limited and very specific pool of users (for example, the
members of the organization which a grid-based data center belonged
to)118.
Security has been and still is one of the greatest concerns regarding the
adoption of cloud computing119. To give a thorough catalogue of all secu-
j.
115 Ian Foster, Yong Zhao, Ioan Raicu & Shiyong Lu (note 92).
116 Sean Marston, Zhi Li, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, Juheng Zhang & Anand Ghal-
sasi, Cloud computing — The business perspective, 51 Decision Support Systems
176–189 (2011.)
117 Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL),
both of which are frequently referred to as 'SSL', are cryptographic protocols de-
signed to provide communications security over a computer network. (https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security; last accessed on 01/12/2017.)
118 Ian Foster, Yong Zhao, Ioan Raicu & Shiyong Lu (note 92).
119 For an analytical overview of the security parameter as one of the main determi-
nant factors for growth and further adoption of cloud computing, refer to: W. K.
Hon, C. Millard & I. Walden, The problem of 'personal data' in cloud computing:
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rity questions surrounding the cloud, it would be extensively technical and
beyond the scope of this paper. However, here is a list of the seven most
common (and potentially affecting most users) security threats coming
with the adoption of cloud computing:
– Privileged user access120: whenever cloud-based services users need
to perform computational tasks involving sensitive data on a cloud sys-
tem from which they lease resources, it is very common that they ask
for assurances that any processing done to those data will only be ac-
cessible by those privileged users;
– Regulatory compliance121: customers who decide to turn to cloud ser-
vices commonly ask to verify if their cloud provider has external audits
and security certifications and if they truly comply to the awarded se-
curity certificates they demonstrate;
– Data location122: this is one the most fervently debated and contested
issues regarding cloud technology. Extensive discourse will be made
over data location and cloud computing in the course of this study.
However, at this point one could briefly mention that currently, since a
what information is regulated?--the cloud of unknowing, 1 International Data Pri-
vacy Law 211–228 (2011); Dara Hallinan, Michael Friedewald, Paul McCarthy,
Citizens’ Perceptions of Data Protection and Privacy in Europe, 28 Computer
Law and Security Review 263–272 (2012); M. Friedewald & R. J. Pohoryles,
Privacy and Security in the Digital Age: Privacy in the Age of Super-Technolo-
gies (2016); Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans
Graux, Sadie Creese & Paul P. Hopkins, The Cloud: Understanding the Security,
Privacy and Trust Challenges. Prepared for Unit F.5, Directorate-General Infor-
mation Society and Media, European Commission (2012); S. Subashini & V.
Kavitha, A survey on security issues in service delivery models of cloud compu-
ting, 34 Journal of Network and Computer Applications 1–11 (2011); Hassan
Takabi, James B. D. Joshi & Gail-Joon Ahn, Security and Privacy Challenges in
Cloud Computing Environments IEEE Security & Privacy 24–31 (2010); A. van
Cleeff, W. Pieters & R. J. Wieringa, Security Implications of Virtualization: A
Literature Study, vol. 3; Α. Ε. Whitley, P. L. Willcocks & W. Venters, Privacy
and Security in the Cloud: A Review of Guidance and Responses, 22 Journal of
International Technology and Information Management 75–92 (2013); M. Zhou,
R. Zhang, W. Xie, W. Qian & A. Zhou, Security and Privacy in Cloud Comput-
ing: A Survey; Kirstin Brennscheidt, Cloud Computing und Datenschutz.
120 Christof Weinhardt, Arun Anandasivam, Benjamin Blau, Nikolay Borissov,
Thomas Meinl, Wibke Michalk & Jochen Stößer (note 65).
121 Liang-Jie Zhang & Qun Zhou (note 96).
122 Sean Marston, Zhi Li, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, Juheng Zhang & Anand Ghal-
sasi (note 116).
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customer does not immediately know where data are stored, it is not
uncommon for mid- and big-scale users of cloud services to ask their
providers for reassurances regarding storing and processing data in
specific jurisdictions and under pre-defined privacy requirements on
behalf of the customer;
– Data segregation123: mid- to big-scale users often ask for reassurances
that their data is fully segregated from data belonging to other users of
the same cloud facility;
– Recovery124: it is a pressing request from the market that cloud
providers have an efficient replication and recovery mechanism to re-
store data if a disaster occurs;
– Investigative support125: Cloud services are especially difficult to in-
vestigate but not at all impossible. Right now, if this is important for a
customer, it is usually concretized in the contractual agreement be-
tween the customer and the cloud service provider. However, in the fu-
ture and as investigative mechanisms for the cloud will become more
and more efficient, they can actually be among the cornerstone of an
efficient regulatory mechanism for cloud computing;
– Long-term viability126: obviously, it is already a pressing demand
from users that data remain viable even when the cloud provider is ac-
quired by another company.
What is cloud computing after all and why does it merit a new
regulatory approach?
In conclusion, it can now be said without hesitation that cloud computing
is an operations model, not a technology127. What makes cloud computing
stand out from other data handling technologies is the fact that the physi-
cal resources of a cloud facility are operated to deliver abstract IT re-
sources on-demand, at scale, and (almost always) in a multi-tenant envi-
k.
123 Christof Weinhardt, Arun Anandasivam, Benjamin Blau, Nikolay Borissov,
Thomas Meinl, Wibke Michalk & Jochen Stößer (note 65).
124 W. K. Hon, C. Millard & I. Walden (note 119).
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ronment128. In a nutshell, cloud computing as a term should be understood
to signify the way in which available technologies for data handling are
involved to maximize efficiency, economies of scale and ease of use.
Cloud borrows much from long established technologies and from vari-
ous long standing operation models. However, the combination of all these
technologies and models in an on-demand, at scale and multi-tenant in-
frastructure is relatively unique for the post client-server era, and is the
main reason why cloud computing has had such an impact on the stan-
dards of data handling industry, rather than being another passing fad.
Consequently, cloud computing is the evolutionary climax of several
decades of technological progress in the field of computational data pro-
cessing. It is a ‘revolution’, since it fundamentally simplified and opti-
mized the processes involving digital data but, at the same time, it is not a
‘revolution’ in the sense of a phenomenon coming out of nowhere. The
cloud has firm roots to almost all technological steps that preceded it, it
borrows features from most of them yet it rearranges them in an entirely
new spectrum. This new arrangement results in different processes, prob-
lems and challenges that will ensure that the processes carried out through
it are flawless and respectful of the rights and duties of all the actors in-
volved (from data subjects to data owners to data controllers and regula-
tors). Nevertheless, the fact that it happened so gradually and in a rather
‘natural evolution’ pattern has resulted in ignoring, to some extent, its
gravity and differentiation from the previous status quo. As it will be
demonstrated immediately after, this has resulted in a current situation
where the cloud is attempted to be regulated with pre-existing norms and
rules, which were produced in the era of its preceding technologies129.
However, things in the cloud era are essentially different and they merit a
new regulatory approach which will be explored over the course of this
study.
128 Software Multitenancy refers to a software architecture in which a single instance
of a software runs on a server and serves multiple tenants. A tenant is a group of
users who share a common access with specific privileges to the software instan-
ce. With a multitenant architecture, a software application is designed to provide
every tenant a dedicated share of the instance including its data, configuration,
user management, tenant individual functionality and non-functional properties.
Multitenancy contrasts with multi-instance architectures, where separate software
instances operate on behalf of different tenants. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mu
ltitenancy; last accessed on 11/4/2015.)
129 See Chapter 2.e.
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EU vs. US: the two major schools of thought
regarding internet and privacy regulation and why
they took divergent paths. Can this distance be
bridged in the context of a regulatory framework
for the cloud?
Introduction – scope of the chapter
It is commonly accepted and can be also verified through figures130 that
the EU and the US have been the two most important players when it
comes to the issue of internet and privacy regulation131. The EU has man-
aged to influence with its legislation on the fields tens of other national or
regional jurisdictions worldwide, which have developed their privacy and
internet laws very much following the essence and cornerstone elements
of European legislation132. On the other hand, the USA, despite not having
been equally successful in ‘exporting’ their legal approach regarding the
above issues, have clearly managed to maintain a gravitas in the field due
to their enormous share in the overall market size of the internet, both
from the perspective of users and from that of service providers133. As it is
known, these two jurisdictions have over the course of the years followed
distinct paths as to how issues related to the development of applications
of information technologies were regulated134. The distance between them
was never totally bridged and it exists, as far as the issue of cloud comput-
ing is concerned, as well. However, given that the genuinely borderless
nature of cloud technologies contradicts the fragmented regulatory land-
scape caused by divergent jurisdictional tendencies, in the context of an
CHAPTER 3.
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analysis that seeks to bring together potential points of convergence on the
matter between EU and US law, we must agree on a minimum common
understanding that will permit not necessarily the convergence of different
jurisdictions but most importantly the effective interaction between them.
Over the course of this chapter, the different standpoints at which Euro-
pean and American laws about the internet and its subsequent phenomena
have been traditionally standing, are summarized and presented. Then, the
ground is set for ways in which these two schools of thought (and the nu-
merous others that have been evolving under the influence thereof135)
could approach each other and govern in a more pragmatic manner a state-
of-the-art IT phenomenon, such as cloud computing.
How extensive is the influence of European data privacy standards
outside Europe? Is it EU law that has been so influencing or is it more
the entire European legal thinking?
One of the generally admitted facts about data privacy and regulation
thereof worldwide is that a great deal of countries across continents have
developed their respective laws by following the patterns and legal notions
originally conceived in Europe136. However, despite the fact that popular
belief usually attributes this wave effect to EU legislation, in reality it is
the overall European legal tradition that has succeeded so much in shaping
data privacy legislative standards on a global scale137. The two major ar-
eas and jurisdictions that have been exempt from the influence of the
European school of thought in the area of data privacy, are the USA and
China. The fact that these two countries have largely maintained their in-
dependent path in regulating data privacy related issues along with the
economic and political power they both carry requires special considera-
tion in any assessment of global data privacy developments138. Neverthe-
b.
135 Graham Greenleaf ed. (note 130).
136 For more see Chapter 4.
137 L. A. Bygrave, Privacy protection in a global context–a comparative overview,
47 Scandinavian Studies in Law 319–348 (2004.)
138 Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws: Forty Years of Acceleration. UN-
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less, the increasing pressure for change these two jurisdictions face, espe-
cially in recent years, must also be pointed out.
In the USA, there are many privacy laws with relevantly effective en-
forcement, but no comprehensive privacy law in the private sector139.
What is more, despite the fact that the revelations of latest years have in-
creased pubic outcries for more comprehensive protection of privacy,
there is not much real prospect for a comprehensive legislative package on
the matter, despite periodic calls for one from major companies or draft
Bills introduced into Congress. It is not of course the case that the USA
does not have any standards for (private sector) data privacy; the main
problem is rather that they must be inferred from many scattered pieces of
legislation, while, in various sectors, there is utter absence of any signifi-
cant legislation140. There are also some State constitutional protections
along with common law structures141. All of the above lead as a fact to a
situation that often makes scholars claim that the US approach is incoher-
ent, sectoral-based, and with legislative protections that are largely reac-
tive, driven by outrage and at particularly narrow practices142.
On the other hand, since everyone admits that ‘European standards’ for
data privacy have been influential on a global scale, we need to devise
ways in which we could measure that. It is also essential to check whether
the causes of influence can be traced, apart from its effects. With a very
small number of exceptions (Israel, public sector laws in some OECD
countries, New Zealand) data protection laws outside Europe were adopt-
ed in the aftermath of the 1995 Directive143 (or at least in the aftermath of
puting regulation. For structural, as well as practical barriers, e.g. the language
barrier, this project focuses on the European and US jurisdictions alone.)
139 Elisa Bertino, Ravi Sandhu, Lujo Bauer & Jaehong Park eds., the third ACM
conference.
140 Chris Hoofnagle, COMPARATIVE STUDY ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES
TO NEW PRIVACY CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR IN THE LIGHT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. B.1 – UNITED STATES OF AMERI-
CA, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_pri
vacy_challenges/final_report_country_report_B1_usa.pdf (2 May 2016.)
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the introduction of its draft form in the early 90s)144; consequently, they
were open to influences from it at their inception. In certain cases, even
revised laws (for instance, those of Taiwan, South Korea and New
Zealand) have incorporated new elements in their body influenced by the
EU Directive145.
If one would like to present a comprehensive picture about how laws
outside Europe have been influenced by the European legal thinking about
data privacy regulation, one would need to pinpoint two big pools of influ-
ences: (i) those which can be attributed to both the EU Directive and the
OECD Guidelines146; and (ii) those which are found in the Directive but
are not required by the OECD Guidelines147. In literature, it has prevailed
that the first are called influences with ‘global’ and the second influences
with ‘European’ origins148. All of them put together, they prove that it is
not EU law that has had such a profound influence on global standards for
data privacy regulation but, in fact, European legal thinking in its entirety.
Those ten plus ten influences offer a comprehensive picture about the
most common elements that define data privacy in the online world cur-
rently across jurisdictions worldwide. In particular, the ten influences with
‘global’ origins, i.e. notions that are common to all three major interna-
tional instruments governing online (data) privacy that have started devel-
oping in Europe149 plus the APEC Privacy Framework150 of 1998 (which
was lastly revised in 2004) are151:
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 The comprehensive set of OECD guidelines on privacy and transborder flows of
personal data is available here: https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguideline
sontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm (lastly ac-
cessed 02/23/2017.)
147 L. A. Bygrave (note 137).
148 Graham Greenleaf (note 132).
149 These instruments are: the EU Data Privacy Directive of 1995, the Council of
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data of 1981, the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 1980 (ETS 108).
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– Collection, which has to be limited, lawful and conducted by fair
means; with consent or knowledge of the data subject [OECD 7; CoE
5(c), (d)]
– Data quality, which requires that any data collected need to be rele-
vant, accurate and up-to-date [OECD 8; CoE 5(a)]
– Purpose specification at time of collection [OECD 9; CoE 5)]
– Notice of purpose and rights at time of collection, which have to be
communicated to all data subjects [OECD ambiguous; APEC stronger;
CoE not explicit but implied]
– Uses of collected data have to be limited (including disclosures) to
specified or compatible purposes [OECD 10; CoE 5(b)]
– Security of data has to be continuously maintained through reason-
able safeguards (OECD 11; CoE 7)
– Personal data and the practices applied to them need to be open and
clearly stipulated at all times [OECD 12; CoE 8(a)]
– Access: data subjects need to have individual right of access to their
data at all times [OECD 13; CoE 8(b)]
– Correction: the data subject needs to have the individual right of cor-
recting the data relevant them [OECD 13; CoE 8(c), (d)]
– Accountable: data controllers are to be held accountable for imple-
mentation of previous nine points (OECD 14; CoE 8)
Then, there are these ten influences with ‘European’ origins that may or
may not be found in national privacy laws152:
– Requirement of an independent Data Protection Authority as the key
actor of an enforcement regime (EU Directive, and Additional Protocol
to Convention 108)
– Requirement of recourse to courts to enforce data privacy rights (EU
Directive, Convention 108 and more explicitly the Additional Protocol
to Convention 108)
– Requirement of restrictions on personal data exports to countries that
do not meet sufficient standards of privacy protection (defined as ‘ad-
equate’) (EU Directive, and Additional Protocol to Convention 108)
– Collection of data must at each time be the minimum necessary for the
purpose it is executed, not simply ‘limited’ to this purpose (both EU
Directive and Convention 108)
152 Id.
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– A general requirement of ‘fair and lawful processing’ (not just collec-
tion) (both EU Directive and Convention 108)
– Requirements to notify, and sometimes to provide ‘prior checking’, of
particular types of processing systems (EU Directive)
– Destruction or anonymization of personal data after a certain period
(both EU Directive and Convention 108);
– Additional layers of protections for particular categories of sensitive
data (both EU Directive and Convention 108)
– Limitations on automated decision-making, along with a right to know
the logic of any automated data processing arrangement (EU Directive)
– Requirement to provide ‘opt-out’ of any direct marketing use of per-
sonal data (EU Directive).
What is the main difference from Europe in USA’s arrangement of their
regulatory framework for privacy and the internet?
There are several reasons which serve to explain why the United States
have not been anywhere near as successful as Europe in exporting their le-
gal culture on privacy and the Internet to third jurisdictions. However, be-
fore moving into seeking the answers to this questions, one observation is
essential: There is a fundamental difference in the way the issues of data
privacy and internet regulation have been built so far compared to Europe
and the European Union, in particular153. In fact, the United States contin-
ues to lack an omnibus law that would cover, in a comprehensive manner,
all these issues in the private sector. At the same time, it has, at best, only
a relatively limited omnibus law for part of the public sector154. This is in
stark contrast to what happens in Europe, where new countries that have
joined the EU, have quickly adapted their regulation of information priva-
cy with omnibus laws. Then, they have supplemented these statutes with
sectoral ones, wherever further details in regulation where necessary. Ac-
cording to many scholars, this continuing difference between Europe and
America can best be explained by the following two factors155:
c.
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– initial regulatory choices which were then solidified as a pattern by
path dependency in each jurisdiction, and
– the usefulness of omnibus laws in multinational systems, such as the
European Union, that wish to harmonize their regulations compared to
the tendency of federal systems, like the USA, to prefer regulatory ar-
rangements and more multi-layered regulatory structures.
There has been a lot of discussion as to whether a federal US law on priva-
cy would be a good or a necessary thing. It is certain that the conse-
quences from a unifying federal legislation would be both positive and
negative. On the one hand, an omnibus law would overcome the inability
of sectoral laws to respond adequately to telecommunications conver-
gence, which is one of the most prevalent processes on the Internet156. In
addition, omnibus laws tend to level the regulatory playing field while
sectoral laws can place unequal burdens on industries in closely related ar-
eas157. Last but not least, an omnibus law is considered by many that it
could help convince the EU of the adequacy of US privacy laws, thereby
assisting in smoothing data flows between the two markets158. However,
there is a good deal of people who tend to criticize an eventual movement
of the US towards the adoption of omnibus legislation on privacy. They
cite as the most important reasons for this criticism the costs that an extra
layer of regulation would give rise to, and the risk of an omnibus law’s ob-
solescence due to latency in the pace of its reform cycles159.
The ‘privacy collision’ between Europe and the USA: a brief historical
overview
Having pointed out how the USA, as a legal culture and jurisdiction have
traditionally decided to deal with privacy in a diffusible, non-omnibus
manner, it is worth briefly examining how Europe has moved through time
in dealing with the same issues. At the end of this historical flashback, one
will have already discerned some of the causes that made these two impor-
d.
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tant players in the privacy and internet regulation field follow so divergent
paths.
On a European, as well as on a global level, it was the Hessian Parlia-
ment that enacted the world’s first comprehensive information privacy
statute in Wiesbaden, Germany, in 1970160. This piece of law was fol-
lowed by similar ones of other German states161, and in 1977 a Federal
German law on privacy was adopted162. Other European countries closely
followed suit in 1970s when Sweden (1973)163, Austria (1978)164, Den-
mark (1978)165, France (1978)166, and Norway (1978)167 all enacted data
protection statutes.
Europe has been also the stage for some of the most important suprana-
tional privacy agreements that were adopted even before the EU Data Pro-
tection Directive of 1995. The two most important, as it has already been
demonstrated168, are the Privacy Guidelines of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Convention on Pri-
vacy of the Council of Europe. The OECD principles, despite being non-
binding, have had a great influence on numerous national laws.
Simitis, one of the academic forerunners in the field of data protection
in Europe, summarizes the prevailing view about privacy in EU law al-
ready since its early days, as follows: “Data protection does not stop at na-
tional borders. Transfers of information must be bound to conditions that
attempt in a targeted fashion to protect the affected parties.”169
The impact of the Data Privacy Directive had been significant. Apart
from shaping the form of numerous laws, inside and outside the EU, it
contributed to the evolution and concretization of the well-known substan-
tive EU model of data protection, which has been so highly influential.
What is more, given the expressive preference for omnibus privacy laws,
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European legal thinking contributed towards the establishment of regula-
tory standards with a broad scope in contrary to the limited protection
guaranteed by sectoral laws.
These developments led to today’s status quo with reference to privacy
regulation in the US and Europe. Following the sectoral instead of the om-
nibus legislative route, the United States have different statutes on privacy
for the public and private sectors. Within the private sector, they concen-
trate on the data holder and, in some instances, on the type of data170. In
certain privacy statutes, there is an even deeper distinction related to the
form in which the data is held, or the content of the information171. This
approach has been thought by scholars to generally give a freer rein to da-
ta processors to try new kinds of processing172. This has been regarded as
a boost to innovation as, particularly enterprises in new business areas, are
largely free of regulation under a sectoral regime and thereby able to test
innovative new practices; on the other hand, there is the opposite perspec-
tive which sees this greater freedom as fertile ground for new ways to vio-
late privacy173. Another effect of this approach is the tendency that has
been repetitively witnessed in the USA to place heavier data privacy re-
strictions on established enterprises than on new companies174.
The two starkly different approaches have met equally diversifying cri-
tique from scholarly opinion. For instance, on the one end of the stick we
find Joel Reidenberg, who, in a bold move already in 2000, took the view
that between the US and the European approach on privacy there is a pro-
found dichotomy. In particular, Reidenberg found that “US information
privacy regulation was based on liberal norms and market forces, while
the EU’s information privacy regulations were based on “social-protection
norms,” where “data privacy is a political imperative anchored in funda-
mental human rights protection.”175
A more positive take was adopted by scholars such as Anne-Marie
Slaughter whose opinions are demonstrative of the scholarly thought that
170 Paul Schwartz (note 155).
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took a more insightful perspective on global privacy policymaking. Ac-
cording to Slaughter, “states now relate to each other through their parts
and not their whole. States are disaggregated, that is, they interact not only
through their foreign offices and state departments, but also through a va-
riety of regulatory, judicial, and legislative channels”176.
Extensive analysis of how the current EU Data Protection Regulation
works are done in other parts of this study177. In terms of the evolutionary
perspective of EU’s data protection policymaking and the need for it to be-
come more accountable and transparent the most promising element is Ar-
ticle 45178 of the Regulation, which calls for collaboration in data protec-
tion on a global basis. For the time being, this is only a wish and encour-
agement for the future. However, a regulatory field such as the one of
cloud computing would be an ideal one for putting this call into practice.
The evolutionary process of data protection laws in Europe and the
USA and the point where we are right now, in terms of available technolo-
gies, IT applications which have already been or are about to be commer-
cialized and, in particular, the appearance of cloud computing, big data,
internet of things and artificial intelligence, not as small sectors of IT ac-
tivity but as entire industries that have the potential to substitute or, at
least, offer all-inclusive alternatives to practically all kinds of data pro-
cessing and knowledge generation we used to do offline so far, call for
much more proactive and generic policymaking and regulatory rules in the
future. Both Europe and the US have to work towards laws that will not
simply concentrate on a limited set of instances made possible through IT
technologies or the cloud but towards legislation that will stand above in-
dividual occurrences and will bring the big picture in focus. At the same
time, apart from promoting a more generic over a case-based approach, fu-
ture IT laws need to set the foundations for a regulatory regime that will
be able to work independently without the constant need for interventions
from executive supervisory bodies such the Data Protection Authorities, in
Europe, or the National Security Agency, in the USA. In other words, just
as it has been done in other more conventional sectors of regulation, cloud
computing and IT laws in general should be constructed in such a manner
that they empower the actors in the very system that they regulate to make
sure the system will work in a trustworthy manner. Proactivity instead of
176 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2009.)
177 For more see Chapter 4.
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interventionism is the answer to a sound legislative future for the cloud
and this is what regulators need to try to achieve both in Europe and in the
USA, even if they have to depart, of course, from the different points
where their diversified legal traditions have led them today.
Homogeneity is not sine qua non for such a way forward. In Europe,
privacy and data protection are heralded as fundamental rights that de-
serve erga omnes protection. Conversely, in the United States, the Consti-
tution contains no express right to privacy. Instead, the American concep-
tion of privacy is practically synonymous to the ‘right to be left alone’ – a
provision whose constitutional basis can be traced in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the Bill of Rights. As it has been put, in the core of the
American version of the right to privacy still exists to a great extent ‘the
form that this took in the eighteenth century: it is the right to freedom
from intrusions by the state, especially in one’s own home’179. In essence,
contrary to the path followed in Europe, privacy in the U.S. (as a constitu-
tional right) has materialized as one exclusively assertable against the
State180. This ‘public nature’ of the right to privacy still remains prevalent
today, even though certain subsequent statutory laws have endorsed a legal
right to privacy enforceable also in private affairs on the basis of a ‘sec-
toral approach’181.
Despite these profoundly differing courses, it is definitely possible and,
at the same time, desirable for both EU and US law to move towards a
more pragmatic direction with reference to laws for the cloud. An element
that would certainly bolster this necessity and would invigorate a regime
of governance182 instead of one of continuous state inspection is self-regu-
lation183. This would imply a certain degree of independence from state
regulation, as market players would be responsible for regulating them-
selves by following common rules and self-enforcing them184. The conse-
quences, in case of failing to abide by this legal obligation for self-regu-
179 K. S. Ziegler, Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (2007.)
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lation, would come at a stage prior to the occurrence of any detrimental
incidents for the data hosted on the cloud or the subjects of that data. They
will in fact be the repercussions of failing to prove that, as an actor of the
cloud environment, one lives up to the duties expected from them, not as a
result of allowing a network failure to cause damage to the data or the sub-
jects thereof. In other words, responsibility will be asserted on a proactive
instead of a punitive basis. In the actual business of cloud computing, self-
regulation can be made more attractive as an approach if it is promoted as
a means to increase professional reputation and preserve ethical stan-
dards185. Practically speaking, self-regulation can be achieved by promot-
ing certain practices (interoperability, privacy-compliant services, etc.),
from the one hand, and banning or heavily discouraging others kinds of
activities that might negatively affect users (user-profiling, targeted adver-
tising, arbitrary censorship, etc.) on the other186.
Nevertheless, this is not to imply at all that the State would have no role
to play in a future cloud computing regulatory regime. In fact, the very
way in which cloud services exist today, along with the dominance of the
cloud market by a few large corporations, mean that private regulation
amongst market players alone is unlikely to lead to satisfactory results.
The state will continue to play a decisive role in the future cloud gover-
nance structure as the extra-network actor that will be tasked with inter-
vening in order to push self-regulation towards the right direction187. In-
deed, despite the fact that self-regulation concerns market players, to the
extent that they operate within the boundaries of sovereign states and their
respective jurisdictions, they are nonetheless subject to national rules188.
As a result, state regulation can serve as the necessary backbone and pro-
vide the incentives for cloud providers to regulate themselves in a manner
that effectively responds to users’ demands and expectations189.
In addition, self-regulation should not be limited to the realm of market
players; in response to the sectoral diversification the cloud applications
and uses demonstrate, it could be implemented amongst specific commu-
nities of users belonging to specific sectors who are eager to autonomous-
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ly establish the rules they will have to abide to, rather than observing rules
dictated by third party cloud operators190. This typology of self-regulation
stands out from the self-regulation of cloud operators as it does not prima-
ry rely on pre-fabricated contracts or codes of conduct, but rather on tech-
nical arrangements (hardware or software) developed by users to tackle
what has not been properly addressed by cloud operators191. In conclusion,
self-regulation rules addressed to users (coming from specific sectors) will
act as a form of self-discipline with private origins effected through bot-
tom-up technical regulation192.
Personal data privacy in Europe and the US: a pragmatic and an
articulate approach
The evolution of the European and the American doctrine on privacy has
led to the current legal approaches of the two jurisdictions on the issue of
personal data privacy. Europe has nourished through the years a more
pragmatic approach. In particular, Community lawmakers had to bridge
the gap between the ‘ideal’ of the Single Market for unrestricted and un-
regulated movement of all personal data within the EU Members’ area and
the requirements of the Council of Europe's (CoE) Convention on the Au-
tomated Processing of Personal Data193, to which all EU Member States
are signatories194. The latter stipulates that any information about individ-
uals which is to be automatically processed has to be handled in such a
manner that the privacy rights of the subjects of this information are pro-
tected195. At the same time, CoE’s Convention encouraged the establish-
ment of a common international standard of protection for individuals196,
with the aspiration that the free flow of information across international
boundaries could proceed without interruptions. In the end, EU law had to
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strike a balance between various country interpretations of this goals: for a
number of them, such as Germany, France and the Nordic countries, these
issues had been understood as having a significant human rights element.
For others, such as the UK, the primary concern turned to be making sure
that the minimum standards of protection required by the Convention were
ensured so that international trade may not be disrupted197. These diversi-
fied tendencies were attempted to be abridged by means of the Data Priva-
cy Directive which elevated the concept of personal data privacy into a
concrete and enforceable privacy right198. As it was stated in Article 1 of
the Directive: ‘Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with
respect to the processing of personal data.’199 Finally, the currently appli-
cable General Data Protection Regulation is an effort to further concretize
the nature of privacy of personal data as a fundamental right mainly by in-
creasing the means or possibilities for individuals to verify or keep under
control the circulation of their data200.
The United States have concretized through the years a more complex
approach on the issue of data privacy201. Despite the lack of an explicit
constitutional provision for a right to privacy, the concept of privacy in the
sense of ‘the right to be left alone' has traditionally been entertained in
principle by the US legal system, despite having been only rarely genuine-
ly supported in practice when it comes to informational privacy.
Nevertheless, the types of privacy issues that federal and state legisla-
tors and courts have dealt with so far in the US tend to revolve around
physical or decisional privacy202. What is more, these US constitutional
privacy rights are always exercised against either federal, or state, govern-
ment, i.e. they prevent the government from degrading individual citizens’
rights; they do not require them to protect these rights against third parties.
This is by no means to imply that the USA lack personal data privacy
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laws. What the USA lack, however, is a coherent personal data privacy
framework and any meaningful enforcement mechanism203.
In summary, it can be argued that the key differences between the EU
and US approaches to privacy are more in the mechanics of achieving data
privacy than in the concept itself. The essential difference between them
lies with the fact that EU laws provide for a legislatively backed data pri-
vacy regime, applicable to both public and private sector, overseen by
regulatory authorities and with remedies to individuals whose data privacy
rights have been breached. This renders the US strategic choice to leave
privacy matters in the private sector untouched as the main obstacle to-
wards a convergence of data privacy laws between the EU and the
USA204.
However, for the comparative presentation of the two approaches to be
complete, it is meaningful to also present the arguments against the US
adopting a similar regime, which can be summarized to the following
points205:
– the USA should not comply with the extraterritorial application of an-
other jurisdiction's laws206;
– trade in personal data in the USA is so advanced that it is too late to
provide a data privacy regime207;
– a centralized government privacy regulator is not trustworthy; at the
same time, centralization of data and knowledge about data protection
is a graver threat to personal privacy than commercial activity involv-
ing data208;
– the cost of compliance would outweigh the social benefit209;
– such a radical change of course would hamper information-related
businesses and would slow their expansion into global markets210;
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– the way the US Constitution is modeled may prevent the federal gov-
ernment from engaging in European-style regulation of personal data
use211; and
– deliberate self-regulation is a more effective approach than legal regu-
lation.
Cyber challenges and state-of-the-art in Europe and the USA
Before concluding the analytical comparison between Europe and the
USA regarding their legal traditions and treatment of online data privacy,
the Internet and related phenomena, it is essential to go over the latest and
current developments about these issues in the two jurisdictions. In this
way, the state-of-the-art picture in the two jurisdictions will lead to evi-
dence about the course future cloud computing laws will need to follow so
that an overall efficient regulatory regime for the cloud is achieved among
different jurisdictions on a worldwide scale.
EU’s approach towards cyber challenges
The EU has recently taken a decisive step by introducing the General Data
Protection Regulation into force212. However, and despite the undoubted
novelties that this new piece of legislation introduces in the field of data
protection, it largely focuses on just one aspect of the uses of technologies
like cloud computing, leaving aside the cloud as a broader regulatory phe-
nomenon per se. Additionally, the GDPR continues on Europe’s tradition
on regulating privacy from the perspective of a human right that needs to
be defended against malpractice. Nevertheless, few, if any, new elements
are added that reflect on the true nature of cloud computing, that of a
generic IT technology, which regulation-wise cannot be dealt with on a
case by case basis but needs laws with a holistic approach. Even if the EU
succeeds in creating an abuse-proof environment of cyber security within
its borders (which is in itself a very ambitious and not necessarily realistic
goal), it can by no means be totally immune to the threat of cyberattack.
At the end of the day, when arguing about cyber issues, it is vital to keep
f.
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in mind that the internet, as a borderless environment, guarantees no pro-
tection from outer coming threats. In today’s digital environment, a cyber-
attack on an EU target will more likely originate from outside the EU than
from within.
It is high time for Europe to live up to its role as a global economic and
political power and exert its political strength and outreach capacity to the
international field as well. Cyber security has an enormous impact on the
global economy and can affect the general public in many different ways
as it has already been demonstrated. Securing the personal data of con-
sumers and the general public should be of the utmost importance not only
for regulators but also for the international private sector and state institu-
tions. However, it is imperative that soon these goals are pursued not only
on an ex-post basis but also on a proactive basis by switching their focus
from correcting damage when it is done or by adding layers of control that
may hinder damage to occur to ensuring that the cloud and cyber environ-
ments, in general, are properly built up and continuously run in a manner
that upholds these values and effectively eliminates (or seriously limits)
the chances of such unfortunate damage to happen.
What is more, although personal data security may be the major, or
most common, kind of damage that may occur through cloud computing,
it is crucial to understand that data protection is only an element within the
broader challenge of “the misuse of technology”213. Besides, apart from
the fundamental right aspect of data privacy, mishandling personal infor-
mation can be much more than simply the means of very lucrative accu-
mulation of wealth. The cloud, and the internet that is facilitated thanks to
it, can be abused by terrorist organizations, organized crime groups, cyber
warfare and espionage on the part of states. Moreover, a cloud based inter-
net can also be manipulated (and, in fact, more effectively than the pre-
cloud Web) for the proliferation of cryptocurrencies and the promotion of
cyber underground economy. In a nutshell, Europe has done enough to de-
velop a protective shield for the human rights put at risk for its subjects
due to the expansive transposition of data-related processes from the of-
fline to the online realm. On a long-term level, what the EU needs to focus
on is not changing or substituting its existing data related legal tools but
rather on complementing it with laws that will realistically regulate the en-
213 Francesca Bosco, Assessing Europe’s cyber challenges, available at: http://policy
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vironments where such data damage may occur214. The most prominent
field of this kind nowadays is probably the cloud.
The US approach towards cyber challenges
In the wake of 9/11 and the threats to national security the USA faced over
the last 15 years, the country’s legal landscape for the internet and online
privacy was not left unaffected. In fact, these incidents led US lawmakers
to pass bills that reflected the profound aftermath of those historic attacks
-which were to a crucial degree made possible thanks to data or security
breaches – both on the internal and on the external affairs of the USA. The
two most crucial of these acts were:
– the U.S. PATRIOT Act215 and,
– The U.S. Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act
The USA PATRIOT Act is only one aspect of the problematic landscape
regarding privacy that currently exists in the USA. Most of the US safe-
guards for privacy that have been discussed so far are instantly invalidated
when confronted with a much more intrusive (although, interestingly,
much less debated) piece of U.S. legislation, the Foreign Intelligence and
Surveillance Act (FISA)216, which provides for special procedures for
conducting physical searches and electronic surveillance of individuals al-
legedly involved in international espionage or terrorism against the United
States of America217.
The landscape that has been displayed above on both coasts of the At-
lantic makes imperative the need for an international coordination for the
future of IT laws, even those regulating data protection. While the Euro-
pean Data Protection Regulation introduced new safeguards aimed at fur-
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ther reducing the risks of EU citizens’ data being handed over to the US or
other third countries’ governments, concerns are expressed as to whether
European authorities will properly address these issues out of fear of not
decisively standing up against US authorities218. Others point one more
danger out: the possibility that European intelligence services may try to
circumvent EU law and benefit from the surveillance activities of the U.S.
government that has a much wider margin of freedom as it has been
demonstrated, in order to obtain information that could not be lawfully
collected under European law219.
As things stand right now, Europeans wishing to enjoy the maximum
protection for their online presence, may only achieve that by storing their
data exclusively on European cloud computing platforms operated by EU-
based service providers. However, except for any setbacks that such a
strategy could set on cloud adoption in the EU, it is a viable only for citi-
zens living within the EU. It cannot for work for non-EU residents or EU
citizens residing outside the EU, who may ultimately be subject to the
laws of the country they live in. Yet, in a global and increasingly connect-
ed online world, the EU, as the most influential global legislator on priva-
cy and internet issues, should lead the way and take actual care not only of
the privacy of EU citizens but it should pave the path towards the estab-
lishment of a more comprehensive framework of international rules when
it comes to privacy and data protection. More broadly, the EU needs to
take actual steps towards an improved system of internet governance, with
more sophisticated models of laws and/or standards which are properly
adapted and constantly updated to the latest advancements in cloud com-
puting220.
Can cloud computing be a tipping point for regulating and thinking
about privacy in the US or Europe?
Moving towards the concluding observations on how Europe’s and USA’s
legal cultures have evolved through time in relation to the issue of online
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data privacy, it is time to examine whether up to this point the massive ex-
pansion of cloud computing has already initiated any profound processes
of change in the two jurisdictions and the way they deal with these issues.
Privacy under the effect of the cloud in the US
In the US, the piece of law most relevant to the technological status quo
effected by cloud computing is the Stored Communications Act221. The
privacy protection that a user of cloud services will have the right to enjoy
under the Act is currently dependent on the cloud provider’s terms of ser-
vice (ToS) agreement and privacy policy222. Actually, whenever the ToS
agreement permits to the cloud provider to rely on customer’s data in or-
der to determine the contextual advertising it will channel towards him,
that cloud service does not qualify as a remote computing service (RCS).
Similarly, when the cloud provider in its ToS agreement reserves a general
right to access customer’s data without setting specific limits for that pos-
sibility, this cloud service is also unlikely to qualify as an RCS223. It is on-
ly when a cloud provider sets expressive limitations to its access to cus-
tomer’s data solely for the purposes of providing computer storage or pro-
cessing functions that the customer benefits from the Act’s RCS provi-
sions, including the protection from compelled disclosure by the govern-
ment and civil litigants224.
It becomes evident that the margin for granting protection to a cus-
tomer’s data under the Act is much narrower than that of excluding the
said data from protection. However, the consequences of being excluded
from the Stored Communications Act privacy protections can be substan-
tially significant for a cloud services user. Experience has shown that the
US government have limited restrictions in assessing whether or not they
i.
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have the ability to compel disclosure of a customer’s data225. A user might
try to fight back by revoking a Fourth Amendment privacy right, but such
a defense has not prevailed in past cases involving email226. These facts
suggest that US courts under the current status quo would be unlikely to
extend privacy related constitutional protections into the realm of cloud
computing. Simultaneously, the only effective limit to the ability to dis-
close a customer’s data to a third party under US law is currently the con-
tractual promises made in the cloud provider’s ToS agreement and privacy
policy. Unfortunately for users of cloud services, these protections are, as
a rule, weak or nonexistent. As a result, cloud providers under the nowa-
days applicable US law have complete discretion in deciding whether to
respond to requests for their customers’ data or personal identifying infor-
mation227.
As more and more Americans move their personal content to the cloud,
a respective upgrade in the privacy regime seems appropriate. There are,
however, serious obstacles that would need to be tackled for this new con-
cept of privacy to be made feasible.
Judicial obstacles
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence indicates until today that courts are un-
likely to uphold elevated privacy protections for cloud computing users. In
the US, courts only rarely act as the initial forum for expanding privacy
protections; when they do, it is typically through very reluctant extensions
of the Fourth Amendment principles, under the pressing effect of societal
or technological change228. However, as it has been already demonstrat-
ed229, the Supreme Court has been formulating an ever-narrower view of
the Fourth Amendment’s provisions and the applicability of them. Lately,
the Supreme Court has focused its Fourth Amendment handling on weigh-
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ing the costs and benefits of decisions excluding evidence gathered in
breach of the Fourth Amendment and on limiting the range of situations
that merit Fourth Amendment protection. Overall, the way the Supreme
Court has treated its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows for limited
hope only as to the chances that it will drastically expand the extent of pri-
vacy protections for Internet users230. The main argument why it will still
be too difficult for such a turn in jurisprudence to happen is that not only
would such a shift change the dimensions of the Fourth Amendment’s
scope but it would also require reassessing core privacy principles, such as
the third-party disclosure doctrine231, that would have extensive repercus-
sions as to how the US treats privacy beyond the digital world.
Legislative obstacles
it is not up to a legal study like this to deal with factors external to the law
making and judicial process that could impede (or enhance) evolution of
legislature. Nevertheless, a few observations can and should be made as to
the legislative and political landscape in the US in which the need for ef-
fective regulation of cloud computing has to mature. Although the US
Congress has historically been favorable to the calls for enlargement of
privacy protections, it is unlikely to lead the way towards expansion of the
protective realm in the direction of online privacy232. This standstill could
possibly be overcome with the right combination of catalysts like political
momentum and societal demand. It is beyond the aims of this study to an-
alyze what is the current balance of powers in the US Congress and
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whether this is favorable for online privacy issues or not. However, even if
there is societal demand for greater online privacy protections, a certain
amount of time is needed before this is observed and realized by elected
officials and judges233. Unfortunately, the typical age range of members of
US Congress and the Judiciary makes it unlikely that they are as respon-
sive as necessary to societal expectations such as those stemming from
emerging technologies. Younger populace embrace cloud computing ser-
vices very fast, but the average age of legislators – as well as that of Jus-
tices on the Supreme Court – exposes a noticeable generational gap be-
tween law subjects and law makers234. It is therefore up to advocates for
enhanced online privacy as well as scholars and academia to bridge this
gap and convey to legislature the technological state-of-the-art and its im-
plications for individual privacy, which calls for the respective changes or
additions in the regulatory status quo.
Societal obstacles
One last obstacle towards US laws adopting a more advanced approach to-
wards online privacy is the changing societal views toward the issue. In
general, younger generations have much less concern about online privacy
than older generations235. This differentiation can to a certain extent be ex-
plained by the different ways in which each generation uses the Internet.
Older users generally engage into transactional encounters online, such as
looking up information from websites, exchanging e-mail, or purchasing
goods236. On the contrary, users from younger age groups embrace the in-
ternet’s interconnectivity by engaging in social networking, sharing con-
tent, and adopting cloud services237.
Another important element decisively shaping cloud users’ privacy ex-
pectations is their growing expectation to receive ‘free services’ from
cloud providers. In fact, especially younger users declare to be comfort-
able with cloud providers analyzing which websites they visit, what kind
iv.
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of data they store online or other similar data that enable them to deliver
targeted advertising238. From a market economics perspective, the fre-
quency with which Internet users are willing to expose their online activi-
ties or exchange their personal data for free services and content suggests
that they assign a low market value to their privacy239.
Europe’s combined approach towards the cloud and economic growth
Although the EU has not yet taken serious steps towards analyzing the
specific challenges and characteristics of the cloud in order to regulate it,
it has already realized its economic significance and the expansive effect it
will have on many of the world’s economies. This explosive global de-
mand for cloud services, especially in emerging economies, has served as
a cornerstone of the European cloud strategy240. The European Commis-
sion has explicitly addressed the paradox of a growing demand in cloud
services as opposed to the slower progress of engineering science in Euro-
pe or the lack of a ‘cloud-friendly’ environment in Europe so that the con-
tinent can be at the forefront of global cloud developments. So far, the two
main steps taken to amend this situation have been:
– negotiating free trade agreements that contain favorable conditions for
EU-based cloud service providers
This method of ‘positive conditionality’ that the Commission implements
in relation to cloud development is not new. It was also utilized by the US
in the early 2000s with regard to the regulation of internet service
providers (ISPs)241. Its reasoning is that third countries that wish to con-
clude free trade agreements with the European Union are requested to de-
velop a regulatory framework for cloud-related matters that will be in line
with Europe’s respective regulatory framework so that EU-based cloud
service providers can more easily lay foot on those markets.
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– deliberations and close contact with key cloud stakeholders
The second pillar of the EU’s cloud computing strategy is fostering an in-
tra-European dialogue with key actors of the broader cloud ecosystem242.
In order to tackle current problems and challenges of cloud computing
within the European digital single market, the Commission is fostering
several initiatives which aim to bring if in direct contact with key actors of
the cloud sector, who through these channels will have the opportunity to
express their concerns and propose their ideas for generating solutions to
problems or tackling challenges. It remains to be seen, however, to what
extent this input from market stakeholders is indeed taken into account in
the future handling of the Cloud by the European authorities or not.
A close look on how the EU and the US currently handle sensitive
consumer data on the cloud. It the current regime adequate and efficient
enough?
Before wrapping up this all-inclusive comparison between Europe and the
USA and how the two legal cultures currently deal with issues associated
or generated out of cloud technologies, as well as how they deal with the
cloud itself, one last aspect merits careful presentation: the handling con-
sumer data receive in each of the two legal environments. As individual
users are undoubtedly the most powerful driving force behind the cloud’s
geometric expansion, it is crucial to have a clear picture of how the data
generated by this type of users are handled. Answering this question is
easier from the EU perspective since the EU Data Protection Regulation
contains in itself a precise definition of sensitive data when talking about
‘special categories of data’ as ‘personal data revealing the racial origin,
political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data on
health, sex life or criminal convictions’ of natural persons243. This defini-
tion of special categories of data is, of course, closely connected and af-
fected by the European view that data protection is a fundamental human
right. Some EU member states currently include in the term of sensitive
data additional categories of personally identifiable data such as informa-
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tion about consumers’ debts, financial standing, or the payment of welfare
benefits244. However, this regime is bound to be homogenized once the
General Data Protection Regulation enters into full force.
In contrast, there is no clear definition for sensitive data in the United
States or one that could serve as an analogous point of reference to the
‘special categories’ of personal data found in EU legislation. This is rea-
sonable, of course, if one takes into account that, in principle, there is no
generally applicable data protection legislation in that legal order. How-
ever, a careful analysis of federal privacy legislation in the United States
brings forward certain types of consumer data that are entitled to solid da-
ta protection245; as a result, one could use them as a counter reference to
Europe’s sensitive data. The most prominent data categories of this nature
are:
– data collected by websites that refer to children under the age of thir-
teen,
– data collected by financial institutions about their customers,
– patient data collected by health care providers and
– data collected by credit reporting agencies about consumers’ credit his-
tory.
Despite the FTC246, as the competent agency, not having expressly defined
sensitive data, from its practice it can be broadly inferred that the above
categories of data are classified under US law as sensitive. At the same
time, the FTC also recognizes that whether a particular piece of data is
sensitive or not may also depend on certain subjective considerations. Yet,
in any case, excluding data related to consumers’ protected classifications
under discrimination laws from the definition of sensitive data is not un-
common practice. On the contrary, it very well fits the prevalent U.S. view
that information privacy law is primarily an instrument aimed at prevent-
244 Douwe Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC (2008.)
245 Nancy J. King & V. T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the Cloud?
A Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security of Sensitive
Consumer Data, 50 Am Bus Law J 413–482 (2013.)
246 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the United
States government, founded in 1914 by virtue of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Its principal mission is the promotion of consumer protection and the elimi-
nation and prevention of anticompetitive business practices, such as coercive mo-
nopoly. In the field of IT, the FTC is mandated with several tasks that make it the
US analogous of Europe’s Data Protection Authorities.
i. A close look on how the EU and the US currently handle sensitive consumer data
83
ing economic harm247. This approach is, of course, a juxtaposition from
the fundamental human rights approach adopted by EU law, under which
consumers are protected from a visibly broader scope of privacy harms.
Regulating privacy and security of consumer sensitive data in the cloud;
the US current status quo
At present, it could be argued that the cloud computing industry faces li-
mited legal restrictions in the United States, as all activities related to the
field are largely permissible or unregulated. This is both a blessing and a
curse for the industry. On the one hand, the lack of comprehensive federal
legislation that would set minimum requirements regarding the protection
of consumers’ privacy in the cloud leaves considerable freedom of activity
to US cloud businesses248.
At the same time, the federal laws that define the specific categories of
sensitive consumer data that were previously presented, mandate for sensi-
tive data under these four statutes a protection regime analogous to the da-
ta protection for sensitive personal data provided for consumers in the
EU249. However, in the absence of such industry-specific legislation there
may be no requirement for businesses offering or using cloud services to
guarantee information privacy for consumers’ personal data. This leads to
the other extreme, where information as crucial as a consumer’s name,
residence address, e-mail address, mobile phone number, income level,
marital status, sex, and race do not qualify as sensitive and, hence, do not
receive adequate privacy protection. Of course, before concluding that in-
formation privacy management is a matter of unlimited discretion for U.S.
cloud businesses, it is important to examine other sources of law that may
serve as foundations for privacy and security rights for consumers such as
state privacy tort laws and federal or state consumer protection laws250.
Across several US states there are statutes that require companies to in-
form consumers in advance about security breaches that may expose con-
sumers’ personal data to identity theft or other wrongful uses, despite the
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lack of a federal data breach notification law251. Another source of protec-
tion for consumers’ privacy rights are state tort laws which may enable
consumers to recover their data through the civil litigation process from
businesses that misuse them252. The applicability of tort law in the field of
security for sensitive data is not yet settled; nevertheless, civil lawsuits are
increasingly being brought by consumers as a means of redress for such
claims253.
To sum up, although at present there are only few U.S. laws that restrict
the growth of cloud computing industry, and the regulatory framework for
the cloud heavily relies on contractual agreements between CSPs and their
clients or industry self-regulation, issues such as the uncertainty regarding
the applicability of the USA Patriot Act and related federal statutes against
global CSPs sets legal obstacles to unhindered cross-border provision of
cloud service between the United States and the EU.
Regulating privacy and security of consumer sensitive data in the
cloud; the EU current status quo
In contrast to the current legal framework in the USA, European rules set
high compliance obligations for companies active in the field of cloud
computing requiring them to protect the privacy and security of con-
sumers’ sensitive data, including such data stored in public cloud facili-
ties. EU laws establish two levels of consumer rights and compliance obli-
gations for businesses dealing with personal data, a basic and a heightened
one254.
On the first level, the EU’s Regulation grants to consumers (i.e. data
subjects) a number of basic protections with regard to their personal data
while it requires data controllers to abide by rules and restrictions with re-
spect to their data processing operations. Additionally, consumers are enti-
tled to receive notification about any data controller that expropriates their
data as well as the purposes for which these are being collected or other-
wise processed. On an advanced level, increased levels of data protection
may also be required under the Regulation. For example, sensitive data
ii.
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that fall within the definition of ‘special categories of data’255 are entitled
to increased data protection.
The need for efficient protection of sensitive data also points towards
regulatory reform in the cloud
All the above facts point out to the need for a fundamentally different
regulatory approach for the cloud, both in Europe and the US. Cloud com-
puting as a generic technology empowering today most variations of the
IT economy and applications in the world calls for lawmakers to realize
the true extent of the change the introduction of the cloud has signaled for
all these areas of human activity256. Before drawing some general conclu-
sions, we can now summarize the most important changes or innovations
that sensitive data, in particular, call for in the way we will be regulating
cloud computing:
– Working out a competent definition for sensitive data on the cloud
Right now, neither U.S. nor EU laws adequately define sensitive consumer
data257. In the quest for an all-inclusive definition of sensitive data appli-
cable in the global cloud computing industry, each jurisdiction could and
should benefit from the other. Future laws governing the cloud should ex-
pand regulatory protection of sensitive data in such a way that both goals
of encompassing the protection of human rights and avoiding economic
and physical harms are effectively pursued. This pluralistic approach
would clearly be in better alignment with information systems architecture
for the cloud industry, which is largely defiant towards national borders,
typically serves clients from every single country and jurisdiction and
most often involves the processing and transfer of the personal data of
users on a cross-country basis. A competent for current standards defini-
tion of sensitive consumer data should aim to prevent both discrimination
on the basis of protected classifications as well as serious economic and
iii.
255 Andrew Charlesworth (note 185).
256 W. K. Hon, C. Millard & I. Walden, Who is responsible for 'personal data' in
cloud computing? --The cloud of unknowing, Part 2, 2 International Data Privacy
Law 3–18 (2012.)
257 Nancy J. King, V.T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the Cloud? A
Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security of Sensitive
Consumer Data, 50 American Business Law Journal 413–482 (2013.)
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physical harm258. A carefully planned step ahead for both US and EU laws
for the cloud would adequately define sensitive consumer data to ensure
efficient privacy and security for this kind of data on the cloud. Such a
legislation and such a well-articulated definition would support adminis-
trative, industry as well as information technology best practices to estab-
lish themselves and be decisively mirrored in cloud service agreements
thus guaranteeing better protection for customers, particularly since many
cloud service agreements are effectively nonnegotiable due to the lack of
bargaining power by users259.
– In the US, moving towards comprehensive cloud computing laws
Even if existing US privacy laws are reformed to adequately clarify issues
such as sensitive data and, thus, address the needs and concerns of users
and providers of cloud services, they still lack an overall applicable fed-
eral information privacy regulation to govern the cloud. It is a historic op-
portunity for the US to take advantage of the generic nature of cloud com-
puting and work out, for the first time in their legislative history, a robust,
federal legislation for cloud computing that will also serve the broader
need for a more federal approach on information security and privacy.
– In Europe, producing laws for the cloud that will keep on the conti-
nent’s tradition of protecting privacy, as a human right, in ways more
in line with the technological standards the cloud has established
Europe has an expressed intention of attracting more businesses to invest
in cloud infrastructure on its soil, while existing cloud providers also put
pressure on Europe to adopt a more business-friendly attitude towards
cloud computing. In other words, both sides want the same thing and there
has to be found the best way to pursue it. This could be achieved if Europe
adopts a more receptive attitude towards technology solutions that could
permit it to produce laws regulating the broader landscape the cloud has
set. There are already, for instance, advancements in technology260 that
achieve anonymity of data in the cloud. These tools could be the imple-
menting means of future cloud computing laws that would continue to
serve Europe’s long-held and much-cherished tradition of preserving pri-
258 J. Goldring, Globalisation, National Sovereignty and the Harmonisation of Laws,
3 Uniform Law Review – Revue de droit uniforme 435–451 (1998.)
259 Nancy J. King & V. T. Raja (note 245).
260 Response to the UK Ministry of Justice’s Call for Evidence on the European
Commission’s Data Protection Proposals (2012.)
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vacy as a fundamental right and, at the same time, make the EU area a
much more favorable market for doing cloud business in.
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An introduction to the definition of cloud
computing under EU law and the challenges it
poses
Introduction – scope of this chapter
According to European Commission’s White Paper on the cloud: “‘Cloud
computing’ in simplified terms can be understood as the storing, process-
ing and use of data on remotely located computers accessed over the inter-
net. This means that users can command almost unlimited computing
power on demand, that they do not have to make major capital invest-
ments to fulfil their needs and that they can get to their data from any-
where with an internet connection.”261
Based on this definition, the Commission had recognized back in 2012
certain key areas where regulatory actions were needed: Fragmentation of
the digital single market due to differing national legal frameworks and
uncertainties over applicable law; digital content and data location, which
ranked highest amongst the concerns of potential cloud computing
adopters and providers; problems with contracts related to worries over
data access and portability; change control and ownership of the data262.
The current labyrinth of standards generates confusion by, on one hand, a
proliferation of standards and on the other hand, a lack of certainty as to
which standards provide adequate levels of interoperability of data formats
to permit portability.
In its Digital Agenda for Europe263, the Commission set itself the objec-
tives to achieve the digital single market, enhance interoperability and
standards, strengthen online trust and security, simplify copyright clear-
ance, management and cross-border licensing, goals that have gained im-
portance as a result of the prevalence of cloud computing as the standard
technology in the field of data processing.
CHAPTER 4.
a.




Adopting the definition of cloud computing which the US National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released in its Special Publi-
cation SP 800-145 in September 2011264, European Commission’s Art. 29
Working Party brought out in 2012 a cornerstone document for the treat-
ment of cloud computing in Europe, usually quoted as the ‘Sopot Memo-
randum’265. In that paper, Art. 29 WP highlighted the most important is-
sues that the cloud poses for European regulators, which include266:
– there is not yet an international agreement on common terminology;
– the development of the technology is still in progress making unclear
the precise landscape that needs to be regulated;
– enormous amounts of data are being accumulated and concentrated
posing even more challenges that stem from cloud technologies which
facilitate these processes;
– cloud technology is boundless and transboundary;
– data processing has become genuinely global;
– transparency is lacking with respect to cloud service provider process-
es, procedures and practices, including whether or not cloud service
providers sub-contract any of the processing and if so, what their re-
spective processes, procedures and practices are;
– this lack of transparency makes it difficult to conduct a proper risk as-
sessment;
– this lack of transparency also makes it more difficult to enforce rules
regarding data protection;
– cloud service providers are under great pressure to quickly capitalize
significant investment costs;
– cloud customers are under increasing pressure to reduce costs, includ-
ing those of their data processing; and
– to keep low prices cloud service providers are more likely to offer stan-
dard terms and conditions.
264 Peter Mell & Timothy Grance (note 63).
265 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Work-
ing Paper on Cloud Computing – Privacy and data protection issues. “Sopot
Memorandum”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29
/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm#h2-3 (3 February 2015.)
266 Id.
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In the same document, Art. 29 WP laid down the major risks associated to
the surge of cloud computing267:
– breaches of information security such as breaches of confidentiality, in-
tegrity or availability of (personal) data that go unnoticed by the con-
troller;
– data being transferred to jurisdictions that do not provide adequate data
protection;
– acts in violation of laws and principles for privacy and data protection;
– the controller accepting standard terms and conditions that give the
cloud service provider too much leeway, including the possibility that
the cloud service provider may process data in a way that contradicts
the controller’s instructions;
– cloud service providers or their subcontractors using the controllers’
data for their own purposes without the controllers’ knowledge or per-
mission;
– accountability and responsibility seemingly fading or disappearing in a
chain of subcontractors;
– the controller losing control of the data and data processing;
– the controller or its trusted third party (e.g. auditor) being unable to
properly monitor the cloud service provider;
– data protection authorities being precluded from properly supervising
the processing of personal data by the controller and the cloud service
provider; and
– the controller relying on unfounded trust in the absence of insight and
monitoring, thereby potentially contravening the data protection legis-
lation in force in the country of establishment.
In light of the above, the aim of this chapter is to present an overview of
how cloud computing has been progressively defined under EU law as
well as put together the most important critique and arguments regarding
the efficiency of the Union’s latest cornerstone regulation in the wider area
of IT law, i.e. the General Data Protection Regulation. Finally, in the last
sections of the chapter analysis will be focused on how a heavily cloud-
based IT landscape looks like (or is expected to look like, in a few years’
time). This analysis will then serve, along with findings from following
chapters, to determine the rate at which existing IT laws applicable when
it comes to cloud regulation have achieved the required level of maturity
267 Id.
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and efficacy with regard to the subject matter they are supposed to settle
and how they should evolve in the future.
The most important policy views on aspects of cloud computing
brought out so far and why they are not yet sufficient
During the last decade, since the cloud started to rapidly gain ground as a
data handling technology, actors in the EU and the US market with a di-
rect or indirect interest in the relevant fields have formulated a number of
policy manifestos that contain the main current views on the cloud and
how it should be dealt with from a regulatory perspective. By summariz-
ing the main principles of these views one can then more easily point out
the loopholes in the way the cloud has been treated so far by regulators268.
Purpose limitation used to be a key concept in the EU’s data privacy
legislation269 during the DPD era, which largely served as the basis for
any regulatory approach for cloud computing. In particular, purpose limi-
tation protected data subjects270 by setting limits on how controllers271
were able to use their personal data272. The concept of purpose limitation
was built on two main ideas: personal data had to be collected for 'speci-
b.
268 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-reco
mmendation/index_en.htm (3 February 2015.)
269 Hunton Privacy Blog, Article 29 Working Party Clarifies Purpose Limitation
Principle; Opines on Big and Open Data, available at: https://www.huntonprivacy
blog.com/2013/04/09/article-29-working-party-clarifies-purpose-limitation-princi
ple-opines-on-big-and-open-data/ (5 November 2015.)
270 By ‘data subject’ in the context of IT and privacy law reference is made to an
individual entity who is the subject of personal data.
271 A ‘controller’ is “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other bo-
dy which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data”. Definition as it appears in Regulation (EU)
2016/679 (GDPR) (note 25).
272 ‘Personal data’ is any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identi-
fied, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a na-
me, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity of that natural person. Definition as it appears in Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) (note 25).
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fied, explicit and legitimate'273 purposes (purpose specification) and could
not be 'further processed in a way incompatible'274 with those purposes
(compatible use). It should be noted that further processing for a different
purpose does not necessarily mean that there is a breach of the purpose
limitation: compatibility is assessed on a case-by-case basis.
This Art. 29 WP Opinion was meant to apply to all kinds of data trans-
fers, i.e. also to those effected through the use of cloud computing tech-
nologies. Given that, so far, European regulators tend to approach the task
of regulating the cloud through the prism of already existing legislation for
specific uses of it, such as data transfers, several elements of the practical
application of the purpose limitation principle lead to a need for an in-
depth analysis of this concept, which, after all, decisively defined EU data
protection law:
– The way privacy limitation has been implemented in Member States
has led to a diversity of interpretations over it275. If we are to keep ap-
plying it in data transfer related legislations in the future, a clear com-
mon understanding of the concept will better ensure its effective appli-
cation – and that would be, of course, in the interest of all concerned.
– The context of processing activities needs also to be updated and
amended to reflect today’s standards276. The development of new tech-
nologies, such as cloud computing, results in increasingly more data
being available, for a far wider diversity of purposes.
– Apart from the traditional concept of data transfer, i.e. transferring data
between two points of a linear or at least insulated network, there are
many more current trends for reuse of data by the private sector ('big
data’) but also 'open data' and 'data sharing' initiatives proposed by
many governments, including EU legislative initiatives277. These
practices which have been made feasible and are clearly based on the
newest technologies in data transfers are of particular relevance and
their repercussions need to be meticulously analyzed so that any future
legislation can provide realistic answers for them.
273 Article 29 Working Party (note 268).
274 Id.
275 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman & Lorenzo Valeri, RAND Euro-
pe: Review of the European Data Protection Directive, available at: http://www.r
and.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR710.html (13 February 2015.)
276 Borivoje Furht & Armando Escalante, Handbook of cloud computing (2010.)
277 Hunton Privacy Blog (note 269).; European Commission (note 242).
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As it has already been pointed out the ‘purpose limitation’ principle does
not stop to the explicitly defined purposes for which a set of given data are
collected, transferred or stored but goes one step further to assess also how
compatible are the actual uses effected with a particular set of data com-
pared to the stated ones at the moment of collection.
The framework for the compatibility assessment which answers
whether uses of data other than the ones stated at the moment of collection
are permissible or not is based on the notion of 'further processing’. A
generally acknowledged working definition for this notion is: “...any pro-
cessing following collection, whether for the purposes initially specified
or for any additional purposes, must be considered 'further processing' and
must thus meet the requirement of compatibility.”278 From here comes an-
other term that needs to be defined, i.e. that of ‘(in)compatibility’. This
notion is understood to suggest that “the fact that the further processing is
for a different purpose does not necessarily mean that it is automatically
incompatible: this needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.”279 A
compatibility assessment can be either a purely formal or a substantive
one280:
– A formal assessment is suggested that it should compare the purposes
that were initially provided, usually in writing, by the data controller
with any further uses to find out whether these uses were covered by
the initially stated purposes (explicitly or implicitly).
– A substantive assessment should go beyond formal statements to iden-
tify both the new and the original purpose, taking into account the way
they are (or should be) understood, depending on the context and other
factors.
When conducting a compatibility assessment several key factors are sug-
gested to be considered, namely281:
– the relationship between the purposes for which the data had been orig-
inally collected and the purposes of further processing
– the context in which the data had been collected and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the data subjects as to the further use of their data that
they agreed to submit to the controller for collection
278 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman & Lorenzo Valeri (note 275).
279 Id.
280 Siani Pearson & George Yee, Privacy and security for cloud computing (2013.)
281 Id.
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– the nature of the data and the impact of the further processing on the
data subjects
– the safeguards applied by the controller to ensure fair processing and to
prevent any undue impact on the data subjects.
The newly arriving GDPR tried to settle the above frictions by introducing
the ‘legitimate interest’ concept282, which tries to make use and processing
of data more flexible and pragmatic in light of the technological standards
of today by recognizing wider margins of differentiation in the stated pur-
pose for which data are collected between the time of their collection and
the time the processing takes place, without, however, going as far as al-
lowing processing of data for purposes totally alien to those at the time of
their collection283. Despite the fact that this latest regulatory device is in-
deed heralded by many as a facilitator for the big data and IoT econo-
my284, there are just as many scholars who point out to the risk that an ar-
bitrary interpretation of the ‘legitimate interest’ concept may jeopardize
282 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) (note 25); in particular, perambulatory clause
no. 47, which reads: “The legitimate interests of a controller, including those of a
controller to which the personal data may be disclosed, or of a third party, may
provide a legal basis for processing, provided that the interests or the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding, taking into conside-
ration the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship
with the controller. Such legitimate interest could exist for example where there
is a relevant and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the con-
troller in situations such as where the data subject is a client or in the service of
the controller. At any rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need care-
ful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time
and in the context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that
purpose may take place...”; also, perambulatory clauses 48, 49 and 50, which
aims to retain some of the limitations (i.e. protections) offered to data subjects
with the old regime of the DPD by stating: “…such transmission in the legitimate
interest of the controller or further processing of personal data should be prohibit-
ed if the processing is not compatible with a legal, professional or other binding
obligation of secrecy.”.
283 This precarious balance can be observed throughout GDPR’s operative clauses
regarding the ‘legitimate interest’ ground, i.e.: Art. 1(f) [“…processing is ne-
cessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by
a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of perso-
nal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.”], art. 13, para. 2(d), art.
35, para. 7(a), to name a few; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) (note 25).
284 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Yann Padova, Regime Change: Enabling Big Data
through Europe, XVII The Columbia Science & Technology Law Review 315–
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the protection granted so far to data subjects or, at least, it may cause a lot
of confusion before the transit from the old to the new regime is complet-
ed285. It goes without saying that in the meantime technological advance-
ment may have again bypassed regulatory prudence causing a vicious cir-
cle, the exit of which can only be achieved if cloud computing regulation
stops being so ad-hoc formulated and takes a more technologically ab-
stract yet intra-jurisdictionally systematic direction. In other words, cloud
computing regulation should not serve as a cure to technological imple-
mentations that may go wrong but should change its focus on making sure
that the margin for accidents from cloud-enabled technological applica-
tions (presently known or even forthcoming ones) is limited to the biggest
extent possible.
The European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC; an assessment of its
effects on the prevalent views about data protection and related IT
technologies; are things different under the GDPR?
In April 2016, the European Parliament and the Council finally reached a
conclusion after several years of consultations and negotiations and adopt-
ed the General Data Protection Regulation, which is set to become, as of
2018 when it enters into force, Europe’s law of reference regarding a wide
range of privacy and IT affairs. However, prior to the GDPR, Europe had
been handling these affairs based on its world-famous Data Protection Di-
rective or the DPD, as it is often quoted. And despite the fact that the DPD
c.
335 (2016); W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Developments,
70 Business Lawyer 253–260 (2014/2015.)
285 Dutch Lawyers ed., Privacy for the Homo Digitalis. Proposal for a New Regu-
latory Framework for Data Protection in the Light of Big Data and the Internet of
Things (2016); Olof Nyrén, Magnus Stenbeck & Henrik Grönberg, The European
Parliament proposal for the new EU General Data Protection Regulation may
severely restrict European epidemiological research, 29 European Journal of Epi-
demiology 227–230 (2014); Menno Mostert, Annelien L. Bredenoord, Biesaart,
Monique C I H & Delden, Johannes J M van, Big Data in medical research and
EU data protection law. Challenges to the consent or anonymise approach, 24
European Journal of Human Genetics 956–960 (2016); Tobias Bräutigam, The
Land of Confusion. International Data Transfers between Schrems and the GD-
PR; Alexander Roßnagel ed., Datenschutzaufsicht nach der EU-Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung. Neue Aufgaben und Befugnisse der Aufsichtsbehörden
(2017.)
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will soon cease to apply, its remarkable lifespan makes it a timelessly sig-
nificant piece of law, whose functions and effects merit careful analysis in
the context of a study on cloud computing regulation.
To begin with, after two decades of continuous application, one could
generally say that the impact of the DPD on European perceptions of data
protection principles has been largely positive. The Directive can fairly be
credited for achieving to harmonize and professionalize a core body of da-
ta protection principles within Europe, even if implementation still varies
from one Member State to the other. The Directive is also generally recog-
nized as a piece of law that created one of the world’s leading paradigms
for privacy protection, which has served as an inspiration to legal regimes
outside Europe. According to the opinions of many academics but also as
statistical data suggests286, EU’s DPD has been the reference for the pro-
duction of data protection legislation by most third countries, apart from
the United States and China that have their very own data protection legal
cultures.
However, despite this substantially positive impact and general admit-
tance of the soundness of principles behind the Directive, certain aspects
have also received considerable criticism which, for the most part, remains
relevant even after the adoption of the GDPR given the dynamism with
which cloud computing technology continues to evolve. The main objec-
tions voiced from within the EU have often focused on the formalities im-
posed by the Directive (or by its national transpositions across Member
States), the economic costs of compliance to the procedures it prescribes
and the unequal enforcement from one EU country to another. Compliance
costs largely remain an issue under the GDPR as well, especially consider-
ing the introduction of the data protection officer as an essential role in the
organigram of a great deal of entities dealing with personal data. The un-
equal enforcement is an issue that is supposed to be resolved when a piece
of EU law is elevated from the status of a Directive to that of a Regu-
lation287. However, there are numerous voices warning of the reservations
the GDPR makes for national regulators, which can be exploited and un-
dermine equal implementation across all EU member states288. Outside
Europe, many data protection competent organizations tend to perceive
the European regulations as somewhat paternalistic towards the respective
286 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman & Lorenzo Valeri (note 275).
287 P. P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU law. Text, cases, and materials (2015.)
288 Jiahong Chen (note 24).
c. The European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC
97
laws of third country legal orders or other comparably valid data protec-
tion approaches.
One of the most fervently debated points for the DPD was its mecha-
nism for determining and assigning accountability289. Overall, it is ex-
tremely difficult to infer or even predict how public and private sector
bodies that act as data controllers intend to use personal information in the
future290. Therefore, accountability provisions must be flexible enough to
apply in different cases and suit the context in which personal data is used
on each occasion. This may be reasonably understood as implying that ac-
countability measures for data controllers with economic drives in mind
might need to be different from those for the public sector or individuals,
as accountability imposable via economic sanctions can expectedly be
more effective in situations where the incentive for personal data process-
ing was generated by pursuance of direct economic benefit. Under the
GDPR a step is certainly made towards more efficient accountability allo-
cation not only with economic criteria in mind but also with consideration
of the various ways in which data are processed and not just of the entities
they run the processing and how financially robust or weak they are, e.g.
the possibility to allocate accountability even to algorithms enacting data
processing291. Nevertheless, the problem of technology-bound regulation
persists and further, bolder moves towards more generic rules are neces-
sary.
Just as there have been several pioneering points in the DPD, over the
two decades that it has been in force, scholarly opinion and interested bod-
ies have also pointed out certain weaknesses of the Data Protection Direc-
tive. The most important ones, which have actually been aggravated with
the advancement of new technologies like cloud computing and which pay
witness to the need for IT regulation to take the decisive step and more
from a perspective anchored to current applications of cloud computing
technology to a more generic one that will take into account what the
cloud is capable of doing beyond what it is currently doing, were:
– The link between the concept of personal data and the real risks related
to data handling, which is no longer clear enough292. The DPD was
289 Borivoje Furht & Armando Escalante (note 276).
290 European Commission (note 242).
291 D. Hofman, Duranti L. & E. How (note 4).
292 Siani Pearson & George Yee (note 280).
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conceptualized in an era of plainer, more linear data transfers293; to-
day’s cloud applications and networks, which are characterized by lack
of geographical borders, dynamic handling of resources and a true
global nature, have fundamentally altered the standards regarding data
handling. The risks that data face today are more complicated and mul-
ti-layered, just as more multi-layered are the cloud systems used to
handle it.
– The application scope of the DPD largely depended on whether or not
the data processed can be defined as “personal”294. In fact, provisions
of the Data Protection Directive set a ‘take it or leave it’ setting regard-
ing applicability of what they prescribe to each and every collection of
data: there is no room for “more or less personal” data (and, respec-
tively, “more or less protection” of them). However, today’s economy
has already facilitated the emergence of different types of data, such as
anonymous or anonymized big data, data related to state and gover-
nance etc.295. For these subdivisions of data, the DPD did not provide
adequate answers anymore and understandably so given that these data
species are products of human activity much more recent than the
times the DPD was drafted. As it was just pointed out, the GDPR con-
tains specific provisions for these new typifications of data, yet the is-
sue of excessive anchoring to the current state-of-the-art instead of fo-
cusing on technological feasibilities as well persists.
– DPD’s measures aimed at ensuring transparency of data processing
through better information and notification of data regulators had be-
come inconsistent and ineffective in today’s data processing land-
scape296. The privacy policies provisioned by the DPD were no longer
matching average data practice. The majority of data handling actions
are nowadays carried out by plain consumers, yet the processes pre-
scribed to make these actions secure were highly complex, addressed
primarily to law professionals and not average individual users who,
nevertheless, should have a clear idea of protective measures in ef-
fect297. As these non-expert individuals are the direct perpetrators of
293 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman & Lorenzo Valeri (note 275).
294 Id.
295 Christopher Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (2013.)
296 European Commission (note 242).
297 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (note
265).
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such a significant amount of data processing, they do need to be able to
easily comprehend the protective measures which they need to apply or
which are in place to protect them. This unanimity in prescribed priva-
cy policies does not really enhance market differentiation, given its
stiff, all-or-nothing nature, while it can also be reasonably argued that
it hinders fair competition and consumer choice as it sets up very spe-
cific standards for market entry to aspiring new service providers. The
notification mechanism that the DPD had foreseen was of an unclear
purpose298: there were as many as 20 different notification processes,
and an equally significant variety of exemption rules; at the same time,
much of the process was carried out through paperwork or via an awful
load of reporting platforms, which are totally incompatible with the
rapidness and efficiency that cloud technologies permit today in all da-
ta handling processes299.
– The rules on data export and transfer to third countries, as they were
prescribed in the DPD, are nowadays outmoded and out of line with
the technological status quo300. First of all, the definition of ‘third
countries’ is perceived as outmoded in light of the fact that technologi-
cal facilities are no longer restricted within the geographical borders of
particular countries, let alone within the geographical borders where a
service provider has its headquarters. This, in turn, had caused even
more complexities as notions like the ‘adequacy of countries’ is no
longer relevant to business realities or data protection, given that the
business or the data processing is not carried out necessarily within one
and only country anymore. Last but not least, regulation in some other
countries is generally admitted to be even stronger than in the EU;
however, given the DPD’s stiff criteria in its adequacy mechanism (but
also, due to other, mainly political or bilateral reasons) these countries
were still, till the very last days of DPD’s applicability, not recognized
as adequate.
– The tools providing for transfer of data to third countries were cumber-
some301, as it has already been pointed out. At the same time, the
length of time and effort required to get Standard Contractual Clauses,
Model Contracts or Binding Corporate Rules approved was excessive
298 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman & Lorenzo Valeri (note 275).
299 Christopher Kuner (note 295).
300 Borivoje Furht & Armando Escalante (note 276).
301 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman & Lorenzo Valeri (note 275).
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and unrealistic in light of the fast pace at which data handling is carried
out via cloud systems today.
– It is beyond the purposes of this paper to examine weaknesses of the
current regime that are rooted in factors such as the poor coordination
between the Member States, the role of DPAs in accountability and en-
forcement of the provisions or the uneven implementation of enforce-
ment across Member States or the different criteria for imposing sanc-
tions. However, these too were fair points of criticism against the DPD
which should not fail our attention.
– Last but not least, the DPD regime was heavily criticized towards the
end of its era on the definition of entities involved in processing and
managing personal data it contains as being simplistic and static302.
Genuinely globalized data transfers303 and increased re-use of personal
data have effectively rendered outmoded the static definitions of data
controller and processor of the DPD, calling for a fundamentally new
regulatory framework.
As it will be argued immediately after, the GDPR dealt with a fair amount
of these shortcomings and criticisms. However, the regulatory challenges
posed by cloud computing are from definitively settled with the new
Regulation and on the course of this analysis ideas and solutions will be
put forward that will hopefully permit a more wholesome take on cloud
computing and overall IT regulation in the near future.
Focus on the General Data Protection Regulation: is the European
Union’s brand new law already insufficient to effectively regulate the
cloud?
An historical overview on the most important legal texts that have shaped
the way EU law is treating the cloud phenomenon today would not be
complete without a conclusive reference and analysis on the newly voted
and impedingly binding upon all EU Member States General Data Protec-
tion Regulation. The GDPR has been adopted recently by the European
Union and is expected, as of 2018, to replace the Data Protection Direc-
tive. This brand-new piece of EU law deals with all IT applications in-
volving processing of personal data that used to be regulated by way of the
d.
302 Id.
303 Christopher Kuner (note 295).
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provisions of the DPD and it is the fruit of yearlong negotiations and con-
sultation processes. Therefore, one would reasonably expect that during
the preparatory phase for this new law the particularities of the cloud com-
puting phenomenon had been well taken into consideration and that its
provisions are structured in such a way that they can tackle all sorts of le-
gal challenges posed by the cloud. True as that may be – and indeed it is
not the intention of this study to argue that the GDPR is of little use before
it even enters into force – the overall regulatory framework of EU law in
the field of IT law remains incomplete. As it will be argued and thorough-
ly analyzed at a later stage of this paper304, the main reason for that is the
fact that so far IT laws insist on focusing and regulating applications made
possible thanks to cloud technologies but not the cloud phenomenon itself.
In other words, all the laws that we currently have on our disposal to pro-
vide solutions caused by the IT applications that we are using are abso-
lutely useful and welcome but, as long as we continue to produce or up-
date them having the end cloud-enabled applications that exist on the mar-
ket in mind, they will just be specialized laws. By ‘specialized laws’ refer-
ence is made to the typification of technology-specific laws, which is of
paramount importance in the discipline of IT law305. Although it extends
beyond the scope of this study to analyze under what criteria a piece of IT
legislation or regulatory principle classifies as a technology-specific or
technology-generic one, the aim of this project is to propose the methodol-
ogy with which regulators should work to complement the frameworks of
their jurisdictions with basic principles on cloud computing of a technolo-
gy-generic nature.
304 For more see Chapters 8, 9 and 10.
305 For a more thorough introduction on the issue of technology-specific vs. technol-
ogy-generic IT laws refer to: Xenofon Kontargyris, From effective to efficient
regulation of ICT: time to build the backbone of information technology legisla-
tion, available at: http://www.juwiss.de/66-2016/. In addition, for more extensive
analysis on the issue look in: V. Sharma, Information Technology Law and Prac-
tice (2011); N. Cox, Technology and Legal Systems (2016); Jonathan B. Wiener,
The regulation of technology, and the technology of regulation, 26 Technology in
Society 483–500 (2004); R. Brownsword, E. Scotford & K. Yeung, The Oxford
Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (2017); S. Brenner, Law in an Era
of Smart Technology (2007.)
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Does the GDPR set up a truly universal legal framework for data
transfer law?
For starters, it is worth dedicating some attention on the GDPR and dis-
cuss some of its inherent deficiencies or failings, which may even under-
mine its ability to provide for a very long time working solutions to the
well-known issues of privacy and security in the field of data transfers,
which is its natural field of application anyway. One of the primary points
of concern with regard to the efficiency and longevity of the GDPR is the
way its makers chose to deal with the issue of territoriality as far as appli-
cable law is concerned. Actually, the Regulation follows a similar pattern
to the one implemented by the DPD on this issue; however, unlike the Di-
rective, the issue of applicable national law is no longer addressed at
all306. On the contrary, the Regulation explicitly permits Member States to
deviate from its default rules on a series of specific matters, certain among
which have the potential to trigger serious problems concerning the appli-
cability of national data protection laws. What is worse, these potential
conflicts of law may be further exacerbated by the tendency of Member
State laws to exploit this possibility of unilateral scope definition in in-
compatible ways, are bound to create legal uncertainties to data subjects,
data controllers and data protection authorities307. Several scholars are
putting forward the idea of resorting to private international law for re-
solving such conflicts. Nonetheless, handy as it may come in certain cases,
private international law can only play a very limited role in this respect
due to the unique and bindingly structured nature and objectives of EU da-
ta protection legislation. It goes without saying that uncertainties posed by
this issue of silence on the topic of territoriality will eventually be clarified
by the new European Data Protection Board or the CJEU, but some diffi-
culties are nevertheless bound to persist.
Prima facie, the fact that the GDPR does not contain any reference re-
garding the relationship between EU and national legislations should
sound perfectly reasonable; after all, a Regulation is precisely meant to
have direct, universal, and consistent binding force throughout the EU308.
According to the letter of EU constitutional law, if perfectly implemented,
i.
306 Jiahong Chen (note 24).
307 Ibrahim Hasan, New EU data protection regulation Law Society Gazette
(2016); Alexander Roßnagel ed. (note 285).
308 P. P. Craig & G. de Búrca (note 287).
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the GDPR should lead to a data protection legal framework that is unani-
mously applied across all Member States, at least in principle. Conse-
quently, the issue of determining applicable national law would no longer
exist as the Regulation would be considered the only valid law on the mat-
ter in all EU and EEA jurisdictions. It goes without saying that this was
the intention of those that drafted the GDPR and, taking this into account,
it appears to be beyond necessary to have provisions on conflict of laws,
since the main is let only one law take over anyway. This is most likely
why the question of applicable national law no longer shows up in the
Regulation and no such reference is to be found. But the question remains
whether this EU-wide landscape will indeed be achieved.
In reality, early analysis and review of the provisions of the GDPR sug-
gest that there are at least two areas where national data protection laws
will remain relevant even after the Regulation’s entry into force. Firstly,
the Regulation does not prevent Member States from enacting national
provisions with regard to particular issues that are unspecified by the
GDPR itself. The most common reason why such issues are not explicitly
regulated in the text of the Regulation is the fact that, in relation to several
topics, the GDPR has maintained the letter and text of the DPD; although
the room for national ‘originality’ will be narrower due to the binding
force of the Regulation compared to the Directive, as long as these issues
remain vague, nothing can be taken for granted309.
Secondly, apart from the grey areas where there is silence from the
Regulation on specific matters in the way it was just explained, there are
some other issues on which, even more importantly, the Regulation explic-
itly permits Member States to decide whether they wish to deviate from its
own provisions on certain aspects. In particular, Recital 8 of the GDPR
reads: ‘Regarding the processing of personal data for compliance with a
legal obligation, for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller,
Member States should be allowed to maintain or introduce national provi-
sions to further specify the application of the rules of this Regulation…
309 An extensive analysis of all concepts and ideas in the field of data protection law
that are even somewhat differently defined across different national EU laws can
be found in: European Commission, Working Paper No. 2: Data protection laws
in the EU: The difficulties in meeting the challenges posed by global social and
technical developments (2010.)
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This Regulation also provides a margin of manoeuvre for Member States
to specify its rules, including for the processing of sensitive data…’310
This excerpt reflects then in the provisions of Article 6(1) [in particular,
points (c) and (e)] and Article 9 of the operative part of the GDPR. Article
6(1) is where the legal grounds on which processing of personal data can
be legitimized are stipulated. Point (c) provides that processing is consid-
ered legal if it ‘is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to
which the controller is subject’311. In the same spirit, point (e) permits pro-
cessing that ‘is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the con-
troller’312. Further down, in Article 6(3) the GDPR elaborates that the two
previous legal bases must be provided for by either ‘Union law’ or ‘Mem-
ber State law to which the controller is subject’313. As far as Article 9 is
concerned, the GDPR therein attempts to set a higher threshold for the
processing of sensitive data by imposing a prohibition on operations over
these categories of personal data, unless one of the exceptions it stipulates
applies314. In similarity to what happens in Article 6(1), this provision also
gives Member States a sideway regarding a few matters, as it can be veri-
fied by reading its text. Each of these provisions could potentially set fer-
tile ground for a conflict of laws between two or more Member States.
What does the spirit of GDPR tell us about the longevity of the current
overall EU data protection regime?
It is admittedly a bit early to bring out strong verdicts on how good or bad
the GDPR will turn out to be as a piece of legislation. However, while
waiting for the new law to enter into force and start producing real regula-
tory output so that we can evaluate it as positive and efficient or negative
and insufficient, we can already draw certain conclusions regarding the
dynamism and rejuvenation that this major uplift of EU data protection
law, which has been attempted with the adoption of the GDPR, does in-
deed carry. And, in this context, it has to be pointed out that the GDPR is
ii.
310 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Recital 8 (note 25).
311 Id,, art 6(1)(c) (note 25).
312 Id,, art 6(1)(e) (note 25).
313 Id,, art 6(3) (note 25).
314 Id,, art 9 (note 25).
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expected to achieve very little with regard to reviving the long-stagnated
data protection regime of Europe. This is so due to the fact that the three
main aims that the GRDR sets for itself are based on unrealistic assump-
tions315.
The first wrongful impression is the persistent one, at least in Europe,
that data protection law can offer to individuals actual control over their
data, which it cannot316. The second is the popular belief that the recent
reform has managed to simplify the law, while in fact it has only made
compliance even more complex. And last but not least, comes the assump-
tion that data protection law should be comprehensive, while, as it has also
been previously discussed, data protection is an issue raised by specific IT
end applications only and, therefore, it can only provide footing for tech-
nology-specific legislation. We cannot stretch data protection laws to regu-
late every single issue raised by IT as a whole, because then we drain the
originality out of it causing only confusion and legal uncertainty. In detail:
– Shortcoming no. 1: too much obsession with data self-determination
Although data protection is in no way synonymous with the unequivocal
ability to decide alone on the destiny of any kind of data referring directly
or indirectly to you, in European legal thinking and practice the two
concepts have persistently been brought forward as concurrent. ‘Informa-
tional self-determination’ is the most widely-used term to describe the no-
tion that people should be able to exercise control over what happens with
their personal data317. This concept implies, on the one hand, that individ-
uals’ free and informed consent is an important element towards legitimiz-
ing data processing, and, second, that individuals have various and very
pluralistic in content rights by which they can exercise control over the da-
ta, such as rights to correction or erasure.
Viewed through the prism of today’s technological status quo, the idea
of consent is largely a fallacy318. Yes, consent may be considered within a
great number of contexts as a typical way for individual data owners to fa-
315 B.-J. Koops, The trouble with European data protection law, 4 International Data
Privacy Law 250–261 (2014.)
316 See also Chapter 3.
317 W. K. Hon, C. Millard & I. Walden (note 119); Steffen Kroschwald ed., Informa-
tionelle Selbstbestimmung in der Cloud. Datenschutzrechtliche Bewertung und
Gestaltung des Cloud Computing aus dem Blickwinkel des Mittelstands (2016.)
318 See also Chapters 2 and 8.
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cilitate or block data processing; but in light of today’s status quo, this is
now largely theoretical and with little practical meaning, if any at all.
For the greatest number of services where personal data are involved,
often, there is little room for choice: if you want to use a service, you have
to comply with the technical conditions its maker or provider has built it
upon — which may well entail giving in certain personal data. Otherwise,
access will be simply denied, not because the specific service provider is
not interested in profit or increasing the market of their service but be-
cause the service simply cannot work otherwise319. In addition, it needs to
be pointed out that, while it gets more and more popular to work on ever
more simplified ways for IT applications users to express consent, this
works to the detriment of meaningful consent. The fact that a user of a da-
ta-related service ticks a box next to a statement of consent after having
viewed some brief and simplified imagery roughly describing the kind of
consent they are about to give does not mean, of course, that they have
sincere knowledge over the kind of permission they are giving320.
What is more, technological reality of the 21st century tends to erode or
progressively invalidate any giving of consent. Even if a data owner ex-
pressly permitted certain uses of their information at some point, techno-
logical practices such as databases, profiling, and Big Data make informa-
tional self-determination all the more elusive321.
Last but not least, even if we accept that informational self-determina-
tion can function effectively in the context of private relationships and ap-
plications or services – and to a very significant degree, it does function –
it works poorly or it is not even supposed to apply in many cases when it
comes to citizen–government affairs322. Citizens exercising control over
the fate of their personal data, which is what informational self-determina-
tion is all about, contrasts with the character of many data-driven applica-
tions from the public sector323.
319 Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum eds., On Notice: The Trouble with Notice
and Consent (2009); Alexander Roßnagel ed. (note 285).
320 Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum eds. (note 319).
321 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big data. A revolution that will
transform how we live, work, and think (2013.)
322 A. Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 Berkeley Technology Law
Journal 618–633 (1999.)
323 Kristina Irion (note 220).
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– Shortcoming no. 2: taking controllers’ due diligence too much for
granted
The current data protection regime not only relies too much on user per-
mission, but also on the assumption that data controllers are duly fulfilling
their duties, either because they feel obliged to do so from the presence of
Data Protection Authorities or because they deliberately choose to be dili-
gent324. And it is true that, some notorious exceptions aside, for most un-
dertakings and organizations dealing with data, legal compliance is of
paramount value. However, even if we assume that all kinds of data con-
trollers want to observe data protection law, it cannot be taken for granted
that they are in a realistic position to do so. To begin with, controller com-
pliance is undermined by the fact that data protection law is complex to
put from theory to practice. Moreover, the GDPR invests a lot on a priori
over a posteriori regulation, which is in principle of course better.
Notwithstanding, it still interprets a priori protection as a range of proce-
dures and checklists data controllers have to go through before any specif-
ic data processing and not as some clearly formulated, aim-oriented gener-
al principles which will make clear the level of protection that is to be
maintained at all times during a data processing cycle irrespective of how
this will be achieved by any given data controller. In other words, what we
need for a data protection regime looking to the future is not more forms
or compliance questionnaires; the real challenge is to let everyone know
under what quality standards data are expected to be processed and let
them then decide how to achieve them, knowing that, should they fail,
equally clear repercussions will be faced325.
– Shortcoming no. 3: excessively outstretching statutory data protection
laws to the extent that they become dysfunctional
As it has been analyzed both the GDPR and its predecessor, the DPD, are
pure examples of technology-specific laws. They determine how the is-
sues they deal with are to be regulated by focusing on the results data
technology has when applied in the context of specific data services or for
the completion of particular data-related tasks. This is an understanding
we need to keep in mind at all times when reading a statutory law such as
the GDPR, which, in addition, has been constructed in light of a particular
factual framework (e.g. the reality of transborder data transfers). Very of-
324 B.-J. Koops (note 315); Alexander Roßnagel ed. (note 285).
325 See also Chapters 8, 9 and 10.
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ten, expanding the meaning of the provisions of a statutory law, which is,
nevertheless, of a technology-specific nature, to such an extent that is can
cover more and more novel phenomena caused much more legal confu-
sion and uncertainty than it actually resolves326. In other words, what
needs to be done is to stop abusing technology-specific IT laws, such as
the GDPR and the like, in order to continue being on a relative par with
technological advancement and novel IT applications and focus on con-
ceptualizing robust regulatory principles reflecting on the core and heart
of modern and future IT, i.e. on cloud computing.
GDPR and its readiness to respond to big scale uses of data in the
cloud; the case of machine learning
Just as the GDPR was going through its negotiations phase, the cloud was
becoming the platform for numerous big scale data-based applications
which are becoming increasingly important in several aspects of the inter-
net-based economy327. The majority of them are founded on processing of
data of massive amounts, typically being referred to as ‘big data’328. Most,
if not all of these uses, are made possible thanks to cloud computing and,
e.
326 Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania law review 549–599 (1985.)
327 See also Chapter 11.
328 Big data is an evolving term that describes any voluminous amount of structured,
semi-structured and unstructured data that has the potential to be mined for infor-
mation. Big data is often characterized by three qualities, which in relevant tech-
nical literature have been established as ‘the 3 Vs’: extreme volume of data, wide
variety of data types and velocity at which the data must be processed. Although
big data does not equate to any specific volume of data, the term is often used to
describe terabytes, petabytes and even exabytes of data captured over time. Such
voluminous data can derive from countless different sources, such as business sa-
les records, harvested results of scientific experiments or real-time sensors used
in the internet of things. Data may be raw or preprocessed using separate soft-
ware tools before analytics are applied. It may also exist in a wide variety of file
types such as structured data, e.g. in SQL database stores; unstructured data, e.g.
document files; or streaming data from sensors. Moreover, collection of big data
may involve multiple, simultaneous data sources, which may not otherwise be in-
tegrated. Velocity refers to the speed at which big data must be analyzed. As a
rule, every big data analytics project will ingest, correlate and analyze data sour-
ces, and then render an answer or result based on an overarching query. This
means that for the final product of the processing to be of essence, human ana-
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naturally, will clearly be within the field of application of the GDPR. The
aim of such massive data processing operations can be greatly diversified
but one of the most common purposes they serve is to create patterns that
will be able to predict human behavior, choices and decisions329. These
patterns are then fed to systems such as online marketplaces or software
and systems used in tracking health of patients or dissemination patterns
of diseases, to name a few. Moreover, the bigger the amount of data col-
lected and processed, the more accurate these patterns are supposed to be-
come and the more precise the predictions they render330.
It goes without saying that one of the biggest questions surrounding the
GDPR is to what extent the new law has managed to be timely enough
when it was officially adopted in order for its provisions to regulate these
phenomena efficiently for as long as possible. Of course, this question is
too broad one for it to merit a mere ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. However, an as-
lysts must have a clear understanding of the available data and possess some sen-
se of the kind of answer they are looking for. Velocity becomes of growing im-
portance as big data analysis expands into fields like machine learning and artifi-
cial intelligence, where analytical processes mimic perception by finding and
using patterns in the collected data. Achieving such velocity in a cost-effective
manner is a major challenge. Even enterprise leaders are reticent to invest in an
extensive server and storage infrastructure that might only be used occasionally
to complete big data tasks. Consequently, public cloud computing has emerged as
a primary vehicle for hosting big data analytics projects. A public cloud provider
can store petabytes of data and scale up thousands of servers just long enough to
accomplish the big data project. The business only pays for the storage and com-
pute time actually used, and cloud instances can be turned off until they're needed
again. For more details and orientation into the concept of big data, refer to: Vik-
tor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier (note 321).; Jonathan Stuart Ward &
Adam Barker, Undefined By Data. A Survey of Big Data Definitions, available
at: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1309.5821; Amir Gandomi & Murtaza Haider, Beyond the
hype. Big data concepts, methods, and analytics, 35 International Journal of In-
formation Management 137–144 (2015); Andrea de Mauro, Marco Greco
& Michele Grimaldi, What is big data? A consensual definition and a review of
key research topics, in, 97–104 (2015); Ibrahim Abaker Targio Hashem, Ibrar
Yaqoob, Nor Badrul Anuar, Salimah Mokhtar, Abdullah Gani & Samee Ullah
Khan, The rise of “big data” on cloud computing. Review and open research is-
sues, 47 Information Systems 98–115 (2015).
329 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard & Jatinder Singh, Machine Learning
with Personal Data (2016.)
330 Andrej Savin, Profiling and Automated Decision Making in the Present and New
EU Data Protection Frameworks SSRN Journal (2014); Alexander Roßnagel ed.
(note 285).
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sessment can indeed be driven for the issue of machine learning given the
specialized provisions on profiling331 that form part of the GDPR.
As a rule, automated decision-making332 often entails profiling, where
the profiles gradually constructed through the processing of data guide the
decision-making process333. Reflecting this technological fact, the GDPR
defines profiling as a sub-category of automated processing, and stipulates
it as the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects of natural
people in an effort to analyze and predict certain aspects of their behavior.
In the era of the DPD already a number of academics had suggested
that one of the Directive’s underlying principles was that ‘fully automated
assessments of a person’s character should not form the sole basis of deci-
sions that significantly impinge upon the person’s interests’334. This prin-
ciple survives in the provisions of the new Regulation, where according to
its Article 22 – which also covers profiling of people based on their health,
location and movement – data subjects have the right not to be subject to
decision-making if that is solely based on automated processing, at all in-
stances that this may significantly affect them in some way. This provision
plays a crucial role in relation to machine learning, given that proponents
of the specific technology emphasize precisely its ability to automate and
facilitate decision making processes.
The rest of protection mechanisms, appeal processes and risk assess-
ment or control procedures of the GDPR can naturally be read through the
prism of profiling as well, given its explicit recognition as a form of data
processing that falls within its regulatory scope from the GDPR335. It is
beyond the scope of this study to analyze the entire body of provisions of
the new Regulation; however, if one conclusion is to drawn regarding big
scale data processing operations which are made possible thanks to cloud
331 In particular, Art. 4, para. 4, and Art. 22, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (note 25).
332 The term ‘automated decision making’ refers to the use of computers to carry out
tasks requiring the generation or selection of options. For further details refer
to: McGraw-Hill, McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms
(2003.)
333 Andrej Savin (note 330).
334 Lee A. Bygrave, Aytomated Profiling, 17 Computer Law & Security Review 17–
24 (2001.)
335 Profiling is explicitly mentioned in all instances of GDPR rules where specific
protective measures and tools available to data subjects are stipulated, namely:
Art. 13, para. 2f; Art. 14, para. 2g; Art. 15, para. 1h; Art. 21, para. 1 & 2; Art. 35,
para. 3a; Art. 47, para. 2e Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) (note 25).
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computing (such as profiling and, subsequently, machine learning), it can
be argued that EU data protection law, in its latest form, still assumes that
large scale data applications such as automated decision-making processes
are risky and that individuals need to be protected from them. Among the
types of protection granted to data subjects are the right to be informed
about automated decision-making, including profiling, as well as rights to
have a human review a machine decision. While such measures are indeed
useful to be in place and uphold Europe’s long tradition of empowering
the individual against undesirable uses of their data, as much as possible,
enthusiasts of relevant technologies (the cloud being one of them) point
out that technology should not always be viewed with suspicion336. For in-
stance, advances in machine learning research and in cloud networks as
the main enabler of machine learning systems, mean that machines can
more and more may surpass certain limitations of human decision makers
and provide us with decisions that are emphatically fair337. How ‘ready’ is
the GDPR to show tolerance and trust towards these technologies and their
constantly improved capabilities? Time and actual enforcement practices
of the new law by competent authorities will soon tell us.
Vision for a cloud-based future
It has already been demonstrated that today data is prevalent everywhere.
Sources of data are multiple in comparison to a couple of decades ago,
their uses are also many more, their economic value is incomparably high-
er than it used to be and from the moment they are collected, data venture
on an open-ended journey through multiple uses, different formats and
several platforms. With this landscape in the field of data in mind, a very
different privacy framework for the data age is necessary, one focused less
on individual consent at the time of collection and more on continuously
holding data users, be them controllers or processors as they are typified
for the time being, accountable for what they do with the information they
have in their possession338. Under such a regulatory regime, entities that
have any kind of data in their possession will formally assess any particu-
lar use or reuse of them based on the impact it has on the individuals these
f.
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337 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard & Jatinder Singh (note 329).
338 For more see Chapter 8.
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data originally belong to or come from. This perpetual accountability does
not have to be onerously detailed or excessively time-consuming339. Fu-
ture privacy laws should stipulate broad categories of uses and services in-
volving data, certain of which will also be permissible without or with on-
ly limited, standardized safeguards. For riskier applications involving data,
future regulatory schemes should articulate ground rules for how data
users will determine the dangers of a particular data use or service and de-
termine thereafter what measures best avoid or mitigate them. In general,
the cloud and the IT environment it fosters call for a regulatory framework
that will spur creative services for, uses and reuses of data, while at the
same time it will ensure that sufficient measures are taken340 to make sure
individuals, who data belong to or come from, are not hurt.
The road from data privacy to cloud computing regulation
Privacy and security viewed through the years and across major
jurisdictions341
Viewed from a European standpoint, privacy has been traditionally regard-
ed as a fundamental human right. Enshrined in the United Nations Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)342, it subsequently became part of
the European Convention on Human Rights343 and numerous national con-
stitutions and charters of rights across Europe but also worldwide344. Since
g.
i.
339 For more see Chapter 10.
340 For more see Chapters 8, 9 and 10.
341 Siani Pearson & George Yee (note 280).
342 Article 12 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: “No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or cor-
respondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”. UN General
Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A
(III).
343 Article 8 para. 1 of the ECHR reads: “Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”. Council of Europe,
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
344 For an extensive overview of the basic privacy laws and regulations across most
countries around the world, refer to http://privacypolicies.com/blog/privacy-law-
by-country/ (last accessed: 01/19/2017.)
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at least the 1970s, the primary focus of privacy had been personal infor-
mation particularly that which was put under question from government
surveillance or potential mandatory disclosure in light of the need to set up
databases on topics of public security, health or other emergencies.
The 1980s brought along the rise of direct marketing and telemarket-
ing345 and, consequently, new kinds of concerns were raised related to pri-
vacy of personal data and security, while soon after the transposition of
buying and commerce on the internet spurred further consideration to the
increasing threats of online identity theft and spamming346.
In the end, one could argue that one way of thinking about privacy is as
‘the appropriate use of personal information under the circumstances’347.
Data protection is the management of such personal information and it is a
terminology often used within the European Union with reference to pri-
vacy-related laws and regulations. On the contrary, in the USA the term
‘data protection’ mostly refers to security348.
The terms ‘personal information’ and ‘personal data’ are commonly
used within Europe and Asia; in the USA, the respective term is ‘Personal-
ly Identifiable Information’ (PII), but, as convergence of jurisdictions as a
result of the globalized structures of today’s world moves on, the same
terms are generally used also in America to refer to the same (or a very
similar) concept349.
The European Union definition of ‘personal data’, since long estab-
lished via the DPD, is that of “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”350.
Traditionally, scholarly views tend to differ about certain types of per-
sonal data which are considered more sensitive than others; expectedly,
these variations occur as a result of the differences in the definition of
345 Bradley, A. K. (1991). An employer's perspective on monitoring telemarketing
calls: Invasion of privacy or legitimate business practice? Labor Law Journal,
42(5), 259. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1290705829?acc
ountid=11262 (last accessed: 01/19/2017.)
346 Huaiqing Wang, Matthew K. O. Lee & Chen Wang (note 12).
347 Siani Pearson & George Yee (note 280).
348 C. J. Bennett (note 194).
349 Borivoje Furht & Armando Escalante (note 276).
350 Directive 95/46/EC (DPD) (note 143.)
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what is considered sensitive personal information from one jurisdiction to
the other.
As opposed to Europe’s, the US approach to privacy legislation is his-
torically sector-based or enacted at the state level (e.g. the State of Mas-
sachusetts has set out appropriate security standards for protecting the per-
sonal information of residents of that state) and imposes few if any restric-
tions on transborder data flow351.
To summarize, privacy is essentially regarded as a human right in Euro-
pe; on the contrary, in America, it has been traditionally viewed more as a
concept aimed at avoiding harm to people in specific contexts352. It is a
complex but important notion, and correspondingly, the collection and
processing of personal information is subject to regulation in many coun-
tries across the world. As a result, any future set of rules for cloud busi-
ness will need to reflect these varied perspectives and try to balance
among or, ultimately, merge them; and this is a policy recommendation
that should be taken into account by regulators in both jurisdictions.
Privacy issues particular to cloud computing technologies
The specificities of cloud technologies and the differences they have intro-
duced in the field of data handling have, subsequently, also modified the
challenges that privacy faces in today’s IT landscape353.
For starters, handling your data via cloud means a great lack of user
control354. User-centric control seems essentially incompatible with the
cloud: as soon as a SaaS environment is used, the service provider be-
comes responsible for storage of data, in a way in which visibility and
control is limited. As a result, unauthorized secondary usage of data, risks
to data integrity owing to complexity of regulatory compliance or the ef-
forts in addressing transborder data flow restrictions are always possible.
Legal uncertainty is one more direct effect of the rapid development of
the cloud sector355. Since cloud technology has moved ahead of the law,
ii.
351 See also Chapter 3.
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there is understandably much legal uncertainty about privacy rights in the
cloud and it is becoming more and more prevalent that applying existing
laws to cloud environments gives insufficient results. Cloud computing
poses significant challenges for organizations that need to meet various
global privacy regulations at the same time, due to the universal nature of
IT as a market and its collision with geographical or jurisdictional borders
that exist in the real world.
Security issues are also raised due to the emergence of cloud comput-
ing356. Security gaps, instances of unwanted access or vendor lock-in, in-
adequate deletion of data, potential compromise of the management inter-
face that would extend to a degree beyond the average user’s control or
understanding, backup vulnerabilities, isolation failure, inadequate moni-
toring are just a few situations that could jeopardize the security of cloud
platforms and merit attention.
Why does cloud computing call for a new regulatory framework?
It has been already sufficiently demonstrated that cloud computing, from a
technological perspective, is fundamentally different from what existed
before357 as tools to perform computational processing of data tasks. Simi-
larly, there are essential differences on the focus of cloud technologies in
comparison to previous environments: while systems based on technolo-
gies prior to the cloud where largely one-dimensional and they were built
more or less on a linear logic and architecture (in the sense that the pro-
cessing was easily traceable at all times throughout the system, regardless
of whether the resources of the system were all in the same physical loca-
tion or not), cloud environments obey to a multi-dimensional logic: the
processing work can be executed using resources dispersed around the
cloud facility and without even being at the same physical location either.
Understandably, this shift in the way data processing environments are
constructed resulted also in a shift on the priorities they set: pre-cloud fa-
cilities were designed with a primary objective to get the data processing
done in a clearly laid-out and secure manner. Cloud-based facilities are
constructed with the primary aim of getting data processing done in an as
iii.
356 Borivoje Furht & Armando Escalante (note 276).
357 See Chapter 2.
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user-friendly as possible manner and with a priority on optimizing
economies of scale for the provider but also the user of the cloud infras-
tructure. This change of focus resulted in the security of the processing not
being possible to be taken for granted anymore. From a status quo where it
was enough to know what role each of the actors participating in a data
processing sequence held in order to be able to identify their responsibili-
ties and duties, we are today in a situation where the data processing
workflow is geographically and resource-wise dynamic and spread-out
across the cloud facility, hence calling for a different approach that will
guarantee security and transparency throughout the processing workflow.
In the following parts of this study it will be examined to what degree
using the criterion of ‘legitimate scope’ (teleological perspective) in order
to define the justifiable actions of each actor in a data processing work-
flow facilitated by cloud infrastructure would be a viable norm in order to
produce an efficient regulatory framework for cloud computing technolo-
gies and the tasks carried out through them. Moreover, recognizing the
boundless nature of the cloud, effort will be made to set up this set of
regulatory principles with a universal perspective. Consequently, from the
one hand, the best possible regulatory approaches will be looked for
across the two most predominant markets and jurisdictions where the
cloud business thrives, i.e. Europe and the U.S.A. Simultaneously, the pro-
posed scheme will in as much as possible be fit for ‘universal applicabili-
ty’, i.e. without being affected by the cross-country or cross-market nature
of cloud environments but, instead, by focusing on the cloud infrastructure
as a locus in itself, where certain rules should apply and specific regula-
tory goals and priorities should at all times be respected.
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Legal pluralism and harmonization – how can we
reach a common minimum understanding on how
to regulate the cloud?
Introduction – scope of this chapter
As it has been already exposed358 cloud computing brought about one fun-
damental change in the standards regarding data handling: it has rendered
largely invalid the notion of a specific physical space within which any in-
stance of data processing – or any part thereof – takes place. Of course,
exceptions still are – and presumably will always be – technically feasible
to exist but the norm nowadays is that the cloud, as the vital space where
data ‘live’ and ‘circulate’, is a boundless, limitless area, at least in terms of
the geographical meaning of boundaries. Clearly, this is not the first time
we are faced with such a concept of lack of borders, or more precisely, of
lack of clearly manifested borders: the internet itself is a limitless concep-
tion, an entity that can be verbally and technically defined but cannot be
physically delineated.
It should be made clear from the very beginning that the internet and
cloud computing are not the same thing. In fact, cloud computing is, as it
has been demonstrated359, a technological concept for the ultimate use of
available tools facilitating computing while, the internet could be de-
scribed as one of the main constituting parts of this technological concept,
as its backbone. Nevertheless, given the internet’s pivotal role in facilitat-
ing cloud computing applications, it is reasonable to look among the theo-
retical approaches and patterns used for its regulation for answers and
tools that can potentially help also with the challenge of an effective regu-
lation of the cloud.
Regulation of the internet is, of course, an all but settled issue360. Still,
there are a few clearly prevailing approaches or suggestions that can serve
CHAPTER 5.
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as an efficient starting point in a quest for a unique and dedicated frame-
work for cloud computing regulation. Legal pluralism and harmonization
of laws are two juridical norms largely compatible with the particularities
of the internet and the challenges its nature poses to any legislator. These
two approaches have over the past decades offered some of the boldest
propositions in the debate for effective internet regulation, ideas that were
clearly in touch with the actual nature of the internet sphere361. The solu-
tions constructed on the basis of legal pluralism and harmonization of laws
are discussed in this chapter as potential answers or starting points to the
challenge of a pragmatic cloud computing regulatory framework.
In this chapter, the legal methodologies that will be the main instru-
ments of this research are presented and put in context. These are legal
pluralism and harmonization of regulatory principles in the context of
global administrative law, which are argued to be the most suitable ap-
proaches in the quest for an efficient regulatory framework for the cloud.
In addition, it has been argued that the cloud’s universal nature necessi-
tates not a conventional harmonization of laws on a regional level (as har-
monization has been traditionally understood until today) but an original
process that will aim to bring closer the way regulators worldwide think
about and develop rules that govern it. This proposal is also brought in
context along with the legal methodologies named above as the instru-
ments with which the following parts of this study are constructed.
Internet Regulation: a paramount of unilateralism
The internet has emerged to be one prime example of legal unilateral-
ism362. Although the medium itself was by no means defined by limits or
boundaries in the traditional sense – with the exception, probably, of some
of its earliest versions which still had not reached an adequate level of ma-
turity – early efforts to regulate it followed the traditional pattern of na-
tional (or intergovernmental) regulators getting down to set up legal
frameworks which would control how the internet ‘worked’ within the ex-
b.
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tent of their competence363. Unilateralism clearly prevailed over coopera-
tion among nations and, as a result, internet related legislation quickly be-
came fragmented, while it is meant to address one and the same thing364.
Nevertheless, unilateralism in producing internet laws should not be so
effortlessly dismissed as a bad choice365. One side of the coin being a
fragmented mosaic of laws governing the internet, on the other side of the
debating table stand those who believe that unilateralism in internet regu-
lation may have given a boost to the evolution of the net as a medium366.
In fact, there has been repeatedly suggested that differing legislations may
have impeded internet growth and evolution in certain legal orders but
may well have accelerated them in others. After one point, these gaps in
internet advancement among different jurisdictions have paved the way
for two distinct consequences367:
– from a technological point of view, this imbalance among internet laws
of different legal orders meant that the net developed much faster in
certain parts of the world than others. At the same time, though, after a
certain point, the universality of the net permitted it to expand also in
areas where stricter control and regulations had been responsible for
poorer evolution. The economics of scale of internet based activities
made it eventually defiant of borders and limitations and served as the
driving force behind the emergence of global technological standards.
The latter found the way to establish themselves even in jurisdictions
where prima facie they were not allowed; yet, consumer demand made
them a de facto necessity.
– from a legal point of view, irregularities in internet laws may, from the
one side, be responsible for the fragmented legal mosaic with which
the internet is governed today. Notwithstanding, these differing legisla-
tions mean exactly that there have been specific geographical areas and
respective jurisdictions where internet laws became powerful more
quickly and robust enough to affect regulatory trends in other jurisdic-
tions as well. Just as technological standards were manifesting them-
selves more and more as of a truly global nature, so did internet
363 Chris Reed, How to Make Bad Law: Lessons from Cyberspace, 73 The Modern
Law Review 903–932 (2010.)
364 Id.
365 Y. Benkler (note 362).
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laws368: some of them managed to rise above the others and to dictate
pretty much the legal landscape regarding the internet in vast areas of
the world369.
To sum up, a system with imperfectly defined relations between local and
global, private and public regulatory processes, and between exceptional-
ism and harmonization, as is the system of laws regulating the internet,
serves as an institutional environment ideal for non-representative com-
mercial or other organizations to embed their values in the regulatory
framework that will eventually emerge370. This is a tendency we already
witness in the field of internet law; more and more non-legislative entities
contest a seat on the law-making table and several of them, either directly
or representatively, manage to make their voice heard371. Similarly, an
area which started to develop so recklessly as that of cloud computing,
mainly due to the fact that it was not immediately recognized as a distinct
phenomenon, might have set off from a unilateral basis regulation-wise
but this is not necessarily bad. As long as, from now on, we make sure that
we take the best from every cup (i.e. from every national or regional juris-
diction) and end up with a set of rules that will give universal and working
answers to handling the cloud, unilateralism can turn out to be a good
thing.
As the US Supreme Court stipulated in a landmark judgement of
1997372: “law dictates behavior and technology dictates behavior. Efforts
to regulate technology usually end up in pushing technological develop-
368 Y. Benkler (note 362).
369 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
370 Baudouin. Dupret, Legal pluralism, plurality of laws, and legal practices, 1
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ment towards the desired direction”. Regulating technology in one juris-
diction, although not a matter of clearly unilateral nature, usually prompts
technology development towards the desired direction also in other juris-
dictions as technological standards today are of a truly global nature373.
Consequently, the choices regulators, especially those of the prominent le-
gal orders, will make in the path they will shape for the regulation of the
cloud in the years to come will play a decisive role in the development of
cloud computing on a global scale. Therefore, it is of vital importance to
make the best out of what unilateralism has produced so far as regulatory
perceptions regarding the cloud and come up with a representative and, at
the same time, effective governing scheme.
From governments to governance; learning to do laws for a borderless
world374
Regulating a dynamic phenomenon such as the internet or cloud comput-
ing requires a profoundly different approach from legislators. It is not the
scope of this study to go on and propose such far-fetched ideas as global
laws for cloud computing. Even if this is what cloud computing and IT
technologies regulations eventually evolve into, this cannot happen
overnight and, certainly, it cannot be proposed at this moment as the next
step; there is yet a great distance to be covered till such a development.
The need for evolution in law making in such dynamic areas as cloud
computing calls, however, for at least two significant changes of perspec-
tive:
– regulators need to be more in tune with the borderless nature of more
and more constituting parts of today’s world375. And this not by bring-
ing down borders or homogenizing jurisdictions but by making sure
that the laws put in place will take into account that they are meant to
give sufficient answers and persuasive solutions to a far greater vital
space than that of the geographical area where they are immediately
applicable376.
c.
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– law making process has to be more open towards non-legislative bod-
ies and actors and their input377. Of course, this is not to mean that ex-
isting jurisdictions and their law-processing workflows are ready or
should admit non-legislative actors as peers on the table; however, it is
imperative to come up with ways in which the key players of an area
can provide their crucial first-hand experience, suggestions and pro-
posals and that this input shall be taken into serious consideration
when formulating laws for such unconventional phenomena as the
cloud.
In order to initiate a transition from laws for governing to laws for gover-
nance scholarly opinion has brought forward certain guiding principles
that should characterize the new law-making mindset. Without prejudice
to other propositions, the ideas that are suggested as the most crucial ones
are:
– private sector should lead the debate on how sectors, whose develop-
ment was spurred primarily by non-state actors, need to be regulat-
ed378. This proposal should not be understood as a call for a carte
blanche to private entities. It goes without saying that the answer to the
need for more efficient laws is not laws that would facilitate reckless-
ness. However, legislators need to make sure that private actors, espe-
cially those spearheading the way in a specific field, will have consid-
erable autonomy to take their sector one step further at any time and
that their ideas about how activity in the sector could be streamlined
through laws are carefully heard.
– governments are encouraged to avoid undue restrictions379. Experience
and history tell us that in dynamic phenomena, such as cloud comput-
ing, restrictive approaches usually either hinder progress or are simply
rendered invalid via a workaround. Consequently, it does not seem
meaningful to try to control what will happen next in a sector by for-
bidding certain things from happening. The key to better regulation is
definitely not greater or unjustified restrictions.
377 Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules
Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 Ohio State Law Journal 1030–1069
(2013.)
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– the legislators’ mindset should be towards fostering a predictable, min-
imalist, consistent and simple legal environment380. In fact, many
scholars agree that this should not be just the wish pursued with every
new adopted legislation but rather the primary goal future laws should
serve: ensuring that the regulated environment in which law subjects
will be let to act will be a simple-to-understand and opaque one.
– legislators should recognize the unique qualities of cloud comput-
ing381. This means that, first of all, the cloud should not be confused
with any other neighboring phenomenon and should be clearly defined
before regulated. In this manner, we can be more certain that the laws
we will end up with will correspond to the actual matters they aim to
settle.
– further development of cloud computing should be facilitated in an or-
chestrated global manner382. This call for globalized action does not
immediately mean reckless, unimpeded growth that knows and needs
to respect no boundaries or particularities. Nevertheless, a minimum
common understanding between legislators of different legal orders
would definitely foster this globalized growth much more effectively.
As far as the most suitable locus to facilitate this transition from governing
to governance is concerned, scholarly opinion largely agrees that interna-
tional law can be a good first playing field in the progress towards greater
harmonization of laws about phenomena such as the internet or cloud
computing. By carefully studying what has been happening already on the
front of the internet, which is a relatively riper phenomenon than cloud
technologies, one could recognize the following forces that facilitate har-
monization processes383:
– the most decentralized form of harmonization mechanism generally oc-
curs when norms spontaneously develop within a usually specialized
transnational community (e.g. lex mercatoria)384.
– a strong harmonization drive also builds up when one jurisdiction's law
becomes the de facto rule also for other places, perhaps due to regula-
380 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
381 David R. Johnson & David G. Post (note 361).
382 Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 Annual Review of Law & Social Sci-
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tory arbitrage (e.g. a country with excellent internet connectivity man-
ages to set the pace in the field of internet regulation globally)385
– harmonization may also be accelerated under conditions of regulatory
competition. i.e. when one jurisdiction copies elements of another in a
race for supremacy in a harmonized field386
– participation of governments in communal law reform projects also
fosters harmonization forces (e.g. UNCITRAL387).
– proven contributors to harmonization are the supranational bodies with
a mandate to harmonize national laws of member-states (e.g. the Unit-
ed Nations bodies)
– last but not least, international and, especially, multilateral treaties also
serve the harmonization goal.
So far, existing laws about cyberspace are bad laws. Lessons learnt?
Excessively complicated legal frameworks tend to prove themselves as
bad laws388. Classical examples of this rule are laws governing phenome-
na which are global or borderless by nature but which are dealt with in a
conventional jurisdictionally compartmentalized manner. Such over-com-
plex sets of laws have serious disadvantages, particularly a greatly weak-
ened normative effect, and problems of contradiction and over-frequent
amendment. One of the most common paradigms is the until now pro-
duced cyberspace law.
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In legal theory, it is possible to judge the quality of law as long as, at
any such attempt, you adopt a specific legal perspective from which to ex-
ecute this judgement389. Law is broadly defined to be ‘a system of rules
which a particular country or community or group of subjects recognize as
regulating their actions and which may be enforced by the imposition of
penalties’390. A fundamental aim of any law, inherent in this definition, is
to influence its subjects’ behavior to some useful end. Thus, when a law
fails to achieve such influence, it is necessarily not as good as one which
does achieve these aims. This conclusion also applies to whole groups of
laws regulating different aspects of the same phenomenon.
The law system which attempts to regulate activities in cyberspace is,
taken as a whole and as it currently stands, of a lower quality than of what
if could have been had the laws which constitute that system been devised
more effectively. One of the reasons for this low quality of the existing
corpus legis for the cyberspace is that cyberspace laws have, until present,
fixated on the precision of rules to the exclusion of the basic morality,
which must underlie all systems of law391.
The basic morality that any law or system of laws needs to be character-
ized with in order to prove successful has been greatly discussed and for-
mulated by legal philosopher, Lon Luvois Fuller392. Throughout his aca-
demic discourse, Fuller went at great lengths to understand what made
laws fail. In the end, he proposed his famous ‘eight routes of failure of any
legal system’, a set of principles and conditions which, if met at the heart
of a corpus legis or an entire legal system, can answer as for the reasons of
their failure393. It is worth pointing out that the Fuller routes (or principles
as they are commonly alternatively denominated) do not need to be cumu-
latively traceable in a system of laws for it to be regarded as a failed one;
presence of even one of them suffice to explain for failure. These eight
principles are:
389 Y. Benkler (note 362).
390 Legal Information Institute – an Open Access to Law Project, Conrell University,
Faculty of Law; available online at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/legal_syste
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– The lack of rules or law, which leads to ad hoc and inconsistent adjudi-
cation.
This is not so relevant in the case of laws on cyberspace. Quite the oppo-
site, for those aspects of cyberspace for which laws have already been put
together, they are so numerous and contradictory towards each other that,
in the end, failure is due to their abundance.
– Failure to publicize or make known the rules of law.
Although not the most prevalent, this principle can indeed be attributed to
the current body of laws governing cyberspace. Especially on the level of
international law, there are treaties and conventions dealing with specific
aspects of the cyber world which are only on the sidelines of legal atten-
tion and remain largely unused as legal tools.
– Unclear or obscure legislation that is impossible to understand.
This is one of the Fuller principles most excessively defining the problem-
atic nature of cyberspace law till today. Cyber laws attempted to regulate
technological concepts which had already been considerably advanced and
complicated, while, equally frequently, the real life repercussions of these
complex technological notions were also perplexed situations. Regrettably,
these laws fell victims to this perplexity and, instead of trying to clear out
the way and provide simple answers to complicated situations, they went
on reiterating this complexity on the regulatory level. This danger is one
of the things that needs to be avoided at all costs also in the case of any
regulation for cloud computing. The fact that the cloud, its applications
and the real life situations it facilitates are already quite advanced should
not trick us into believing that the laws governing them need to be equally
perplexed.
– Retrospective legislation.
In an effort to bridge the gap between the time when cyberspace had start-
ed to matter and affect real life and the time when, finally, laws to regulate
it were adopted, legislators tend at times to devise legal instruments with a
retrospective nature. However, unless we are talking about aspects of hu-
man activity that cannot be left unregulated, even for a short block of time,
such as the issues dealt with by criminal law, retrospectivity is not always
the way to go. After all, until laws came to exist, areas such as the internet
were self-regulated in a de facto sense and it is of little, if any use, to try
and arrange otherwise ex post situations that have been settled since long
ago in a particular functioning manner.
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– Contradictions in the law.
This is the second most prevalent problem with currently existing cy-
berspace legislation. Given that Fuller was applying these principles not
only against individual laws but also against bodies of laws governing one
topic across borders and jurisdictions, contradictions are probably the
gravest wound on the body of cyberspace law. What is more, this is proba-
bly the gravest issue also with frameworks dealing with cloud computing
affairs till now: as these laws were developed simply under the mindset
and legal traditions prevalent in each and every legal order, forgetful of the
fact that they are meant to be applied to issues of purely cross-border na-
ture that call for unanimous response otherwise we can only expect even
more complicated situations after than prior to the application of a particu-
lar law.
– Demands that are beyond the power of the subjects and the ruled.
When it comes to cyberspace laws, this Fuller principle could be traced to
the burdensome procedures some pieces of legislation necessitate from cy-
ber law subjects. For instance, the licensing processes that some national
laws impose on entities that wish to execute trans-border data transfers
compared to the volume and frequency with which such transfers occur in
the course of their business is nowadays clearly counter-productive.
– Unstable legislation (e.g. daily revisions of laws).
It is not so much the case in cyberspace laws. On the contrary, one might
say that the delays occurring in the revision processes of cyberspace laws
are mostly the problem rather than the very frequent revisions of them.
– Divergence between adjudication/administration and legislation.
This is an often malice across many areas of law, the EU law produced
through Directives being prominent among them. Such was the case also
with the EU Data Protection Directive and the differentiating applications
it came to have across jurisdictions of the EU Member States. This is at-
tempted to be ameliorated with the General Data Protection Regulation,
which will be directly applicable across EU jurisdictions and is meant to
replace the Directive394.
In summary, already existing laws for cyberspace issues teach us a
thing or two about the reasons that could lead to the production of bad
laws, which, if disregarded for long, can cause this body of poor quality
394 However, there are still counterarguments as to the extent in which the GDPR
will manage to establish a truly unanimous regulatory space across the EU. For
more, see Chapter 4.
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legislation to grow exponentially395. Since, so far, there has been no con-
crete cloud regulation, it is a golden opportunity to avoid past mistakes
committed in neighboring fields and produce laws that will be effective
and to-the-point bearing in mind the particularities of the cloud right from
the beginning.
Lex informatica: The formulation of policy rules for the web through
applied technology. Can it offer any useful insight for the
conceptualization of a dedicated cloud computing regime?
The notion of ‘lex informatica’ was originally introduced in legal dis-
course over internet affairs around the second half of 1990s, when the web
started to gain momentum as a new space or means of human activity. By
‘lex informatica’ it is to be understood the whole range of interpretations,
adaptations and approaches to practices and activities on the web and the
norms and generally accepted policy rules that have been concretized
thereof396. Lex informatica is, one could assert, the de facto way in which
participating actors fine-tuned and self-regulated their activities on the in-
ternet. A significant amount of these policies and norms have, over the
years, transformed into laws or have, at least, influenced the respective
law making processes. Of course, there is at the same time an equally
great deal of lex informatica that has not yet made it to law status. How-
ever, promoters of the notion have constantly suggested that this set of
rules for information flows imposed by technology and communication
networks call for policymakers to understand, consciously recognize, and
encourage them.
It goes without saying that lex informatica is not law, in the convention-
al sense of the term, because it has certain differences from typical laws.
On the other side, it is these very differences that have permitted it to es-
tablish itself and serve well the functioning of regulating online activities.
To begin with, jurisdictionally, the regime that lex informatica encourages
provides overlapping of rule systems. Jurisdiction for conventional legal
regulation is primarily based on territory. Legal rules apply only in a well-
defined place where a sovereign can exert its power. In contrast, the juris-
e.
395 Chris Reed (note 363).
396 Joel Reidenberg (note 173).
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dictional lines for lex informatica do not depend on or necessarily agree
with territorial borders397.
Instead, the jurisdictional space of lex informatica is the network itself
because the governing rules apply to information flows across network
spheres rather than physical places. Consequently, lex informatica does
not contest to replace legal rules. The latter can still apply to each con-
stituent part of the network that is located in a particular physical jurisdic-
tion.
Lex informatica, bearing all basic characteristics of a legal regime, of-
fers both the possibilities of customization of rules and inalienable rules.
The most commonplace customization mechanism for lex informatica is
the various technological configurations. It has also been attributed with
distinct enforcement properties. Legal regulation depends primarily on ju-
dicial authorities for rule enforcement. Rule violations are pursued on an
ex post basis before the courts. Lex informatica, on the contrary, allows
for automated and self-executing rule enforcement. Technological stan-
dards can be designed to prevent actions from taking place without the
proper permission or authority.
In summary, lex informatica is defined by three sets of particularly
valuable characteristics for establishing information policy and rule-mak-
ing in an information society. First, technological rules do not rely on na-
tional borders. Second, lex Informatica permits easy customization of
rules through a variety of technical mechanisms. Finally, lex informatica
rules may also benefit from built-in self-enforcement and compliance-
monitoring capabilities398.
As already previously stated, lex informatica and legal rules exist both
parallel to and overlapping one another. Therefore, legal discourse never
suggested that lex informatica should substitute law. Instead, this relation-
ship means that policymakers should add lex informatica to their set of
policy instruments and pursue lex informatica norms as an effective sub-
stitute for law where self-executing, customized rules are desirable.
In conclusion, lex informatica is a de facto existing complex source of
information policy rules on global networks. Lex informatica does not
constitute a separate jurisdiction, antagonistic to the conventional ones. It
just provides useful tools to formulate rules customized for particular situ-
397 David R. Johnson & David G. Post (note 361).
398 Joel Reidenberg (note 173).
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ations, allowing the coexistence of varying information policies in a het-
erogeneous environment. The pursuit of technological rules that embody
flexibility for information flows maximizes public policy options; at the
same time, the ability to embed an immutable rule in the architecture of a
legal system allows for the preservation of public-order values. These
tools can lessen a number of problems that traditional legal solutions face
in regulating information society. As it has been pointed out, despite being
on the table as a concept, already since about 20 years, lex informatica has
not yet been unquestionably recognized as a working supplement to legal
regulation. Yet, the numerous instances at which it has proven to be of use
can serve as a reference for the perspective we should view cloud comput-
ing regulation from.
Sectoral codes of conduct: the most dedicated attempt to come up with
cloud computing laws so far and how it could be improved
Globalization of commerce and the intensification of cross-border trade
were the main driving forces behind a relatively recent effort to regulate
affairs in a homogenous and dedicated manner as regards specific business
sectors. Sectoral codes of conduct are regulations concluded and agreed by
the most prominent actors in a specific sector of (usually) economic activi-
ty, which, thanks to the gravitational positions these actors hold within the
sector, reach a status of governing principles for the affairs they apply
to399. A quasi bi-product of the sectoral rules of conduct are the ‘binding
corporate rules’ (BCRs). These are regulations devised and self-imposed
by multinational companies active in the field of cross-border data trans-
fers400. BCRs were created in response to the need for ensuring adequate
and comparable levels of protection to those upheld within the European
Union when data is transferred to a third country. BCRs have been the
most ad hoc effort till now in the strive to construct regulatory schemes for
IT related issues for which currently existing regulations are not con-
cretized enough and deal only in an analogous manner with.
The problem with sectoral codes of conduct so far has been that, al-
though they are concluded precisely in an effort to help the industry work
f.
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more efficiently in the environment delineated by the laws applicable at
the time, they lack the legitimacy of law per se401. The minds behind sec-
toral codes are members of a given sector themselves who, no matter how
much gravity they may exert in their sector, they are not in the same insti-
tutional position as law makers. A great share of scholarly opinion asserts
that if this bridging between sector actors and their working principles and
institutional regulators is somehow achieved, then sectoral codes could
well be the forerunner of sectoral legislations much more in touch with the
specific nature of each sector. Actually, this challenge, i.e. how to shorten
the gap between actors of a sector and law makers that are charged with
formulating laws that will govern this sector, is at the root of the problem
of efficient law making402. When it comes to increasing the efficiency of
sectoral codes for the IT business, one of the most promising proposals
put forward is the adoption of internationally approved industry codes of
conduct403. This could work as follows: The IT sector would draft a code
of conduct on issues such as privacy, cloud computing, big data etc.,
which would be ensured that it fulfills the core requirements of the main
pieces of legislation on the table, at that given time, on a global scale (for
instance, the E.U.’s relevant pieces of legislation, the APEC forum’s Pri-
vacy Principles and, maybe, also other regional privacy regimes). Compe-
tent sector representatives would then submit the code to the relevant au-
thority of each regional jurisdiction. If the authority gives the green light
for the code, firms that comply with it can know that their activities meet
the requirements for that jurisdiction (the E.U., the APEC countries, etc.).
In this way, a single industry code, approved in each of the regional juris-
dictions, can step-by-step reach a status of a nearly global set of privacy
rules for that sector.
So far, all the attempts to develop such codes of conduct were initia-
tives of a single firm or group of companies, usually of a multinational na-
ture404. It goes without saying that this was a factor weakening the effica-
cy of these efforts. Apart from any discipline it might ensure for the com-
pany which self-imposed the code on it, any code of binding corporate
rules is, by nature, impractical for the great majority of companies to abide
401 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
402 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157); Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of
Law, 81 The Yale Law Journal 823–854 (1972.)
403 Dennis D. Hirsch (note 377).
404 Chris Reed (note 363).
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by, expensive for governments to administer and enforce, and difficult for
stakeholder groups to track and monitor. By looking into the possibility of
developing sector based codes, not only does a profoundly different at-
tempt to regulate effectively such fast developing sectors like cloud com-
puting emerge, but we can also gain significant insights into the collective
and synthetic way in which regulators should work when devising new
laws for cloud computing or even other similar subject matters.
A sectoral code for cloud computing would need to provide persuasive
answers to, among others, the following two pressing questions:
– problems related to privacy protection
Differences among national privacy regimes pose a fundamental challenge
for the protection of individual privacy405. Some companies may purpose-
ly orchestrate their operations in such a way in order to take advantage of
“regulatory arbitrage” prevalent in certain jurisdictions. Global data flows,
combined with national privacy laws, can result in migration of personal
data primarily to nations with the weakest laws or, at minimum, to tempo-
rary gaps in privacy protection as the data moves from one jurisdiction to
the other. Even in instances when each of the nations a given set of data
crosses has implemented meaningful privacy laws, the cross-border nature
of a standard data transfer today makes it difficult to track compliance
with them.
– problems for the business
This lack of consistency among national laws additionally poses problems
for the businesses that engage in cross-border transfers of personal data
and wish to be compliant with legal requirements406. These companies
must closely track the flow of their data in order to know which jurisdic-
tion’s rules apply at any given moment, a process that can be quite costly.
As a result, a new framework for privacy protection needs to be con-
structed bearing in mind this global scale of the phenomenon it is expected
to regulate. Through this law, it will be attempted to decrease the cost of
doing business globally, provide consumers with consistent levels of pro-
tection worldwide, and contribute to global economic growth.
Now that the aims of a new law on privacy and the cloud have been
crystallized the big question is how to achieve these goals. This is, of
405 Joel Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cy-
berspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1315–1371 (1999.)
406 P. Blume, Transborder data flow: is there a solution in sight?, 8 International
Journal of Law and Information Technology 65–86 (2000.)
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course, a question of regulatory design and by consulting regulatory theo-
ry we can have answers with respect to the possible approaches. Any
question of regulatory design requires the designer to answer two basic
questions: Who will regulate? At what level will that entity regulate?
In the case of a sectoral code for the market of cloud computing the reg-
ulators need to be clearly more than one and spread out in a horizontal and
vertical manner407: (1) government will regulate industry (direct govern-
ment regulation), (2) industry will regulate itself (self-regulation), and (3)
government and industry will intentionally and expressly share responsi-
bility for the drafting and enforcement of rules (co-regulation). Regarding
the question at what level each of these entities will regulate, there are
likewise three possible answers408: (1) regulating at the level of the indi-
vidual company (company-based regulation), (2) regulating at the level of
the industry sector (sector-based regulation), or (3) regulating at the level
of the economy as a whole (economy-wide regulation). Each of these
three levels of regulation presents distinct features:
– direct government regulation409
In direct regulation, government bodies create, monitor compliance with,
and enforce the regulatory requirements.
The advantages of such an approach are all those commonly associated
with direct regulation. Governments are expected to establish relatively
uniform sets of rules. Uniformity would make it easier for regulators to
monitor compliance with, and enforceability of these rules. Such a regula-
tory regime would also create a level playing field for business. Neverthe-
less, direct regulation, in the form of national laws enforcing an interna-
tional treaty, traditionally face important obstacles and presents significant
downsides. At first and from a purely practical perspective, it is extremely
difficult to establish an international treaty of any sort, let alone one that
will merge together all the differing views existing today around the world
on the issue of privacy and IT technologies.
– self-regulation410
Because of the concerns pointed out above some question the viability of
direct government regulation and consider self-regulation as the most suit-
able approach to privacy over IT governance. Under this approach, indus-
407 Dennis D. Hirsch (note 377).
408 Id.
409 A. Froomkin (note 322).
410 Joel Reidenberg (note 173).
CHAPTER 5. Legal pluralism and harmonization of laws
134
try sets, monitors, and enforces its own standards. Multinational com-
panies could utilize self-regulation to formulate and impose uniform,
cross-border privacy rules. To achieve this a specific company, or a sector
organization that represents it, would firstly establish a voluntary set of
privacy rules. It would then commit itself to following that set of rules
throughout its international operations establishing in this manner a single,
global set of privacy rules for the company.
Promoters of self-regulation argue that, since the rules developed in this
method come from industry itself, they are able to tap into business
knowledge and thereby produce more intelligent and effective rules than
government regulation411. It is further argued that self-regulatory entities,
which do not need to comply with notice-and-comment procedures and
other such bureaucratic legal requirements, should be able to update their
rules far more quickly than government regulators can.
Notwithstanding its promoters’ arguments, there are both practical and
theoretical reasons to question whether self-regulation is the best choice
for international privacy rules. For starters, self-regulation, by definition,
does not involve formal government approval412. As a consequence, it nei-
ther provides the legal safe harbor that companies need to engage confi-
dently in cross-border data transfers, nor saves firms from the costly duty
of having to track and comply with multiple national privacy laws.
Regulatory theory suggests additional reasons to be cautious about self-
regulation. Businesses have an incentive to draft self-regulatory rules on
the surface offer solid protection but are not, in fact, very stringent413.
Self-regulation accordingly tends to be more lenient than government re-
quirements, and may not achieve public goals like privacy. Theory further
indicates that companies may commit to impressive-sounding self-regula-
tory goals but then fail to subject themselves to the independent moni-
toring needed to make these claims credible.
– co-regulation
What has been discussed so far may well explain why the greatest focus is
lately on “co-regulatory” initiatives in which government and industry ex-
pressly share responsibility for drafting, monitoring, and enforcing privacy
411 Christopher T. Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation. European Law, Regulatory
Governance and Legitimacy in Cyberspace (2011.)
412 Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self‐Regulation: An Institutional Per-
spective, 19 Law & Policy 363–414 (1997.)
413 Christopher T. Marsden (note 411).
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standards414. Proponents of co-regulation claim that it combines the ad-
vantages of self-regulation with those of direct regulation415. Like self-
regulation, co-regulatory methods such as enforceable codes of conduct
allow industry to draft the specific privacy rules. They therefore profit
from industry knowledge and expertise in the same way that self-regu-
lation does. They are also more likely to get industry to accept and buy in
to rules that they or their peers have drafted. Like direct regulation, co-
regulatory strategies generally call on government to establish the privacy
framework which all industry-drafted rules must conform to. Co-regula-
tory schemes also get regulators involved in assessing, monitoring compli-
ance with, and enforcing rules. This governmental involvement increases
the guarantees that the rules will truly protect the public interest, and that
companies will comply with them. In conclusion, co-regulation promises
rules that are stringent, intelligent and up-to-date, that government en-
forces and industry accepts. This is a promising picture for an area like
cloud computing and privacy law where technologies and business models
change too quickly for direct regulation, but where the stakes are too high
to rely solely on industry self-regulation.
Co-regulation, of course, has its weaknesses too. It envisions a govern-
ment–industry negotiation over rules. Such regulation through “deal-mak-
ing” can lead to sweetheart deals that favor industry interests over those of
the public416. An equally alarming point is that co-regulation can some-
times provide certain companies with an advantage over others, with the
chances being, most likely, with those controlling a decisive share of the
market. Last but not least, co-regulation will likely be less nimble and
adaptive than self-regulation.
Efforts undertaken so far on the front of sector-based regulation of IT
and their common weakness
The initiatives that have been undertaken so far towards self-regulation in
the IT sector — binding corporate rules (BCRs), community based partici-
g.
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patory research (CBPRs), and the once mighty U.S.–E.U. Safe Harbor
Agreement417— definitely have shared certain common virtues. They have
served as bases for companies (and, in the case of the Safe Harbor Agree-
ment, self-regulatory privacy programs such as TRUSTe418) with the
means to create an approved, cross-border set of privacy rules by which to
do business419. They have attempted to do this through co-regulatory
mechanisms that utilize industry knowledge to produce intelligent rules.
Unfortunately, each of them has worked only with respect to certain re-
gions (i.e. BCRs within the borders of the E.U.; CBPRs among APEC
member nations; and the Safe Harbor Agreement between the EU and the
United States), and none managed to provide a truly global solution420.
417 The international Safe Harbor Privacy Principles or Safe Harbor Privacy Princi-
ples or the Safe Harbor Agreement were principles developed between 1998 and
2000 in order to prevent private organizations within the European Union or
United States which store customer data from accidentally disclosing or losing
personal information. They were struck down on October 6, 2015 by the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with its Judgement in the case Maximilli-
an Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. Under the Safe Harbor Regime, US
companies storing customer data could self-certify that they adhered to 7 princi-
ples, to comply with the EU Data Protection Directive and with Swiss require-
ments. The US Department of Commerce developed privacy frameworks in con-
junction with both the European Union and the Federal Data Protection and In-
formation Commissioner of Switzerland.
Within the context of a series of decisions on the adequacy of the protection of
personal data transferred to other countries, the European Commission made a
decision in 2000 that the United States' principles did comply with the EU Direc-
tive applicable at the time (the DPD) – the so-called "Safe Harbor decision".
However, after a customer complained that his Facebook data were insufficiently
protected, the ECJ declared in October 2015 that the Safe Harbor Decision was
invalid, leading to further talks being held by the Commission with the US autho-
rities towards "a renewed and sound framework for transatlantic data flows".
Consequently, the European Commission and the United States agreed to esta-
blish a new framework for transatlantic data flows on 2nd February 2016, known
as the "EU-US Privacy Shield", which governs relevant data transfers between
the two jurisdictions since then. See also the CJEU’s Judgement in Maximillian
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
418 TrustArc (formerly TRUSTe) is a technology compliance and security company
based in San Francisco, California. It became famous worldwide thanks to its
software and tools were used to help corporations update their technology so that
it complies with government laws, or operates using best practices.
419 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
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Notwithstanding, each of them has been worthy as an effort toward the
goal of broadly applicable, cross-border privacy rules.
At the same time, all three initiatives suffer from the same fundamental
weakness: They rely on individual companies, rather than industry sectors,
to draft the cross-border privacy rules421. In other words, they are compa-
ny-based rather than sector-based codes, which undermine their contribu-
tion to the ultimate goal of universally effective IT regulation. Additional-
ly, company-based codes also frustrate public participation thus enduring
reduced accountability.
In light of these observations, it is becoming more and more tempting
to switch to the sectoral approach regarding construction of a regulatory
framework for the cloud, over company initiated solutions.
Seeking the way forward on cloud computing regulation in the field of
global administrative law
Defining global administrative law
As it has been demonstrated so far, seeking to produce dedicated and in
principle harmonized cloud computing regulation, either in the form of
concrete laws or just as generic regulatory principles, cannot be achieved
via conventional routes of law making (i.e. international law treaties or su-
pervisory bodies) nor via arbitrary ventures such as the construction of an
IT-only legal order that will be built on its own foundations, totally sepa-
rated by other disciplines of law (such as a full-fledged corpus of lex in-
formatica).
For cloud computing regulation to develop in a coherent manner to ma-
ture and bond along with other co-competent disciplines of regulation and
provide persuasive answers a mid-solution needs to be found, one that will
permit adopting the innovative attitude that IT law should be defined by
but, at the same time, will not make the resulting principles look unrealis-
tic or out of touch with the reality they aim at regulating. The path towards
achieving this precarious balance goes through the field of global adminis-
trative law, its methods and tools.
h.
i.
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The term ‘global administrative law’ indicates an emerging field of law
development that is founded on a twofold principle: on the one side, that a
great deal of what has been recently termed in law and international stud-
ies as “global governance” essentially constitutes, one way or another, ad-
ministrative action; and, on the other side, that it is more and more typical
of such action to be regulated by administrative law-kind principles, rules
and mechanisms – particularly, those putting am emphasis on participa-
tion, transparency, accountability and review422. Consequently, global ad-
ministrative law is a concept and set of methods for developing regulatory
frameworks regarding cross-border phenomena of modern life which does
not seek to turn a blind eye on existing legal norms and structures but
rather aims to co-ordinate all suitable structures, procedures and normative
standards for regulatory decision-making including transparency, partici-
pation, and review, and the rule-governed mechanisms for implementing
these standards423. However, what it does differently compared to conven-
tional sub-disciplines of international or public law is that, instead of lim-
iting itself to the means available within each sub-discipline alone, it gath-
ers all of the previously named resources that may be applicable to formal
intergovernmental regulatory bodies but also to informal intergovernmen-
tal regulatory networks, to regulatory decisions of national governments
where these are part of or constrained by an international intergovernmen-
tal regime, even to hybrid public-private or private transnational bodies424.
To put it plainly, the main focus of global administrative law is not the
specific content of substantive rules, but rather the coordination on the op-
eration of existing or possible principles, procedural rules and reviewing
and other mechanisms relating to accountability, transparency, participa-
tion, and assurance of legality425 from different jurisdictions or legal or-
ders with a view to achieving an as sound as possible global governance in
the field under discussion, i.e., in this case, in IT and, specifically, in cloud
computing regulation.
422 http://www.iilj.org/GAL/.
423 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15–62 (2005.)
424 Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law without the State – The Challenge of Global
Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. Int 663–694 (2005.)
425 Alexander Somek, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law: A Reply
to Benedict Kingsbury, 20 Eur J Int Law 985–995 (2009.)
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The general theory on global administrative law and its principles
Pursuant to the definition above, the theory backing global administrative
law instead of viewing clearly divided levels of regulation (private, local,
national, intergovernmental etc.), affirms the existence of numerous over-
laps among different actors and layers forming the wider pool of ‘global
administrative space’426. These overlaps can occur between international
institutions and transnational networks, but also domestic administrative
bodies when these form part of international regimes or when their acts
can provoke transboundary regulatory effects427 or even when the subject
matter for which they are responsible extends by nature beyond the geo-
graphical borders of their competence, just as it happens with cloud com-
puting.
Global administrative law and its principal device the ‘global adminis-
trative space’ were devised precisely due to the pressing need for the law,
with relation to several regulatory issues, to get detached from the conven-
tional understandings of international law by virtue of which there is a
sharp separation between the domestic and international element428. How-
ever, in an ever increasing range of regulatory affairs this global adminis-
trative space is nowadays taken up by actors such as transnational private
regulators, hybrid entities such as public-private partnerships involving
states or inter-state organizations, national public regulators whose regula-
tory call has external effects but may not be controlled by the central ex-
ecutive authority, informal inter-state bodies with no treaty basis or formal
interstate institutions (such as the United Nations system of organizations)
affecting third parties through administrative type actions429. As it can be
easily inferred, a great deal of the administration of global governance has
become highly decentralized and not very systematic. This arrangement
affects not only the executive but also the judiciary practice with national
courts finding themselves in a position where they need to review the acts
of international, transnational, even national bodies that are essentially ad-
ministering decentralized global governance systems; in this manner, na-
ii.
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tional courts also form part not only of the review but of the actual admin-
istration of a global governance regime430, given that they are called to in-
terpret laws developed by bodies on the regulatory level of global admin-
istrative law or ones that they address cross-border phenomena.
Equally confluent as the actors making it are also the sources of global
administrative law; due to the fact that it is practiced at multiple fora, its
norms may come to be the result of convergence among different sources
of obligation applicable to a matter, ranging from national laws to regula-
tions of law-applying institutions, to contracts establishing private rights
based on those laws, to rules of international law on the same issues.
Theoretical foundations of global administrative law based on US and
EU administrative law
Scholarship in the US has been pondering on the legitimizing elements of
global administrative law for several years since the term came to the fore-
front of academic discourse. Lately and after extensive debate, it has been
proposed that for global administrative law the same fundamental princi-
ples that define US administrative law should apply as well431. These are:
– Transparency: in US public administrative legal discourse the call for
transparency is fulfilled by means of a series of practices, namely, pub-
lication of agency rules, decisions, procedures and policies, as well as
public access to agency records.
– Fair and equitable decision making procedures: the main means of
guaranteeing fairness and equal treatment in public administrative pro-
cedures under US law are notice of proposed agency decisions and op-
portunity of affected or interested persons to submit evidence and argu-
ment to the decision maker.
– Decision requirements: decisions made up following procedures pre-
scribed by US administrative law should be accompanied by agency
statements of factual findings and reasons for decisions, based on an
administrative record that includes relevant agency records and sub-
missions by affected or interested persons.
– Availability of judicial review of final agency decisions.
iii.
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– Legality: the term refers to the need for reassurance regarding any de-
cision made by public administrative agencies that it was made in con-
formity with binding legal norms, including those established by the
Constitution, statutes, Executive Orders (if reviewable), and agency
regulations and adjudicatory decisions.
– Reasoned and responsive exercise of discretion: this principle refers to
the need for assuring that the deciding agency has considered relevant
alternatives and their implications and provided a reasoned justification
for its choice among the alternatives, giving due account and respond-
ing to the material evidence and arguments in the submissions of af-
fected or interested persons.
At the same time, the doctrine of global administrative law has received
considerable attention within EU legal scholarship as well. Besides, as
Hans-Heinrich Trute is noting, the European Union, with all its adminis-
trative authorities that are competent for regulating on numerous issues
along with national counterparts from the EU’s Member States, is possibly
one of the prominent venues where essential administrative law and prac-
tice with acute cross-border characteristics is made432. Consequently, it is
only reasonable that there has been discourse on the theoretical founda-
tions of global administrative law in Europe as well the outcome of which
finds democracy and the rule of law as the principles at the core of global
administrative praxis. In particular, for European legal thinking ‘the legiti-
mating principles of any Western administrative law system are found in
the twin ideals of democracy and the rule of law’433. To a certain extent, as
the European Union has demonstrated through its enlargement or coopera-
tion procedures with third countries434, it holds these two ideals as the cra-
dle of every system of administrative law. Within the EU itself, democracy
and the rule of law have matured into constitutional principles, firmly em-
bedded in the political arrangements and institutional texts of the
Union435. As a result, these dual values have come to be regarded sine qua
non conditions for any Western system of government and political theory.
Expectedly, this also applies for global and transnational systems of gover-
432 Hans-Heinrich Trute, Law and Knowledge – Remarks on a Debate in German
Legal Science, 32 Ewha Journal of Social Sciences 34 (2016.)
433 Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values,
17 Eur J Int Law 187–214 (2006.)
434 P. P. Craig & G. de Búrca (note 287).
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nance, such as the ones developed under the auspices of global administra-
tive law.
Legal pluralism in global administrative law
The proposal
The juridical concept of ‘legal pluralism’ has been part of the discourse
about how laws are made, how their applicability is determined and how
supremacy is recognized for several decades. Naturally, at the beginning,
legal pluralism could be perceived only through the lens of sovereign ju-
risdictions, which were largely concurrent with national legal systems.
Until about mid-1980s scarce were the scholars that had come forward to
suggest an idea of synthesis and co-existence under rules of hierarchy of
laws and norms from varying legal orders, on a regional or even global
scale436.
Equal was the evolution of the meaning of legal pluralism which is de-
fined as ‘the existence of multiple legal systems within one (human) popu-
lation and/or geographic area’437. At the early steps of legal pluralism as
an arrangement among co-existing laws ‘one human population’ was gen-
erally understood to mean the populace of a country or the people of the
same tribal origins who, even though they might have been living across
different, but as a rule neighboring, countries, were allowed to uphold at
least one additional legal system apart from that of the state where they
resided. Similarly, the notion of ‘geographic area’ usually meant the terri-
tory of a sovereign state or, at best, a region extending across more but
still neighboring countries. This remains the case also today, as plural le-
gal systems are particularly prevalent in former colonies, where the law of
a former colonial authority may exist alongside more traditional legal sys-
tems (i.e. customary law)438. However, as the mechanics of coexistence
and cooperation among different laws are evolving, today legal pluralism
is not understood only through the stricto sensu interpretation discussed
i.
i.
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above but there is a lato sensu dimension of legal pluralism as well439.
Through that perspective, the vital space for legal pluralism can be much
broader than the borders of a sovereign state; it can extend to entire geo-
graphical regions, continents or even the world. It goes without saying that
the population bound by the rules of a system constructed under the rules
of legal pluralism can be much greater; it can actually even include the
global population440.
Indeed, legal pluralism can be met today as a tool in almost all sectors
of law, and definitely in administrative law441, which is the focus point of
this dissertation. What is more, in topics such as the internet the very con-
cept of legal pluralism in global administrative law is suggested as the tool
with which to come up with a system of governing rules that will offer
pragmatic governance to such a particular phenomenon as the web. As this
study will propose legal pluralism as one of the most important tools in
constructing the principles of a universally oriented regulatory framework
for cloud computing, it is essential to discuss in advance the main charac-
teristics of this approach:
The fact that legal pluralism has spread across different sectors of law
over the years means that it has been enriched as legal method with nu-
merous constituencies442. Several of them compete for primacy, with dif-
ferent patterns emerging in different institutional settings. Although the
entire cadre resulting thereof is highly varied and inconsistent, one can
identify three dominant approaches:
– the nationalist approach443; it is considered as the classical and proba-
bly still the dominant among constituencies of legal pluralism. Its main
claim is that final control over regulatory decisions should lie at the na-
tional level.
– the internationalist approach444; contrary to the former, this approach
views the international community of states as the main constituency.
In this context, on such issues as human rights or the environment, in-
439 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to
Global, 30 Sydney L. Rev. 375–411 (2008.)
440 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart (note 423).
441 Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 Annual Review of Law and So-
cial Science 225–242 (2009.)
442 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155–1238
(2006.)
443 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 Law & Society Review 869–896 (1988.)
444 Baudouin. Dupret (note 370).
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ternational law is regarded as having already moved beyond the narrow
confines of the state perspective. The internationalist approach deems
that nowadays law is increasingly shaped by concerns common to all
states445.
– the cosmopolitan approach446; it goes even further in proposing a gen-
uinely global constituency for issues of global governance. The cos-
mopolitan shares with the international approach the view that ac-
countability to national constituencies is insufficient. It is firmly found-
ed on a theoretical framework of liberal individualism according to
which the role of modern states is not to act as vessels of fundamental
diversity but only as organizational tools to ensure division of labor
and harness the dangers of a world state447. For cosmopolitans, the ba-
sic constituency in law nowadays would not be based on the communi-
ty of states, but on the global community of individuals, on a truly
global public. However, there is still great ambiguity as to how ac-
countability should be institutionalized in the cosmopolitan perspec-
tive. The proposals voiced so far range from representative options
such as a world parliament to more liberal proposals448.
Bearing in mind the nature of cloud computing, this study will primarily
use elements from the nationalist and internationalist approach in its effort
to construct a dedicated regulatory framework for the cloud. It is true that,
from a very bold perspective, the cosmopolitan element could be also uti-
lized; nevertheless, a realistic analysis of where things stand right now can
reveal that the general legal and political mindset, at a global scale, is not
ready for the adoption of a purely universal legal system. Therefore, this
dissertation will primarily focus on constructing a governance spectrum
for cloud computing which will serve the global nature of the cloud, as its
subject matter, but, at the same time, will pay respect to the divergence
and the clear dividing lines that remain strong and are expected to stay so
among various state or regional jurisdictions. After all, legal history has
repeatedly proven that law matures much better when the next step is tak-
en upon what is already in place as prevalent legal culture than by trying
445 Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1–28 (1988.)
446 Ralf Michaels (note 382).
447 Richard Jones, Legal Pluralism and the Adjudication of Internet Disputes, 13 In-
ternational Review of Law, Computers & Technology 49–68 (1999.)
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to take strides from the current status quo to profoundly different construc-
tions. In the first instance, the rate of adoption of the newly proposed legal
framework is by far greater both by law subjects and law makers or con-
trollers while, in the second case, the theoretical frameworks brought for-
ward face great difficulty in gaining acceptance and recognition.
The problems of legal pluralism
Understandably, legal pluralism is far from flawless as an approach to the
challenge of constructing efficiently working legal frameworks449. Going
over its main weaknesses will allow to identify what are the main gaps we
will need to fill up in constructing a governing framework for cloud tech-
nologies and will permit well in advance to look elsewhere for regulatory
solutions on certain challenges associated to the cloud for which legal
pluralism does not provide persuasive answers.
One problem is the lack of certainty: as legal pluralism suggests a bal-
ancing act among various legal orders, the disappearance of a clearly com-
petent authority and the resulting fluidity of decisions, the clarity and sta-
bilization that we usually expect from the law can be compromised450. On
most issues, however, a pluralist order will operate much more smoothly
exactly because it is suggested as a way to adjudicate on issues that neces-
sitate fluidity in handling by nature. And, of course, if it appears necessary
to provide for greater clarity and stability in some contexts, one might de-
cide to establish institutions along jurisdictional lines, or even on a federal
model by sacrificing a certain amount of procedural fairness for the sake
of substantive goals. In the end, legal pluralism offers significant trade-
offs, and it is highly debatable whether the added uncertainty of a pluralist
order is indeed as problematic as the risk of blockade and the lack of in-
clusiveness of conventional models.
A yet more serious problem is power disparities451. Pluralist approaches
(even those of a less radical level) have long had to face the objection that
some groups, societal, regional or even of global proportions, possess su-
perior organizational capabilities and, in general, more power than others,
so that relying on free interplay between them will merely favor the
ii.
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powerful at the expense of the weak. Yet it is absolutely questionable
whether a pluralist landscape would be much different in this respect from
a classical, hierarchically ordered structure. This will ultimately have to be
assessed in specific contexts of global regulation, but as we know from
domestic contexts, differences in organizational capacities are extremely
important also in procedural models with clearly defined participation
rights for affected interest groups; the power relations outside an institu-
tion are always to some extent reflected inside it, despite provisions for
formal equality452. Therefore, reluctance to adopt elements of legal plur-
alism only because of fear that they might put affected parties on disad-
vantageous positions, while this inequality is a feature already inherent to
the current arrangements of public administration law is not enough rea-
son to dismiss the pluralistic perspective altogether453.
A pluralist global administrative law may not correspond to anybody’s
ideal; its design is far too open-ended and leaves too much room for politi-
cal struggle. Yet this is precisely its virtue. Being nobody’s ideal, legal
pluralism refrains from taking sides in the fundamental contests that de-
fine the global order454. Bracketing its current deficiencies, and finding
ways to work around them pragmatically, may after all not only be prudent
but also morally preferable. What is more, it might also be politically ad-
vantageous: rather than stabilizing a particular institutional setting, a plu-
ralist order is poised to open up space for the political transformation of a
structure of global governance whose legitimacy is far from settled455. In
parallel to that, putting legal pluralism to work for constructing regulatory
arrangements for naturally global phenomena such as cloud computing,
will not only help us achieve fruitful answers to the pressing need for effi-
cient regulation of such phenomena but it will also contribute to the ma-
turing process of the new generation of administrative law and governance
that today’s multilayered global agenda calls for456.
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Can effective cloud computing regulation be achieved through
international law? Not really.
Having extensively talked about the nature of cloud computing, the tech-
nologies it is based on and the applications it facilitates, one would reason-
ably bring forward the idea of regulating the cloud with recourse to the
tools offered by international law, i.e. an international convention, an in-
ternational body inspecting its application etc. Alas, the differences in per-
ceiving the key legal issues associated with the cloud, such as privacy, se-
cure communications and online anonymity, to name a few, make this op-
tion invalid or, at least, insufficient457. What is more, it would be highly
problematic to try to regulate the cloud only via recourse to international
law given, first of all, the way the primary world jurisdictions understand
their own relationship to it458.
Case law of the EU’s and US’ top courts are the ultimate pool of evi-
dence for anyone who would like to understand how these two jurisdic-
tions understand the hierarchical structure binding them to the internation-
al legal order. Over the years, this perception has been clarified, enriched
and evolved for each of the two legal orders on the occasion of various
cases with greatly diversified subject matters. We will examine here the
latest instances where the CJEU and the US Supreme Court touched upon
the issue of the relationship between the EU and the US legal order, re-
spectively, and international law.
As far as Europe is concerned, the CJEU had the chance to elaborate on
how the EU views its relative position against the international legal order
most recently in the context of cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi and
Al Barakaat459, the judgments on which were published by the Grand
Chamber of the Court on 3 September 2008460. The cases dealt with cer-
tain UN Security Council resolutions which named the two plaintiffs as
suspects for terrorist activities and called for the imposition of certain re-
strictive measures on them, mostly affecting their financial liquidity and
j.
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assets in an attempt to prevent them from indeed perpetrating or support-
ing terrorist acts. The plaintiffs received a judgment in their favor and the
CJEU decided to freeze the execution of the measures prescribed by the
UN Security Council resolutions on the grounds that they would pro-
foundly violate undisputable values firmly held within the EU legal order
regarding fundamental human rights.
Despite the praise which Kadi has drawn from various quarters461, the
reasoning of the Court in this case reaffirms once more “the uncomfort-
able image the EU has traditionally held for itself as a virtuous interna-
tional actor in extrapolation to the exceptionalism of the US”462. It also re-
instates a long-standing political ambition of the European Union to carve
out a distinctive international role for itself as a ‘normative power’ com-
mitted to effective multilateralism under international law463. What is also
paradoxical, yet at the same time demonstrative of where the European
Union currently poses itself in relation to international law, is the fact that
such a cornerstone judgment about the role, relationship and authority of
international law in connection to the EU is versed in some of its most im-
portant parts in rather chauvinist and parochial tones. Additionally, it
should be pointed out that this decision was delivered not by a court of a
powerful nation-state but by the top court of an international organization,
which is itself a creature of international law. Nonetheless, the CJEU in
Kadi chose to keep a certain distance from the international legal order
and place itself and the EU at a distinct, not directly hierarchical position,
in relation to the international legal structure.
An equally striking case, this time affirming the privileged role the
USA reserves for itself in relation to the international law is Medellin v
Texas 552 U.S. (2008)464. This case dealt not with Security Council reso-
lutions but with a judgment of the International Court of Justice, which the
US Supreme Court found not enforceable in the US without prior congres-
sional action.
461 H.S.P.L.C.E.L.P. Eeckhout & P.L.T. Tridimas, Yearbook of European Law 2009,
v. 28 (2010.)
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Although starting off from totally different context, the striking similar-
ity between the reasoning and interpretative approaches of the US
Supreme Court in Medellin and that of the CJEU in Kadi are clear evi-
dence of a very important truth: the relationship EU and US reserve for
themselves and the international legal order is at the very least standing at
the opposite end from their professed embrace of international law and in-
stitutions465. Without defying international law, it is clear that both these
jurisdictions – which, it should not be failed, are the two most important
ones on a global scale – prefer to keep certain reservations and room for
flexibility regarding their treatment towards international laws. Even if, in
the meantime since 2008, Europe’s political institutions have asserted time
and again the EU’s distinctive role as a global actor committed to multilat-
eralism under international law, and even if the Lisbon Treaty nowadays
enshrines the ‘strict’ commitment to international law in EU’s foundation-
al texts, the European Court chose to use that much-anticipated Kadi rul-
ing as the occasion to proclaim the internal and external autonomy and
separateness of the EU’s legal order from the international domain, and
the primacy of its internal constitutional values over the norms of interna-
tional law466. Similarly, the US has kept a comparatively preferential ap-
proach for itself against bodies of law or treaties of the international do-
main; in fact, it could be argued that from the US side this special self-
positioning has been even firmer than from the European side.
In light of the above observations, it becomes almost self-evident that,
since Europe and the US view their relative connection to the international
jurisdiction in such a precarious manner, international law and its instru-
ments per se cannot be viable means for achieving universal and harmo-
nized cloud computing regulation. Since both these jurisdictions keep their
distances from such high-ranking instruments of international law as reso-
lutions of the UN Security Council or rulings of the International Criminal
Court, it is highly unlikely that they will unreservedly comply with a sup-
posed treaty that would venture to impose a universal way of handling
cloud computing related matters. Having demonstrated the importance of
the cloud as a facilitator for a wide range of economic activities with un-
deniable profitability, it is only reasonable to expect that the chances of an
465 Grainne de Burca (note 462).
466 Daniel Halberstam, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend,
in: U of Michigan Public Law Working Paper (2008.)
CHAPTER 5. Legal pluralism and harmonization of laws
150
international convention on cloud computing to be abided by and applied
unreservedly are rather dim.
A comparatist approach and synthesis is the only way; moving forward
to regulate cloud computing through legal pluralism
Having exhaustively discussed all options or arbitrary proposals currently
on the table regarding ways in which the cloud could be effectively regu-
lated, it becomes evident that none of the conventional routes or methods
for leveling the field over how a specific subject matter is regulated is
enough. Cloud computing cannot be governed solely by governmental au-
thorities, nor can it be directed by the free market alone. Similarly, it can-
not be governed globally with norms and rules inspired by one and only
jurisdiction, be it the European, the US one or any other, nor can its han-
dling become harmonious via a typical international convention.
However, it should be made clear that regulating the cloud will not be
an easy venture. At first, cloud computing is one of the most contempo-
rary subject matters that world jurisdictions have to find a way to effec-
tively govern nowadays. This means that caution is necessary in order for
law makers to have clear and thorough knowledge of what cloud comput-
ing actually is before sitting down to write any law about it. Simultaneous-
ly, its novel nature in comparison to other phenomena calling for gover-
nance, even to those very close in nature and characteristics to it, means
that it will not be easy to make affected parties be bound by laws that will
be based on norms different from the traditional ones. It will not be possi-
ble to build up these laws or the foundations they should be built upon,
based on the views and appraisals of only one school of law. Consequent-
ly, this study will follow the middle way in its effort not to build up a uni-
versally applicable law about cloud computing but, pragmatically think-
ing, in formulating the set of principles every law and jurisdiction should
take account of when working on a cloud computing law. This path is that
of legal pluralism, upon which the following chapters will walk after ana-
lyzing, in a comparative manner, and synthesizing the best practices held
about the cloud in EU and US law.
Embarking on a legal discourse that needs to be genuinely creative and
strongly persuasive at the same time, we will largely rely on the Nico
k.
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Krisch’s version of ‘legal pluralism in a regional context’467. In this con-
figuration of legal pluralism, Krisch departs from the traditional norms
limiting legal pluralism to one or neighboring legal orders and proposes
tools that advocate harmonization on a broader, regional scale (for in-
stance, within Europe, between the EU and the ECHR countries). The aim
of this approach is to recognize the common principles within a region
that could serve as a basis for better coordinated laws but without aiming
to subordinate one jurisdiction to the other but, instead, to promote their
reproach through mutual persuasion, while emphasizing the autonomy and
authority of each unit468. Then, once the connecting links between the EU
and US regulatory views over the different aspects of the cloud are accu-
mulated, this dissertation will conclude by demonstrating how these find-
ings can be applied to the European, the US and the rest of the world’s ju-
risdictions paving the way for a system of laws governing cloud comput-
ing which will easily interconnect with each other.
After all, much as it is already technically feasible to perceive the cloud
as one, purely boundless and global space, totally defiant of geographical
or borders of any other nature, in real life terms it would be unrealistic
and, possibly, of little use at the moment, to directly propose the adoption
of a ‘globally applicable law on cloud computing’ of any nature. There-
fore, instead of dealing with the challenge of regulating such unique phe-
nomena as the cloud in highly experimental ways, it is much wiser to fo-
cus on more pragmatic solutions; schemes that strike an accord between
originality necessitated by the nature of the cloud and balancing of inter-
ests and long-held perceptions of rivaling legal orders are the way to go.
One such scheme will be constructed hereafter.
467 N. Krisch (note 427).
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Jurisdiction and accountability in the cloud
Introduction – scope of this chapter
Having defined the research methodologies that will be utilized in the con-
text of this analysis, the following chapters will be dedicated in presenting
findings and putting forward proposals with regard to regulation of legal
issues arising from on involving cloud computing as the standard technol-
ogy for facilitating the vast majority of uses and processes it today’s IT
landscape. For starters, one needs to examine the main issues that any
regulatory scheme applying to the cloud should deal with. Therefore, in
the following two chapters we will consider the questions that any kind of
legislative text meant specifically for cloud computing and its applications
should provide answers for before, ultimately, moving on to bringing to-
gether proposals and best practices from either the EU or the US school of
thought regarding the cloud and arguing on how these could be better co-
ordinated between the two jurisdictions. At first, in the present chapter the
issues of who is accountable for incidents occurring in a cloud-based envi-
ronment and how authorities or courts claim jurisdiction to adjudicate on
these incidents will be examined.
Jurisdiction in the era of cloud computing
The currently prevailing legal norms in EU law for claiming
jurisdiction over cases involving data transfer and processing
Given the lack of a body of legislation specifically dealing with cloud
computing, one needs to look into neighboring fields of legislation in or-
der to describe the current status quo about how laws dealing with issues
involving digital data claim jurisdiction among each other.
As it has been explained already469, EU laws are the ones with the most





469 See Chapter 3.
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ing technologies470. The most representative piece of law among all IT-re-
lated EU legislation is the General Data Protection Regulation. Since we
currently are at the crossroads between the GDPR and its long-lived pre-
decessor, the Data Protection Directive (DPD), it is worth analyzing how
both these laws settled the issue of territorial and material scope for their
provisions. In this way, it will be possible to draw conclusions with regard
to the trend EU laws follow on this matter, which, it can already be briefly
stated that it is expansive.
Firstly, then, in the DPD three main grounds were described as the ones
that suffice to justify jurisdiction on an IT-related case. In particular, the
GDPR’s forerunner generally recognized three different grounds for deter-
mining its applicability on personal data processing affairs. These were:
– establishment of the data processor under examination471,
– public international law472 and
– use of equipment within the jurisdiction473.
In a cloud computing context, the above grounds determined the extent
to which a user or provider of cloud computing services, even if not in-
corporated, residing or headquartered in an EEA Member State, could be-
come subject to obligations under EU data protection law as a result of:
– having a subsidiary, branch or agent, or a mere data centre, in the EEA;
or
– making use of a data centre located in the EEA, or other equipment lo-
cated in the EEA.
Establishment – Art. 4 para. 1(a) DPD
The DPD stipulated that each EEA Member State had to apply the Direc-
tive’s provisions as this was implemented in that Member State if ‘the pro-
cessing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of
the controller on the territory of the Member State’. In other words, the
controller had to have an establishment on the ground of that Member
i.
470 See also Chapter 2.
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State and should process personal data ‘in the context of the activities of
that establishment’.
In fact, what is described above is, one could say, a two-step test as it
was examined whether
– the data controller has an ‘establishment’ on the territory of an EU
Member State, and
– whether the controller processes personal data in the context of the ac-
tivities of that establishment.
If the answer to both questions was yes, then the Member State which
hosts the data controller on its soil had to implement the DPD to personal
data processing activities carried out by that controller, regardless of
where in the world they took place – outside or inside the EEA.
It is worth briefly mentioning that the criterion of ‘the context of the ac-
tivities of an establishment of a controller’, which was among the main
ones in EU law under the Data Protection Directive had, over the years
and with the evolution of technology, come to cause a great deal of fric-
tion as to its precise interpretation474. In the latest years when the DPD
was still in force, Art. 29 Working Party had stated three factors which
should be taken into account when assessing this criterion475:
– the degree of involvement of the establishment(s) in the activities in
the context of which personal data are processed;
– the nature of the activities as a secondary consideration and
– the goal of ensuring effective data protection.
Art. 29 WP went on to suggest that a ‘who is doing what’ test should be
applied in the sense that the test required a determination of:
– who carries out the relevant activities and
– whether there is data processing in the context of these activities.
The involvement of the establishment in the activities is the most impor-
tant of these factors.
The wide interpretation of ‘in the context of the activities of an estab-
lishment’ that was put forward meant that a cloud provider with one or
474 Joel Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 University of Penn-
sylvania law review 1951–1974 (2005.)
475 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2009 on the Draft Commission Decision on
standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors estab-
lished in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC (data controller to data pro-
cessor), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/docume
ntation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm.
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more establishments in the EEA was also subject to this provision. This
had two important consequences476:
– EU data protection law could be applicable even if no processing of
personal data was carried out at the establishment of the cloud
provider, and
– because of the nature of cloud services and the geographical dispersion
of their facilities, more than one establishment of the same cloud
provider in the EEA may be involved in activities, so that the con-
troller is subject to two different national implementations of the DPD.
One contemporary case, sparked by the use of technological resources
heavily based on cloud computing technology that is demonstrative of
how loosely Europe has been interpreting until now the criteria it upholds
for determining jurisdiction on a cloud computing related case was the so
called ‘Google Italy’477 one.
The case referred to a video which was posted on September 8, 2006 in
Google Videos showing a disabled student being bullied and insulted by
three of his colleagues (while another student was recording with her mo-
bile phone, and ten more were watching the scene without intervening).
The video, with a duration of about 3 minutes, was viewed by a significant
number of people, counting more than 5000 downloads. Eventually it had
made it to being the most popular one in the category of “video divertenti”
(funny videos). Users of Google posted various messages in the comments
section of the video; apparently, some flagged it as being inappropriate
and some e-mailed Google requesting for it to be removed. On 7 Novem-
ber 2006, the Italian Postal Police, after a communication from a citizen,
requested Google to remove the video, which was deleted on the same
day. As a result, the video had been available in total for about two months
after it was initially posted. On the aftermath of the incident, three law-
suits were filed against
– the students molesting the victim of the bullying attack on the video
– the teacher and school authorities of the facility where the incident
took place for failing to prevent the incident
– Google Italia and its executives for criminal defamation and violation
of data protection rules. With regard to data protection, the accusation
476 Id.
477 Raul Mendez, Google case in Italy, 1 International Data Privacy Law 137–139
(2011.)
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was that Google Italy was processing personal data, and in particular
health data, illicitly, for the purpose of making a profit478.
Leaving aside all other aspects of the case, it is worth summarizing the
main findings related to the issue of responsibility of the internet service
provider (in this case, Google and its cloud based service Google Videos),
which was found to exist by application of the very broad in scope EU
legislation479 in force at the time. A major part of commentary has found
the decision of the Italian judge in this case defective in various regards.
Most importantly, the decision was slammed because it failed to conceptu-
alize the role of platform providers in the context of the web 2.0480, and
their enabling function with regard to user-driven generation of contents;
in other words, it failed to understand the edgy difference of cloud em-
powered platforms. In any case, this was just one example of several simi-
lar cases that arose during the years of the DPD which, especially as cloud
technologies were taking more and more over older conventional IT solu-
tions, made clear that the cloud era brought with it the need for a profound
shift in the ways in which jurisdiction was recognized in relevant affairs.
International law – Art. 4 para. 1(b) DPD
The second criterion through which EU law in the years of the DPD deter-
mined jurisdiction in data processing and handling matters is that of inter-
national law. Precisely, European data protection laws applied where the
controller was not established on a Member State’s territory, but the law of
at least one Member State applies by virtue of international law481. Such
would be, for instance, the case of a ship or aircraft under a particular
Member State’s flag. In the context of cloud computing, this may be rele-
ii.
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vant for cloud facilities, e.g. data centers, which may be set up on vessels
or platforms floating outside the territorial waters of any Member State482.
Equipment – Art. 4 para. 1(c) DPD
The final grounds on which the DPD had been traditionally basing juris-
diction to apply its data protection law in cases relevant to the provision or
use of cloud computing services was the ‘equipment’ criterion483. Under
this, even if the data controller ‘is not established on Community terri-
tory’, the application of a Member State’s data protection law may never-
theless be valid if this controller ‘makes use of equipment, automated or
otherwise, situated on the territory’ of that State for the purposes of pro-
cessing personal data, unless the equipment is only used ‘for transit
through’ Community territory. We should also not fail to point out that
there is no requirement that the personal data processed had to relate to
EEA individuals.
Changes to current status quo by the upcoming GDPR
Under the newly arriving regime of the GDPR, the issue of material and
territorial scope of European legislation on data processing and transfers
(still the piece of law closest to the nature of the data related activities exe-
cuted via cloud computing) will become even broader. In particular, the
GDPR will apply to organizations which have EU “establishments”,
where personal data are processed “in the context of the activities” of such
an establishment484. As long as this test is met, the GDPR applies irrespec-
tive of whether the actual data processing takes place in the EU or not.
The term “establishment” was analyzed by the Court of Justice of the
European Union in the 2015 Weltimmo vs. NAIH case485. In there the
iii.
iv.
482 While this may sound futuristic, Google has obtained a patent in the United Sta-
tes for such data centers built on ships. So in future there may well be data cen-
ters on ships moored outside territorial waters, with the possibility of flags of
convenience being used for data protection law purposes.
483 W. Kuan Hon, Julia Hörnle & Christopher Millard (note 472.)
484 Art. 3 para. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) (note 25.)
485 Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, Case
C-230/14, (OJ) ECLI:EU:C:2015:639.
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CJEU confirmed that establishment is a “broad” and “flexible” phrase that
should not hinge on any particular legal form. An organization may be
“established” where it exercises “any real and effective activity – even a
minimal one” – through “stable arrangements” in the EU. The presence of
a single representative may be sufficient. In that case, Weltimmo was con-
sidered to be established in Hungary as a result of the use of a website in
Hungarian which advertised Hungarian properties (which meant, accord-
ing to the Court’s interpretation that it was “mainly or entirely directed at
that Member State”), use of a local agent (who was responsible for local
debt collection and acted as a representative in administrative and judicial
proceedings), and use of a Hungarian postal address and bank account for
business purposes – even though Weltimmo was incorporated in Slovakia.
Organizations maintaining EU sales offices, which promote or sell adver-
tising or marketing targeting EU residents, are therefore expected to be
subject to the GDPR as well – since the associated processing of personal
data is considered to be “inextricably linked” to and thus carried out “in
the context of the activities of” those EU establishments486.
Non-EU established legal entities will be subject to the GDPR as well
whenever they process personal data about EU data subjects in connection
with:
– the “offering of goods or services” (payment is not required);
– “monitoring” of their behavior within the EU487.
For the criterion of “offering of goods and services” (but not monitoring)
to be fulfilled, mere accessibility of a site from within the EU is not suffi-
cient. It must be apparent that the organization envisages that activities
will be directed to EU data subjects. Contact addresses accessible from the
EU and the use of a language used in the controller’s own country are also
not sufficient. However, the use of an EU language or currency, the ability
to place orders in that other language and references to EU users or cus-
tomers will be relevant indications that will be taken into account and as-
sessed. The CJEU has examined when an activity (such as offering goods
and services) will be considered “directed to” EU Member States, even
though in a different context unrelated to data processing (i.e. under the
“Brussels 1” Regulation (44/2001/EC) governing jurisdiction in civil and
486 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v AEPD, Mario Costeja González, Case C-131/12,
(OJ) ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
487 Art. 3 para. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) (note 25.)
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commercial matters488). Its comments are one of the few leads we have so
far in our effort to interpret the same aspect of the GDPR. In addition to
the considerations mentioned above, the CJEU notes that an intention to
target EU customers may be illustrated by:
– “patent” evidence, such as the payment of money to a search engine to
facilitate access by those within a Member State or where targeted
Member States are designated by name; and
– other factors – possibly in combination with each other – including the
“international nature” of the relevant activity (e.g. certain tourist activi-
ties), mentions of telephone numbers with an international code, use of
a top-level domain name other than that of the state in which the trader
is established (such as.de or.eu), the description of “itineraries from
Member States to the place where the service is provided” and men-
tions of an “international clientele composed of customers domiciled in
various Member States”489.
It should be noted though that this list is not exhaustive and the question
should be determined on a case-by-case basis, especially until a certain
amount of time has passed by after the GDPR officially enters into force
and enough experience from its actual implementation is accumulated.
It is not clear at this transitional point between the DPD and GDPR eras
whether non-EU organizations offering goods and services to EU busi-
nesses (as opposed to individuals) will fall within the scope of the “offer-
ing goods and services” test in Article 3(2)(a) GDPR. “Monitoring”
specifically includes the tracking of individuals online with the intention
of creating profiles, including where this is used to take decisions to pre-
dict personal preferences, behaviors and attitudes490.
Organizations subject to the GDPR’s long-arm jurisdictional reach must
appoint an EU-based representative. As analyzed immediately above, un-
der the Data Protection Directive, organizations targeting EU data subjects
only had to comply with EU rules if they also made use of “equipment” in
the EU to process personal data. However, this led national supervisory
488 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and en-
forcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (OJ) L 012, 16/01/2001 P. 0001 –
0023.
489 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co and Hotel Alpenhof v Heller;
Joined cases (C-585/08) and (C-144/09), ECLI:EU:C:2010:740.
490 For more on profiling and automated decision making, refer also to Chapter 4.
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authorities, who were seeking to assert jurisdiction, to develop arguments
that the placing of cookies, or requesting users to fill in forms, would
amount to the use of “equipment” in the EU. It is hoped that the GDPR
provisions will make easier to demonstrate that EU law applies; although,
whenever organizations have no EU presence, enforcement may be just as
difficult as before.
From the above, it becomes apparent that EU data protection law cre-
ates for itself an ever-wider space of material and territorial scope. The
same can generally be said for any jurisdiction, in principle: every legal
order is inherently striving to impose itself as much as possible over others
wishing to secure for its subjects an as extended as possible (physical as
well as material) vital space of legal security. This, however, respectively
increases the chances for conflicts among jurisdictions. Therefore, the
need for coordination among different legal orders grows even more im-
portant so that frictions and jurisdictional uncertainty are avoided, as much
as possible. Shifting the focus from data processing as a particular activity
to cloud enabled processes involving data in general and developing cloud
computing regulation rules through this generic perspective will offer a
much more suitable ground for common understanding among different
legal orders.
Technology and internet jurisdiction: a process of parallel ‘give and
take’
The rise and evolution of technology, especially in the field of IT, has de-
cisively defined many different aspects of people’s lives over the latest
decades. Reasonably, this technological omnipresence has also spurred
new legal disputes and cases that called for adjudication. As a result, this
new genre of legal cases has affected all different aspects of judicial pro-
cedure including the one of determination of jurisdiction. Initially, cases
that were born out of technological evolution were mostly seeking to deny
jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement to states where users and vic-
tims were located491. Those cases have been described by a certain num-
b.
491 Joel Reidenberg (note 474).
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ber of scholars as a type of “denial-of-service” attack492 against the legal
system, in particular to the jurisdictions of users and victims.
However, after this initial type of technology-spurred cases that threat-
ened to stir an imbalance between jurisdictions of countries that were
home to IT providers over those of users or victims of malicious practices
involving IT innovations, the trend was reversed493. The continued surge
in IT has already tamed and will further undermine the initial technologi-
cal assault on state jurisdiction. This reverse of the tide was made possible
thanks to the fact that as computing gets more sophisticated, so it enhances
the processing capabilities and power of users’ computers494. These tech-
nologically advanced machines are gradually giving to the victim’s state a
wider nexus of tools for dealing with offending acts, while it greatly facili-
tates the establishment of a direct relationship with the offender for pur-
poses of personal jurisdiction and choice of law495. Even more, some of
these innovations additionally enable states to enforce their decisions elec-
tronically and, consequently, bypass the problems of foreign recognition
and enforcement of judgments496.
This peculiar ‘war’ between exercises of state power through assertions
of jurisdiction and technologically spurred legal issues has proven to be
beneficial for technology itself497. In fact, out of this friction came consid-
erable momentum that helped the advancement of pioneering granular
technologies498 and the consolidation of new service markets for legal
compliance499.
In conclusion, the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction to protect citizens
might indeed be a tricky thing that is far from being settled and, actually, it
urgently needs to be revisited. Additionally, another aspect of the matter is
that the phenomenon is likely to advance the fundamental public policy
premise that the rule of law should be supreme to technological determin-
492 Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warefare: New Challenges for Public International
Law, 37 Harv. Int'l LJ 272–568 (1996.)
493 Joel Reidenberg (note 474).
494 Joel Reidenberg (note 173).
495 Reidenberg, J. R., Schwartz, P. M. (note 174).
496 Joel Reidenberg (note 175).
497 Joel Reidenberg (note 474).
498 Id.
499 Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning speech on the Internet: A legal and
technical model, 98 Michigan Law Review 395–431 (1999.)
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ism500. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of states with jurisdiction over Inter-
net activities is also likely to stimulate creativity towards new Internet ser-
vices such as more accurate and selective filtering technologies, stronger
security zones and more robust, customized compliance capabilities via
sophisticated applications. In that sense, and taking for granted that the va-
riety of choice on the jurisdictional front is not going to cease from exist-
ing any time soon, an attempt to build a minimum threshold of under-
standing between competing jurisdictions about what they view and un-
derstand as ‘cloud computing’ or by other terms related to IT advance-
ments and applications could even serve as one extra catalyst that would
accelerate innovation. ‘Playing’ with known rules but, at the same time,
having to come up with arrangements that will work with all different in-
terpretations of these rules is a condition favorable to technological evolu-
tion501.
These observations are also backed by two of the most prominent aca-
demics in the field of IT law and regulation502. From one side, Paul
Schwartz has formulated the thesis that “different parties in the cloud can
contribute inputs, outputs, analytics, and execute different kinds of ac-
tions. The result of this distributed computing environment is to permit
dramatic flexibility in processing decisions – on a global basis.”503
On the other side, Lawrence Lessig has portrayed this unconventional
relation between legal rules and technological capacities with an emphatic
dictum: “code is the law of cyberspace.”504 Indeed, the architecture of the
internet – its code, network protocols and enabling technologies – is what
determines what can or cannot be done on the network505. Lessig went so
far to actually suggest that “as the underlying code of the network ulti-
mately dictates the rules to which users are compelled to obey (whether or
not these rules are actually endorsed by the law), it becomes a de facto
law”506.
500 Id.
501 Joel Reidenberg (note 474).
502 E. Kosta, Consent in European Data Protection Law (2013); Steffen Kroschwald
ed. (note 317).
503 Reidenberg, J. R., Schwartz, P. M. (note 174).
504 L. Lessig, Code and other laws of cyberspace (1999.)
505 Lawrence Lessig, Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal 1–14 (2003.)
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From data protection law to international jurisdiction on the internet;
adapting laws to modern needs and reality
As defined under public international law ‘jurisdiction is a State’s right to
regulate conduct in matters not exclusively of domestic concern’507. It
needs to be made clear that the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ must not be con-
fused with neighboring terms as choice of law, ‘conflict of laws’, or ‘ap-
plicable law’, which deal with the question of which law or laws shall be
applied in a given case. However, as the complexity of matters seeking ju-
dicial remedy increases, jurisdiction and choice of law as concepts become
closely related, and the distinction between them has become increasingly
vague508.
In an effort to trace the updated meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ when it comes
to issues stemming from cloud computing technologies, one may depart
from neighboring legal fields which are already sufficiently regulated.
Probably the closest field from which useful information could be extract-
ed to serve as the basis for a theoretical discourse about the question of
jurisdiction in cloud computing matters is that of data protection. Data
protection law should not be regarded as falling entirely within either pri-
vate or public law. In fact, the body of law known today as data protection
derives from a wide variety of legal sources, namely consumer protection
law, human rights law, internal market law, and others509.
As Jon Bing has stated: ‘Data protection legislation will typically con-
tain provisions of a public law nature, relating to an authority and its du-
ties and decisions. But the law will also often include civil law provisions,
typically on liability for data protection violations. The provisions of data
protection legislation may therefore have to be qualified as belonging to
different areas of law, to which different relevant connection criteria are
assigned. Following the traditional method, different aspects of one case
may then have to be decided by different lex causae, which easily may
lead to distortions as the legislation is conceived as an organic whole
c.
507 C. Kuner, Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet
(Part 2), 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 227–247
(2010.)
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509 C. Kuner, Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet
(Part 1), 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 176–193
(2010.)
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where the different provisions support an appropriate solution’510. One
should not forget that the origins of data protection law in consumer pro-
tection and human rights law may also indicate that courts and data pro-
tection authorities could regard some of its rules as ordre publique, i.e. di-
rectly and unconditionally enforceable regardless of the applicable law511.
While, as it is known, public international law only applies directly to
relations between States, it also serves another purpose as the basic limit-
ing standard of the international legal order and the testing ground for ju-
risdictional rules affecting private parties in different States as well512. In
fact, even for the specific field of IT, the Article 29 Working Party has rec-
ognized that “jurisdiction under data protection law should be evaluated
under public international law”513. Besides, the legality of jurisdictional
rules under international law is important because of the global nature of
the Internet. Since both major legal systems that are under focus in this
study, i.e. those of the EU and the US, at least attempt to interpret domes-
tic law in harmony with international law, the main assumptions of inter-
national law on jurisdiction can be vital in the quest for a harmonized ap-
proach on cloud related matters.
Although there is a certain degree of overlap between them, jurisdiction
in international law is generally divided up into three different cat-
egories514:
– Legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction, which is ‘the power of a
State to apply its laws to cases involving a foreign element’515. Legis-
lative jurisdiction is, at most times, concurrent rather than exclusive516.
A very typical example of legislative jurisdiction in the area of data
510 J. Bing, Data Protection, jurisdiction and the choice of law Privacy Laws & Poli-
cy Reporter 92–98 (1999.)
511 Christopher Kuner, Internet Jurisdiction and Data Protection Law: An Interna-
tional Legal Analysis (Part 2), 18 International Journal of Law and Information
Technology 227–257 (2010.)
512 Id.
513 Article 29 Working Party, Working document on determining the international
application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet
by non-EU based websites, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protectio
n/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm.
514 C. Kuner (note 507).
515 Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the Internet. A study of regulatory competence over
online activity (2010.)
516 Svantesson, Dan Jerker B, Private international law and the internet (2012.)
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protection law is the application of EU data protection law to a web-
page located outside the EU that deploys cookies to process personal
data of individuals residing within the EU area. In the field of cloud
computing, one case where prescriptive jurisdiction would apply is
when the servers of a cloud provider with whose resources personal
data of individuals from within the EU area are processed are located
outside the EU.
– Adjudicative jurisdiction, which means ‘the power of a State’s courts
to try cases involving a foreign element’517. An example of this type of
jurisdiction occurs when a European data protection authority that de-
cides on a complaint submitted by an individual residing in the EU
with regard to the processing of their personal data by an entity outside
the EU. If, in addition, we consider data protection law as ‘public law’,
adjudicative jurisdiction becomes identical to legislative jurisdic-
tion518. Mutatis mutandis, an example of adjudicative jurisdiction in
the realm of cloud computing occurs when a DPA investigates the
practices of a cloud resources provider outside the EU, which are uti-
lized for processing data belonging to EU law subjects.
– Enforcement jurisdiction, which refers to ‘the power of one State to
perform acts in the territory of another State’519. One such instance is
when a European data protection authority moves to conduct an audit
of an entity headquartered outside the EU. Similarly, in the case of
cloud computing, enforcement jurisdiction occurs when a European
DPA moves to carry out an audit on the facilities of a cloud provider
headquartered outside the EU area.
It shouldn’t be overlooked that the legality of any of these types of juris-
diction is closely connected with that of the other types, while any limita-
tions on one type of jurisdiction may also have effects the scope of the
others520.
Logically, each of the different types of jurisdiction described above
need a conceptual basis to be founded on521. The following are the juris-
517 Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 145–
258 (1972.)
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dictional bases that have become most widely accepted, and that are most
relevant to data protection law:
– Territoriality: Following the principle of territoriality, jurisdiction is
determined based on the acts that have been committed within the ter-
ritory of the judging state522. A variation of it is the ‘objective territori-
ality principle’, according to which the act under judgement was initi-
ated outside but completed within the territory of the state, or a consti-
tuting element of the conduct under examination occurred within the
territory of the state claiming jurisdiction523. Much as the territoriality
principle is probably the most fundamental one for concretizing juris-
diction, the Internet greatly complicates application of it; as it has been
already explained, it can be nearly impossible or resources-wise non-
viable to localize an online action down to the territory of a particular
State.
– Personality: Under the principle of personality, jurisdiction is asserted
by the state of nationality of the perpetrator (active personality princi-
ple) or of the victim (passive personality principle)524. This jurisdic-
tional principle is prevalent in criminal law; however, there are in-
stances when it is applied also in civil law525. When it comes to cloud
computing, a lot of details merit clarification before the personality
principle can be applied; such as, how is the perpetrator among all
those actors making a cloud-based processing possible, whether the
cloud services user, who may also be the person that finally bears the
burden of a cloud-based processing, can be billed as the victim of an
act if he/she was also the one that had triggered off the processing etc.
– Effects doctrine: The ‘effects doctrine’ has traditionally been regarded
as the most controversial of all jurisdictional bases526. According to it,
jurisdiction is claimed based on the fact that a certain conduct outside a
state has effects within the state527. Despite the relentless critique it has
attracted, the effects doctrine seems to have become widespread, par-
ticularly with regard to assertions of jurisdiction over conduct on the
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Internet528. The basic argument of opponents of the effects doctrine is
that it is open-ended, since ‘in a globalized economy, everything has an
effect on everything’529. An additional point of friction is that ‘the
widening of the reach of effect based jurisdictional rules results in a
widening of the gap between reasonable grounds for jurisdictional, and
application of law, claims on the one hand and reasonable grounds for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on the other’530.
– Protective principle: The protective principle has been conceptualized
with the aim of protecting a state from acts committed outside its terri-
tory but which jeopardize its sovereignty531. Jurisdiction founded on
this basis is usually limited exclusively to criminal law or serious vio-
lations that endanger the security of a country532; such instances would
normally not include data protection violations. Besides, the focus of
the protective principle is on protection of the state, not of individuals
(who are the main subject of protection of data protection law)533.
However, at least in the EU, Member States have been lately interpret-
ing the protective principle under a much wider scope than security is-
sues, so that it resembles an application of the objective territoriality or
the effects doctrine and, of course, from that perspective many internet
or cloud related issues are also included534 (e.g. the calls for investiga-
tions on the wire-tapping of communications of civilians by foreign in-
telligence agencies as an anti-terrorist protective measure).
What is the problem with asserting jurisdiction over cloud-related
cases under current EU laws?
Goldsmith and Wu, two of the most prominent figures of the wider area of
IT law, have expressed the view that jurisdictional uncertainties related to
d.
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Internet matters have been exaggerated535. In fact, they try to support this
estimate by putting forward the following considerations:
– unilateral assertions of jurisdiction by States on the web are no differ-
ent than those they make in other areas;
– technological fixes (like geolocation) offer ways in which entities can
minimize their legal exposure against overlapping and exorbitant juris-
dictional claims;
– there is no need to worry about all kinds of jurisdictions, just because
you are doing business online. Instead, the parties need only take into
consideration the relevant laws of states that are capable of taking en-
forcement action in relation to their case; for instance, the states which
can initiate liquidation proceedings against assets of the defendant in-
side their territory;
– finally, it is argued that awareness is increasing that dealing with juris-
dictional issues is part of the cost of doing business on the internet.
However, these ‘jurisdictional threats’ are not always substantial; for
instance, jurisdiction under EU law against a data controller without
assets in the EU but has been using cookies on its website to process
the data of Europeans should be of little concern to the controller, since
there is no plausible chance of enforcement.
Even if these approaches are fair, by and large, the problems caused by on-
line jurisdictional uncertainties in the context of data protection and cloud
computing appear to be more serious than these536. As it has been already
demonstrated ‘cloud computing’, as a term, is not synonymous to ‘data
processing’ but it refers to a much wider range of technologies, which
serve as facilitators of many different IT applications537. Consequently, if
we continue to resort to laws that regulate the cloud without being specifi-
cally customized for the cloud, we will continue resorting to legislation
that will cover a wide variety of online data-related tasks while lacking the
necessary degree of specialization, thus increasing the odds for jurisdic-
tional conflicts.
535 Jack L. Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who controls the Internet? Illusions of a border-
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Moreover, when the rules resolving jurisdictional matters with regard to
a law are versed in such a broad and open to interpretation manner, while
the chances that this law will indeed be enforced are not equally broad,
there is an inherent risk that respect for this law from its subjects will
eventually be diminished538. Statistics and experience prove that the gap
between compliance and enforcement of European data protection law up
to date has been certainly large, even within the EU539. At the current
standpoint, which coincides with the end of the DPD era, relevant figures
that can be retrieved for that piece of law speak volumes: for example540,
the Spanish DPA had stated that in 2007 it had received 8,463 notifica-
tions from data controllers about international data transfers. However, it
has to be pointed out that all telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, Internet
browsing activities, etc. executed between end users in Spain and coun-
tries outside the EU are also to be considered ‘international data transfers’
in the sense of data protection law. As a result, all these occurrences might
also be subject to a duty of notification, which means that out of these
8,463 reports several can be essentially insignificant, while there may be
millions or even billion others which may go on completely unreported541.
Therefore, a balancing exercise is necessary in order for the EU body of
law to acquire cloud-specific laws that will be more concrete and will pri-
marily apply on actual instances where personal privacy and similar rights
are at stake and not merely when a process fulfils the technical criteria for
being defined as data processing.
Steps to reduce jurisdictional disputes from the perspective of EU law
Achieving greater jurisdictional clarity in conflicts related to cases caused
by cloud-based applications or their uses is not possible solely by changes
e.
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to jurisdictional rules. It can a priori be said that, given the fragmented
landscape put together by different jurisdictions, there is not one such rule,
or set of rules that could both envisage all cases where jurisdiction under
cloud computing law would be justified, and at the same time, avoid un-
justifiably extending jurisdiction in other cases. Notwithstanding, other
measures compatible with the European legal thinking and practice so far
could be taken that could help jurisdictional rules become more relevant
and to the point while producing a more balanced framework for protec-
tion especially in cross-border cases. Such measures could include, prima-
rily542:
– greater harmonization of the law: As demonstrated already, application
of a state’s data protection law and assertions of jurisdiction by that
state seem to go hand in hand. Consequently, greater harmonization of
data protection or cloud computing laws would contribute to reducing
the number and the scope of jurisdictional conflicts ignited by them.
Despite the primary role EU law has played so far in personal data543,
IT and alike legislations, the respective laws around the world are in-
spired by divergent cultural and legal values544. Harmonization of data
protection and similar nature laws in a comprehensive, or universal,
manner is unlikely to be achieved. However, as this project maintains
as its primary thesis, a lot more could be done to achieve a quasi- or
even a genuinely global understanding of key notions of cloud comput-
ing technologies and their most common implementations, prime
among which is, undoubtedly, data protection law (for instance, terms
like ‘personal data’, ‘data controller’ or ‘data processor’).
– cooperation between regulatory authorities: Cooperation among na-
tional or regional regulators can greatly contribute to the concretization
of the scope and impact of jurisdictional conflicts545. A culture of rap-
prochement and coordination of enforcement actions, along with the
adoption of common positions on important substantive legal issues
are areas of cooperation where the world’s DPAs could achieve real
progress in the foreseeable future.
– technical solutions: Technical means such as geolocation, which are
becoming more widely available, though not a solution per se, can help
542 Id.
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reduce jurisdictional conflicts by helping to ‘map’ the Internet, thus
making it easier to limit jurisdictional uncertainty546.
– development of a theory of reasonableness547: As Lowenfeld suggests,
any theory developed with the aim of providing answers to the broad
issue of jurisdiction, at the end of the day, attempts to strike a compro-
mise between legal certainty and flexibility. The rules that may, at any
time, be adopted “need to be clear and definite enough to lead to an ac-
ceptable degree of legal certainty, but also flexible enough to cover un-
foreseen and complex situations, which suggests the need for a ‘safety
valve’ that allows jurisdiction not to be asserted even when technically
it could be”548. This concept, code-named as the ‘concept of reason-
ableness’, is intended to help resolve particular situations, typical
among which are those when there is a jurisdictional conflict between
regulators in two sovereign states549.
– The use of the reasonableness doctrine to limit jurisdictional assertions
was met, primarily, with strong criticism, as it seemed too vague a cri-
terion to be useful in practice550. Mann also famously argued that juris-
diction should be based on a ‘link’ as an objective tie to the forum that
is distinct from ‘mere political, economic, commercial or social inter-
ests’551. However, as IT evolves and its main implementing technolo-
gies become more and more defiant of conventional boundaries, such
as geographical or jurisdictional borders, we need to revisit suggestions
like the reasonableness test and assess how they could offer answers to
modern challenges.
546 Jack L. Goldsmith & Tim Wu (note 535); Zachary NJ Peterson, Mark Gondree,
Robert Beverly, A position paper on data sovereignty: the importance of geolo-
cating data in the cloud Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Hot top-
ics in cloud computing (2011.)
547 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International litigation and the quest for reasonableness.
Essays in private international law (1996.)
548 Dan Svantesson, Protecting Privacy on the 'Borderless' Internet – Some Thoughts
on Extraterritoriality and Transborder Data Flow, 19 Bond Law Review 168–
187 (2007.)
549 C. Kuner (note 507).
550 Svantesson, Dan Jerker B., Privacy, the Internet and Transborder Data Flows –
An Australian Perspective, 4 Masaryk University journal of law and technology 1
(2010.)
551 F. A. Mann & Académie de droit international de La Haye., The doctrine of inter-
national jurisdiction revisited after twenty years, 186 Recueil des cours = Col-
lected courses 9–116 (1984.)
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– greater interdisciplinary collaboration between the jurisdiction and data
protection world and the IT world: Up to this point, there has been only
limited interaction between scholars, international organizations, regu-
lators, and others working on international jurisdiction or on data pro-
tection and the members of the IT industry, who are the minds that ac-
tually make possible all the applications that have ignited the problems
which are discussed in this study. However, this one-sighted approach
has to change and bodies dealing with international jurisdictional is-
sues (such as The Hague Conference on Private International Law,
UNCITRAL, and others) have to turn their interest also in IT, cloud
computing and data protection law552. At the same time, they need to
invite and closely collaborate with representatives from the IT industry,
who can offer the input and ideas of someone with hands-on experi-
ence on the matter.
The internet jurisdiction risk of cloud computing under US law
After a thorough presentation of the jurisdictional risks associated to IT
law and, in particular, cloud computing given the current thinking on de-
termining jurisdiction in Europe, it is now time to turn to the US legal sys-
tem and assess how American legal thinking deals with these questions.
The basics about determining jurisdiction under US law
US courts have struggled over jurisdictional issues related to the internet
in cases of both domestic and international nature since many years553.
The main legal instruments through which US justice has claimed and ex-
ercised jurisdiction over this type of cases are:
– Personal jurisdiction
Generally, according to US laws, courts exert personal jurisdiction over
individuals or businesses that are residents of, or that are physically locat-
ed within, a political jurisdiction, i.e., county, state, or country554. For an
f.
i.
552 C. Kuner (note 507).
553 Burke T. Ward & Janice C. Sipior, The Internet Jurisdiction Risk of Cloud Com-
puting, 27 Information Systems Management 334–339 (2010.)
554 Id.
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assertion of personal jurisdiction to be valid, it must satisfy the require-
ments of the ‘due process clause’555 prescribed in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the US Constitution. Under certain circumstances, a court
can exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident individuals and busi-
nesses under the authority of a state long arm statute556. Such statutes
serve as a “long arm” to reach defendants outside of the geographical ju-
risdictional boundaries of the court. One such example of long arm juris-
diction would be a Missouri resident being served with a legal process by
a California court.
– Sufficient minimum contacts and long arm jurisdiction
Beginning with International Shoe Company v. State of Washington
(1945)557, the US Supreme Court has held that due process requires that it
be established that the non-resident defendant has sufficient minimum
contacts with the state attempting to exercise jurisdiction558. The nature of
the contacts has to be such that the exercise of jurisdiction did not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice559.
555 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution contain
a due process clause. Due process refers to the administration of justice, acting as
a safeguard from arbitrary denials of life, liberty, or property by the Government.
The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted even broader interpretations
of the clauses, which, as it is has found, provide four protections: procedural due
process (in civil and criminal proceedings), substantive due process, a prohibition
against vague laws, and, lastly, act as the vehicle for the incorporation of the Bill
of Rights. Due process, in other words, ensures the rights and equality of all citi-
zens.
556 Long-arm statute is one that allows for a state court to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state defendant on the basis of certain acts committed by an
out-of-state defendant, provided that the defendant has a sufficient connection
with the state.
557 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95
(1945.)
558 Burke T. Ward & Janice C. Sipior (note 553.)
559 ‘Fair play and substantial justice’ notion: a requirement or standard of fairness
that must be made by a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant in order to sufficiently deter a violation of the defendant's right to
due process.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that ‘in order
for a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose residence is else-
where, the court must establish that the defendant has such minimum contacts
with the state that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’. The main factors used to
make this determination are:
CHAPTER 6. Jurisdiction and accountability in the cloud
174
The minimum contacts standard560 necessitates at least some physical
presence prior to determining jurisdiction. In commercial transactions, the
minimum contacts standard has been found to be met, in general, by the
presence of a store, warehouse, salesperson, agent, or physical pres-
ence561. An example of a transaction is the execution of a sales contract;
an example of an occurrence is an automobile accident. Overall, a long
arm statute gives jurisdictional statutory authority to a local court to hear a
case and make a judgment against an out-of-state defendant.
– Long arm statutes to assert internet jurisdiction
The development of the internet has spurred a series of US States to enact
long arm statutes enabling them to assert jurisdiction over defendants who
take part in e-commerce or other internet activities562. One of the oldest
such instances, nearly a decade ago, is Georgia’s Computer Systems Pro-
tection Act, which contains rules for authorizing jurisdiction over comput-
er related crimes563. The act stipulates that Georgia will have jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant ‘in any county for which, to which or
through which any use of a computer or a computer network was made,
whether by wires, electromagnetic waves, microwaves or any other means
of communication’564. The said statute had been met with certain reserva-
tions by its opponents; the most important among the arguments565 was
that the act was viewed as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce and
violate the dormant commerce clause566. The dormant commerce clause
prohibits states from unduly burdening interstate commerce. Their argu-
i. the difficulty for the defendant of appearing in the court
ii. the state's interest in deciding the case
iii. the plaintiff's interest in the convenience of the court
iv. the effectiveness of the relief to be obtained there.
560 ‘Minimum contacts’ is a term used in the United States law of civil procedure to
determine when it is appropriate for a court in one state to assert personal juris-
diction over a defendant from another state.
561 Id.
562 Id.
563 Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act, H. B. No. 822 (available under http://




566 The "dormant commerce clause”, also known as the "negative commerce clause”,
is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have formulated out of the
commerce clause in Article I of the United States Constitution. The commerce
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ment is based on prior Supreme Court decisions where the Court invalidat-
ed statutes that attempted to regulate interstate commerce or violated the
dormant commerce clause567. Since then, a lot more statutes of similar na-
ture have been set up by US states in their effort to claim jurisdiction and
exert power over the complex issues instigated by the online world and its
facilitating technologies.
Jurisdiction under the influence of technological evolution; practices
for alleviating jurisdiction risks in the US and internationally over IT-
related cases
As technology changes and evolutions in IT, in particular, impact society,
laws are forced to live up to the demands of these changes. These adjust-
ments of laws to the new reality are accomplished through amended legis-
lation, judicial decisions, or both. Similarly, US law has moved to respond
to these challenges and the new questions they raise over the issue of juris-
diction not only via enactment of new laws that have moved their focus
from physical presence to the economics and effects of the commercial ac-
tivity568. In part, this evolution was also brought about by a series of cases
involving mail order vendors; yet, it did not result in an absolute jurisdic-
tional standard for e-commerce569. These precedent cases are used in
courts for bolstering a still fervent argumentation regarding jurisdiction.
ii.
clause expressly grants to the US Congress the power to regulate commerce
"among the several states." Conversely, the dormant commerce clause expresses
the idea that this grant of power implies the opposite power — i.e., a restriction
deterring a state from passing laws that would improperly burden or introduce
discrimination practices against interstate commerce. This restriction is self-exe-
cuting and immediately applicable even in the absence of a conflict between state
and federal statutes, but Congress may allow states to pass legislation that would
otherwise be forbidden by the dormant commerce clause.
567 Id.
568 Id.
569 An indicative list of such cases brought out by US courts would include:
i. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 1996; Federal District Court for the Sou-
thern District of New York denied jurisdiction by focusing on the local nature of
the alleged infringing activity (Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 1996; Mano-
lopoulos, 2003)
ii. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DotCom, Inc., 1997; Federal District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania determined jurisdiction on a “passive vs. ac-
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In the end, no conclusive answer exists yet as to how to address the ju-
risdiction risk posed by the most up-to-date IT tools, cloud computing in
particular. On the contrary, US laws are far from offering a tried and set-
tled test as to determine how to exert jurisdiction on the internet in the US
or internationally570. The majority of US scholarly opinion maintains the
position that the cloud is inherently global, calling for a cross-jurisdiction-
al solution571. On the other hand, cloud computing providers systematical-
ly seek to reduce liability by proposing cloud service agreements with “as
is” provisions572 and no warranty573. This means that most cloud services
are provided without any assurance or promise of a specific level of per-
formance. In response, businesses, for the moment and until the issue of
jurisdictional rules regarding the cloud is settled, prior to adopting cloud
computing need to consider internet jurisdiction risk, as well as other legal
issues574, before deploying a cloud service. The most important criteria
against which a cloud service needs to be evaluated before it is adopted or
rejected by a business, and which ideally should be assessed both in their
virtual and physical dimensions are currently regarded to be575:
tive” or “sliding scale” test, cited as precedent in many subsequent cases (Geist,
2001; Hestermeyer, 2006; Manolopoulos, 2003; Minnesota v. Granite Gate Re-
sorts, Inc., 1997; Rosenthal, 2003; Rustad & Koenig, 2006; Waldmeir, 2003; Wa-
re, 2006; Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 1997)
iii. People Solutions, Inc. v. People Solutions, Inc., 2000; Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Texas held that personal jurisdiction should not be ba-
sed on the mere possibility that it is possible to do business (People Solutions,
Inc. v. People Solutions, Inc., 2000).
570 Joel Reidenberg (note 474).
571 Michael R. Nelson, The Cloud, the Crowd, and Public Policy, 25 Issues in sci-
ence and technology 71–76 (2009.)
572 “As is” is a term used in contract law to disclaim some implied warranties for an
item being sold. "As is" denotes that the seller is selling, and the buyer is buying
an item or server in whatever condition it is at the time the buy is effected, while
the buyer is accepting the item "with all faults", whether or not immediately ap-
parent. An “as is” contract puts the buyer in a situation described as the "buyer
beware" status, in which buyer is advised to take the time to examine the item or
service before accepting it or to ask expert advice for this assessment.
573 McAlpine C., Weigh Legal Risks of Cloud Computing, available at: http://www.b
aselinemag.com/c/a/Legal/Weigh-Legal-Risks-of-Cloud-Computing-869422 (19
February 2016.)
574 See also Chapter 7.
575 Burke T. Ward & Janice C. Sipior (note 553).
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– considering how serious the jurisdiction risk is when compared to a
company’s corporate strategy;
– establishing a governance structure tackling cloud computing particu-
larities across the enterprise;
– determining the appropriate cloud computing model before selecting a
service, i.e. picking a service which complies with the company’s
adopted cloud protocols;
– partnering with the cloud provider instead of simply subscribing to its
services in order to secure an, as much as possible, customized service;
and
– securing adequate liability insurance that will keep them immune, to a
certain degree, against the financial exposure of internet liability.
Corporate strategy as a pre-emptive measure for facing the long arm of
cloud jurisdiction
As a rule, businesses maintain that they should comply with the laws of all
countries in which they conduct business and avoid violating laws in
countries in which they do not do business576 but in which their facilities,
applications or the data they handle physically reside. Consequently, this
global legal environment which, however, is contradicted by the fragment-
ed landscape of different legal orders, demands that modern businesses’
corporate strategies directly address jurisdiction risk both on its virtual and
physical dimensions577. In the end, proper evaluation of jurisdictional im-
plications has become a de facto and constant managerial activity, at least
until the jurisdictional hurdles the cloud poses are effectively tackled by
law.
Virtual and physical environments
The overall behavior of businesses towards cloud computing need also
take into account the double nature, which is almost inherent to all kinds




577 Reidenberg, J. R., Schwartz, P. M. (note 174); Reinhard Posch (note 240).
578 Burke T. Ward & Janice C. Sipior (note 553).
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lizing the cloud almost unanimously operate in two environments, the vir-
tual, and the physical ones579. These two may be regarded as separate and
distinct; however, corporate strategy must comprehensively address legal
issues raised by both of them580.
Accepting the inherent nature of cloud jurisdiction risk
In conclusion, it is evident from the examination that has been carried out
that, under the present status quo of US laws, the jurisdiction risk associat-
ed with cloud computing is continuous and inherent. Therefore, businesses
are advised to maintain corporate strategies that steadily look for ways to
reduce this risk. The practical way to achieve this is by conducting a de-
tailed legal analysis and assessment of those risks across different coun-
tries and multiple jurisdictions, certainly in those which are relevant for
each undertaking (i.e. the legal order where the company resides, where it
has its data storage facilities or where its services are accessible etc.).
Based on this constant monitoring mechanisms, the governing body of
a business is expected to make conscious and deliberate decisions or adap-
tations thereof as to where and how cloud computing processes of the en-
terprise are conducted. These strategic decisions are made and reviewed
based on criteria such as a company’s capabilities and resources, knowl-
edge base, applicable domestic and foreign laws and perceptions of risk in
conducting business activities581.
Where are cloud data centers located? How jurisdiction plays a major
part in deciding on geographic location, economic and environmental
parameters in cloud computing
Having examined how Europe and the US treat the issue of determining
jurisdiction over cloud computing, it is worth briefly summarizing how
the above practices bear real effect on the actual cloud computing busi-
ness. Essentially, what makes cloud computing possible is the data centers
ii.
h.
579 Robert Ware, The strategic use of American cyberlaw and cyberspace jurispru-
dence, 48 Managerial Law 303–321 (2006.)
580 Burke T. Ward & Janice C. Sipior (note 553).
581 Robert Ware (note 579).
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where data of the users of various services are hosted and which provide
the resources necessary for the execution of any processing tasks involv-
ing that data. Anyone who is interested in setting up a data center that will
offer services based on cloud computing technologies and protocols evalu-
ates the following four primary considerations of where in order to choose
where their data center will be constructed582:
– Suitable physical space in which the warehouse–sized buildings that
will host the data center’s hardware will be located
– Proximity to high–capacity Internet connections
– The availability of affordable electricity or other energy resources
– The laws, policies, and regulations of the local jurisdiction
Interestingly but not surprisingly, one of the major factors weighing de-
cisively on the decision regarding the location of cloud computing data
centers is the jurisdictional issues that the chosen location will give rise to.
As it has already been sufficiently demonstrated, the laws, policies, and
regulations of a particular jurisdiction can have a significant impact both
on the cloud provider and the cloud user. Governments and legislators can
either stifle or promote the development of cloud computing within a par-
ticular jurisdiction with the decisions they are empowered to make and the
laws they can enact on the topic.
We have already examined the main challenges the issue of jurisdiction
raises with regard to doing business in the field of cloud computing. Simi-
larly, numerous and equally gravitational law and policy concerns exist
also for cloud users as a result of the jurisdiction risk associated to the
cloud583. For users, the most crucial of these issues and expectations in-
clude584:
– Access: users expect to be able to access and use the cloud where and
when they wish without any hindrance from the cloud provider or third
parties.
– Reliability: users expect the cloud to be a reliable resource, especially
if they assign to their cloud provider tasks that are of a critical nature to
their business or online presence, in general.
582 Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin, Justin M. Grimes & Shannon N. Simmons (note 208).
583 Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin & Justin M. Grimes, Cloud Computing and Informati-
on Policy: Computing in a Policy Cloud?, 5 Journal of Information Technology
& Politics 269–283 (2008.)
584 Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin, Justin M. Grimes & Shannon N. Simmons (note 208).
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– Security: users expect that the cloud provider will not allow unautho-
rized access to both data and code, and that these will remain secure at
all times.
– Data confidentiality and privacy: users expect that their cloud provider,
other third parties, and governments will not monitor their activities,
with the exception of cloud providers selectively monitoring usage for
quality control purposes.
– Liability: users expect clear delineation of liability if serious problems
occur.
– Intellectual property: users and third party content providers expect
that their intellectual property rights will be upheld.
– Ownership of data: users expect to be able regulate and control the in-
formation that is created and modified using the cloud services they
have chosen.
– Portability: users expect that data and resources stored in one cloud fa-
cility can be easily moved or transferred to another facility or service
with little or no effort.
– Auditability: users, particularly corporate, expect that providers will
comply with regulations or at least be able to provide them the option
to have them audited per regulation requirements.
Accountability on the cloud
Accountability: the essentials from data protection to cloud computing
Having discussed the issue of how to claim jurisdiction over cases seeking
judicial resolution in the field of cloud computing and the broader area of
IT law, it is now time to look on the other side of the coin. Besides estab-
lishing rules that answer the question what court or jurisdiction is compe-
tent to adjudicate on a case, immediately afterwards comes the question of
who is to be held responsible about that case.
In the most up-to-date fields of human activity, the term used to refer to
this responsibility about an act or incident is ‘accountability’585. The term
PART II:
a.
585 Siani Pearson & Andrew Charlesworth, Accountability as a Way Forward for
Privacy Protection in the Cloud, in Cloud computing. First international confer-
ence, CloudCom 2009, Beijing, China, December 1-4, 2009 : proceedings, 131–
144 (Martin Gilje Jaatun, Gansen Zhao & Chunming Rong eds., 2009.)
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is anything but new but recently it has been coined with several meanings:
from an ethics and governance point of view (stricto sensu accountability),
accountability is implied as answerability, liability, and, of course, as the
respective expectation of account-giving586. Viewed as a sub-sector of
governance (lato sensu accountability, accountability has been associated
with issues in public, nonprofit as well as private (corporate) sector, even
within individual contexts587.
In recent governance theories, accountability has expanded beyond the
basic concept of "being called to account for one's actions"588. Several re-
searchers have brought forward a description of accountability as a rela-
tionship, an at least two-party structure with account-giving between its
constituents at its core589. In an illustrative manner, accountability is the
bond between actor A and actor B when "A is accountable to B when A is
obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to jus-
tify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct"590.
It goes without saying that, as a tracking and reporting mechanism, ac-
countability cannot function without proper accounting practices and
mechanisms; in other words, an absence of an accounting workflow auto-
matically means an absence of accountability591. On a generic level, the
essential elements for a solid accountability policy are592:
– commitment of the organization adopting accountability to the main
principles of it and adoption of internal policies consistent with exter-
nal criteria.
– mechanisms that will put privacy policies into effect, such as relevant
tools, training and education.
586 Clarence A. Dykstra, The Quest for Responsibility, 33 The American Political
Science Review 1–25 (1939.)
587 M. Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in
Complex Organisations (1998.)
588 Richard Mulgan, 'Accountability'. An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 Public Ad-
ministration 555–573 (2000.)
589 Andrew Charlesworth (note 185).
590 Andreas Schedler, Larry Jay Diamond & Marc F. Plattner, The self-restraining
state. Power and accountability in new democracies (1999.)
591 Siani Pearson & Andrew Charlesworth (note 585).
592 Centre for Information Policy Leadership, Data Protection Accountability: The
Essential Elements A Document for Discussion, available at: http://www.huntonf
iles.com/files/webupload/CIPL_Galway_Accountability_Paper.pdf (19 March
2015.)
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– systems enabling constant oversight internally, towards collecting the
data necessary for regular assurance reviews and, eventually, external
verification.
– transparency and mechanisms facilitating individual participation in
the accountability process.
– means for remediation and external enforcement.
Accountability in the broad field of data management and protection is de-
signed with a view to make some strong protection processes for data pos-
sible593. Where implemented, accountability allows the said organization
much more extensive flexibility to adapt its data practices594. Of course, in
order for it to function properly and efficiently, it requires that the organi-
zation commit to and actively demonstrate its upholding of responsible
policies and of systems necessary to ensure those policies are carried out
in a manner that protects information and the individuals to which it be-
longs or refers595. In other words, accountability as a governance practice,
requires that an organization remains accountable no matter where the in-
formation it handles is processed. Functioning under the prism of account-
ability, a data-related organization is less interested in the rules that exist
where the data is processed and more in those applicable where the obliga-
tion is first established596. That said, it becomes evident that data manage-
ment accountability is purpose oriented and constructed based on a teleo-
logical perspective, putting emphasis not on when and where a breach oc-
curred but rather on who had the obligation to take every measure possible
to prevent the breach from happening based on their position and role in
the data cycle.
Accountability is not self-regulation; clearing the picture between two
comparable but critically different concepts
Having described the nature and content of the term ‘accountability’
(stricto and lato sensu), it is vital to clear an ambiguity as to what account-
b.
593 Id.
594 David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey, The accountable net:
Peer production of internet governance, 9 Berkman Center for Internet & Society
at Harvard Law School Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 1–32 (2004.)
595 Id.
596 Siani Pearson & Andrew Charlesworth (note 585).
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ability in the cloud would be in essence. There has been a considerable
share of scholars and industry experts who have been equating account-
ability in cloud computing with the self-regulation structure the industry
and policy actors devised in order to regulate internet names and numbers
in the second half of the 1990s597. The model of ICANN598 was a response
to the need for effective internet governance and involved creating an en-
tirely new institutional and property rights framework599. At its core lied
the problem of who owned probably the most important, valuable assets of
the internet, i.e. the name and address spaces600. Under the ICANN
scheme, control of these assets was voluntarily transferred from an infor-
mal set of competent agencies loosely belonging to the US government
and its private contractors to a formal, internationally representative, legal-
ly incorporated entity601. As a result of this ‘migration’ a whole range of
sophisticated property rights issues came up602. ICANN, as an organiza-
tion and as a structure, had to cope with as challenging issues as how to
reconcile domain name registration with trademark protection, what rules
or procedures governing access to the root of the domain name space
would be, how much control a domain name registry would have over the
zone files containing the authoritative list of second-level names and many
more603. These questions, purely legal in nature, were even further compli-
cated by the global, trans-jurisdictional scope of the system. Ultimately,
the US Department of Commerce gave answer to these issues by basically
devolving global state power to ICANN604.
597 Milton Mueller, ICANN and Internet governance: sorting through the debris
of “self‐regulation”, 1 info 497–520 (1999.)
598 ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) is a nonprofit
organization, organized from the Secretary of State of the State of California in
the U.S. that is responsible for coordinating the maintenance and methodologies
of several databases, with unique identifiers, related to the namespaces of the In-
ternet – and thereby, ensuring the network's stable and secure operation.
("ICANN Bylaws", 30 July 2014. Retrieved 30 June 2017.)
599 Id.
600 Jonathan G. S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability. ICANN and the Challenge
of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”, 65 Public Administration Review 94–
108 (2005.)
601 Milton Mueller (note 597).
602 Id.
603 Jonathan G. S. Koppell (note 600).
604 Milton Mueller (note 597).
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This enormous venture of self-regulation seems comparable but is defi-
nitely not identical to the concept of accountability605 that has been previ-
ously discussed and is put forward as a way to achieve pragmatic cloud
computing regulation. The harmonization reached via ICANN was based
on the strong motives given to the market to seize control of the process
and the property rights issues that stemmed from it and, more or less, to
try and win in a struggle for power606. Accountability, on the other hand,
is not about deciding who among market factors will retain more power
over the others but, rather, about putting in place a governing scheme that
will clearly delineate roles for the actors of the cloud computing sphere,
describe their rights and duties, what function(s) they are expected to fulfil
across the cloud computing cycle and what kind of responsibility they car-
ry as a result of only partially or wrongly fulfilling those functions. In oth-
er words, accountability is not an initiative left entirely to the good will of
private sector607. It is a two-level process whereby, on the one hand, the
legislator and the empowered inspecting authorities make sure a set of
rules and regulations is upheld and, on the other hand, private actors –
stakeholders of the cloud market – self-adhere to those rules a priori and
not only when a breach is found to have been committed from them608. In
other words, for accountability to bear fruit, a pre-emptive rather than a
punitive logic is necessary.
Accountability in the cloud cannot be sufficiently settled with existing
EU laws
The way relevant EU legislation has been constructed until today, does not
offer an adequate scheme that would effectively govern cloud computing
from the perspective of accountability and not merely culpability, as it has
been happening so far. There are primarily two main proposals that merit
serious consideration in order for the EU regulatory thinking to be in a
position to offer realistic solutions in the challenges posed by cloud tech-
c.
605 Marcel Machill, Thomas Hart & Bettina Kaltenhäuser, Structural development of
Internet self‐regulation, 4 INFO 39–55 (2002.)
606 Milton Mueller (note 597).
607 Marcel Machill, Thomas Hart & Bettina Kaltenhäuser (note 605).
608 Id.
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nologies609. Firstly, the binary distinction between controllers and proces-
sors, sitting right now at the heart of the regulatory scheme utilized to de-
cide on cloud-related issues, is unsuitable for a cloud computing environ-
ment and should be abolished610. Alternatively, a wholly new principle of
end to end accountability needs to be introduced, one that would run
through the cloud business chain and will at all times hold the different ac-
tors accountable for their share of duties in the broader task of making
sure the cloud cycle runs smoothly. Secondly, in order to strike a finer bal-
ance between protection of privacy and the fostering and further growth of
the cloud sector and business, it is suggested to introduce in the cloud in-
dustry a logic already present in other pieces of EU legislation about simi-
lar matter, for instance, in the Privacy and Electronic Communications Di-
rective611: in particular, it is high time to start thinking whether it makes
sense for pure infrastructure cloud providers to be treated as neutral inter-
mediaries, unless and until they have the requisite knowledge and control
over a specific bunch of data (in the form of access to it, at least for more
than incidental purposes). In this way, the industry will benefit, on the one
hand, from not having to bear the burden of a constant suspicion in case a
breach occurs at some point over the cloud computing cycle. At the same
time, by setting aside infrastructure as a prima facie reason for breaches of
the cloud cycle, we profit from not sticking to a convenient and obvious
answer but focusing instead on the actual actors of the cloud computing
business that could, due to their role and the processes they execute, cause
a harmful incident involving certain volumes of data and their owners or
subjects.
In detail, after doing away with the simplistic binary controller/proces-
sor distinction, it is suggested that the cloud industry be reorganized based
on an end to end accountability approach612. This approach will lead the
greater sector to be arranged over a continuum or spectrum of parties, of
whom only those that indeed process data at some point through the data
life cycle will be considered as potentially culpable. Additionally, this ac-
609 Siani Pearson & Andrew Charlesworth (note 585).
610 J. Domingue, D. Fensel & J. A. Hendler, Handbook of Semantic Web Technolo-
gies (2011.)
611 Martin Gilje Jaatun, Gansen Zhao & Chunming Rong eds., Cloud computing.
First international conference, CloudCom 2009, Beijing, China, December 1-4,
2009 : proceedings, vol. 5931 (2009.)
612 David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey (note 594).
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countability will not be vague nor will it only be affirmed when a wrong-
doing occurs613. It will, instead, have varying degrees of obligations and
liabilities, directly analogous to the position of the party in the cloud cy-
cle, the scope it is supposed to be serving and the processes for which it is
fair to be held responsible614. This approach would not only bring the ac-
tual responsible parties to the forefront of culpability but it would also
contribute to the quest for achieving a more appropriate balance between
commercial and privacy considerations in light of the complex and dy-
namic nature of today’s cloud computing industry.
Providing answers to the privacy challenges of cloud computing under
US law; the importance of the Fourth Amendment principles
In general, we are used to be regarding the US as a legal culture with not
as much preoccupation about privacy as Europe. While that might have
been true until recently, things have rapidly been changing especially un-
der the effect of events of considerable magnitude, such as the Snowden
scandal and other threats or direct intrusions to citizens’ privacy that have
come to light as of late. The origins of the quest for protection of privacy
in the American legal culture are found in a landmark decision of the US
Supreme Court, Katz v. United States615. The case was a chance for the
US Supreme Court to revisit its stance on the basic principles of the
Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution616. In the same decision, the
d.
613 Id.
614 Andrew Charlesworth (note 185).
615 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): in this United States Supreme Court
case the nature of the "right to privacy" and the legal definition of a "search" we-
re extensively discussed and profoundly updated to mirror modern challenges.
The Court in its ruling refined previous interpretations of the unreasonable search
and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment to also include immaterial intrusion
with technology as a search, overruling previous decisions, i.e. Olmstead v.
United States and Goldman v. United States, that had adopted more restrictive
views on the matter. In Katz, the US Supreme Court also extended Fourth
Amendment protection to all areas where a person has a "reasonable expectation
of privacy".
616 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable se-
arches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
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US Court put also forward the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy test’617;
with regards to it, one of the concurring judges, Justice Harlan, outlined a
two-fold requirement for the call for protection to be justified; that the per-
son demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy over the object and
that the expectation was reasonable618.
The focus of the analysis regarding the reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in Katz was on how courts generally define searches of containers un-
der the Fourth Amendment619. Nevertheless, the same decision also stood
for another important principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: that
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”620 As a result, this
decision marked for the first time a shift of focus in US legal thinking
from “persons, houses, papers, and effects,621” which are the spaces or ar-
eas where the Fourth Amendment principles directly apply to, towards a
broader view which extended protection to privacy interests in intangible
communications622.
This novel approach to protection of privacy has to be once more updat-
ed today to give meaningful responses to the issue of intangible digital da-
ta, their handling and the main tools for processing them, such as cloud
computing623. Although computers and the devices or technologies pre-
vailing in today’s IT sector are more technologically complex than brief-
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The ultimate goal of this provision is to protect people’s right to privacy and free-
dom from arbitrary governmental interventions. Private intrusions not acting in
the color of governmental authority were exempted from the Fourth Amendment
at the time of its adoption.
617 The reasonable expectation of privacy is a legal test essential in defining the
scope of the applicability of the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The test is essentially related but not the identical
to the ‘right to privacy’, which is a much broader concept central to EU law and
many other legal systems that have developed under EU law influence.
618 Katz v. United States (note 615.)
619 DAvid Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles
to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 Minnesota Law Re-
view 2205–2239 (2009.)
620 Katz v. United States (note 615.)
621 U.S. Constitution, amend. IV.
622 Id.
623 D. Scott Blake, Let’s Be Reasonable: Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital
Age, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 491–531 (2010.)
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cases or even perhaps telephone calls, US courts have already held that
computer searches are limited by the Fourth Amendment624.
There have already been instances where courts have extended the pro-
tective legal structure which has its origins in the Katz case into the cloud
computing world625. In particular, the district court in D’Andrea case626
recognized that virtual containers do exist in the cloud, hence protection of
privacy is a legitimate request also in the realm of cloud computing. How-
ever, legal scholars still believe that the US justice needs to take further
steps in order not just to recognize the legitimacy of the call for privacy
protection on the cloud but also to legitimize certain types of tools that
will facilitate the fulfilment of this call627. Consequently, there have been
voices calling upon US justice to also acknowledge the legitimacy of vir-
tual concealment efforts, namely, encryption, password protection, and the
practical obscurity of unlisted links, as means of opacity in the cloud con-
text628. It is suggested that if these steps were taken, courts would then be
in a position to make a case-by-case determination as to whether a user’s
behavior online or his recourse to tools such as passwords, encryption, or
obscurity techniques were reasonable in a given situation or went beyond
legitimate629. On the other hand, this delineation of what is permissible
and what is not in the cloud environment, will also boost the previously
discussed call for accountability over culpability in the cloud. Consequent-
ly, while maintaining its distinct position from other jurisdictions, the US
624 For example, in Maes v. Folberg, 504 F. Supp. 2d 339, 347 (N.D. Ill. 2007), an
Illinois federal district court found that the plaintiff, a state employee, had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in her government-issued laptop computer becau-
se there was no evidence that the plaintiff was on notice that her laptop was sub-
ject to search. The court relied upon O’Connor v. Ortega, which held that govern-
ment employees are protected from unreasonable searches by their government
employers. Maes, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 347–48 [citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 715–16, 725–26 (1987)]; cf. Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741,
743 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s privacy expectation was destroyed
because his government employer “announced that it could inspect the laptops
that it furnished for the use of its employees”).
625 David Couillard (note 619).
626 United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011.)
627 D. Scott Blake (note 623).
628 S. S. Smith, Web-based Instruction: A Guide for Libraries (2006); David W.
Opderbeck, Encryption Policy and Law Enforcement in the Cloud, 49 Connecti-
cut Law Review (2017.)
629 Jack L. Goldsmith & Tim Wu (note 535).
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legal system can also take steps towards harmonization of the universal le-
gal landscape regarding cloud computing regulation.
Achieving effective regulation of the cyberspace: discussing
particularities of the web and how these should be mirrored in modern
laws about aspects of the digital world
In every matter calling for regulation, the ultimate aim of policymakers
has always been to strike a balance between protecting the rights of the
parties affected by the legislation, on the one hand, and the constraints that
need to be introduced for the enjoyment of these rights not to create con-
flicts between different law subjects, on the other630. For example, in the
field of intellectual property law, the aim of policymakers is to strike a
balance between securing some protection for creators for their work
while ensuring that that protection does not reach so far as to pose con-
flicting situations.
The same challenging balance has to be struck in the field of privacy.
Every free society believes that there is some realm of individual life that
should be free of surveillance or invasion631. Among societal factors, there
are those who are strong promoters of this privacy realm, which they be-
lieve that sits beyond government regulation. There are, of course, other
more moderate voices who assert that this realm at least should be pre-
sumptively free from state control. Opposite all these sit the policymakers
who need to fine tune all tendencies into an efficient regulatory scheme632.
The question that comes naturally to mind is how policymakers achieve
this balance and what factors they need to take into account when design-
ing laws. The traditional school of thought in legal science supports that in
designing a law only those factors directly tied to the subject matter that is
e.
630 Lawrence Lessig (note 505).
631 This view is documented, for example, in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472,
2475 (2003). Justice Kennedy wrote: Liberty protects the person from unwarran-
ted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition,
the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant pre-
sence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.
632 Id.
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to be regulated need to be considered633. Consequently, in long-established
fields of law, such as intellectual property, the balance is achieved by con-
sidering the sum of statutory and common law protections. Similarly, a
fair statutory scheme for privacy protection takes into account the same
kind of protections, as well as the constitutional perspective634. In other
words, from the traditionalists’ perspective policymaking is simply the
process of tuning legal code635. Any changes in policy, from this point of
view, simply map changes in legal code636.
Nonetheless, as it has become clear already, when it comes to regulat-
ing aspects of the cyber world and its enabling technologies, policy mak-
ing cannot be done solely based on legal code637. Instead, it is essential to
maintain a continuous interaction between the legal code and the architec-
ture or technology within which this code will be called to function on ev-
ery occasion, i.e. in every different phase of technological status quo638.
This applies to virtually all aspects of the internet, such as privacy and, of
course, now cloud computing. In its early days, the Internet, its architec-
ture and its technologies produced relative anonymity for users639. The
very first internet protocols were neither designed for nor based on recog-
nizing who people were, where they came from, or what use they were
making of the Internet640. That information, back in the time, was not em-
bedded in the basic Internet protocol, which meant that the basic protocols
protected users from inadvertent releases of such information. Conse-
quently, the balance between privacy and respect for the user’s fundamen-
tal rights and, on the other hand, the interests of those doing business on or
for the internet was much easier to strike. However, things have rapidly
changed today, with a great deal of internet services and applications be-
ing based on the personalization of the work environment or the tying of
the service to each and every individual user641. In view of these, the bal-
633 Id.
634 Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value
of Applying Constitutional Norms to 'Private' Regulation, 71 University of Col-
orado Law Review 1263–1310 (2000.)
635 L. Lessig (note 504).
636 Id.
637 Id.
638 Joel Reidenberg (note 474).
639 L. Lessig (note 504).
640 Id.
641 See Chapter 2.
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ance policymakers have to achieve between conflicting tendencies and in-
terests of the internet sphere actors has become all the more precarious.
As of late, there have been increasingly louder voices arguing that the
best way to make the internet and its surrounding ecosystem, including
cloud computing, flourish is to limit or refrain from regulation of it, giving
it the chance to self-regulate itself642. Much as it is supposed to support a
liberal take on cyberspace, this unwillingness to regulate eventually de-
feats the very values that is supposed to be defending643. It should not be
overlooked that, all the more so after the recent developments regarding
internet security around the world, citizens and a big share of the internet
stakeholders in general, voice stronger and stronger calls for a more effi-
ciently regulated virtual world644. In other words, the answer to the partic-
ular nature of the internet, which decisively affects its regulatory needs, is
not to go from the extreme of overregulation to that of non-regulation.
It is not the first time that the law will need to work hand in hand with
other sectors in order to provide efficient answers to novel challenges645.
A spirit of openness is necessary. As many are beginning to recognize,
probably the most salient feature of cyberspace is its ability to embed con-
trols that resist or reinforce values that we bring to it646. This capacity is a
unique asset in designing and implementing effective laws for the cyber
world and its constituting parts, i.e. also for cloud computing. Understand-
ing the manner in which these values are resisted or reinforced will allow
us to design a regulatory scheme that will promote accountability while, at
the same time, will make cloud computing and all the areas where it is
used more user-friendly and less of a mystery, boosting its prospects as a
business sector as well.
642 Chris Reed (note 363).
643 Lawrence Lessig (note 505).
644 See also Chapter 3.
645 Siani Pearson & Nick Wainwright, An interdisciplinary approach to accountabi-
lity for future internet service provision, 1 IJTMCC 52–72 (2013.)
646 Lawrence Lessig (note 505).
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Tackling the issue of perspective in internet law; an essential step
towards a pragmatic accountability regime
Law, in doctrine and in practice, can be understood from either an inter-
nal or external perspective647. The internal perspective is the one adopted
by judges and lawyers who work within the legal system. In their official
function, these actors of the law cycle are required to view the law as a set
of rules with legitimacy and moral authority648. On the contrary, the exter-
nal perspective is predominant among sociologists, economists, and histo-
rians, i.e. experts who approach law and legal conduct as epiphenomenal,
as a reflection of deeper forces unrecognized by the players within the law
cycle649. Simply put, the internal perspective approximates a first-person
view or insider's view of the legal system, whereas the external perspec-
tive is a third-person view or observer's view of the law650.
The problem of perspective is also present in Internet law and how this
is resolved will largely determine the nature and shape of regulation that
will be set in place to regulate the internet and, consequently, cloud com-
puting. Experience proves that in a surprising number of situations, the
outcome reached when applying law to one case from an internal or an ex-
ternal perspective is profoundly different651. The cyber space and its sub-
domains or enabling technologies are a prime example of such fields
where major regulatory challenges essentially boil down to clashes be-
tween the internal and external perspective652. To further complicate mat-
ters, neither perspective is a priori right or wrong, nor is any of the two
more or less legitimate. Both perspectives can prove to be perfectly viable
depending on the circumstances; therefore, courts and commentators
switch between them frequently without even recognizing the change653.
The essential task of a regulator is to apply legal rules to facts and reach
meaningful solutions to outstanding conflicts between them654. In the case
f.
647 E. Douglas Litowitz, Internal versus external perspectives in law: toward media-
tion, 26 Florida State University Law Review 127–150 (1998.)
648 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
649 E. Douglas Litowitz (note 647); Philip Leith, The socio-legal context of privacy,
2 IJC 105–136 (2006.)
650 E. Douglas Litowitz (note 647).
651 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
652 Paul Schiff Berman (note 634).
653 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
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of the internet and cloud computing, however, there are two strongly com-
peting understandings of reality. On one side, there is a virtual reality,
which is the one we come to view through the internal perspective and, on
the other side, there is a physical reality, which we perceive when viewing
cloud computing from the external perspective655. This brings the regula-
tors (and all other actors involved in cloud governance) before a dilemma
as to which perspective should be adopted when attempting to regulate the
cloud. By choosing the perspective, we choose the reality; by choosing the
reality, we choose the facts; and by choosing the facts, we choose the
law656.
From the internal perspective of cloud users, cloud computing is the
work environments of the cloud-based services they are using, and they
understand regulating the cloud as the task of projecting real world situa-
tions to the virtual world of cyberspace, spotting the analogies between the
two and trying to match the rules between them657. To external observers,
in contrast, cloud computing is the physical infrastructure and the consti-
tuting parts of the cloud environment; for them, applying law to the inter-
net means applying the law to the constituting parts that made feasible the
operation of the cloud network658.
A direct ‘product’ of this ongoing divide between the internal and ex-
ternal perspective in internet law has been the increasingly popular con-
cept of ‘internet governance’ which has already been discussed659. Internet
governance can be defined as the study of how law, legal institutions, and
computer code collectively regulate and define the virtual world of cy-
berspace660. Internet governance, as a normative structure, has been nour-
ishing from this sharp division along internal and external perceptions of
the internet, and this should come as no surprise661. In essence, internet
governance seeks to expose the analogies between the process of creation
655 Renzo Marchini, Cloud computing. A practical introduction to the legal issues
(2010.)
656 Lawrence Lessig (note 505).
657 Sean Marston, Zhi Li, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, Juheng Zhang & Anand Ghal-
sasi (note 116).
658 Id.
659 See Chapter 5.
660 Francesca Musiani & Internet Policy Review, Decentralised internet governance:
the case of a ‘peer-to-peer cloud’ (2014.)
661 David S. Wall, Digital Realism and the Governance of Spam as Cybercrime, 10
Eur J Crim Policy Res 309–335 (2004.)
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of rules in the physical world (traditional questions of governance) and the
creation of rules in cyberspace (internet governance)662. Similarly, extend-
ed to the issue of cloud computing, a sound governance scheme, which
will in turn permit a sound accountability mechanism, strives to identify
connectors between the challenges and points of concern of the cloud
ecosystem users and actors and the external perceptions held about the
cloud by the regulators.
In social sciences, the terms “internal” and “external” are normally used
to compare different ways of analyzing a phenomenon such as religion
and law. The internal perspective is the view of a participant in the system,
who feels bound by its rules; the external perspective is the view of a
third-party observer who does not consider himself bound663.
As far as law is concerned, this bipolar internal vs. external view was
famously applied by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law664. According to
Hart, viewed from the internal perspective, the law as a system holds that
we are bound by its rule, and indicates faith in the power and authority of
legal reasoning and doctrine. In contrast, when perceiving law externally,
legal rules are understood merely as dressing for other forces that generate
observable regularities of behavior but have little additional signifi-
cance665.
Nevertheless, when it comes to the internet and cloud computing, the
two perspectives mirror two different representations of reality666. In a
nutshell, the external perspective brings to surface physical reality, and the
internal perspective exposes virtual reality. For instance, accessing a web-
site on a browser can be interpreted as either sending a request to a remote
server that sends back text and pictures (physical reality), or getting access
to a place where certain information is hosted (virtual reality). An internal
and an external viewer form two strikingly different understandings of the
same thing667. Of course, there can be users who have an understanding of
both realities simultaneously668; technically savvy users, with a certain
662 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
663 Gustavo Ribeiro, No Need to Toss a Coin: Conflicting Scientific Expert Testimo-
nies and Intellectual Due Process, 12 Law, Probability and Risk 1–44 (2013.)
664 H. L. A. Hart, The concept of law (1998.)
665 John T. Noonan, THE CONCEPT OF LAW. By H. L. A. Hart. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 263. 21s, 7 Am. J. Juris. 169–177 (1962.)
666 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
667 E. Douglas Litowitz (note 647).
668 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
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level of awareness about technology can very efficiently follow the exter-
nal view along with the internal. Nonetheless, the internet and cloud com-
puting as its main facilitator necessitate a choice between these two repre-
sentations of reality. A user may be aware of both realities at the same
time, but will have to choose to accept only one at a time when trying to
understand online experiences. On the contrary, while regulators, alone or
with the assistance of specialized advisors, may well be able to distinguish
between the two versions of the cloud reality, they cannot act so in ex-
tremis as plain users: they need to come up with a set of rules of law
which will serve the interests, respond to challenges and, ultimately, strike
a balance between both perceptions of the cloud computing phenomenon
in order for this law to provide thorough and not partial answers. This is
the only way in which the accountability mechanism that will be put in
place can work all the way through different stages of the cloud cycle, be
objective and essentially universal, even if it will have of course to respect
jurisdictional particularities.
The road to an accountable cloud computing goes through the road to
an accountable internet: how to achieve a sound internet governance
Cloud computing is, without doubt, the main and major facilitator of the
internet. And just as we have seen that there is only one internet, there is
also only one basic concept of cloud computing. Particular arrangements
may change from one facility to the other, specific technical features may
be added or blocked or be only partially available from one cloud environ-
ment to the other but the general idea of the cloud, the technologies it is
based on, the fundamental principles it has been built upon and the func-
tions it is supposed to fulfil are universal and the same regardless of where
a cloud facility is located, from where it is accessed or where it gives ac-
cess to. However, although there is only one internet and only one core
concept of cloud computing, there is neither a global system operator nor a
global regulator. And even if there were such an operator, it would be in
such an advantageous and powerful position that, in the end, it would not
be accountable to anyone, let alone the system it ruled over669. Even in the
extreme case when an election of an online government was possible, the
g.
669 David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey (note 594).
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only way for it to produce truly uniform laws would be by systematically
discriminating against the interests of minorities in a heterogeneous
world670. However, the key to a genuinely global internet and cloud com-
puting administration is not to cede power over either of these to a central
authority. What we need, instead, is to painstakingly describe and com-
monly agree on the elements that make up the internet and the cloud, as
concepts, the actors taking part in the cloud computing network, the role
each on them holds in the course of the cloud chain and the responsibili-
ties they carry, or else, the duties they are expected to fulfil. As long as we
create this common ground of understanding, each of the regional govern-
ing systems or authorities responsible for ruling over the internet or cloud
computing across the globe will have a starting point from which to pro-
duce laws that will preserve the autonomous character of the jurisdiction
from which they originate but, at the same time, will very efficiently inter-
act with each other and produce viable and borderless solutions. As the in-
ternet and cloud technologies continue to evolve, new tools that make this
interconnectivity even easier and more effective will become available671.
Along with laws based on a minimum common understanding, technologi-
cal tools with better and better functionalities will enable us to single out
actors on the cloud that uphold or banish others that abuse trust, good will
and ethics. In this way, accountability of the internet as a whole will be
continuously augmented and, simultaneously, accountability of cloud
computing, as the main technology that makes the web possible, will also
be continuously improving.
Effective accountability for cloud computing
A cornerstone characteristic of the way cloud computing services are or-
ganized nowadays is the outsourcing from cloud service providers of non-
core aspects of their business to third parties672. That, along with the effec-
h.
670 Id.
671 Julia Black, Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in poly-
centric regulatory regimes, 2 Regulation & Governance 137–164 (2008.)
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tively boundless nature of the cloud from a geographical perspective673
renders the complexity of the service provision ecosystem even greater,
even though many times that may not be visible to an individual or busi-
ness end user674. Nevertheless, it is imperative to device a way for each of
these links in the cloud cycle to be held accountable, among themselves
and to the regulator for how each of them manages, uses, and passes on
data and other related information (e.g. metadata)675.
This chain of accountability, which will be illustrated in detail later on,
will allow the members of a cloud ecosystem to ensure that the obligations
and specific duties each one undertakes to protect data while they are
within the reach of their responsibility are duly observed at all times and
uninterruptedly; in this manner, data remain continuously protected by all
who process them at any point of the cloud cycle, irrespective of where
that processing occurs at each time. Of course, this will not only apply
when a data subject will directly use cloud services, but also when such
services will be provided in an enterprise cloud setting.
The legal essence behind this concept of a chain of accountability is
discussed in Chapter 7 of this study. However, an overview of how and on
what principles this cycle will be built can already be described676: service
providers, implementing accountability mechanisms, will provide users
with control and transparency over data in the cloud. The links between
them as elements of the chain of accountability should not understood as
simply technical linkages; they will be genuine accountability relation-
ships between supplier and customer, embodied in contracts, addressing
regulatory obligations, ensuring each partner will use interoperable pol-
icies and functioning efficiently and effectively for the supplier and the
673 Mark Gondree & Zachary N.J. Peterson, Geolocation of data in the cloud, in the
third ACM conference, 25 (Elisa Bertino, Ravi Sandhu, Lujo Bauer & Jaehong
Park eds.)
674 Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin, Justin M. Grimes & Shannon N. Simmons (note 208).
675 Mark Gondree & Zachary N.J. Peterson (note 673).
676 Siani Pearson, Vasilis Tountopoulos, Daniele Catteddu, Mario Sudholt, Refik
Molva, Christoph Reich, Simone Fischer-Hubner, Christopher Millard, Volkmar
Lotz, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Ronald Leenes, Chunming Rong & Javier Lopez, Ac-
countability for cloud and other future Internet services, in 2012 IEEE 4th Inter-
national Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom),
629–632.
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service user677. Additionally, apart from the overall chain of accountability
extending from end to end over the supply chain, shorter, mole localized
accountability bonds will also be possible as a result of deployment of ac-
countability-enhancing mechanisms throughout the service network678.
All the above linking and controlling mechanisms will be made possi-
ble also thanks to trusted third-party services, which will offer monitoring,
certification, trust modelling and other functionalities that support any ac-
countability structure679. All these inherent and third-party accountability
tools will, on the one side, enable providers to implement accountability,
on the other side will support users in assessing the trustworthiness of
each service and, will also offer to governance actors effective ways to
check and monitor the use of data in the cloud680.
Accountability as a way to further reinforce privacy in the cloud
Following the discourse we have presented so far, accountability in the
cloud can, in the end, be defined as the management of the availability, us-
ability, integrity and security of the data used, stored, or processed on the
cloud, and, as a term, it encompasses all processes by which a particular
goal – the prevention of harm to the subjects of the data in question – can
be achieved681. Towards this end, a combination of public law (legislation,
regulation), private law (contract), self-regulation and privacy technology
uses (system architectures, access controls, machine readable policies) is
deployed682.
Traditional national and international privacy protection approaches,
which had been constructed under the heavy influence of public law are
characterized today by declining effectiveness as technological develop-
i.
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ments render the underlying regulatory techniques obsolete683. In view of
the above, the solution towards achieving a viably regulated cloud com-
puting and, in general, IT technologies landscape is that of accountability.
What is particularly suggested is a holistic approach combining private
and public accountability684. Public accountability is made possible thanks
to an active interaction between subjects of PII685, regulatory bodies, such
as data Commissioners and data controllers and it is dependent upon high-
ly transparent processes686. Private accountability, on the other hand, is
made possible thanks to the interaction between data controllers and data
processors, and is founded on contract law, technological processes, and
practical internal compliance requirements687. Along with the change from
traditional legal structures to the regime of accountability comes also a
shift of focus regarding the way in which the integrity of a cloud network
and of the data hosted therein is meant to be achieved. In fact, account-
ability is not based on setting up extensive procedural or bureaucratic re-
quirements for processing activities but rather on reducing the risk of (dis-
proportionate in context) harm to the subjects of PII and, consequently, on
reducing the amount of negative consequences for the data controller688.
The decisive differentiating point between the previous and the newly pro-
posed status quo is the acceptance that absolute avoidance of harm is an
impossible goal in a disaggregated environment, such as a cloud ser-
vice689. Therefore, focusing on enhancing the ability to respond flexibly
and efficiently to harm that occasionally arise will provide a more efficient
form of privacy protection than the enforcement of blunt compliance crite-
ria.
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now Waterman (note 21).
687 Id.
688 Siani Pearson & Andrew Charlesworth (note 585).
689 Fa-Chang Cheng & Wen-Hsing Lai, The Impact of Cloud Computing Technology
on Legal Infrastructure within Internet—Focusing on the Protection of Informati-
on Privacy, 29 2012 International Workshop on Information and Electronics En-
gineering 241–251 (2012.)
CHAPTER 6. Jurisdiction and accountability in the cloud
200
In the way cloud computing has been regulated till today, i.e. from the
legal and regulatory approach, geographic location is of prime importance
to enforcement690. Under the accountability regime, location becomes less
relevant because of assurances that data will be treated as described re-
gardless of jurisdiction691. Accountability can also contribute towards the
enforceability of laws that apply to cloud computing either via the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties for misuse or with the assistance of technolo-
gy692.
Last but not least, the current regulatory structure places too much em-
phasis on recovering tools and procedures, if things go wrong, and not so
much on trying to get cloud computing actors to ‘do the right thing’ for
privacy in the first place693. On the contrary, a hybrid accountability mech-
anism built up via a combination of legal, regulatory and technological re-
sources extending across public and private accountability domains is a
practical way of securing effective cloud regulation694. Constructed in this
manner, the accountability based regulatory framework for cloud comput-
ing can offer appropriate answers to the questions stemming from the pri-
vacy issues that arise and are rooted in cloud computing. In chapters 8 to
10 of this study, the legal principles of this accountability mechanism are
described and analyzed.
690 Mark Gondree & Zachary N.J. Peterson (note 673).
691 Siani Pearson & Nick Wainwright (note 645).
692 Rolf H. Weber (note 677).
693 Id.
694 Siani Pearson & Nick Wainwright (note 645).
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Risks and compliance in cloud computing
environments – views from Europe and the USA
Introduction – scope of this chapter
The aim of this chapter is to continue the analysis on the fundamental is-
sues that any piece of regulation aiming to regulate legal issues arising out
of the use of cloud computing should provide answers for. After having
gone over the issues of accountability and jurisdiction, we will now look
into defining what are the main risks posed by the cloud as a technology,
to the extent that it is possible to make such an assessment being based on
the current state-of-the-art of cloud computing technology. Additionally,
the main compliance policies are discussed, in order to be assessed for suf-
ficiency and compatibility with the main legal norms and values prevail-
ing in the discussion for the construction of a working regulatory frame-
work for the cloud.
THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CLOUD COMPUTING
Privacy issues raised on the cloud: existent for all kinds of data across
all types of cloud networks
Cloud architecture poses by nature implications for the privacy of all dif-
ferent kinds of information hosted on cloud networks695. Be it personal,
business or governmental information, in order to capitalize on efficiency
and maximize the economies of scale, cloud ecosystems usually adopt
technological concepts that stand on the axis between security and priva-
cy696. And although piling up on security safeguards is one way to deal





695 Refer also to Chapter 2.
696 Robert Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality
from Cloud Computing, available at: https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2011/1
1/resource-page-cloud-privacy/ (20 April 2015.)
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and should not be disregarded when trying to grasp the bigger picture and
construct an all-inclusive regulatory scheme for cloud computing697.
A crucial factor determining the privacy and confidentiality risks a
cloud computing user faces are the terms of service and privacy policy es-
tablished by the cloud provider in the predesigned service agreement that
the customer is required to sign. Several efforts have been made to present
in a collective manner the different versions of service agreements pro-
posed by various cloud computing service providers. Nevertheless, it is
true that we are far from achieving an adequate level of awareness among
users about the varying versions of contractual clauses available on the
market for the kind of cloud service they are looking for698. Nor would it
of course be legally sound to force the market to adapt to one specific pro-
totype for conditions for offering cloud services699; that would be an unde-
sirable market intervention, only paving the way to illegal disruption. As a
result, this diversification of terms of service is here to stay and from a
market point of view, it will not go away any time soon. Consequently, the
challenges to privacy of users’ data depending on the cloud provider they
engage with are a challenge that needs to be adequately tackled with, in
the context of a regulatory regime for the cloud.
For certain types of information and specific categories of cloud com-
puting users, privacy and confidentiality rights, obligations, and status
may change when a user discloses information to a cloud provider700. This
is, for example, the case when a government authority switches to cloud
computing in order to cover its data storage needs or when the same type
of body deserts, mostly for reasons of economies of scale, its privately
owned and maintained storage facilities over hosting and storage services
from one of the private suppliers on the market (differentiation of privacy
status within the same jurisdiction). Similarly, a change in the privacy sta-
tus emerges in the example of data referring to health records when such
archives migrate from cloud computing facilities located in one specific
jurisdiction to different servers somewhere else in the world (differentia-
tion of privacy status as a result of changing jurisdiction).
697 Paul Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 University of Pennsylvania
law review 1623–1662 (2013.)
698 Robert Gellman (note 696).
699 Id.
700 Id.
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Disclosure and remote storage may have adverse consequences for the
legal status or protection of personal or business information701. For in-
stance, there are clear differences between the handling of data referring to
tax and income information of citizens or businesses in Europe and the
US. Similarly, business-owned data are under clearly varying protection
between EU and US law702.
As it has already been demonstrated703, the location of information in
the cloud may also have significant effects on the privacy and confiden-
tiality protections of information and on the privacy obligations of those
who process or store the information as well as on how the upholding of
these obligations is legally evaluated. Additionally, co-existing jurisdiction
laws may result in information in the cloud having more than one legal lo-
cation at the same time, with differing legal consequences704. Privacy of
data on the cloud can also be put in question due to different laws that may
oblige a cloud provider to examine user records for evidence of criminal
activity and other matters. And these are just very few examples of the dif-
ferences in treatment data on the cloud may receive depending on which
laws a certain cloud facility, network controller, cloud service provider or
data processor is subject to.
In summary, legal uncertainties make it difficult in various ways to as-
sess the status of information in the cloud as well as the privacy and confi-
dentiality protections available to users.
The above risks to privacy are generally more likely to occur in the
context of the US legal system705. The following are some characteristic
instances of US laws which set fertile ground for undermined privacy of
data stored on or transferred via cloud computing networks, certainly
when compared to the prevailing legal thinking in Europe:
701 Robert Gellman (note 696); Clare Sullivan, Protecting digital identity in the
cloud: Regulating cross border data disclosure, 30 Computer Law & Security
Review 137–152 (2014.)
702 See Chapter 3.
703 See Chapter 6.
704 Id.
705 Robert Gellman (note 696).
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United States v. Miller
In this cornerstone case brought before the US Supreme Court in 1976,
Mitch Miller706 was charged with carrying alcohol distilling equipment
and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Mr. Miller's
banks, The Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the
Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks com-
plied with the subpoenas, and the evidence was used during Miller's trial
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor. The case was then brought before the
US Supreme Court with the question whether Miller's bank records had
been illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court an-
swered negatively; in a 6-3 opinion, it reversed the Fifth Circuit and held
that Miller had no right to privacy in his bank records. Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Lewis F. Powell asserted that the "documents subpoenaed
are not [Miller's] 'private papers',"707 but instead, part of the bank's busi-
ness records. Consistent with Hoffa v. United States708, the Court found
that Miller's rights were not violated when a third party – his bank – trans-
mitted information that he had entrusted them with to the government.
While the prevailing aspects of the specific case are arguably unique to
banking, the decision brought out by the US Supreme Court in Miller
stands generally for the proposition that an individual’s personal record
held by a third party does not have the same constitutional privacy protec-
tion as the one that applies to the same record when this is held by the in-
dividual. From a privacy perspective, this proposition and the doctrine it
has fostered are unsettling because of the volume of personal information
necessarily held by third parties today709. In the cloud context, cloud ser-
vice providers could very likely be regarded as third parties in the mean-
ing of United States v. Miller.
i.
706 United States v. Miller, 425 US 435 (1976).
707 Id.
708 Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 (1966).
709 Id.
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The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) – a step ahead
but obscurity lingers
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)710 is legislation dat-
ing back to 1986 and was enacted by the United States Congress with the
aim of extending government restrictions on wire taps from telephone
calls to the field of transmissions of electronic data by computer as well as
adding new provisions prohibiting access to stored electronic communica-
tions.
In an electronic environment, the ECPA provides certain protections
against government access to electronic mail and other types of computer
records held by third parties (e.g., Internet service providers or cloud ser-
vice providers). ECPA was an attempt to bring the constitutional and statu-
tory protections against the wiretapping of telephonic communications in-
to the computer age. Since its enactment and all the more so nowadays,
ECPA is generally regarded as a difficult law to understand and apply711;
on the one hand, it is an old law that relies and was inspired by a model of
electronic mail and Internet activity that is generations behind current
practice and technology. It is commonly agreed that ECPA is significantly
out-of-date, at least in certain aspects712. Nevertheless, it reflects a legis-
lative recognition that some Internet activities do merit protection from the
Miller doctrine that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
records maintained by third parties. The difficulty with ECPA, however, is
figuring out what those protections apply to and when.
ii.
710 ECPA (Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (Oct. 21, 1986), codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-22, 2701-11, 3121-26) was an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the Wiretap Statute), which was pri-
marily designed to prevent unauthorized government access to private electronic
communications. Since its enactment, the ECPA has been amended by the Com-
munications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994, the USA
PATRIOT Act (2001), the USA PATRIOT reauthorization acts (2006), and the
FISA Amendments Act (2008).
711 Id.
712 Id.
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The USA PATRIOT Act
The USA PATRIOT Act713 includes provisions allowing the FBI to access
virtually any business record. Although a court order is required, the FBI’s
authority under the USA PATRIOT Act is sufficient to extend also to a
record maintained by a cloud provider. The authorities granted by the
USA PATRIOT Act weaken certain privacy protections from the ECPA,
and they generally allowed for an expansion of the government’s ability to
compel disclosure714. What is more, anyone who receives an order to dis-
close information under a provision of this Act is highly limited in their
ability to disclose that they have received such an order715. Consequently,
a user who provided records to a cloud provider for storage or processing
is highly unlikely to know that the government obtained those records if
this has been effected under a provision of the USA PATRIOT Act.
The HIPAA and compelled disclosures
Potential threats to privacy currently exist for cloud services and the use of
them under US law not only in relation to demands from the central gov-
ernment or other government agencies, but also with regard to demands
that are permissible by law from private parties. One typical such example
iii.
iv.
713 The USA PATRIOT Act (note 215) was signed into law by President George W.
Bush on October 26, 2001. Its title is in fact a ten-letter acronym (U.S.A.
P.A.T.R.I.O.T.) that stands for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001".
On May 26, 2011, President Barack Obama signed the PATRIOT Sunsets Exten-
sion Act of 2011, a four-year extension of three key provisions in the USA PA-
TRIOT Act: roving wiretaps, searches of business records, and conducting sur-
veillance of "lone wolves"—individuals suspected of terrorist-related activities
not linked to terrorist groups. Resulting from a lack of Congressional approval,
parts of the Patriot Act expired on June 1, 2015. However, with the enactment of
the USA Freedom Act on June 2, 2015 the expired parts were restored and rene-
wed through 2019. Nevertheless, Section 215 of the law was amended to stop the
National Security Agency (NSA) from continuing its mass phone data collection
program. Instead, phone companies are nowadays obliged to retain the relevant
data and the NSA can obtain information about targeted individuals with permis-
sion from a federal court.
714 Id.
715 Id.
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is the HIPAA716 Privacy Rule, part of the respective HIPAA Act, which
imposes some limits on compelled disclosures of health data that are pro-
vided for by this law. In detail, a legal demand by a private party to a
cloud provider for disclosure of protected health information has to follow
the procedures set out in the rule governing judicial and administrative
proceedings. In general, the rule stipulates that anyone seeking access to
information constituting part of a patient’s health record via a court order,
subpoena, discovery request, or the like must notify the patient, who has
an opportunity to object to the disclosure. The said necessity under HIPAA
means that a cloud provider should duly notify prospective customers that
it maintains patient records to which specific procedures apply if the
provider receives an order for disclosure of a record that is held (stored or
processed) on behalf of an entity making use of the provider’s services717.
While the burden of those procedures falls on the person seeking the
records, problems of control and compliance have never ceased to exist
also on the part of providers.
While HIPAA provides for such a process of notification as a safeguard
to users’ privacy, other personal information shared by a business with a
cloud provider will most likely receive less detailed treatment with regard
to an obligation for disclosure by the provider. It goes without saying that
when a cloud provider allows anyone to use its resources without any con-
tractual or other prearrangement, the provider may have little or no knowl-
edge about the information that a user puts on the cloud. If a cloud
provider is not legally obliged to consult with the user, is not motivated to
consult with the user, or is actively prevented from notifying the user, any
subsequent disclosure by means of a court order or subpoena may have
undesirable consequences for the user or for the ultimate data subject.
716 HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), Pub.L. 104–191,
110 Stat. 1936, was passed by Congress in 1996. It is the federal law that esta-
blishes standards for the privacy and security of health information, as well as
standards for electronic data interchange (EDI) of health information.
717 Id.
CHAPTER 7. Risks and compliance in cloud computing environments
208
The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act718 (FCRA) is one more example of US leg-
islation that nurtures potential undermining for users’ privacy on the
cloud. The Act imposes limits on the use of credit reports specifically to
what is defined as a ‘permissible purpose’ by it719. If a creditor stores a
credit report with a cloud provider and a third party obtains the report
from the cloud provider, the legal limit on use of it could be violated.
A violation of the FCRA may also occur if the cloud provider uses the
stored credit report for an improper purpose. Despite imposing a restric-
tion on uses of credit reports, the FCRA does not have a mandatory proce-
dure comparable to the one articulated by HIPAA that would require in-
forming a cloud provider that it has information subject to disclosure lim-
its. As a result, a crediting institution that stores records with a cloud
provider may unexpectedly confront legal problems due to this vagueness
in law.
The above examples are demonstrative of how privacy can be put under
question and should not be taken for granted in today’s cloud cased envi-
ronments under the laws that currently regulate them. In previous parts of
this research, we have already explored similar pathologies for privacy un-
der the current EU legislation720. In conclusion, it should be admitted that
differences in legal culture and traditions do not result in ‘right or wrong’
situations, i.e. conditions where one legal order is right and the other
wrong about privacy. On the contrary, conditions undermining privacy
may be traced in both cases. Therefore, convergence and the promotion of
a minimum common ground of understanding becomes necessary for a
sound governance of cloud computing technology and its uses.
v.
718 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), title VI of Pub.L. 91–508, 84 Stat. 1114,
is a piece of U.S. Federal Government legislation enacted to promote the accura-
cy, fairness, and privacy of consumer information contained in the files of consu-
mer reporting agencies. It was originally passed in 1970 and is enforced by the
US Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
private litigants.
719 Id.
720 See Chapter 4.
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Threats to privacy means threats to security: the two prominent issues
that go hand in hand in cloud computing environments
Threats to privacy in cloud environments are usually followed or set fertile
ground for subsequent threats to security as well. In fact, the best angle
from which privacy and security concerns that can arise when moving to
the cloud are best observed and, thus, profoundly understood is from a
risk–based perspective721. On further articulation, privacy and security
risks on the cloud can be divided into operational, regulatory and compli-
ance risks722.
As it has already been extensively argued723 many of the privacy and
security concerns raised in the context of cloud computing are a direct
consequence of the nature of the cloud; particularly in the early years of
cloud adoption, its benefits had been invariably presented in terms of cost
reduction, thus overlooking some of the inherent risks the new technology
was bringing along, which have been left until now insufficiently ad-
dressed from a regulatory and, at times, also from a technological point of
view. According to this angle, the cloud achieves its renowned economies
of scale, that have actually enabled it to rise so quickly as a ruling techno-
logical standard in the field of IT services, thanks to a transformation of
the nature of IT provision from specific, internally hosted and managed IT
resources to commodity hardware and software platforms hosted outside
the organizational boundary724. As it is known, in order to achieve this
low-cost offering, cloud providers may switch customers’ data and pro-
cesses from one hardware facility to another; it is precisely this switching
that nourishes some of the most common privacy and security issues with
regard to the cloud.
The risks posed to privacy and security are relevant not only to cloud
customers but also to cloud service providers. And this is not merely due
to marketing or customer satisfaction reasons. As it has already become
evident and will further be demonstrated on the course of this study, any
loophole left in the overall structure of cloud computing environments and
b.
721 Α. Ε. Whitley, P. L. Willcocks & W. Venters (note 119).
722 Webster, J., & Watson, R. T., Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: Writing
a literature review., 26 MIS quarterly 13–23 (2002.)
723 See also Chapters 2 and 3.
724 Willcocks, Leslie P., Venters, Will and Whitley, Edgar A. (note 111).
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the regulation thereof poses serious legal questions as well, apart from lia-
bilities of any other nature.
Consequently, from a cloud computing customer’s point of view, be it
an average private customer or a big enterprise user or even an entity be-
longing to the wider administrative and government sector, the first set of
questions relating to concerns that the use of the cloud is bringing forward
are:
– Users wish to receive guarantees that their data and processes are not
accessible to staff working for the cloud service provider or to other
users running their processes on the same hardware environment as
them725.
– Users wish to have reassurances that, when the use of the hardware by
them comes to an end (either because the specific service can no longer
meet their demands, because the cloud hardware is decommissioned or
because the cloud provider relocates the customer’s services to other,
cheaper computing resources) any data stored on that hardware is irre-
versibly removed. In the event the cloud provider is bound by any legal
provision to retain data, users wish to have guarantees that their data
will remain accessible to them during the retention period726.
– Specifically in the case of cloud providers hosting mission critical ser-
vices, users demand reassurances regarding the effectiveness of the
cloud provider’s disaster recovery plans727.
– One of the greatest issues for cloud users, as it usually happens with
every market growing in an accelerated manner, is the risk of attempts,
on behalf of service providers, to lock–in the customer by methods,
such as the use of non–standard hardware configurations or by making
it impractical for them to transfer their data and processes to another
provider728.
– It is very typical for cloud facilities to host in their resources multiple
service providers’ data and processes. Sharing a storage facility with
multiple other service providers can have unintended consequences
that cannot be easily measured in advance. For example, one unpre-
725 Α. Ε. Whitley, P. L. Willcocks & W. Venters (note 119).
726 Willcocks, Leslie P., Venters, Will and Whitley, Edgar A. (note 111).
727 DER HESSISCHE DATENSCHUTZBEAUFTRAGTE, Key data protection
points for the trilogue on the General Data Protection Regulation (2015.)
728 Siani Pearson, Taking account of privacy when designing cloud computing ser-
vices (2009.)
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dictable consequence of Amazon and DynDNS hosting WikiLeaks was
that these services were targeted by hackers with consequent adverse
effects on other users of their services729.
From a cloud provider’s point of view, some of the major privacy and se-
curity concerns raised by cloud computing and the way it is technically
built are:
– In an effort to respond to their users’ worries, cloud providers apply
different levels of staff accreditation to demonstrate to their customers
that their staff will not misuse the data held on their cloud hardware.
The number of different levels of staff accreditation and the distinctive
features of each one of them has constantly been a matter of concern
among cloud service providers730.
– In response to the demand for safeguard mechanisms that permit un-
equivocal deletion of data hosted on a cloud facility after a user’s quit-
ting of the use of that facility, cloud providers look into the possibili-
ties for developing such tools for data–wiping processes. In the context
of such plans, cloud providers have to deal also with the issue of the
cost, in capital and resources, for making these tools available to their
customers, as well as whether it makes sense to give these options as
standard tools to all users or offer them on a premium basis731.
– A major challenge for cloud providers is also to put in place recovery
mechanisms that will help contain the damage caused as a result of a
major outage of service732.
– Last but not least, cloud providers face the challenge to balance be-
tween offering commodity products on the basis of price and service
quality and offering distinctive capabilities which might raise customer
concerns about lock-in733.
The privacy and security concerns described above are obviously common
to users and suppliers of cloud computing services in both the EU and the
US. However, the fundamentally different approaches the two jurisdic-
tions take on privacy result in fragmented responses to common issues.
While in the EU privacy is regarded as a fundamental human right, in the
US it is viewed as a demand that businesses need to meet in order to pre-
729 Α. Ε. Whitley, P. L. Willcocks & W. Venters (note 119).
730 Siani Pearson (note 728).
731 Francesca Musiani & Internet Policy Review (note 660).
732 Siani Pearson (note 728).
733 Id.
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vent specific, serious risks of economic harm that may result from misuses
of sensitive personal data734. These divergent approaches, however, work
on the opposite direction of the tendency for more and more universal
cloud services. Therefore, since cloud ecosystems and facilities are grow-
ing more and more unaffected of any kind of regional boundaries, an
equally convergent mindset needs to be adopted towards setting up rules
that will be based on shared principles and will create a minimum com-
mon understanding for tackling the risks rising out of the use of cloud
computing.
Privacy risks posed by the cloud put into question cornerstone elements
of information privacy laws
The architectural foundations of cloud computing technologies, along with
the questions it raises regarding privacy and security of data and processes
hosted in cloud ecosystems, have all contributed in basic definitions of in-
formation privacy law being challenged. Legislation developed in Europe
before cloud computing, which became so widely used in the field of IT
and data processing, understood information privacy law as a body of leg-
islation concerning the processing of personal data735. Yet, with the arrival
of cloud questions have been raised as to the meaning of both “personal
data” and the “processing” of that data”736.
The decisive criterion for the application of privacy law in the Euro-
pean Union is the assessment of whether personal data are involved. As it
has been already demonstrated737, personal data under EU law is any in-
formation that refers to “identified or identifiable” persons738. More ex-
plicitly, the EU Data Protection Directive would define that “an identifi-
able person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particu-
lar by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors spe-
cific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
c.
734 Nancy J. King & V. T. Raja (note 245).
735 Gerrit Hornung, Regulating privacy enhancing technologies: seizing the opportu-
nity of the future European Data Protection Framework, 26 Innovation: The
European Journal of Social Science Research 181–196 (2013.)
736 Paul Schwartz (note 697).
737 See Chapter 4.
738 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2(a) (note 143).
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identity”739. As long as the information at hand refers to identified or iden-
tifiable persons, information privacy law applies. This approach has been
transposed to the newly introduced Data Protection Regulation740 as well.
Following this track, the GDPR goes one step further to offer more de-
tails in an overall effort of greater specificity, wherever possible, com-
pared with the Directive. Under the Regulation, the definition of persons
as “identified” or “who can be identified” (i.e. identifiable) brings to the
forefront the critical concept of direct or indirect identification by “means
reasonably likely to be used”741. In this matter, EU law has been heavily
influenced by German law, which has since long held the “means reason-
ably likely to be used” as the key criterion in defining whether or not a
piece of information is identifiable742. The Regulation also sets out some
additional typology criteria that help to make the relevant analysis more
concrete: in that sense, it is specified that identification may be effected
“by reference to an identification number, location data, online identifier
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person”743. These ad-
ditional details provide useful guidelines for the successful execution of
the required assessment of whether some information refers to a specific
person or not.
Looking into the United States and how the same issue is viewed under
the American legal thinking, the decisive element there is whether a piece
of information relates to an identified person744. Unlike the EU’s proposed
Regulation, which offers a central point of reference regarding how to
reach this determination over specific data, in the US there is no universal
test but rather a variety of them scattered around federal and state statutes
and regulations for deciding when information relates to an identified per-
son745. Overall, it can be noted that US law does not extend as far as iden-
tifiability in order to grant to specific information the quality of falling un-
der information privacy law; as a general rule, the U.S. threshold approach
739 Id.
740 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 4(1) (note 25).
741 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Preamb. 26 (note 25).
742 Anne Arendt, Ulrich Dammann & Spiros Simitis, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
(2011.)
743 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 4(1) (note 25).
744 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove (note 16).
745 Paul Schwartz (note 697).
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for defining information as personal is reductionist when compared with
the European Union’s expansionist approach746. Under US law, personal
information is typically found to be at stake only when the data under ex-
amination refers to a currently identified person747. Except for the points
of difference, there are also similarities in the EU and U.S. legal approach-
es to determining the moment when information falls within the scope of
information privacy law. Rather than drawing a fixed line between person-
al information and non-personal information, both legal systems establish
a determination mechanism that depends on a number of factors, such as
technology and corporate practices748.
It is crucial to point out, however, that whether information becomes
personal information in a networked environment depends on decisions
made throughout the world, sometimes in real time. Consequently, it is
getting increasingly difficult to decide a priori if certain kinds of cloud da-
ta processing have to be determined by privacy information law provisions
or not749. This difficulty is all the more intensified with the ever-greater
adoption of the cloud, which has managed to profoundly destabilize the
regulatory approaches to personal information in the European Union and
United States alike.
From the perspective of EU law, the cloud has increasingly been ac-
cepted as a “means reasonably likely to be used”, thus being considered as
responsible for making more information “identifiable” and, consequently,
more extensively, if not entirely, falling under information privacy law.
Yet, it should not be overlooked that identifiable information is not syn-
onymous to identified information, while there are indeed instances of
identifiable information which may never elevate into the status of identi-
fied information750. Furthermore, different risks are associated with the
possible identification of data compared to information already related to
an identified person751. Therefore, EU legislation needs to fine-tune itself
in order to strike a balance between its expansionist protection approach
regarding privacy and the necessary vital space cloud computing necessi-
tates in order to flourish as a technology. At the same time, the US ap-
746 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove (note 16).
747 Id.
748 Id.
749 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
750 Paul Schwartz (note 697).
751 Ulrich Dammann & Spiros Simitis (note 169).
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proach appears too narrow: certain information may only be identifiable
and not identified, but even so it might bring with it a substantial risk of
identification752. As a result, certain rearrangements are necessary for US
law, as well, in order to live up to the elevated privacy risks posed for in-
formation in such a dynamic environment, as today’s cloud-based internet.
The other side of the coin: how cloud computing’s architectural
advantages can turn into threats for privacy
Privacy is a key business risk and compliance issue and even more so in
the field of IT. Given that it sits at the intersection among social norms,
human rights and legal mandates, privacy has been a key comparative cri-
terion for all kinds of IT providers and this also applies for those active in
the field of cloud computing. Conforming to legal privacy requirements or
meeting client privacy expectations with regard to personal identifiable in-
formation, requires from businesses offering cloud related services to
demonstrate a firm level of supervision over such processes at all stages of
the cloud computing cycle, from collection to destruction753. On the other
hand, the cloud has been traditionally praised for its competitive advan-
tages over its predecessors, namely its abilities to scale rapidly, in-house
or through subcontractors, to store data remotely and to share services in a
dynamic environment. However, these very advantages can also become
disadvantages in the effort to maintain a level of privacy assurance suffi-
cient to sustain confidence in users. In particular, the main insecurities
raised by the cloud’s sui generis architecture are:
– Due to outsourcing: The widely-used practice of outsourcing of data
processing by nature raises governance and accountability questions754.
In detail, the use of outsourcing makes it imperative to develop rules
and processes which will permit to clarify at all times which party is
responsible (statutorily or contractually) for upholding legal require-
d.
752 Paul Schwartz (note 697).
753 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
Creese & Paul P. Hopkins (note 119).
754 ACM ed., Controlling data in the cloud: outsourcing computation without out-
sourcing control (2009); Heinz-Dieter Schmelling, Motivation. Wie verhält sich
die IT-Sicherheit zum IT-Outsourcing?, 40 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit –
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ments regarding privacy, or to verify that appropriate data handling
standards are set and followed755. In an effort to further uphold privacy,
effective methods for auditing third-party compliance with privacy
laws and standards are also needed. Such methods will help determine
to what extent it is safe to further sub-contract processing, and to con-
firm the identities and bona fides of sub-contractors756. Extensive use
of outsourcing also necessitates rules that will permit to allocate rights
in the data that are transferred between data processors and their sub-
contractors or that they will even settle other instances, such as
whether and how such data are transferable to other third parties upon
bankruptcy, takeover or merger of the entity that initially undertook the
outsourcing757.
– Due to offshoring758: Offshoring is another practice widely used by
cloud service providers in their effort to maximize their competitive
advantages and secure an even wider client base. At the same time,
though, outsourcing of data processing increases risk factors and legal
complexity. An indicative list of the complex issues that a cloud com-
puting service which relies on outsourcing and offshoring can raise in-
cludes issues of jurisdiction, choice of law and enforcement759. A com-
prehensive cloud computing regulatory framework must include rules
that will help settle these issues.
– Due to relying on virtualization: Cloud computing has been made pos-
sible largely thanks to the extensive use of virtualization760. However,
sharing hardware, which is basically what virtualization is all about,
carries along multiple security risks; among others, loss of control over
data location or who has access to it at any given time. In fact, these
insecurities will be even graver for certain types of data as a result of
their nature761. For example, transactional data is a typical example of
a byproduct with unclear ownership; when transferred or processed on
755 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
Creese & Paul P. Hopkins (note 119).
756 Id.
757 ACM ed. (note 754).
758 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
Creese & Paul P. Hopkins (note 119).
759 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
Creese & Paul P. Hopkins (note 119); Heinz-Dieter Schmelling (note 754).
760 For more see Chapters 2 and 8.
761 A. van Cleeff, W. Pieters & R. J. Wieringa (note 119).
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virtualization based networks, it can be hard to define whose duty is at
any given time during the data life cycle to protect it762.
– Due to the autonomic elements of cloud computing technology: Given
that technological processes on a cloud environment have been granted
a degree of autonomy in decision making (as they, for example, have
the possibility to automatically adapt service resources to meet contin-
uously varying needs of customers and service providers) it becomes
more and more challenging for enterprises to maintain consistent secu-
rity standards or to provide appropriate business continuity and back-
up763. This is a natural consequence of the fact that it may not be con-
tinuously possible to determine in real time and with specificity where
data processing will take or is taking place within the cloud.
All these risks make it clear that in a regulatory framework specifically
developed for the cloud, rules will need to take into account the cloud’s
architectural specialties and offer constructive answers regarding them.
Some proposals about how this could be achieved on the management and
governance of the cloud level have already been presented in the introduc-
tion of accountability as a suitable managing framework for the cloud764.
The affluence of consumer data on cloud computing and particular
threats to them because of the cloud’s specificities
Cloud computing is a high-end technology which has rapidly grown to be
utilized for managing a wide range of commonplace information. One
could persuasively argue that the cloud today is basically the internet, al-
though, as it has been already explained, these two notions are not identi-
cal765. A logical outcome of this widespread deployment of cloud comput-
ing has been that the cloud is the vessel that hosts a staggering affluence
of data and information from billions of common users766. A lot of this da-
ta may seem rudimentary from a wider perspective yet for individual users
they constitute their very personal and sensitive information.
e.
762 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
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The need to host or process this exponentially growing data has fueled
the creation and use of massive cloud data centers, and cloud service
providers such as Amazon have already invested enormous amounts in
building and operating large data centers that provide a seemingly “infi-
nite capacity” of computing resources to their clients767. All these facilities
and the countless different types of information that is hosted on them
pose certain risks apart from the ones we have already discussed in rela-
tion to how the life cycle of data evolves on the cloud computing network.
Firstly, energy grids that power these data centers may be subject to at-
tacks, which could be lengthy. Such power outages or other data center
hardware-related disasters could have a significant impact on the business
continuity of service providers768. If a provider’s disaster recovery proce-
dures for its data centers are inadequate, this sensitive data described be-
forehand run the risk of being lost or irreparably damaged. Secondly, cur-
rent laws do not necessitate from cloud service providers to disclose suffi-
cient information about the security policies and disaster recovery proce-
dures they have designed in relation to their data center operations769.
From a data architectural point of view, cloud service providers use cer-
tain data management practices which also raise concerns regarding the
integrity and safety of consumer data and call for concrete regulatory rules
that will moderate such risks in the context of a specific set of cloud com-
puting laws770. Data commingling771 is the first important such risk and it
occurs when different items or kinds of data are stored in such a manner
that they become commonly accessible while they are supposed to remain
separated. In a cloud environment, this can very easily occur where differ-
ent customer data sits on the same server presenting a continuous security
vulnerability. The reason why cloud service providers choose to store data
from different clients in the same data files is, as expected, the wish for
optimal utilization of resources, especially if different cloud users concur-
767 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
Creese & Paul P. Hopkins (note 119).
768 Id.
769 W. Kuan Hon, Christopher Millard & Ian Walden, The Problem of 'Personal Da-
ta' in Cloud Computing – What Information is Regulated? The Cloud of Unkno-
wing, Part 1, 1 International Data Privacy Law 211–228 (2011.)
770 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
Creese & Paul P. Hopkins (note 119).
771 M. Zhou, R. Zhang, W. Xie, W. Qian & A. Zhou (note 119).
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rently use the same applications on the same cloud server772. It needs to be
made clear that commingling in data is not only a matter of digital data
colocation but it also refers to physical commingling.
The other data practice that poses risks on consumer data hosted on the
cloud is data aggregation773. Aggregation practices raise significant chal-
lenges for protecting sensitive consumer data in cloud computing environ-
ments774. Public clouds, i.e. those where the great majority of cloud ser-
vices nest, typically aggregate numerous clients’ data into single files, and
the latter actually share applications, processing power, and data storage
space all at the same time775. A single instance of an unauthorized penetra-
tion into one cloud server facility that houses large volumes of data may
provoke a massive compromise of sensitive data of multiple cloud users at
the same time776. In a way to put in place countermeasures for this risk, it
has been suggested that cloud users, primarily businesses, should be in a
position to screen the cloud computing users with whom they share the
same servers, applications, and data files to verify whether those other
users have good reputations777. Also, in an effort to reduce the risk of data
espionage, it is suggested that cloud users should be able to opt out of the
commingling of their data with those from competitors778. However, these
are only business choices or tools and are offered mainly as market incen-
tives, hence, they cannot be held as standard practice neither can they be
enforced by law.
Currently, on a statutory level, actors of the cloud market try to deal
with these insecurities posed to consumer data with ad-hoc cloud service
agreements. However, just as it has been proved that these are not an ad-
equate answer to the problem of jurisdiction determination on the cloud779,
772 Id.
773 Data aggregation is the process of transforming scattered data from numerous
sources into a single new one. The objective of data aggregation is to combine
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774 Dawn Song, Elaine Shi, Ian Fischer & Umesh Shankar, Cloud Data Protection
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they cannot deal inclusively with the issue of risks to data integrity either.
In fact, it is more often so that individual cloud users do not have enough
gravitational significance to negotiate the terms of cloud service agree-
ments, particularly when they use the services of large public cloud ser-
vice providers such as Amazon, Microsoft, Dropbox or Google780; in all
these cases, there is a wide disparity in bargaining power between the par-
ties which makes the chances to achieve a negotiated service agreement
highly unrealistic due to lack of adequate bargaining power in this con-
text781.
In conclusion, the cloud as an industry is mainly footed by billions of
plain private users who entrust with cloud service providers a great variety
of their personal consumer data under pre-negotiated terms and condi-
tions. All these clients lack the negotiating capacity to force the companies
from which they are supplied with their computational needs to offer them
contractual agreements with all the reassurances and safeguards that
would allow them to feel secure about their data. Therefore, it is impera-
tive need that a comprehensive cloud computing regulatory regime is put
in place, which will set a level playing field for cloud users and service
providers alike.
Reviewing security, privacy and trust issues on the cloud from an EU
perspective
Having systematically examined the main points of concern regarding se-
curity, privacy and trust issues in cloud computing environments from a
technical viewpoint and also through the angle of US law, this part of this
study concludes with some observations regarding these issues from a
European perspective. For starters, it is worth clarifying how EU legal
thinking defines the main threats raised by cloud environments:
– Under the EU doctrine, security in the cloud concerns the confidential-
ity, availability and integrity of data or information782. Security as a
f.
780 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
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cloud necessity, may also include authentication and non-repudia-
tion783.
– Privacy refers to the expression of or adherence to various legal and
non-legal norms regarding the right to private life. In the European
context, ensuring privacy in the cloud has until today been understood
as compliance with the European Data protection Directive784 and
since May 2018 with the respective Regulation. The main traits the
concept of privacy in the cloud bears under the relevant tradition in EU
law can be summarized down to these principles: consent, purpose re-
striction, legitimacy, transparency, data security and data subject partic-
ipation785.
– Trust is the concept encompassing the assurance and confidence that
people, data, entities, information or processes will function or behave
in expected ways786. The way trust in the cloud is interpreted as an idea
under EU law is broken down to several different genres, i.e. trust from
human to human, machine to machine (for example, handshake proto-
cols negotiated within certain protocols787), human to machine (e.g.,
when a consumer reviews a digital signature advisory notice on a web-
site788) or machine to human (e.g., when a system relies on user input
and instructions without further verification to execute a process789).
From a more thorough perspective, trust should be regarded as the log-
ical consequence of progress towards achieving the broader security or
privacy objectives the cloud industry has imposed on itself as essential.
Given the way these terms are interpreted in European legal thinking and
the generally stricter protection that EU law grants to cloud related matters
than US law, cloud computing raises serious challenges also for EU legis-
lators. In fact, a new EU law aimed at regulating the cloud has to deal not
only with the task of providing updated answers to commonly known IT
problems as these are now readapted in light of cloud technologies but
also to ensure that these answers will be fit for the market and technologi-
783 Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri, Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie
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cal standards set out by cloud computing. Indeed, a great share of experts
on the EU cloud services market have expressed the opinion that certain
aspects of European data protection law (notably the rigid controller-pro-
cessor model and the reliance on geographic location of data processing as
an important factor in determining applicable rules) lead to substantial dif-
ficulties in practice790. Given that these understandings on which existing
EU laws with which the cloud is attempted to be regulated have largely
been rendered obsolete or unimportant by cloud technologies, a profound-
ly different approach is urgently needed.
What is also important to point out is the fact that, despite the strict
rules regarding data protection, in practice there appears to be a substantial
degree of poor compliance with them, especially in relation to transfers to
third countries or data subject rights791. Both these topics merit careful
analysis and consistent and clear responses in the context of a body of
regulation dedicated to efficient governance of the cloud. Even in areas of
data where more restrictive regulatory frameworks are in force, such as
sensitive data mainly from health and financial industries, just adding ex-
tra impediments to data migrations or requiring that such data be pro-
cessed only locally are not adequate measures to alleviate risks related to
them792.
Given the prevailing legal doctrine regarding IT technologies and the
data tasks effectuated through them, the essential elements of an effective
regulatory regime for the cloud should be transparency, availability and
accountability. Transparency is an important element in the struggle to
meet security, privacy or trust obligations, since it brings to the forefront
the (contractual) will of all cloud actors (be them users, service providers,
inspecting authorities etc.) to fulfil the globally accepted privacy princi-
ples that will make up for a sound and secure cloud environment793. Avail-
ability arises as a prerequisite since in a sound governance framework for
the cloud availability for reporting and inspection of cloud actors is of
790 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman & Lorenzo Valeri (note 275).
791 W. Kuan Hon & Christopher Millard, Data Export in Cloud Computing. How
Can Personal Data Be Transferred Outside the EEA? The Cloud of Unknowing,
Part 4, 9 SCRIPT-ed (2011.)
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prime importance as an assurance for application of the commonly accept-
ed privacy and security requirements794. Finally, accountability, as it has
already been demonstrated795, is an important factor arising directly from
one of the main legal challenges with regard to cloud computing: namely
that commitments from parties to the cloud life cycle must be clear and
enforceable in practice796. This, in consequence, stimulates trust through-
out the cloud cycle and further intensifies the bonds between providers
and users of cloud services797.
In summary, it has become evident from the discourse into the issue of
risks related to cloud computing that the legal and, hitherto, the contractu-
al framework for the cloud needs to become sufficiently stable and com-
prehensive to promote the trustworthiness of the legal relationships that
are created among actors of the cloud life cycle798. At the same time, this
requirement for trust and continuous accountability needs to be reconciled
with the inherent flexibility of the cloud computing architecture799. In
practice, this can only be achieved by ensuring that the rights, responsibili-
ties and liabilities of each actor are clearly outlined, and that the expecta-
tions from each link in the cloud chain are at all times transparent and ade-
quately ensured. If these conditions are met, then compliance (and ac-
countability) become more realistic and lead to a viable and, simultane-
ously, trustworthy governing scheme for cloud computing.
CLOUD COMPLIANCE
Introductory remarks on the concept of ‘cloud compliance’
Cloud compliance is the general principle that cloud-delivered systems
must be compliant with standards that the cloud users face800. In other
words, a cloud network and the providers of it or the services that are
PART II:
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made possible thanks to it, need to live up to a series of expectations that
the users of this network have in order to regard the network as a secure,
safe and trustworthy one. Having gone through the overview of the perils
that cloud computing might entail for the data users entrust it with, it has
been made clear that effectively dealing with these risks is not just a regu-
latory matter but also an issue of credibility. Consequently, cloud compli-
ance is for owners, controllers and service providers of a cloud network
the litmus test in their relationship with cloud users as is accountability in
their relation to regulatory authorities inspecting the overall cloud indus-
try. Just as a cloud ecosystem has to meet specific standards set by its su-
pervising public authorities to get the green light and be lawfully commer-
cialized, it also needs to meet the same approval in the eyes of its actual
users. After all, the risks that an effective body of law governing the cloud
will try to keep under control or even resolve are the worries that users of
cloud computing need to be reassured about. In conclusion, analyzing
what cloud compliance constitutes of and discussing how these necessities
will be pursued by an effective regulatory framework for the cloud is as
important as highlighting how public authorities need and should inspect
such a heavily customer-oriented industry.
Effective regulation of technology: the need to define policy tools and
policy actors
Lawrence Lessig801 had already since the 1990s put forward the regulation
of privacy as ‘an example of law taming code’ in order to uphold expecta-
tions of users of IT technologies: in Lessig’s doctrine, the state as an actor
has the discretionary power to impose changes on code in order to in-
crease the ability of the individual to exercise privacy choices802. This
regulatory approach, involving the Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P)803, is fabricated upon the conception of privacy as a property
b.
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right804, in which the giving (or withholding) of consent is the cornerstone
for protecting privacy. According to this predicament, the need for collec-
tive action by the state in order to enable individuals to control their own
privacy by ensuring the availability of respective tools that will allow
them to do so, is of prime significance for a well-functioning and soundly-
regulated IT environment. It also constitutes an exemplary pattern of inter-
action among different constituents playing a role in the IT market.
Generally, a doctrine like this, which makes provision for specific pol-
icies and tools that enable private parties to have an actual say in how their
right to privacy is handled, fits more comfortably in regulatory environ-
ments such as that of the USA, where political and business environments
have shown a considerable resistance to more direct legislative solutions,
such as non-consumerist, human rights-based conceptions of privacy, and,
as a result, the range of alternative regulatory solutions has traditionally
been restricted. However, at least as the prevailing legal thinking has been
until now, such a doctrine mostly contrasts with the approach of European
countries and the European Union. As it has been previously explained in
detail805, in the EU legal doctrine so far has been promoting more active
roles for collective rather than individual actors, such as regulatory agen-
cies. These have been the entities to play – in principle, at least – the key
parts in the regulatory mechanisms for governing IT technologies and the
markets dependent on them by executing the powers entrusted to them to
implement legislation. Consequently, so far European law vests the main
protective initiatives for privacy to state actors rather than individual citi-
zens or consumers, or technological mechanisms.
In mid-2000s, when the revolution of cloud computing was still very
nascent but indications about the cloud’s potential were already growing,
Murray’s806 doctrine of ‘cyberspace regulation’ was introduced in aca-
demic discourse putting emphasis on the need to identify distinct actors
active within multi-level regulatory regimes807. Presenting his doctrine on
an abstract level, Murray put forward an illustrative matrix to conceptual-
ize multi-dimensional regulatory fields, i.e. fields of regulation with multi-
804 Charles D. Raab & Paul de Hert, The Regulation of Technology: Policy Tools and
Policy Actors TILT Law & Technology Working Paper Series (2007.)
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ple actors carrying some type of regulatory capacity for specific actions808.
This conception was then tested against actual regulatory case-studies and
led Murray to argue against static ‘command and control’ regulatory mod-
els in fields with actors spread through various levels. In the end, Murray
concluded that in such multi-layered regulatory fields, regulation attempt-
ed exclusively via external interventions, typically manifested through
law, is likely to be rather disruptive than effective. This is mainly so due to
the fact that regulation produced entirely by actors on the superior levels
of the system is grounded in insufficient understanding of the processes
and interactions that are meant to be regulated. Instead, he argues in favor
of a more dynamic, complementary and symbiotic approach, which ac-
knowledges that regulators and regulates are not separate, and which relies
on hybrid rule-making processes rather than instruments produced out of
single-direction flows809.
Incorporating users’ privacy concerns into the rules governing design
and deployment of cloud environments
Maintaining adequate levels of protection of data and privacy is not only a
matter of legal importance but also crucial for responding to users’ expec-
tations in relation to the cloud. This challenge becomes even more compli-
cated when the restrictions on cross-border data transfers are also to be up-
held. This is not just an accountability issue, in the sense of self-disci-
plinary measures. As cloud services process users’ data on machines that
users do not own or operate themselves, serious privacy issues are raised
which can undermine users’ control and privacy options. However, priva-
cy is a fundamental human right, enshrined in the United Nations Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights810 and the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights811. Out of this basic privacy provisions come various special
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information about ourselves’813 or the newest concept of ‘the right to be
forgotten’814. These are all privacy manifestations which have been in-
spired by the way individuals have been interpreting their right to privacy
over the years and they all play a crucial role in the way cloud technolo-
gies are or should be applied.
Apart from the concerns raised for privacy because of the very techno-
logical architecture of the cloud, another source of potential undermining
effects for privacy on the cloud is that it is a dynamic environment, which
facilitates, for instance, service interactions that can be created in a more
dynamic way than traditional e-commerce scenarios815. In cloud enabled
data paths, personal and sensitive data can move through an organization
or cross organizational boundaries in various simultaneous trajectories.
However, data remains at all times attributable to its original subjects, ad-
equate protection of the information of which is as important as maintain-
ing other aspects of legal compliance.
Apart from the multiple routes made available to data in their constant
flow from one terminal point to another, cloud computing also makes pos-
sible for new services to be made available in the cloud, which come out
of combining two or more individual services816: for instance, a cost-effi-
cient ‘pictures on demand’ service could be made commercially available
by combining a printing service with a cloud storage service. As this pro-
cedure of service combination grows into more layers, it typically leads to
less and less control over aspects, such as the privacy of the data carried
out for and due to the use of these services817. Additionally, while before
the introduction of cloud computing such on-demand services involving
data were made possible via traditional multi-party enterprise schemes,
nowadays convergence happens on the services level, with the owner of
provider of each service not even being necessarily aware of the combina-
tions818. What is more, there might also be varying degrees of security, di-
verse privacy practices and controls in each of the component services.
And given that, as every cloud service, they almost necessarily involve
collection, storage or disclosure of personal and sensitive user data, poten-
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tial users need to receive adequate and persuasive reassurances before ac-
tually deciding to use them. It is precisely at this point, where cloud com-
pliance comes to act as the catalyst that turns users’ expectations into
cloud service providers’ self-discipline processes.
In light of the above observations on privacy expectations users have
from cloud computing systems, the privacy concepts and principles that
have prevailed may be summarized as follows819:
– Notice, openness and transparency: it is increasingly becoming a stan-
dard user expectation that cloud services which need to collect users’
information duly inform them about the kind of information they col-
lect, the ways in which they intend to use it, the amount of time that
they intend to keep it, if it will be shared with any third parties, and the
by-products of the further uses they intend to make of it. It is also ex-
pected that cloud service providers notify users before making any
changes as to how the information is or will be used.
– Choice, consent and control: cloud services users expect to be given
the freedom of choice whether they allow this information to be col-
lected or not. Data subjects are also entitled to giving their consent to
the collection, use and disclosure of their personally identifiable infor-
mation.
– Scope/minimization: only information essential to fulfil the stated pur-
pose should be collected or shared. The collection of data should be
minimized to what is necessary for the service purpose.
– Access and accuracy: cloud services users expect at all times to be able
to access the personal information service providers collect about
them, to review what is being held about them, and to verify its accura-
cy.
– Security safeguards: users expect that safeguards are in place to pre-
vent unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or modification of
personally identifiable information
– Means to challenge compliance: users must have the possibility to
challenge, ideally via official procedures, a provider’s privacy process-
es.
– Limitation of purpose: users expect that their data will only be used for
the purpose for which it was collected. This purpose is expected to be a
clearly specified one. Data subjects are to be informed about the rea-
819 Refer also to Chapters 8, 9 and 10.
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sons why their data is being collected and shared in advance or, at the
latest, at the time of collection.
– Limited use – disclosure and retention: users expect that data will only
be used or disclosed for the purpose for which it was collected and
should only be disclosed to parties authorized to receive it. Additional-
ly, personal data are expected to be aggregated or anonymized with
suitable methods. Personal information should only be kept strictly for
as long as necessary.
– Accountability: users expect that a provider has in place inspecting
personnel that ensures that privacy policies and practices are followed
at all times. Audit functions also play a crucial role towards monitoring
data accesses and modifications.
As it easily becomes evident, the main expectations of users, which are the
actual content of the concept of cloud compliance, are identical with re-
spective elements of the suggested accountability scheme for the cloud820.
This comes as no surprise given that, as it has been previously demonstrat-
ed, cloud compliance is the other side on the coin of sound cloud gover-
nance821. Much as providers try or should even be made to incorporate the
above expectations already since the phase of preliminary design of their
services, it may prove challenging to know exactly how their service will
evolve. In conclusion, the flexible nature of cloud computing as technolo-
gy necessitates respectively more adaptable design specifications. Conse-
quently, the development of a regulatory framework for it comes also to
challenge traditional thinking about legislation production822. In particular,
as user requirements change, taking full advantage of the multiple possi-
bilities offered by the cloud, so may functionality and privacy require-
ments823. On a regulatory level, this means that laws governing the cloud
need to be produced via processes that will allow for more frequent and
effective reassessment or that will aim at more generically formulated
norms so that the gap between the legal and technological, as well as the
service state-of-the-art can be shortened.
820 Siani Pearson & Andrew Charlesworth (note 585).
821 Refer to Chapter 5.
822 L. Lessig (note 504).
823 Siani Pearson & George Yee (note 280).
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Pragmatic answers regarding the deployment of secure and privacy-
proof cloud networks
The rate at which cloud computing is expanding across sub-domains of the
IT sector proves its lasting nature as a technology. It has also been ade-
quately demonstrated that trying to put geographical or other kinds of
boundaries to the cloud is ineffective and out of touch with how cloud
computing is being used in real life. Neither users nor cloud service
providers will voluntarily quit from taking advantage of the full potential
of cloud applications, which is decisively shaped by the universal nature
of this technology. Therefore, also from the perspective of regulating how
service providers should set up their services to make them compatible
with cloud users’ expectations, the focus should primarily be on restricting
unauthorized access to intelligible data, rather than restricting data ex-
port824 or other kinds of data processing that can be executed on the cloud.
The current restrictions, via which data processing in the cloud is attempt-
ed to be regulated, should be replaced by requirements regarding account-
ability, transparency and security, i.e. with measures that will boost cloud
compliance.
In fact, the preoccupation about setting boundaries is rather unnecessary
if close attention is paid to how resources allocation in a cloud network
actually works. While the popular view seems to be that in cloud comput-
ing data moves around the network continuously and almost randomly,
making it virtually impossible to know where a specific bunch of data are
located at any time, in practice this is often not so. In most cases, data are
copied or replicated to different data centers, for business continuity/back-
up purposes825, rather than being constantly circulated through the net-
works storage facilities by being deleted from one data centre and re-creat-
ed in another. Additionally, the primary copy of a set of data (e.g. data of a
specific user inserted on a particular SaaS application) is at most times
stored in the same data centre826. This typically is the one geographically
closest to the user in question, for latency reasons (i.e. for achieving the
optimum speed of access and response for the user827), even if it is also
likely that they are stored in fragments distributed amongst different stor-
d.
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age hardware within that data centre828. Consequently, regulating the
cloud with a view to improving data allocation capabilities on cloud net-
works is not a real priority. If need be, the provider will most likely know
where a user’s data fragments are stored, on a data centre if not on equip-
ment level.
Overall, it becomes evident that the regulatory focus regarding cloud
computing needs to shift from where the data is or can be saved or pro-
cessed to the intention (i.e. the purpose) for which it is saved or processed
at any time by a specific actor of a cloud network. This approach towards
cloud computing regulation through the teleological perspective will be
thoroughly presented as the final outcome of this study829.
Incentivizing privacy and security by encouraging the adoption of
privacy enhancing technologies
In order to achieve a regime of effective data protection on the cloud, un-
der the present and projected status quo of cloud technologies, legal in-
struments are not enough by themselves. A crucial tool in that direction
will also be the availability of privacy enhancing technologies (PETs)830.
It is beyond the scope of a legal research project to describe in detail the
nature of PETs. Nevertheless, it should not fail our attention how PETs can
assist in achieving optimum levels of privacy and security and why it is,
therefore, important that their adoption be prescribed or, at least, encour-
aged by law831.
The intrinsic and, largely, legitimate aim of service providers and users
of cloud computing is the maximization of profit832. In this context, data
protection could remain relevant as long as there is demand for it on the
market. On the other hand, if such demand ceases or becomes minimal,
e.
828 Id.
829 See Chapter 10.
830 Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) is a generic term referring to a set of
computer tools, applications and mechanisms which, integrated in online services
or applications, or used in conjunction with such services or applications, enable
online users to protect the privacy of their personally identifiable information
(PII) which they have handed over to and is handled by such services or applica-
tions.
831 W. K. Hon, C. Millard & I. Walden (note 119).
832 See also Chapter 2.
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privacy and the technologies making it possible may quickly become a
mere cost driver or even end up being irrelevant in the design process be-
cause it neither causes nor reduces costs.
Therefore, in the context of an effective regulatory scheme for the
cloud, it is crucial to emphasize the idea of service responsibility for ser-
vice providers833. Rules can assist in that direction and have a relevant im-
pact in several manners:
– by providing external incentives, such as binding requirements and re-
strictions or liability regulations834.
– by exerting influence on intrinsic goals of service providers; in other
words, by stimulating the market for PETs using data protection audits
or quality certifications as means of pressure for providers to embrace
these technologies835.
– even by going as far as establishing guidelines for the participation of
scholars and practitioners in interdisciplinary research that will be
aimed at devising methods for privacy enhancing design of cloud-
based services. The multi-faceted nature of the cloud means that, apart
from legal experts, interdisciplinary research into the ever-enhanced
privacy and security standards of cloud computing should also bring
together experts from a wide range of areas, such as computer science,
organization and management science, economics and political sci-
ence.
In following parts of this study836, it will be argued that PETs are no one-
way solution, as far as regulatory handling of the cloud is concerned.
Rather, they are just a tool that could offer greater assurance to consumers
about the security of cloud systems. However, the philosophy behind PETs
can already offer invaluable insight towards a thorough set of regulatory
principles for the cloud which, coupled the expertise available from the
technical front can ultimately lead to robust and efficient cloud regulation
rules.
833 Id.
834 See also Chapter 6.
835 Id.
836 See Chapter 10.
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Principles for regulating the cloud (1);
conclusions from the ontology of cloud
computing networks
Introduction – scope of this chapter
Having gone through the norms, prevailing schools of thought and cur-
rently applicable regulatory approaches regarding cloud computing or the
IT applications more closely related to it in Europe and the US, it is now
time to look into the principles and best practices that could be derived
from each of the two jurisdictions and could serve as guidelines for regu-
lating the cloud, as a unique technology and the backbone of the IT envi-
ronment of today and tomorrow.
The following parts of this study will be organized in a manner that will
have a twofold aim:
– To explain why we need rules specifically for cloud computing besides
those already governing the numerous applications based on it
– To formulate these rules not in the strict form of a draft law but as
generic regulatory concepts that each jurisdiction can then adopt and
adapt to the particularities of its own legal conventions being sure,
however, that, if the laws developed have these concepts at heart, the
overall governance of the cloud will be more efficient on a cross-bor-
der scale.
The proposed principles will be grouped in three chapters, in particular:
– Those stemming from the architecture of the cloud computing network
itself and respond to issues related to the way cloud infrastructure is
compiled together (Chapter 8)
– Those stemming from the different actors participating across the cloud
cycle, i.e. across the workflows developed and facilitated by cloud
computing networks, and respond to the way cloud services, business-
es and applications are organized and executed (Chapter 9)
– Those responding to the need to build a governance scheme for cloud
computing that will differentiate between regulatory challenges on the
local and the global level allowing for the concretization of minimum




unified tackling of regulatory issues related to the cloud on a cross-ju-
risdictional basis (Chapter 10).
In comprehensively presenting the regulatory proposals organized into
these three groupings, the following methodological tools will primarily
be applied:
– Interdisciplinarity, primarily with regard to the principles falling under
Chapters 8 and 9
– Legal pluralism, primarily for the principles falling under Chapters 9
and 10
– Harmonization of norms, primarily for the principles under Chapter 10.
Constructing the ontology of the cloud; is the cloud one and only thing
after all?
One of the most common misconceptions regarding cloud computing is
that, in laymen as well as in the regulator’s eyes, it is usually seen as a
concept with just one meaning, that of the means or the medium for the
transfer, storage or processing of personal data. Actually, the term ‘cloud
computing’ is much more multi-layered and complex than that and, before
getting down to talk about it as a term signifying a whole range of applica-
tions serving the above purposes, it is crucial to realize that the cloud has
various different facets on a hardware/architectural level837. Particularities
in the nature of these facets already lead to the first regulatory principles
necessary for an efficient governance of cloud computing.
In computer science, describing and documenting all variations of a
technology or the hardware implementations that make it possible is a pro-
cess called (IT) ontology838. In detail, in computer science and informa-
tion science, an ontology is an official, analytical naming and mapping of
the types, properties, and interrelations of the entities that exist for a par-
ticular domain of discourse, i.e. a particular domain of the overall sec-
b.
837 Deepak Puthal, B.P.S. Sahoo, Sambit Mishra & Satyabrata Swain, Cloud Compu-
ting Features, Issues, and Challenges: A Big Picture, in 2015 International Con-
ference on Computational Intelligence & Networks (CINE), 116–123 (KIIT Uni-
versity ed.)
838 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva, Toward a Unified Ontology of
Cloud Computing, in 2008 Grid Computing Environments Workshop, 1–10.
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tor839. In other words, ontology in IT is a practical application of philo-
sophical ontology, with a taxonomy840. An ontology task, in essence, com-
partmentalizes the variables needed for specific types of computations
and, additionally, establishes the relationships between them841.
Ontology as a tool and practice is increasingly common in several fields
of the wider IT sector842. To name a few, the fields of artificial intelli-
gence, the Semantic Web, systems engineering, software engineering,
biomedical informatics, library science, enterprise bookmarking, and in-
formation architecture all resort to ontologies to limit complexity and or-
ganize information about and within them843. These ontologies can then be
applied to problem solving844. The same practice is suggested as a key tool
in our effort to analytically comprehend, systematize and, ultimately, regu-
late cloud computing.
There are several methodologies with which it is possible to map down
the ontology of an IT field845. The one mostly proposed in relevant litera-
ture as the most suitable to grasp and successfully organize all relevant
839 John F. Sowa, Top-level ontological categories, 43 International Journal of Hu-
man-Computer Studies 669–685 (1995.)
840 Id.
841 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
842 Ling Liu & M. Tamer Özsu, Encyclopedia of database systems (2009.)
843 Id.
844 Xiaolong Jin & Jiming Liu, From Individual Based Modeling to Autonomy Ori-
ented Computation, in International Workshop on Computational Autonomy,
151–169 (2003.)
845 The two fundamental genres of ontology are domain and upper ontology. Domain
ontologies (or domain-specific ontologies) represent concepts which belong to
part of the world. Particular meanings of terms applied to that domain (i.e. the
world) are provided by domain ontology. For instance, the word card has several
meanings. An ontology about the domain of poker would model the "playing
card" meaning of the word, while an ontology about the domain of computer
hardware would model the "sound card" and "video card" meanings. A main fea-
ture of domain ontologies is that they represent concepts in very specific, even
eclectic ways, becoming often incompatible. As systems that rely on domain on-
tologies expand, they often need to merge domain ontologies into a more general
representation. At the same time, different ontologies in the same domain arise
due to different languages, different intended use of the ontologies, and different
perceptions of the domain (based on cultural background, education, ideology,
etc.).
Another major type is upper ontology (or foundation ontology), i.e. a model of
common objects that are generally applicable across a wide range of domain on-
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knowledge regarding the cloud is composability846. Composability, as an
ontology typification method, is inspired by composability as a system de-
sign principle847; the latter heavily deals with the inter-relationships of
components of a system; in this case, of the cloud, as a field of IT848.
For reasons of clarity and simplicity, the ontology of the cloud that is
endeavored here should be conventionally pictured as a stack of layers.
Then, each layer shall encompass one or more cloud services. In addition,
cloud services sharing comparable levels of abstraction will be classified
as belonging to the same layer, while abstraction will be measured as per
which type of users each service is targeted at849. For instance, all cloud
software environments (i.e. cloud platforms) target programmers, while
cloud applications target end users. Therefore, cloud software environ-
ments would be all classified in the same but in a different layer than
cloud applications, which would, however, also fall all under the same lay-
er.
Under composability, one cloud layer is classified as being higher in the
cloud stack, when its services can be composed from the services of the
underlying layer850. For example, when it comes to the cloud application
layer, since cloud applications are made possible, i.e. are developed, using
cloud software environments, it can be said that cloud applications are
composable from cloud software environments, and, consequently, the
cloud application layer is higher in the cloud stack851. Following this log-
ic, the cloud stack is composed from bottom up of the following layers:
– The Firmware/hardware layer (HaaS)
– The Software Kernel layer
– The Cloud Software Infrastructure layer, which is further broken down
to Computational Resources (IaaS), Storage (DaaS), and Communica-
tions (CaaS)
tologies. It usually employs a core glossary that contains the terms and associated
object descriptions as they are used in various relevant domain sets.
Lastly, a hybrid is an ontology incorporating elements from both the domain and
upper model.
846 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
847 John F. Sowa (note 839).
848 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
849 Id.
850 John F. Sowa (note 839).
851 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
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– The Cloud Software Environment layer and,
– The Cloud Application layer (SaaS)852.
An analytical presentation of these layers will permit us, afterwards to pin-
point some essential regulatory guidelines for the cloud.
The Firmware/Hardware layer
By application of the tools described above, the ontology scheme of the
cloud has the firmware/hardware layer at its foundations. It comprises the
actual physical hardware and infrastructure that form the backbone of the
cloud, as technology and as network853. On this layer, the main users are
big enterprises with voluminous IT requirements which, most commonly,
are in need of a service constituting of subleasing hardware which they
will then use for their own computational needs or purposes (HaaS)854. As
a rule, the entities acting as HaaS providers at this level have the tasks of
operating, managing and upgrading the said hardware on behalf of their
consumers, for as long as the sub-lease contracts they have entered into
with customers remain in force. One of the classic examples of HaaS are
the contracts banking service providers enter into with big data storage
providers in order to cover their computational needs855. At this layer,
users have predefined workloads with characteristics that impose strict
performance requirements.
The Software Kernel layer
On this cloud layer are to be allocated all pieces of basic software manage-
ment for the physical servers composing the cloud. Software kernels856 at
i.
ii.
852 IEEE INFOCOM 2010 – IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.
853 Mike P. Papazoglou & Willem-Jan van den Heuvel, Service oriented architec-
tures. Approaches, technologies and research issues, 16 The VLDB Journal 389–
415 (2007.)
854 Id.
855 Morgan Stanley’s sublease contract with IBM in 2004.
856 In computer science, the kernel (also named the nucleus) is a computer program
that constitutes the core of a computer’s (or computer network’s) operating sys-
tem. The kernel has complete control over everything that occurs in the system.
As such, it is the first program loaded on system startup, and it then manages the
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this level are implemented as an OS kernel857, hypervisor858, virtual ma-
chine monitor859 and/or clustering middleware860. Traditionally, grid com-
puting applications were deployed to run on this layer on several intercon-
nected clusters of machines861. However, due to the absence of the virtual-
ization element in grid computing, those tasks were closely tied to the ac-
tual hardware infrastructure; consequently, providing migration, check-
pointing and load balancing to the applications at this level used to be a
complicated task862. In the meantime, a considerable body of research in
grid computing has led to several grid-developed concepts being realized
today in cloud computing863.
remainder of the startup process, as well as input/output requests from software,
by translating them into data processing instructions for the central processing
unit. It is also responsible for managing memory, and for communicating with
computing peripherals, like printers, speakers, etc. The kernel is a fundamental
part of a modern computer's operating system. Mutatis mutandis, in the context
of a cloud computing network the kernel is its most basic software, the one mana-
ging its most fundamental and elementary functions and processes, which are ba-
sically dedicated in making sure that the network itself will run properly.
857 The OS kernel as a term essentially is synonymous to the term ‘software kernel’.
858 A hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM) is a piece of computer software
(there are firmware or hardware typifications of hypervisors but they call outside
the scope of this study) that creates and runs virtual machines. The hypervisor
presents the guest operating systems with a virtual operating platform and mana-
ges the execution of the guest operating systems. The term hypervisor is a variant
of supervisor, a traditional term for the kernel of an operating system: the hyper-
visor is the supervisor of the supervisor, with hyper- used as a stronger variant of
super-.
859 A virtual machine is a software computer that, like a physical computer, runs an
operating system and applications. The virtual machine is comprised of a set of
specification and configuration files and is backed by the physical resources of a
host.
860 In the context of a computing cluster, the activities of computing nodes are or-
chestrated by "clustering middleware", a software layer that sits atop the nodes
and allows the users to treat the cluster as by and large one cohesive computing
unit, e.g. via a single system image concept.
861 Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis & Diomidis Spinellis, A survey of peer-to-
peer content distribution technologies, 36 ACM Comput. Surv. 335–371 (2004.)
862 2008 Grid Computing Environments Workshop.
863 Ian Foster, Yong Zhao, Ioan Raicu & Shiyong Lu (note 92).
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The Cloud Software Infrastructure layer
The cloud software infrastructure layer hosts fundamental resources which
are essential so that other higher-level layers can be used to construct new
cloud software environments or cloud applications. The main reason why
resources allocated on this layer are set apart from the two highest levels
in the cloud stack is that the latter can bypass the cloud infrastructure layer
in directly building their system864. Often this bypass can enhance the effi-
ciency of the system, yet it comes at the cost of simplicity and minimum
development efforts necessary865. The services allocated on this layer are
further divided into: computational resources, data storage, and communi-
cations.
– computational resources: Virtual machines (VMs) are the most com-
mon form for providing computational resources to cloud users at this
layer which they can subsequently use to customize the software stack
for performance and efficiency866. Conventionally, such services are
dubbed Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)867. Virtualization is the en-
abling technology which offers unprecedented flexibility to users in
configuring their settings while protecting the physical infrastructure of
the provider’s data center868. However, since VMs can by nature co-ex-
ist on the same data storage hardware facility, the lack of a strict per-
formance isolation between them while sharing the same physical node
can at any time result in the inability of cloud providers to give strong
guarantees for performance to their clients869. Such weak guarantees,
unfortunately, can inject themselves up the layers of the cloud stack870.
– data storage: The second infrastructure resource is data storage, which
constitutes what cloud computing is probably most widely known for:
allowing users to store their data at remote storage facilities and access
them anytime from anywhere871. This service is commonly quoted as
Data-Storage as a Service (DaaS), and it permits cloud applications to
iii.
864 Deepak Puthal, B.P.S. Sahoo, Sambit Mishra & Satyabrata Swain (note 837).
865 Mike P. Papazoglou & Willem-Jan van den Heuvel (note 853).
866 Refer also to Chapter 2.
867 Refer also to Chapter 2.
868 Refer also to Chapters 2 and 6.
869 Dimitrios Zissis & Dimitrios Lekkas, Addressing cloud computing security is-
sues, 28 Future Generation Computer Systems 583–592 (2012.)
870 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
871 See Chapter 2.
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scale beyond their limited servers. Data storage systems are as a stan-
dard expected to meet several rigorous requirements for maintaining
users’ data and information, including high availability, reliability, per-
formance, replication and data consistency872; however, precisely be-
cause of the conflicting nature of all these requirements, no system can
implement all of them together873. For instance, availability, scalability
and data consistency are regarded as three conflicting goals from a
technical point of view. Given that those features are hard to be simul-
taneously achieved with general data storage systems, DaaS-providers
implement their system to favor one feature over the others, while indi-
cating their choice through their SLA. However, there is no legal war-
ranty at the moment regarding the minimum that needs to be achieved
for any one of the most common performance requirements causing
considerable irregularities and, thus, insecurities throughout the cloud
market.
– communication: As cloud systems evolve and become more and more
popular and the means for developing a wide range of IT services for
the general public, so does the need for guaranteed quality of service
for network communication, with communication becoming a vital
component of the cloud infrastructure. As a result of this demand,
cloud systems have focused on developing features enhancing commu-
nication capability in a service-oriented, configurable, schedulable,
predictable, and reliable manner874. Towards this end, the concept of
Communication as a Service (CaaS) emerged. Although at the begin-
ning this model was the least discussed and adopted in commercial
cloud systems, it is gaining more and more in popularity over the last
years875. Inter alia, systems that belong to CaaS are VoIP telephone
systems, audio and video conferencing as well as instant messaging
apps are cloud applications that are already or are expected to be based
on CaaS876.
872 See Chapter 2.
873 Id.
874 Ozalp Babaoglu, M. Jelasity, Anne Marie Kermarrec, Alberto Montresor &
Maarten van Steen, Operating Systems Review (ACM), available at: http://dl.ac
m.org/citation.cfm?doid=1151374.1151379.
875 Mike P. Papazoglou & Willem-Jan van den Heuvel (note 853).
876 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
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The three sublayers composing the infrastructure layer also share common
challenges besides the ones particular to each of them. Among others, se-
curity of the services, availability and quality are the most commonly ad-
dressed concerns for all cloud infrastructure components877.
The Cloud Software Environment layer
The following layer in cloud ontology is the cloud software environment
layer (or, simply, the software platform layer). Users of this layer are
cloud applications’ developers, who implement their applications for and
deploy them on the cloud878. Providers of this layer, on the other hand,
supply developers with a programming-language-level environment aimed
at facilitating interaction between programming environments and cloud
applications, as well as at accelerating deployment and supporting scala-
bility necessary for those cloud applications879. Services provided by
cloud systems in this layer are commonly referred to as Platform as a Ser-
vice (PaaS)880. A classic example of systems in this layer is Google’s App
Engine, which provides a python runtime environment and APIs for appli-
cations to interact with Google’s cloud runtime environment or Sales-
Force’s Apex language permitting developers of cloud applications to de-
sign the page layout, workflow or customer reports according to the logic
of their applications881. In a nutshell, cloud software environments facili-
tate the process of the development of cloud applications882.
The Cloud Application layer (SaaS)
The cloud application layer is the one closest to the end-users of the cloud.
It basically corresponds to the very cloud-based applications we all know
and use in daily life, from our email service, to Dropbox or similar file
storage and management services etc. This model has exponentially
iv.
v.
877 Deepak Puthal, B.P.S. Sahoo, Sambit Mishra & Satyabrata Swain (note 837).
878 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
879 Id.
880 See Chapter 2.
881 Xiaolong Jin & Jiming Liu (note 844).
882 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
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gained popularity for all the reasons explained in earlier parts of this
study883.
Different uses but the same ontology: what does this mean for cloud
computing regulatory principles?
From the analysis in the previous section in combination with the techni-
cal overview of cloud computing in Chapter 2 of this study we can draw
the conclusion that there is a clear dichotomy between cloud computing as
a technical arrangement, as a technology and infrastructure, on the one
side, and the cloud as the applications through which we have the possibil-
ity to use in various forms the capacity of this infrastructure, on the other.
Viewing the above observation through the basic reasoning proposed by
the doctrine of law and knowledge884, which is rapidly gaining popularity
particularly in public law, it can be argued that this dichotomy has caused
a fussy picture, at least on the front of end-consumers and on the regula-
tory front, due to the fact that the infrastructural nature of the cloud is not,
at most times, immediately visible and, therefore, comprehensible to non-
technically-savvy actors. It is of course, undeniable that there are lots of
different ways to deploy the same kind of infrastructure and this means
that the (regulatory) challenges coming with one type of cloud environ-
ment will not necessarily be the same with those of another. For instance,
a great deal of issues regarding privacy raised by public clouds are non-
existent or they are satisfactorily tackled when the same resources are uti-
lized to set up a private cloud computing network885. However, the techni-
cal expertise, the mechanical skills and the very materials (i.e. pieces of
c.
883 See Chapter 2.
884 Hans-Heinrich Trute (note 432). For further details on the doctrine of law and
knowledge and the broader issue of how knowledge converts into or affects the
law, refer to: Hans Christian Röhl, Wissen, zur kognitiven Dimension des Rechts,
vol. 9 (2010); Gunnar Folke Schuppert & Andreas Vosskuhle, Governance von
und durch Wissen, Bd. 12 (2008); Mariana Valverde, Law's Dream of a Common
Knowledge (2009); Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine Jo
Strandburg, Governing knowledge commons (2014); Friedrich A. von Hayek,
The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 The American Economic Review 519–530
(1945); Adrian Vermeule ed., Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative
State (2013.)
885 See Chapter 2 for the difference between public and private cloud networks.
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hardware) that are necessary in order to build up either a public (with just
the standard protection features) or a private (with as advanced protection
features as possible) cloud ecosystem are, in essence, the same. In both
cases, and in every other in between, one will need pieces of the same
kind of infrastructure, the same kind of information science and IT engi-
neering knowledge that will permit one to put those pieces of hardware in-
to meaningful working arrangements and, of course, even the features that
will differentiate them and make them stand apart from each other will be
based on the same technical principles and scientific intel that makes the
overall concept of cloud computing technology possible. Consequently, it
becomes evident that, despite the great variety in which cloud services and
networks appear on the market and the substantial differences which
might exist between all these variations of cloud environments, there is a
common underlying connecting tissue that binds them all, and that is the
knowledge (of informatics, computing engineering and other disciplines)
related to them which is one and the same.
To put it more illustratively, let’s take the example of two data hosting
and sharing facilities, such as Dropbox, one public and commercially
available and the other private and customized to be accessible by a spe-
cific circle of users only, probably also cut out in a manner that will pro-
vide answers to their very particular needs. It is true that a great deal of
elements of the two applications might look totally different from each
other, from the interfaces to the layers and tools each of them uses to en-
sure privacy and security for its users. But no matter how different the two
applications may look, the basic principles and knowledge behind them
are the same; as a result, from each of these two manifestations of the
cloud there are minimum common expectations which call for minimum
shared regulatory principles that would settle them in a unanimous man-
ner. This unanimity could and should be not just within the boundaries of
one jurisdiction but on a cross-jurisdictional basis. This does not in any
case necessitate some kind of unification of different jurisdictions into one
or the introduction of one extra supranational legal order just for the sake
of IT regulation. Jurisdictional particularities and traditions of every legal
order could very well be upheld and respected in the field of IT law as it is
done in any other legal sector. What we need to make sure is that these
commonly shared principles will advance the achievement of the same
goals from every jurisdiction on each and every matter of cloud computing
regulation.
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In other words, the challenge is not to homogenize IT laws or pulverize
jurisdictional particularities. It rather is to set common goals and establish
rules that will contribute to their achievement. The path towards achieving
these goals can and will expectedly be different, both because cloud com-
puting manifests itself through various different arrangements and because
two or more identical cloud networks in different environments will natu-
rally be treated in differentiated manners according to the legal culture in
each environment. However, as long as the same purposes are pursued
and, ultimately, materialize, the path and the means need not be identical.
With this in mind, the ontology of the cloud as it was previously ana-
lyzed allows us to define a first set of regulatory principles for cloud com-
puting based on the knowledge that makes the cloud possible.
Mapping the life cycle of data on cloud computing networks: risks,
security and privacy issues as indicators for the nature of cloud
computing regulation rules
Having analyzed what cloud computing as technology and technological
arrangement actually consists of via the tool of ontology, it is worth also
mapping down the life cycle data follows while circulating through the
various layers presented above. Presenting the blueprint of the path of data
through the cloud will also allow us to pinpoint the risks they are exposed
to from a technical perspective. This knowledge, which, as it has been ar-
gued in the case of cloud ontology already, is universal and applies to all
different kinds of cloud networks no matter whether they host public ser-
vices or others available only to a limited circle of users, can then lead us
to the concretization of the regulatory principles stemming from the ontol-
ogy of the cloud.
For starters, in the context of the analysis following below, the term
‘data life cycle’ should be interpreted as referring to the entire process
from generation to destruction of any kind of digital data886. This path
consists of seven distinct stages, the essence, features and main risks of
which are summarized as follows. It needs to be noted that, in keeping
with the dynamic relations between the different layers of the cloud ontol-
d.
886 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao, Data Security and Privacy Protection Issues in
Cloud Computing, in 2012 International Conference on Computer Science and
Electronics Engineering, 647–651 (2012.)
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ogy as they were previously analyzed, the stages of the data life cycle on
the cloud can occur equally dynamic. It is only for descriptive easiness
that they are hereunder separately analyzed and their sequence of presence
does not imply at all that each stage is immune to or sealed from the oth-
ers.
Data generation
Data generation describes the moment when data is actually created for
the first time, regardless of whether it is original or data resulting from
processing of preexisting data sets887. At this stage of data generation, the
ownership status of data is also determined888. In pre-cloud IT environ-
ments users of whichever size, i.e. from individual users to large scale or-
ganizations, used to own and manage the data they were the creators of889.
However, in an IT environment where data increasingly, if not by default,
migrate to the cloud immediately after their creation or they are even cre-
ated directly there, the issue of ownership cannot be answered so self-evi-
dently. In other words, regulatory principles are need which will either al-
low the question of data ownership to be answered at all times during the
circulation of data on a cloud network or, if so preferred, will provide
enough safeguards to data owners regarding what extend of their personal
private information is being collected by other actors on the cloud net-
work. Last but not least, principles that will determine under which condi-
tions data owners may put a stop to collection and use of personal infor-
mation regardless of the layer within the cloud network where such prac-
tice occurs are also necessary. However, it needs to be made sure, at the
same time, that these rules need be realistic and promise realistic levels of
protection to data owners, unlike what seems to happen with the respec-
tive provisions of the GDPR890.
i.
887 Michael Backes & Peng Ning eds., Computer security – ESORICS 2009. 14th
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Saint-Malo, France,
September 21-23, 2009 : proceedings, vol. 5789 (2009.)
888 Elen Stokes, Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and
Technological Fixes by Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), 73 The Mod-
ern Law Review 682–689 (2010.)
889 Xiaolong Jin & Jiming Liu (note 844).
890 See Chapter 4.
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Transfer
Another fundamental block of the overall life cycle of data on the cloud is
the transfer of them. As a rule, in the pre-cloud enterprise status quo data
transmission did not require encryption or, at the most, only simple data
encryption measures would suffice891. However, in the new enterprise en-
vironment facilitated by cloud computing, where it is far from given that
the network of one enterprise does not overlap with that of another, trans-
fers of data are commonplace and both data confidentiality and integrity
should be ensured in order to prevent tapping and tampering by unautho-
rized users892. From a technical point of view, this cannot be guaranteed
by data encryption alone nor with technical measures only893. For optimal
data integrity in the cloud confidentiality is also crucial894 and it can only
be achieved if trustworthy transfer protocols are legally necessitated. In
fact, these should be maintained not only throughout the length of a single
cloud network but also during circulations of data from one network to the
other. In other words, the relevant rules providing for integral transfer
mechanisms should be developed having in mind both the horizontal and
the vertical data transfers which are possible in cloud environments.
Use
While being used on the resources of a network digital static data appear
in either of the following formats: as static data being used on a simple
storage service (such as most of storage services addressed to end-users,
like Amazon S3 or Dropbox) where data encryption is already feasible895.
However, static data on the cloud can also be used by cloud-based applica-
tions on the PaaS or SaaS layer and, in those cases, data encryption is not
always feasible896. In fact, on layers prior to the end-applications level da-
ta encryption is very likely to lead to problems of indexing and query, ab-
ii.
iii.
891 S. Subashini & V. Kavitha (note 119).
892 Nir Kshetri, Privacy and security issues in cloud computing. The role of instituti-
ons and institutional evolution, 37 Telecommunications Policy 372–386 (2013.)
893 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886).
894 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886); David W. Opderbeck (note 628).
895 Ozalp Babaoglu, M. Jelasity, Anne Marie Kermarrec, Alberto Montresor &
Maarten van Steen (note 874).
896 Id.
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normalities which would undermine the smooth functioning of the overall
cloud network897. It turns out that, contrary to what may be commonly
perceived as a result of the perception simple end cloud services try to cul-
tivate on customers898, in cloud just as in traditional IT environments, the
data being treated is almost not encrypted for any program that deals with
it on a layer prior to the end applications level899. Moreover, due to the
multi-tenancy feature900 of cloud computing models, the data being pro-
cessed by cloud based applications is in many instances stored together
with the data of other users at least when they are used by applications and
actors other than the end users. Given that this technical arrangement is
technically utopic that it will cease to exist, it becomes evident that regula-
tory principles defining codes of conduct for any actor using data at any
point during their life cycle and on any layer of a cloud network are neces-
sary.
Sharing
Data sharing, which is a function continuously performed by data owners
and several different types of actors that have access to data stored on a
cloud network, is an action expanding the use range of the data thus ren-
dering data permissions more complex901. This is of course a very known
issue about cloud computing, which existing legislation is already striving
to cope with, at least with regard to the specific cloud-enabled applications
for which there is regulation in place. However, given that data owners
iv.
897 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886).
898 Huaiqing Wang, Matthew K. O. Lee & Chen Wang (note 12).
899 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886).
900 "Software multitenancy", which is largely considered as one of the cornerstone
features of cloud computing, refers to a software architecture in which a single
instance of software runs on a server and serves multiple tenants. The term “ten-
ant” denotes a group of users who share common access with specific privileges
to the software instance. Under multitenant architecture, a software application is
designed to provide every tenant a dedicated share of the instance – including its
data, configuration, user management, tenant individual functionality and non-
functional properties. Multitenancy contrasts with multi-instance architectures,
where separate software instances operate on behalf of different tenants. For
more, refer to: Krebs, R., Momm, C., & Kounev, S. (2012). Architectural Con-
cerns in Multi-tenant SaaS Applications. Closer, 12, 426-431.
901 (note 852).
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can authorize data access for one party, which can further share the data
with another party without the consent of the original data owner and tak-
ing into account that this chain of sharing occurrences can go on and on
extending to users that are far from the jurisdiction of the data owner, we
can never realistically expect that simply by devising new methods for ex-
tending law applicability universal legal safety cannot be achieved. There-
fore, only the endorsement of common regulatory principles on the cloud
and the use as foundations of cloud governing laws by as many jurisdic-
tions as possible can be expected to provide trustworthy answers to the is-
sues discussed.
Storage
Possibly the most common activity with regard to data on the cloud is
storage. In fact, data is stored on cloud networks in two distinct contexts,
i.e. in IaaS environments, such as those of any standard cloud storage ser-
vice, and in PaaS or SaaS environment, where data related to the core code
of cloud based applications are stored902.
In computer science, data stored in cloud storages is treated in the same
manner as data stored in any other kind of facility, pre-existing or concur-
rent to cloud computing903. With that in mind, computer science literature
applied to data stored on the cloud the classic three criteria in order to as-
sess how securely they are stored904: confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability.
As far as data confidentiality is concerned, the solution advanced so far
from a technical perspective is data encryption905. The particularities of
cloud environments, involving large amounts of data transmission, storage
and handling, as well as processing speed and computational efficiency of
encrypting large amounts of data, make the use of symmetric encryption
v.
902 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886).
903 Ozalp Babaoglu, M. Jelasity, Anne Marie Kermarrec, Alberto Montresor &
Maarten van Steen (note 874).
904 Nir Kshetri (note 892).
905 Robert Gellman (note 696).
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algorithms906 more suitable than asymmetric ones. Moreover, another key
question coming immediately after the choice of the most suitable encryp-
tion pattern is key management907 and who is responsible for it. An ideal
answer would be that it is the data owners but, for the time being and in
the foreseeable future, average users do not possess enough expertise to
manage these keys and, as a standard, they entrust key management with
the cloud providers. Consequently, the enormous range of tasks for the lat-
ter means their key management responsibilities are way more complex
and difficult to cope with but, in any case, imperative. Switching focus to
data integrity908, the essential question is how users, who put several giga-
bytes or more of data into the cloud, can check the integrity of it. This
turns out to be not an easy question to answer given that rapid elasticity as
an elementary feature of cloud computing resources makes it impossible
for the average end user to know where their data is being stored at all
times909. As data is dynamic in cloud storage environments, traditional
technologies to ensure data integrity may not be effective910. Last but not
least, in a traditional IT environment the main threat to data availability
comes from external attacks911. In the cloud, however, in addition to exter-
nal attacks, there are several other factors that may put data availability
under threat912, namely the availability of cloud computing services;
whether cloud providers have committed themselves to continue to oper-
ate in the future or what safeguards they have undertaken in case their op-
906 Symmetric-key algorithms (applied in symmetric encryption) are algorithms for
cryptography that use the same cryptographic keys for both encryption of plain-
text and decryption of ciphertext. The keys may be identical or there may be a
simple transformation to go between them. In the actual practice of data crypto-
graphy, the keys represent a shared secret between two or more parties that can
be used to maintain a private information link. This requirement that both parties
have access to the secret key is one of the main drawbacks of symmetric key en-
cryption, in comparison to public-key encryption (which is what is known as
asymmetric key encryption). For more details, refer to: Hans Delfs & Helmut
Knebl, Introduction to cryptography. Principles and applications, 2007: 1
(2007); Christof Paar & Jan Pelzl, Understanding cryptography. A textbook for
students and practitioners (2010.)
907 Hans Delfs & Helmut Knebl (note 906).
908 Deepak Puthal, B.P.S. Sahoo, Sambit Mishra & Satyabrata Swain (note 837).
909 See also Chapter 2.
910 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886).
911 S. Subashini & V. Kavitha (note 119).
912 Michael Backes & Peng Ning eds. (note 887).
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eration is suspended; or whether the cloud storage services provide trust-
worthy backup functionalities.
As it becomes evident from the analysis above, there is not a single nor
an obvious answer as to which actor throughout the layers of a cloud net-
work is responsible for making sure storage of data standards live up to
the expectations that have been described as essential. In other words, hav-
ing in place rules that put the burden of such issues to specific entities rel-
evant to specific types of cloud-enabled business will never be a regula-
tory strategy generic enough to provide us with answers to these chal-
lenges in every instance, even in situations which may not be market ap-
plicable at this point but are technically feasible in any case. As a result,
the need for general cloud computing regulatory principles emerges once
more.
Archival
The key criteria for evaluating archiving of data from a technical perspec-
tive913 are the storage media on which archival is done, whether off-site
storage is provided or not and, last but not least, how long archival storage
lasts. If the media chosen for archival are portable and, at some point, they
get out of control, the archived data are exposed to the risk of leakage. On
the other hand, if cloud service providers do not provide off-site archiving,
availability of data is put under question. In addition, archival services are
not adequate if they are not made to last over a certain minimum amount
of time; otherwise, they may result in availability or privacy threats. These
issues occurring with reference to archiving as a fundamental function of
cloud services should also be answered in the framework of a set of gener-
ic regulatory principles for the cloud.
Destruction
When a given set of data is no longer required, it needs to be destroyed914.
The physical dimension of cloud computing storage facilities as well as
vi.
vii.
913 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886).; Dimitrios Zissis & Dimitrios Lekkas (no-
te 869).
914 Deyan Chen & Hong Zhao (note 886).
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the archiving capabilities cloud services are supposed to offer in order to
increase integrity and availability of data pose questions as to after what
point data can be regarded to have been effectively deleted without any
possibility of being restored915. Given the different variations of data and
the different instances throughout the cloud ontology when they might be
created or be rendered useless, it becomes again evident that generic prin-
ciples for governing the cloud are highly advisable.
Regulatory principles derived from the ontology of cloud computing
Bearing into account the ontology of the cloud as it was analytically de-
scribed above we can recognize on each layer certain functions and/or ac-
tors that primarily aim at the same goals with their functions no matter
whether the cloud network they are part of is a public or private one.
Therefore, making use of the teleological perspective, it can be argued
that, despite the particularities of each network and its specific features,
which may neutralize some challenges or, anyway, make them easier to be
tackled by respective actors, we can agree on minimum rules that will
need to be observed by the network and its constituent entities so that the
ultimate goal of the entire workflow is fulfilled916:
On the hardware/firmware layer
As we have seen, this constitutes the backbone of the cloud network, pri-
mary gravity is placed on the issue of security, integrity and (constant)
availability of resources917. Given that, regardless of whether a cloud net-
work’s infrastructure is utilized by the network owners themselves or
whether it is outsourced to third parties, it has to maintain at all times high
levels of security and integrity in order for the data stored or the processes
executed on it to be available and run smoothly at all times918, rules con-
tributing to the achievement of these prerequisites are of vital importance.
This trend can already be observed across various examples of resource
e.
i.
915 Dimitrios Zissis & Dimitrios Lekkas (note 869).
916 See also Chapter 5.
917 Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis & Diomidis Spinellis (note 861).
918 See also Chapter 5.
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outsourcing on this layer, with service level agreements (SLAs) imposing
strict rules and obligations to cloud network owners/managers who lease,
in whole or in part, their resources to third parties919. Given that these re-
quirements of integrity and constant availability are already considered as
sine qua non by all affected actors920, it is high time for them to be incorp-
orated into laws. All the more so if we take into account the fact that the
current regime of SLAs, which are the subject matter of negotiation be-
tween contracting parties, regularly leads to situations of imbalances
where, even within the same market, greatly variable degrees of integrity
and trustworthiness are required or expected from cloud infrastructure
owners, even though their resources will be utilized for the provision of
cloud-based services or the execution of equally sensitive computational
tasks921. It goes without saying that the relevant rules should legislate on
the minimum standards necessary leaving of course room for even more
elevated commitments at the discretion of the parties in each and every
case. Regulating on the minimum standards and leaving room for more el-
evated commitments at the discretion of the parties will also contribute to
the rules that will be adopted being more harmonized on a cross-jurisdic-
tional level since law subjects of a particular jurisdiction will be able to
expand their activities to others simply by adapting the standards on all or
part of their infrastructure to those prescribed by the jurisdiction(s) they
wish to enter. As it has been demonstrated922, mechanics of the cloud per-
fectly permit the infrastructure of a cloud network to be treated either
unanimously or in a compartmentalized manner. Consequently, if the law
states the minimum standards a cloud network needs to uphold at all
times, it is then always possible to divide part of the overall resources and
adjust it to further elevated standards in order to satisfy requirements of
more than one jurisdictions at the same time. The only requirement would
be, of course, to have a basic principle of non-confluence between re-
sources utilized for processing tasks falling under rules dictating different
standards. This does not imply at all that the principle of ultimate utiliza-
tion of resources (which it should never be forgotten that it is one of the
core features of the cloud923) should be compromised. On this issue, we
919 Xiaolong Jin & Jiming Liu (note 844).
920 See also Chapter 5.
921 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
922 See Chapter 2.
923 Refer also to Chapter 2.
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should once again resort to the engineering flexibilities that characterize
cloud technologies and can ensure that resources of a network dedicated to
processing tasks falling under the rules of a specific jurisdiction will abide
by the minimum standards set by the rules of that jurisdiction and will
adapt themselves when switched to tasks governed by different laws.
Regarding the security challenges at this level, from a technical point of
view at HaaS a developer has better control over security924; nevertheless,
the length of this grip should not provoke any security gap in the virtual-
ization element of the cloud network. Similarly, on the other side of the
coin, virtual machines have in principle the capacity to address these in-
tegrity of virtualization issues, yet in practice there are a lot of security
questions that remain unsettled925. The other security element that keeps
calling urgently for resolution is the unwavering quality of the information
that is put on the cloud supplier’s infrastructure. The powerful presence of
virtualization across all types of cloud processing and the proximity in
which it brings data from different users make both holding a definitive
control over information and paying respect to the physical area/resources
that hosts it primary responsibilities of the information owner/cloud re-
sources user926. It becomes clear that, in order to achieve most extreme
trust and security on the HaaS layer, a few procedures starting from both
sides of the provider and user need to be coordinated. Currently, security
obligations of both supplier and client incredibly vary from one cloud net-
work to the other due to different cloud administration models which, at
the lack of minimum requirements prescribed by laws, are arbitrarily de-
veloped by the market927. Undoubtedly, a private cloud is better protected
against security threats on the infrastructure level compared to a public
cloud. Nonetheless, regardless of the deployment model every single
cloud facility has one elementary yet extremely crucial challenge to live
up to: protecting the physical infrastructure of data centers928. Relevant
basic rules should reflect on damage done by any natural disaster but also
any damage done to the facility deliberately. It should not fail our attention
that in every case the infrastructure that needs to be protected is not only
the hardware where data is processed and stored but also that where it is
924 S. Subashini & V. Kavitha (note 119).
925 Id.
926 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
927 Id.
928 Id.
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getting transmitted929. In the cloud reality data transmitted from the source
to destination typically may pass through the resources of a large number
of third parties930. Consequently, rules need to be established that will also
prescribe for the minimum security benchmarks that these third parties
will need to guarantee at all times, in a generic manner and without refer-
ence only to particular types of data processing. Regardless of the fact that
heavy security measures are normally set up in the cloud, still information
is transmitted through ordinary internet routes931. It goes without saying,
then, that there is also the need to establish rules that will necessitate from
cloud infrastructure providers to seal their facilities against threats that
may intrude to them from the world wide web. There are already several
technical options that can help secure transmission of information inside
the cloud932. Encryption techniques tackle those needs to a certain degree
yet they are not connection oriented933. Concerns with respect to interrup-
tion of the flow of information or even interception of it by outer non-
clients of the network through the web need to additionally be considered.
In a nutshell, security on the HaaS layer has both an internal and an exter-
nal dimension and the principles regulating it need to make sure that every
cloud environment will be not only internally secure and integral but also
sealed and isolated towards the internet to also deter external security
threats, such as cyber-criminal attacks.
On the software/kernel layer
As it has already been described, on this layer we find the basic software
tools needed for the management of the physical servers that compose the
cloud network. The roles and duties appearing on this level are almost
identical to those of the hardware layer, only focusing on the software as-
ii.
929 Mike P. Papazoglou & Willem-Jan van den Heuvel (note 853).
930 Ling Liu & M. Tamer Özsu (note 842).
931 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
932 Cong Wang, Qian Wang, Kui Ren & Wenjing Lou, Privacy-Preserving Public
Auditing for Data Storage Security in Cloud Computing, in IEEE INFOCOM
2010 – IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, 1–9; Niels Fallenbeck
& Claudia Eckert, IT-Sicherheit und Cloud Computing, in Handbuch Industrie
4.0 Bd.4, 137–171 (Birgit Vogel-Heuser, Thomas Bauernhansl & Michael ten
Hompel eds., 2017.)
933 Ling Liu & M. Tamer Özsu (note 842).
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pect and processes for keeping the cloud at its foundations sealed and inte-
gral from external threats934. Therefore, with regard to any regulatory
principles stemming from this stack, reference is made to the recommen-
dations analyzed in the previous section, i.e. the hardware layer.
On the cloud software infrastructure layer
As it was analytically presented, fundamental resources to other higher-
level layers are provided through this layer, which are then used to con-
struct new cloud software environments or cloud applications. This is the
first instance across the cloud network where we observe that the roles of
provider and user of the resources of the network are so closely inter-
twined and enter each other’s territory935. To put it more descriptively, a
software infrastructure provider is at the same time a user of the network’s
resources, as he uses part of the network’s hardware resources to host his
processing activities that make the services it offers to entities of the
above layers possible. In addition, a user of the software infrastructure
providers’ services is, at the same time, a provider of other cloud-based
services addressed to end users of the network. This intertwining of roles
brings to the forefront the need for cloud computing rules to be based on
the teleological principle and follow, as much as possible, generic formu-
lation patterns and depart from the case-based logic936. The blurred lines
between roles and functions of actors on the cloud software infrastructure
layer reveal the need to establish rules that will delineate duties, rights and
obligations for entities across the cloud network without personalizing
them or referring to specific arrangements/applications made possible
thanks to the uses of the resources of that network.
iii.
934 S. Subashini & V. Kavitha (note 119).
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936 William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 Stanford Law Review 321–384 (1990); Henry Prakken, An exerci-
se in formalising teleological case-based reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and
Law, 10 Artificial Intelligence and Law 113–133 (2002.)
CHAPTER 8. Principles for regulating the cloud (1); from cloud network ontology
256
On the PaaS and SaaS layers
The last two layers of the ontology, corresponding to the cloud software
environment and the cloud application layer, are the ones commonly re-
ferred to as PaaS937 and SaaS938. With regard to them, some observations
regarding security issues and, respectively, rules that should be established
to regulate them merit to be raised. On the PaaS layer, what actually hap-
pens on a technical level is that the administration supplier gives partial
control to the customer in order for the latter to be able to manufacture ap-
plications on top of that layer939. However, for these applications to func-
tion properly and without interruptions, it is imperative that no insecurities
beneath the software environment level occur. The cloud software envi-
ronment layer is meant to empower cloud application designers to assem-
ble their own particular applications on top of the platform940. Therefore,
system durability and trustworthiness in relation to the underlying layers is
of primary significance. Until now, this has been reflected on the affirma-
tions suppliers bring on the table when negotiating contract services with
potential customers941. Till now, these clauses have been observed to be of
great variety extending even to questionable security gimmicks in an ef-
fort, on behalf of suppliers, to enter into a kind of assurances fight towards
potential customers, which have been found to extend to technical safe-
guards of doubtful trustworthiness942. Therefore, rules establishing the
minimum that should be achieved regarding these standards of safety are
necessary. In fact, these rules are technically possible to be based even on
objective technical measurements that will survey the viability of each
cloud network’s application security features at this level943. Some of
those measurements with immediate application are defenselessness
scores944 and patch scope945. These indices can show the quality of appli-
cation coding based on the security features and the way the resources of
each cloud network are brought together. One additional reason why secu-
iv.
937 See Chapter 2.
938 See Chapter 2.
939 Deepak Puthal, B.P.S. Sahoo, Sambit Mishra & Satyabrata Swain (note 837).
940 Dimitrios Zissis & Dimitrios Lekkas (note 869).
941 Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).
942 Nicholas Platten (note 42).
943 S. Subashini & V. Kavitha (note 119).
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rity standards on the cloud software environment layer need to be reaf-
firmed via clear rules is that, especially when it comes to software-related
vulnerabilities, such weaknesses or malicious elements of a cloud network
can easily extend as far as the web applications that will be made available
to users via the said cloud network, thus endangering or undermining the
integrity of the wider web. Therefore, clear precautionary rules that will
aim at containing them already on the PaaS layer are strongly advisable
and urgently needed.
On the SaaS layer in particular
On the upper level of the cloud ontology, the cloud application layer or
SaaS, lie the end cloud-based applications that are made available to end
users with the only prerequisite that they have access to the internet, even
partially, or that they can in any other technically feasible way access the
cloud network where the service they make use of is hosted. The
quintessence of affairs on this layer is that the client needs to be able to
rely on the supplier to feel safety, in a whole range of different aspects946.
Initially, it is elementary from the part of the supplier that he must actively
prove that he can keep his clients from seeing or accessing without autho-
rization one another’s information. Simultaneously, it is imperative that
the provider guarantees and makes sure that the application will be always
accessible, not just because the other way around would put the client’s
confidence in the application in danger but also because, from a legal
point of view, making sure that the application is always on and users can
access it anytime they wish is a strong determinant towards the fact that
the provider made sure users had unwavering and continuous possibility to
exercise the expected functions through the application environment,
among which also precautionary safety controls about their data. Thanks
to SaaS, it is becoming increasingly possible (and popular) to switch to net
program or software applications over ‘old-fashioned’, (usually) offline
ones947. Consequently, primary focus is not so much on portability of uses,
given that, after all, the new cloud-based apps usually do offer simpler and
friendlier interfaces to users to do things. Rather, the focus lies nowadays
v.
946 (note 852).
947 Xiaolong Jin & Jiming Liu (note 844).
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on safeguarding or upgrading the security element in comparison to the
standards offered in this front by the older applications and achieving ef-
fective information relocation and resource management while maintain-
ing the elevated security standards as well948. What this model and its set
targets practically mean is that in SaaS programming the service provider
may host the application on its own private server farm or on a cloud com-
puting facility administering it through a framework provided by an out-
sider supplier (e.g. Amazon, Google, etc.)949. This arrangement, where the
involved actors and what each one of them is expected to carry out are so
open, in terms of multitude, is one more pointer to the need of stablishing
rules on cloud regulation that will focus on the teleological principle, i.e.
on who is expected to achieve what only ‘who’ should be understood in a
generic sense (as a number of actors and not specific entities) and ‘what’
should be understood in the sense of functionality or body of functionali-
ties within all those comprising the network and not as specific manifesta-
tions that come out when these functionalities are put to work. The corner-
stone of the SaaS model, is that data is stored at the SaaS provider’s data
center, along with the data of other users950. Even more, if the SaaS
provider is depending on a public cloud computing service, users’ data
might be stored on the same facilities along with the data of other unrelat-
ed SaaS applications. It is also quite a standard practice that the cloud sup-
plier imitates the information at numerous locations across borders for rea-
sons of keeping up the high accessibility prerequisite951. Consequently,
there are several security issues raised such as data security, network secu-
rity, data locality, data integrity, data segregation, data access, authentica-
tion and authorization952. Apart from any specialized rules that may estab-
lish specific standards or security policies as the necessary minimum, it is
essential to take the leap and move from the specific to the broad context:
technology and the constant evolution of science related to the cloud will
make available more and more tools that will add up to the security levels
of cloud networks953. As a result, it is not so imperative to legislate on
which specific measures cloud networks should adopt to stand above the
948 S. Subashini & V. Kavitha (note 119).
949 John F. Sowa (note 839).
950 See Chapter 2.
951 See Chapter 2.
952 S. Subashini & V. Kavitha (note 119).
953 Dimitrios Zissis & Dimitrios Lekkas (note 869).
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benchmark for network security but, rather, on what should be achieved in
terms of security-related milestones. In other words, the SaaS layer of the
cloud ontology and the way it is constructed exposes the need to develop a
cloud regulation framework that will have at its core, not the ephemeral
features of such a rapidly evolving phenomenon. Now that we have de-
composed and exhaustively analyzed what the cloud actually is about, it is
evident that cloud computing regulation should not be regarded as a new
body of law that will replace existing legislation on particular manifesta-
tions of cloud computing, because of the latter being insufficient or dys-
functional. On the contrary, the proposed laws will come to serve as the
currently missing cohesion element from the field of IT law, the one that
will boost the integrity of this corpus of legislation as it will take advan-
tage of its inherent features and will focus on its inherent flaws, at the
same time, trying to correct them or, at least, seal cloud networks, as much
as possible, against them.
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Principles for regulating the cloud (2); based on
the roles and functions across the cloud workflow
Introduction – scope of this chapter
Having examined the cloud down to its detail as technology and after
proposing the regulatory principles that should be put in place to efficient-
ly respond to the challenges posed by the technical particularities of it, it is
now time to direct our attention to the way the cloud is perceived from the
outside as an autonomous concept and an entity or environment which is
defined by organic and functional self-sufficiency. In other words, our fo-
cus will now shift to the fact that, when a cloud computing network is un-
derstood as a workflow chart, it should be at any time possible to point
down the entry and exit point in it, to define the distinct functions per-
formed in order for the entire workflow to produce the expected end-prod-
uct and, respectively, to recognize the duties, obligations and expectations
anchored to every such function and, consequently, to the actor (or actors)
performing it.
Reference has already been made, in earlier parts of this study954, to the
issue of the internal vs. external perspective in law and how this is all the
more crucial when it comes to internet law and cloud computing, in partic-
ular. In light of this theorem, and having already explored the cloud in an
analytical manner with regard to its ‘inner nature’ as a technology and
technical arrangement – an aspect of it that could be described as its inter-
nal dimension with regard to laws governing it – it is now time to research
into the question of what constitutes the external aspect of cloud comput-
ing and whether we can pinpoint further regulatory principles for it stem-
ming from that perspective of looking into cloud computing.
But first and foremost, it is necessary to look into the question of
whether the cloud does have an external, apart from an internal aspect and
what it constitutes of.
CHAPTER 9.
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Viewing cloud computing from the outside; what else is the cloud apart
from its infrastructure and the science behind it?
One of the most discussed legal notions in recent years is that of the inter-
nal versus the external perspective of law955. The concept has become of
particular importance and is gaining more and more in prominence as le-
gal subject matters become of a continuously more complex nature, with
multiple levels of reference and substance that does not stem only from
themselves but also through extrapolation to other notions or phenomena
that interact with them, one way or another956. Simultaneously, this inter-
nal vs. external structure refers to the two distinct ways in which a regula-
tory subject matter can be observed and, consequently, analyzed and regu-
lated957. Actually, this aspect of the topic applies to even more legal phe-
nomena, not only modern but also more traditional ones. It refers to rules
that are developed to regulate a phenomenon just by observing the phe-
nomenon itself as opposed to rules which are developed in order to settle
regulatory issues arising from the interaction of the said phenomenon with
other subject matters or actors external to it958.
Focusing on the realm of the internet, and bearing in mind that a regula-
tor’s main challenge is to create rules that will be clear enough to allow
the lawyer and law subjects, in general, to simply apply legal provisions to
facts, a difficult question pops up: “what are the ‘facts’ when it comes to
the world of the internet and IT?”959
The facts of anything related to the Internet depend on whether you
look for them focusing on physical or virtual reality960. From the angle of
virtual reality, we view the Internet from the perspective of a user who un-
derstands the virtual world of cyberspace and the actions and processes
happening there as an analogy to the equivalent instances in the offline,
physical world. Alternatively, we can perceive internet facts based on the
physical reality of how the network operates. From this angle, Internet
b.
955 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
956 Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor, A model of legal reasoning with cases
incorporating theories and values. AI and Law, 150 Artificial Intelligence 97–
143 (2003.)
957 Orin S. Kerr (note 230).
958 Id.
959 Urs Gasser, Cloud Innovation and the Law: Issues, Approaches, and Interplay
(2014.)
960 L. Lessig (note 504).
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transactions are interpreted based on how the network actually works “be-
hind the scenes” and on the inside, irrespective of the perceptions of a us-
er961. When it comes to cloud computing, so far, we have been producing
laws which primarily focus on the external perspective and are developed
to provide answers to the regulatory challenges we perceive when observ-
ing the cloud through the applications that are made possible thanks to it.
However, as it has already been demonstrated in the previous chapter962,
we still miss critical aspects of the cloud which remain unregulated and
which we can only understand if we observe the cloud from the inside, i.e.
from the perspective of an entity that is participating itself to a cloud net-
work’s workflow or from the angle of an observer who focuses on each of
these distinct entities and the role(s) they play across the life cycle of a
cloud network regardless of what the external manifestation of their func-
tion(s) may be. We have already executed this internal observation in the
previous chapter, where the cloud was analyzed as far as its infrastructural
element is concerned. However, in order to have the complete picture of
the cloud’s internal world, it is imperative to examine it also from the as-
pect of how the life cycle developed around this infrastructure looks like,
how it works, what processes it is made of and which actors and with
which roles take part in those processes. After all, we should not forget
that the final manifestations of the cloud, i.e. the end cloud based applica-
tions that reach end users, need a facilitating background to be hosted in,
which should not escape our attention as to the regulatory issues that may
arise within it. Last but not least, this enabling background corresponds to
the internal aspect of a work line which aims at making available the vari-
ous cloud based applications to the market, i.e. to their pool of intended
users, regardless of whether they pay a fee to make use of them (as it is
usually the case) or not.
There have already been scholars who have attempted to view the realm
of the Internet from this internal perspective963. Actually, Lawrence
Lessig964 has gone as far as attributing to code makers, such as Microsoft
and AOL, qualities of ‘virtual governments that exercise real control over
the virtual world of cyberspace’ suggesting that we should consider sub-
jecting their decisions not just to plain legal but to constitutional scrutiny.
961 Id.
962 See Chapter 8.
963 Bibliographical index (or internal reference.)
964 Lawrence Lessig (note 505).
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It is quite revealing to examine the famous theory of Lessig arguing that
“code is law”965 through this internal vs. external perspective lens. In fact,
the very phrase “code is law” reveals a relationship between the internal
and external perspectives. In detail, on the software front “code is law” ex-
trapolated through the internal vs. external perspective prism means that
what is perceived as code from the external perspective has the gravitas of
law from the internal one. A software program’s code stipulates the archi-
tecture of the virtual world that a user encounters while making use of that
program. Consequently, as external code is internal law, we need to regu-
late not just the manifestations of this program in the external world but
also its functioning from an internal perspective. Mutatis mutandis, in the
case of cloud networks, for a complete regulatory framework to be put to-
gether we need to regulate not just what users are confronted with as the
external manifestation of the cloud processing done for them to receive the
end applications they have asked for but also the processing itself as it
happens on the inside of the network, as well as the different stages
through which the processing passes and the agents that push it forward at
each one of these stages.
Viewing Lessig’s theory through this internal vs. external perspective
prism helps us also understand how he went as far as proposing the appli-
cation of constitutional norms in cyberspace966. Lessig has probably been
the most tenacious scholar to date suggesting that the Internet should be
directly subject to constitutional norms from an internal perspective. He
has actually found it is high time to apply rules of constitutional gravity to
the world the Internet user perceives, just as we do to the offline world. In
order to determine who is subject to which constitutional norm in the In-
ternet realm, Lessig proposed the paradigm of state actor as our guide. We
can determine who is a state actor online, according to Lessig967, by look-
ing at the online world from an Internet user’s perspective and determin-
ing who has powers that resemble those of the government. In this way,
Lessig suggests, we will be able to transpose constitutional values to cy-
berspace just by recognizing the user’s perception of the online world as
the functional equivalent of the physical world. With regard to cloud com-
puting, it is not necessary to go as far as constructing such an exhaustive
hierarchical order for laws applicable to everything related to the cloud.
965 L. Lessig (note 504).
966 Lawrence Lessig (note 505).
967 Id.
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As a first step, it would already make a substantial difference to recognize
the difference between the external manifestations of the cloud and its in-
ternal aspects and deal with the need to concretize rules that will regulate
the latter. The relationship between these two pools of laws (i.e. the al-
ready existing and abundant one of laws regulating cloud-based appli-
cations and the currently nascent or almost non-existent but needed
one of rules regulating the cloud per se) is not hierarchical but rather
complimentary: enriching the latter will further boost the efficiency of
the former.
The prism of perspective for dealing with and regulating the cloud
proves that rules specifically constructed for cloud computing do add up
something new to the broader sector of internet law — not so much with
respect to how we approach the law, but more in the way that we approach
the facts surrounding the cloud. Modeling the reality of cloud computing
reveals that this is not as simplified as we have been thinking so far, and
that we need to look into both dimensions of the cloud, the internal and the
external one, in order to get the whole picture.
The dual perspective through which it is either possible or necessary to
view all sorts of systems that make information and data exchange possi-
ble is not anything new968. Actually, the first instance in which the internal
and external perspectives competed with each other demonstrating that
they both exist and that they are both essential in understanding and regu-
lating communication enabling systems is the famous telephone wiretap-
ping case of Olmstead v. United States of 1928969. In summary, that case
dealt with government agents who had wiretapped the telephone lines of a
former police officer who operated a bootlegging operation in violation of
the Alcohol Prohibition laws. The authorities tapped the phone lines from
a city street without entering the plaintiff’s private property. At first and
second degree, Olmstead argued that the wiretapping had violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. The Justices’ opinions are demonstrative of
how decisive the adoption of either the external or the internal perspective
was already since that time for adjudicating (and regulating) on issues and
phenomena of the wider data and communications realm. Writing for a 5-4
968 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 Stanford Law Review 247–316 (2011.)
969 Olmstead et al. v. United States; Green et al. v. United States; McInnis v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 43 S. Ct. 394; 67 L. Ed. 785; 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2588; 24
A.L.R. 1238.
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majority, Chief Justice Taft rejected Olmstead’s argument following a rea-
soning tantamount to an external comprehension of the telephone network.
According to Taft, “the telephone network consisted of electrical lines that
permitted its users to send communications out into the world. By using a
telephone Olmstead and his co-conspirators had opted to send their com-
munications out from the protected spaces of their houses and into the un-
protected space of the public city street”970.
In contrast, Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion portrayed an internal-
ly comprehended account of the same event. In Brandeis’ opinion971, it
was “immaterial where the physical connection with the telephone wires
leading into the defendants’ premises was made.” Rather, “the proper
question was whether from a telephone user’s perspective, the wiretapping
appeared as the equivalent of a search and seizure”. Brandeis thought that
it appeared so: “Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the
persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations between
them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential, and privileged,
may be overheard.”
Of course, what Justice Brandeis described does not entirely amount to
Lessig’s internal perspective of cyberspace or the herewith suggested in-
ternal aspect of cloud computing; however, it is interesting to note how
close he came: Brandeis, in a pioneering manner, understood telephony
not just as a service but, in addition to it, as infrastructure; in fact, he con-
ceived the telephone network as the technological means of creating a pri-
vate space for its users. Already almost a century before, the divide be-
tween Taft and Brandeis was not so much a contest between dogmatic and
dynamic interpretation of laws, as it was a clash of perspectives for inter-
preting the facts of the case. Taft applied an external perspective of the
telephone network, while Brandeis used an internal one.
Needless to say, this case was only a primary forerunner to the whole
issue of the internal vs. external perspective and the great importance
these two have today with regard to regulation of the internet, as a whole,
or cloud computing, more precisely. Given that the telephone simply
transmits sound from one place to another, its ability to generate a virtual
reality is very limited. Consequently, telephone cases with an internal-ex-
ternal dynamic have been rare through all previous decades since the in-
970 Id.
971 Id.
CHAPTER 9. Cloud regulation principles (2); roles and functions on cloud networks
266
vention of telephony, and considered as a whole, they cannot account for a
recurring problem of perspective. Things are fundamentally different
though, when we focus on the most modern technologies facilitating com-
munication today through the transmission and exchange of all kinds of
data and not just sounds972. The advanced technology of the Internet has
elevated to a universal level a problem that remained largely marginal in
the early steps of the telephone network. Some could use the opportunity
to cast in doubt whether the problem of perspective is truly “new”. This is,
however, of little importance. What truly matters is that, one way or an-
other, the problem recurs more and more in Internet law, challenging us to
confront it across a wide range of substantive areas973. What is more,
while in some sub-sectors of IT law effective regulation is achievable only
by choosing to focus on one of the two perspectives, when it comes to reg-
ulating cloud computing, it is not a matter of choice anymore; rather, it is
of vital importance to look into the issues raised by both perspectives and
come up with rules that will deal with all of them in order to end up with
an all-inclusive range of regulations that will manage to persuasively an-
swer to all challenges posed by the cloud.
Completing the picture of the inner side of the cloud; regulatory
challenges stemming from the cloud network’s business workflow
It has by now been established that, in order to end up having a complete
set of rules that will be dealing with cloud regulation in a holistic manner,
it is imperative to look into all aspects of the internal side of cloud com-
puting. According to extensive literature974, the internal perspective of the
cloud also includes, apart from what pertains to its infrastructure and raw
c.
972 M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. Joseph D., R. Katz H., A. Konwinski, G.
Lee, D. Patterson A., A. Rabkin, A. Stoica & M. Zaharia, Above the Clouds: A
Berkeley View of Cloud Computing, available at: http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/
Pubs/TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-28.html (2 March 2015.)
973 Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The governance of privacy. Policy instru-
ments in global perspective (2006.)
974 For a comprehensive review of what the cloud and cloud networks actually con-
sist of as technical arrangements, refer to: Ines Houidi, Marouen Mechtri, Wajdi
Louati & Djamal Zeghlache, Cloud Service Delivery across Multiple Cloud Plat-
forms, in 2011 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing, 741–742
(IEEE Staff ed., 2011); Hoang T. Dinh, Chonho Lee, Dusit Niyato & Ping Wang,
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machinery, all structures, workflows and the organizational scheme under
which the entire cloud network is set in motion and operates. These work-
flows could be more easily understood as the organigram of the cloud net-
work, consisting of the actors taking part in it and the functions each of
them is performing. What is more, our attention will now move on the ser-
vice composition methods975, namely aggregation976, customization977 or
A survey of mobile cloud computing. Architecture, applications, and approaches,
13 Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comput. 1587–1611 (2013); Thomas Erl, Richardo
Puttini & Zaigham Mahmood (note 46); Liang-Jie Zhang & Qun Zhou (note 96);
Won Kim, Cloud computing architecture, 9 IJWGS 287–303 (2013); Wei-Tek
Tsai, Xin Sun & Janaka Balasooriya, Service-Oriented Cloud Computing Archi-
tecture, in ITNG 2010. Information Technology New Generations : proceedings
of the Seventh International Conference on Information Technology :12-14, April
2009, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 684–689 (Jameela Al-Jaroodi & Shahram Latifi
eds., 2010); Yashpalsinh Jadeja & Kirit Modi, Cloud computing – concepts, ar-
chitecture and challenges, in 2012 International Conference on Computing, Elec-
tronics and Electrical Technologies (ICCEET), 877–880 (2012); Bu-Qing Cao,
Bing Li & Qi-Ming Xia, A Service-Oriented Qos-Assured and Multi-Agent Cloud
Computing Architecture, in Cloud computing. First international conference,
CloudCom 2009, Beijing, China, December 1-4, 2009 : proceedings, 644–649
(Martin Gilje Jaatun, Gansen Zhao & Chunming Rong eds., 2009); Liang-Jie
Zhang & Qun Zhou (note 96); Christian Baun, Marcel Kunze, Jens Nimis & Ste-
fan Tai, Cloud Computing (2011); Vijay Sarathy, Purnendu Narayan & Rao Mik-
kilineni, Next Generation Cloud Computing Architecture: Enabling Real-Time
Dynamism for Shared Distributed Physical Infrastructure, in 2010 19th IEEE In-
ternational Workshop on Enabling Technologies. Infrastructures for Collaborative
Enterprises, 48–53 (IEEE ed., 2010.)
975 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar, The
Business Perspective of Cloud Computing: Actors, Roles and Value Networks
ECIS 2010 Proceedings (2010). For more on service composition in cloud com-
puting, refer to: Amin Jula, Elankovan Sundararajan & Zalinda Othman, Cloud
computing service composition. A systematic literature review, 41 Expert Sys-
tems with Applications 3809–3824 (2014); Cheng Zeng, Xiao Guo, Weijie Ou
& Dong Han, Cloud Computing Service Composition and Search Based on Se-
mantic, in Cloud computing. First international conference, CloudCom 2009,
Beijing, China, December 1-4, 2009 : proceedings, 290–300 (Martin Gilje Jaatun,
Gansen Zhao & Chunming Rong eds., 2009.)
976 See also Chapter 7.
977 For further details on the margins for customization on cloud computing net-
works refer to: Rajkumar Buyya, Chee Shin Yeo, Srikumar Venugopal, James
Broberg & Ivona Brandic, Cloud computing and emerging IT platforms. Vision,
hype, and reality for delivering computing as the 5th utility, 25 Future Generation
Computer Systems 599–616 (2009); Tharam Dillon, Chen Wu & Elizabeth
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service distribution channels978, and what kind of dynamics and interrela-
tions these processes develop, which may lead consequently to corre-
sponding regulatory challenges that need to be dealt with. It needs to be
pointed out right from the beginning that, although the following argu-
ments will primarily be presented in light of the way cloud networks
aimed at facilitating commercial applications of the cloud are built, the ob-
servations and recommendations made here largely fit also with those
cloud networks deployed for the provision of hybrid or private services979.
It is a very well-established practice in the industry980 to classify cloud
services along different layers; and we have already seen a most detailed
and representative such listing981. Various cloud services fall all in one of
the five layers of this ontology, which represent a level of abstraction, per-
mitting the user to set aside all underlying or higher-ranking components
and thus providing simplified focus to the resources or functionality that
correspond to each one of them. However, the actors and entities making
all these services possible can be spotted in more than one layers of the
overall ontology982. At the same time, one entity that can occupy the pos-
ition of one specific (and with particular tasks) actor on one layer can si-
multaneously occupy the position and responsibilities of a different actor
on another layer983.
Chang, Cloud Computing: Issues and Challenges, in 24th IEEE International
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA),
2010. 20 – 23 April 2010, Perth, Australia; proceedings, 27–33 (Elizabeth Chang
ed., 2010); Lamia Youseff, Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838); Wei-Tek
Tsai, Xin Sun & Janaka Balasooriya (note 974).
978 For a broader review on the issue of service distribution channels on cloud net-
works refer to: Kaiqi Xiong & Harry Perros, Service Performance and Analysis
in Cloud Computing, in World Conference on Services-I, 2009, 693–700 (Liang-
Jie Zhang ed., 2009); Thomas Erl, Richardo Puttini & Zaigham Mahmood (note
46); M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. Joseph D., R. Katz H., A. Konwinski,
G. Lee, D. Patterson A., A. Rabkin, A. Stoica & M. Zaharia (note 972); Hoang T.
Dinh, Chonho Lee, Dusit Niyato & Ping Wang (note 974).
979 Kristina Irion (note 220).
980 Cong Wang, Qian Wang, Kui Ren & Wenjing Lou (note 932).; Lamia Youseff,
Maria Butrico & Dilma Da Silva (note 838).; Benoit Dupont (note 111).
981 See Chapter 2.
982 Sean Marston, Zhi Li, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, Juheng Zhang & Anand Ghal-
sasi (note 116).
983 Id.
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With these in mind, it becomes clear that in order to single out the regu-
latory challenges posed by the workflow on which cloud networks typical-
ly run today a detailed review of the actors present throughout these net-
works and their typical roles is required. It needs to be made clear that the
actors that will be analyzed hereunder can be present and found on many
different layers of the cloud network ontology. Therefore, their order of
presentation is random and does not imply any hierarchical or significance
sequencing among them:
The customer984 (or user) of cloud computing services
It is the actor who, through various distribution channels buys and makes
use of the different cloud services commercialized by the provider985. The
channels through which the customer can finally receive the services of
his choice can be various, namely directly from the service provider or
through a platform provider or through a reseller986. It needs to be stressed
out that a customer of a cloud service can be found on all layers of the
cloud ontology. One of the most characteristic elements of customers of
cloud services is the ways in which they interact with the service itself,
with only rare exceptions to the rule given that, even those that may also
have physical access to the infrastructure facilitating the service they use
some kind of tool or intermediary facility to interact with the resources of
that infrastructure987. In particular, users access cloud computing to enjoy
the services of their choice using networked client devices, such as desk-
top computers, laptops, tablets and smartphones, but also practically any
Ethernet enabled device. As time goes by, several of these devices turn in-
to actual cloud clients, as they rely more and more exclusively on cloud
computing in order to execute all or the majority of their applications be-
ing rendered essentially useless without it988. As it becomes evident, it
i.
984 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar (note
975).
985 Id.
986 Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis & Diomidis Spinellis (note 861).; Lothar De-
termann, What Happens in the Cloud: Software as a Service and Copyrights, 29
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1096–1129 (2015.)
987 Mike P. Papazoglou & Willem-Jan van den Heuvel (note 853).
988 Id.; J. Hoover, Compliance in the Ether: Cloud Computing, Data Security and
Business Regulation, 8 Journal of Business & Technology Law 255–273 (2013.)
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would be unrealistic to go as far as standardizing these devices with which
users get access to the cloud; that would be a totally unfounded interven-
tion to the market of these products989. Therefore, the need for defining
minimum requirements that these devices should satisfy emerges so that
cloud customers can expect and actually get a minimum quality of access
to the network no matter what medium they choose to enter it with. Some
would argue that the solution to this need would be for regulators to define
the minimum specifications of the pieces of hardware used to facilitate ac-
cess to the cloud. However, it makes much more sense to define the mini-
mum conditions (in terms of security etc.) that access to the cloud should
have than trying to homogenize the range of devices suitable for it. This
approach makes even more sense if we bear in mind that many cloud ap-
plications do not require some sort of specific software on the client from
which they are accessed990; instead, a web browser to interact with the
cloud application would suffice. Apart from this main path for users to ac-
cess the cloud, there is a smaller group of customers who make use of
highly niche services991 which necessitate the use of specific client soft-
ware dedicated to them (for instance, virtual desktop clients and most
email clients). At last, there is a pool of customers992 who use a number of
legacy cloud applications (mostly from the front of business applications)
that are delivered via a screen-sharing technology. All of the above
strengthen the argument that we need rules that will mandate the minimum
conditions under which customers will have access to cloud networks and
the services they wish to use through them, since regulating how the
means of access should look like would be too complicated and an unnec-
essarily interventionist route. If customers are assured, thanks to clear and
established rules, that any of the lawfully commercialized cloud services
on the market meets the minimum requirements guaranteeing safe and un-
equivocal access to it, then it is only logical that customer safety and trust
will increase, opening up simultaneously the way for providers to freely
antagonize for anything superior to those minimum standards maintaining
989 Benoit Dupont (note 111).
990 Christof Weinhardt, Arun Anandasivam, Benjamin Blau, Nikolay Borissov,
Thomas Meinl, Wibke Michalk & Jochen Stößer (note 65).
991 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar (note
975).
992 Id.
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a level of market competition that can only prove further beneficial to cus-
tomers.
The service provider993
It often also called IT vendor, is the actor within a cloud network typically
executing development and operation of services that offer value to either
the customer or the aggregate services provider. Service providers, within
the range of their functions, develop applications that are offered and de-
ployed on the cloud computing platform and, to this end, access hardware
and infrastructure contributed to the network by the infrastructure
providers994. Bearing in mind the above definition, we can now analyze
the specificities of the role of service provider and the respective regula-
tory challenges that come along with them;
– Firstly, it is essential to point out that, despite the fact that a service
provider can also function as a customer within the flow of a cloud net-
work, this happens only in relation to hardware resources which are
necessary for the deployment of the services addressed to cloud cus-
tomers or aggregators995; this kind of buys (i.e. referring exclusively to
hardware) are already sufficiently and effectively regulated by existing
commercial transactions laws and they should not be equated to the ob-
servations made above regarding the functions of the cloud computing
customer.
– One of the most important tools in the hands of service providers on
the cloud is monitoring performance996 of their services and the net-
work’s resources in order to do any tweaking or other interventions
necessary for the performance index to remain or reach optimal levels.
In conducting these performance measurements service providers need
to be forced by law not to compromise core features that their services
are supposed to offer to cloud customers, namely privacy of users’ da-
ta, protection of their identity etc.
ii.
993 Siani Pearson & Nick Wainwright (note 645).
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– Security is one of the competitive advantages that boosted cloud com-
puting to the absolute standard technology of today’s internet and data
networks997. As it has already been analyzed, security on the cloud is
improved in comparison to older technologies due to a number of fac-
tors, such as centralization of data, increased security-focused re-
sources, etc998. Nevertheless, there are still unsettled issues concerning
the security of core cloud services such as the ones made available by
service providers. The main points of concern over security on the
cloud on the service providers level are uncertainty over the possibility
of loss of control over certain types of sensitive data, or the lack of se-
curity for stored kernels999. What improves security on the cloud over
older, traditional systems is its capacity to devote resources to solving
security issues (on a proactive or a posteriori basis) in a magnitude and
volume that many customers cannot afford to by themselves or which
they do not possess the technical skills to address1000. Rules are, there-
fore, necessary that will force service providers to deploy these securi-
ty optimization techniques on a standard basis and not just as a com-
petitive advantage. At the same time, security on the cloud becomes an
all the more complex idea when data is distributed over a wider area or
over a greater number of devices, as well as in multi-tenant systems
shared by unrelated users1001. Additionally, user access to security au-
dit logs may be difficult or impossible as the expanse and complexity
of the cloud network increases. Therefore, regulators need to strike a
balance between the conflicting interests of security and optimization
of the cloud networks economies of scale (which is the main drive be-
hind the increasing vastness and confluence of totally estranged
streams of data over the same network1002.
– The above points of concern exist in the cases of public and hybrid
clouds. In private clouds, most of these issues are not applicable given
that the infrastructure owner and the service provider are, as a rule, one
and the same entity. However, it is not reasonable to claim that the an-
997 Siani Pearson & George Yee (note 280).
998 See Chapter 2.
999 See Chapter 8.
1000 Benoit Dupont (note 111).
1001 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan (note 968).
1002 Private cloud installations are in part motivated by users' desire to retain control
over the infrastructure and avoid losing control of information security.
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swer to these security concerns would be the replacement of all public
and hybrid cloud facilities by private ones given that this would finan-
cially unrealistic and would automatically compromise the cloud’s
most cherished element, i.e. the dynamics achieved due to virtualiza-
tion. Between hybrid and public clouds, the former offer, in general
better answers to the security concerns outlined above; however, at
present and, likely, in general they cannot be the rule. Therefore, any
rules established with a view to defining the minimum standards cloud
networks should respect in light of the issues discussed with regard to
service providers need to be designed with the case study of public
clouds in mind.
– A key issue in relation to service providers in the cloud is the problem
of legal ownership of the data1003, which essentially translates to the
question of whether the service provider can profit from users’ data
stored in the cloud. This issue will grow more and more in significance
as the cloud penetrates the neighboring fields of big data and IoT, at
the heart of which lie vast amounts of data originating from thousands
of different users or entities1004. At the moment, most Terms of Service
agreements remain silent on the question of ownership. The ideal an-
swer would be, similarly to what has been argued before, the choice of
network equipment upon which cloud customers would have immedi-
ate physical control over the computer equipment (private cloud); how-
ever, this is only rarely a choice. The present unregulated landscape
with relation to legal ownership of data stored in the cloud creates
great incentives to public cloud computing service providers to priori-
tize building and maintaining strong management of secure services.
However, things will get all the more complicated as the big data and
IoT applications multiply, given that in those cases the consent of data
subjects regarding collection of data attributable to them is not always
explicit nor can it be taken for granted1005. Moreover, as it widely the
case, plain end users do not pay the necessary attention to service con-
tracts, which is largely the case with regard to service agreements of
most popular cloud services. The fact that for the time being the issue
1003 Hassan Takabi, James B. D. Joshi & Gail-Joon Ahn (note 119).; see also Chap-
ter 6.
1004 Hunton Privacy Blog (note 269).; Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier
(note 321).
1005 Id.
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of legal ownership of data remains unanswered does not necessarily
mean that this will always be the case. As economic incentives will
grow with the push from big data and IoT applications, service
providers may very expectedly decide to deal with this question delib-
erately and in a manner not entirely balanced between theirs and the in-
terests of their customers. Therefore, a clear answer to the issue on be-
half of the law will only work to the benefit of customers, who are gen-
erally the inferior side in this equation. What is more, the sooner the
issue is settled on behalf of cloud regulators the more balanced and fair
the final settlement can be between the need of customers for non-ex-
ploitation of their data and the drive of service providers to maximize
the profits they can derive from the data they host on their systems.
Last but not least, looking at this issue now that big data and IoT have
not yet reached their full capacity (although it is, of course, undeniable
that they are on a steep rise) will permit cloud regulators to regulate on
the matter of legal ownership with a clearer head and not under the
pressure the whole topic may have in the near future, calling for imme-
diate over proactive measures.
Infrastructure providers1006
As actors of the cloud workflow, infrastructure providers are tasked with
supplying the network with the computing and storage services needed in
order for all subsequent software applications to run within the cloud. In
other words, as we have already seen1007, the infrastructure provider
serves as the actor maintaining the technical backbone of the network. The
resources offered by this actor are essentially scalable hardware for the
services1008 upon which the service providers offer their services. Infras-
tructure providers are alternatively called IT vendors. Typically, the con-
sumer of what an infrastructure provider offers does not manage or control
the underlying cloud infrastructure but retains control over operating sys-
tems, storage, and deployed applications, possibly even limited control of
iii.
1006 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar (note
975).
1007 See Chapter 2.
1008 Ozalp Babaoglu, M. Jelasity, Anne Marie Kermarrec, Alberto Montresor &
Maarten van Steen (note 874).
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select networking components (e.g., host firewalls). It becomes evident
then, once again, at this point, that rules describing attribution and extend
of responsibility and culpability between infrastructure providers and ser-
vice providers (who are the customers of the former but providers to cloud
applications customers) towards end users of the applications/services de-
veloped on a cloud network are crucial. In detail, the most basic cloud-ser-
vice model1009 is that where providers offer computing infrastructure – vir-
tual machines and other resources – as a service to subscribers. It needs to
be stressed out that Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), by today’s state-of-
the-art in the cloud business, refers to online services that set the user free
from the details of infrastructure like physical computing resources, loca-
tion, data partitioning, scaling, security, backup etc. Those virtual ma-
chines, which are the vessels of most IaaS, are run by hypervisors1010, i.e.
companies that sit between the actual owners of the cloud network’s in-
frastructure and the customers buying the right to use part of that infras-
tructure in the form of IaaS. This arrangement is yet one more argument in
support of the need for developing rules that will clearly define how obli-
gations and culpability are distributed among actors of the cloud work-
flow, particularly at this rudimentary level. In addition, it is common prac-
tice that hypervisors arrange themselves in pools within the cloud opera-
tional system in order to be able to support large numbers of virtual ma-
chines and to scale services up and down according to customers' varying
requirements1011. The connection to the network’s actual physical re-
sources is then made possible via Linux containers1012 running in isolated
partitions of a single Linux kernel1013 which connects them directly to the
1009 Xiaolong Jin & Jiming Liu (note 844).
1010 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar (note
975).
1011 M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. Joseph D., R. Katz H., A. Konwinski, G.
Lee, D. Patterson A., A. Rabkin, A. Stoica & M. Zaharia (note 972).
1012 LXC (Linux Containers) are an operating system-level virtualization method for
running multiple isolated Linux systems (containers) on a control host using a
single Linux kernel. The Linux kernel provides the functionality that allows li-
mitation and prioritization of resources (CPU, memory, block I/O, network, etc.)
without the need for starting any virtual machines, and also namespace isolation
functionality that allows complete isolation of an applications' view of the ope-
rating environment, including process trees, networking, user IDs and mounted
file systems. (Definition cited as formulated under: https://linuxcontainers.org/lx
c/introduction/; last accessed on 7/11/2016.)
1013 See also Chapter 8.
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physical hardware. Containerization1014 offers at this level better perfor-
mance than virtualization, because there is no hypervisor overhead. Also,
container capacity auto-scales dynamically with computing load, which
eliminates the problem of over-provisioning and enables usage-based
billing.
Aggregate services providers (aggregators)
This is a niche sub-type of service provider that offers new services or so-
lutions ‘by combining pre-existing services or parts of services to form
new services and offer them to customers’1015. As a result, aggregators are
by nature a customer (from the perspective of the service provider) and a
service provider (from the perspective of the customer). They can be fur-
ther sub-divided into aggregators that focus on the integration of data and
others that mostly offer aggregation of services with the former being
quoted as data integrators1016. The main function of those is making sure
that already existing data is prepared and is usable by different cloud ser-
vices and can be regarded as a sub-role of aggregators with a primary fo-
cus on technical data integration. Similar types of cloud network actors are
the “system integrator” or “business process integrator” or the “service
mediator”1017. These terms describe, in general, aggregators that focus
more on the technical aspects necessary for data and system integration
while ‘(service) aggregators’, as a generic term, also includes the business
aspects of merging services to come up with new service bundles. The
quasi-binary nature of aggregators stresses even more the need for cloud
regulation rules that will permit allocation of responsibilities and culpabil-
ity on each instance of cloud business workflow regardless of whether it
iv.
1014 Containerization is a lightweight alternative to full machine virtualization that
involves encapsulating an application in a container with its own operating en-
vironment. This provides many of the benefits of loading an application onto a
virtual machine, as the application can be run on any suitable physical machine
without any worries about dependencies. (Definition cited under: http://www.we
bopedia.com/TERM/C/containerization.html; last accessed on 7/11/2016.)
1015 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar (note
975).
1016 Sean Marston, Zhi Li, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, Juheng Zhang & Anand
Ghalsasi (note 116).
1017 Id.
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corresponds to an already known type of cloud service or a novel, still in-
sufficiently charted one.
The platform provider1018
This is the actor that functions as the provider of an environment within
which cloud applications can be deployed. We could place this actor on
the same level as the kernel software that we have already seen in the con-
text of the ontology of the cloud1019. Platform providers act as a kind of
catalogue of reception in which different service providers offer services.
Platform providers offer the technical basis for the marketplace where
cloud services aimed at the end user are offered. It is very important to
point out that platform providers can be hosted on the same development
level and cloud space with the subsequent services they facilitate. How-
ever, it is also possible to have them located on totally different facilities
as well. This raises serious issues of integrity of the data they handle as
well as of the connections that bind them with the services nested in them,
which points again towards the need for clear regulations referring to the
inner side of cloud networks and the business cycles that are in full motion
within them.
The cloud services consultant
Lastly, the ever more complex structure of the cloud business has provided
fertile ground to one more type of actor within the cloud business cycle,
i.e. the cloud services consultant1020. Entities performing consulting for
the customers on a cloud network serve as support for the selection and
implementation by the latter of relevant services in order to create value
for their business model1021. One might argue that the cloud consultant
does not entirely fall within what we have described as the cloud network
business workflow; nevertheless, those actors, in the context of assessing
cloud customers’ needs and coming up with the most suitable services for
v.
vi.
1018 J. Hoover (note 988).
1019 See also Chapter 8.
1020 Id.
1021 J. Hoover (note 988); Norman Pelzl (note 65).
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their needs, have often access to or an overview of customers’ data. There-
fore, they should also be considered as actors of the cloud business cycle
and have their selves and their functions subjected to any rules put togeth-
er for managing the internal aspect of cloud networks.
The innovative nature of cloud computing business and the legal
challenges raised as a result thereof
The revolutionary elements cloud computing has by nature as a technolo-
gy have also had their effect on the way business is done in the cloud mar-
ket. We have already gone through novel roles and actors appearing in the
business cycle of cloud computing and have also seen into what they do
new or differently compared to the past1022. These innovations, in roles
and tasks, have already ignited demand for original rules that will resolve
issues unique to them. Apart from the points that have already been raised
though, it is important to take a step back and look at the broader picture
of the cloud market and business. Defined and clearly affected by the pio-
neering elements cloud computing inherently possesses, the way the rele-
vant market sector works also offers interesting hints pointing to the way
and characteristics that rules governing the cloud should have.
For starters, it is important to emphasize that the broader cloud comput-
ing business is characterized by several different types of varieties1023
which are also characteristic of the cloud per se and are, therefore, becom-
ing more and more prevalent in numerous areas of the IT economy that
rely on cloud computing:
– Variety in norms: The cloud’s standard order of business is defined by
a plurality of state actors, greatly varying in size, magnitude and au-
thority, ranging from national government agencies to supranational in-
stitutions1024. All these, equipped with a certain degree of formal rule
making capacity have engaged in enacting a diverse set of (partly over-
lapping or otherwise interacting) norms aimed at regulating certain
manifestations of the cloud computing phenomenon. Up to now
though, their regulatory compass has left mostly untouched the essence
of cloud computing per se, i.e. the cloud as a technology made possible
d.
1022 See Chapter 2.
1023 Willcocks, Leslie P., Venters, Will and Whitley, Edgar A. (note 111).
1024 See Chapter 5.
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thanks to a certain technological arrangement and as a workflow/ a
lifecycle for any kind of digital or digitized data with several actors
taking part or contributing to it and several exits from the cycle, each
one marking one of those manifestations of the cloud towards its end
users or recipients of the end-products of this workflow.
– Variety in control mechanisms: Due to the novelties it brought with,
cloud computing has nurtured a great deal of new approaches to the is-
sue of its regulation as a phenomenon. To a certain extent also because
of the lack of concrete rules and laws governing the cloud per se, and
further driven by the speed at which phenomena (i.e. applications, sys-
tems, products, services etc.) facilitated by cloud computing appear,
there has been a plethora of alternative regulatory approaches to cloud
computing1025, besides traditional, hierarchical mechanism of control.
Until now legal and regulatory approaches to cloud computing include
alternative modes of control, such as market regulation, the shaping of
social norms, and design requirements. All of these tools have resulted
in the conception and establishment of a wide range of legal dicta re-
garding the cloud, which it is high time to be systematized and codified
into a code of rules that will not necessarily replace of body of law we
already have regarding manifestations of cloud computing but will
work as the foundations for the entire construction of IT law.
– Variety in controllers: In the race to effectively regulate all manifesta-
tions of cloud computing and the applications it has given life to, tradi-
tional state regulatory bodies, namely government agencies or courts,
continue to play a key role. However, the speedy and innovative evolu-
tion of the broader IT sector the cloud has made possible, also served
as fertile ground so that important control functions be attributed to al-
ternative governance institutions1026, for instance standard setting bod-
ies and trade associations. Of course, the regulatory competence of the
latter is not on a par with that of full-capacity lawmakers. However, it
should not fail our attention that many of them experience the cloud
and the practices developed around and through it from much closer
than conventional legislators. Without suggesting that they should fully
and officially be made part of the law-making process with regard to
rules on cloud computing (after all, law production as such is not yet
1025 See Chapters 3 and 4.
1026 See Chapter 6.
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mature enough to undergo such a major makeover), it is definitely ad-
visable to take what these actors have to say about how to effectively
regulate the cloud seriously into account. As it has been demonstrated
several times throughout this study, these alternative governance insti-
tutions are much closer to the inner, most fundamental aspects of the
cloud computing phenomenon and already possess much more ad-
vanced ways of interpreting the cloud through interdisciplinary and,
thus, more analytical lenses. To fully comprehend cloud computing,
regulators need to profoundly grasp not just what computing results in
for the real world but also what it actually is, how it actually works and
on how many different dimensions (geographic, technical and jurisdic-
tional ones) it is moving in parallel. Working hand in hand with such
entities that can assist this quest for deeper Interdisciplinarity is key to
successful and efficient cloud regulation.
– Variety in controllees1027: so far in the cloud computing related ecosys-
tem of laws, businesses that provide cloud services to consumers have
been the key regulatory subjects. However, as it has been extensively
demonstrated1028, a broader range of actors is relevant if we are to
build up a holistic range of regulatory tools for the cloud. From those
entities putting the cloud together, as infrastructure, to those setting the
stage for cloud service providers to market their offerings to con-
sumers, to actors facilitating access of the users to the APIs of cloud
services, there is a long path with multiple players whose roles and
functions have been so far insufficiently mapped and remain in a state
of regulatory limbo. Even governments themselves play their part in
governance efforts for the cloud, in the sense that, possibly for the first
time in history to such an advanced degree, they need to outdo them-
selves and, without going as far as succumbing part of their sovereign-
ty to some form of abstract supranational IT-dedicated legal order, they
nevertheless need to develop cloud computing laws that will be able to
plug into each other.
1027 Urs Gasser (note 959).
1028 See Chapter 8.
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Summarizing the issues raised by the new modus operandi established
in IT market by cloud computing; where is there a need for new cloud
computing rules and what precisely should their content be?
The cloud market and the way it functions, as they have been extensively
described and analyzed so far, have expectedly given rise to a heated de-
bate about a series of key issues related to the cloud computing phe-
nomenon. In previous parts of this study, we have already presented the
main fronts on which the cloud computing reality has stirred debate and
concern. Many of these issues are the product and result of the very archi-
tecture of the whole cloud market structure and of four basic risk factors
on which it is founded1029: Outsourcing, centralization, internationaliza-
tion and, as a result of the previous three, systemic complexity. Now that
we have examined in such an analytical manner not only what issues the
establishment of the cloud as standard IT technology has raised but also
how it works and how the market created around it is functioning, it is
worth summarizing those issues and arguing on which of them could be
the subject matter of rules dedicated to regulating the cloud or which they
are already dealt with by other pieces of legislation:
Data protection
Undoubtedly, data protection has been brought forward as the main issue
to be closely watched and monitored as to the effects that can be brought
upon it by cloud computing. There are several reasons behind this, namely
the fact that since by definition cloud as a technology is almost always in-
terrelated one way or another to data or that data protection has come, to a
certain extent, to be regarded almost as synonym to ‘risks posed by cloud
computing’ in public debate1030. We have already seen that, indeed, the ar-
chitecture of cloud computing and the sensitive nature of data stored in
cloud-based environments do raise concerns regarding individual rights
and related safeguards, such as data quality, processing transparency, and
international data transfers with good reason. It would be unfair to claim
that legislators have failed to comprehend the urgency of the matter and
work on legal tools that allow us to deal with this issue. However, just as
e.
i.
1029 Benoit Dupont (note 111).
1030 See Chapter 7.
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the GDPR is on the countdown before coming into force in Europe and
other such initiatives are also underway in the US, there has been rightful
warnings voiced that, in our haste to safeguard our data as efficiently as
possible, we are moving in the wrong direction. EU law is dealing with
data as if these continue to be under the effective control of their own-
ers1031 in today’s data technology landscape, while this is not entirely true
nor is it the most efficient way to go after data protection. On the other
hand, US law insists on the path of granting preferential treatment to gov-
ernment and state agencies regarding their possibility to get access to any
of their subjects’ data, while recent experience has proved that this is no
longer safe (the technical lacunae that permit the state to get access to citi-
zens’ data could as well be exploited by others for malicious purposes)
and it is growing less and less bearable by data owners1032. Our discourse
so far and the exposure of what cloud computing is really about has only
highlighted that, while it is absolutely essential to work on the front of da-
ta protection and maintain relevant rules updated at all times, it is high
time to closely examine and regulate the actual medium and field where
the whole game with data is played, i.e. the cloud networks themselves
and cloud computing itself as the actual vessel for practically any compu-
tational process imaginable nowadays.
Data Security
It is regarded by many that security issues are the second biggest risk the
cloud has given rise to with regard to the countless amounts of data hosted
on cloud network facilities1033. Consequently, issues such as data security
standards, contractual rules, and legal obligations have risen among top
preoccupations1034. Already, several specific problems have been brought
to the forefront with equally numerous solutions that have been put to dis-
cussion. These include, for instance, digital signature legislation, breach
notification laws, rules regulating how data can be stored in the cloud, se-
ii.
1031 See Chapters 6 and 7.
1032 See Chapter 3.
1033 Nicholas Platten (note 42).
1034 See also Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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curity audit requirements etc.1035. While on these topics there are already
several legal options on the table, we are still missing the most crucial ele-
ment, i.e. rules that will allow us to determine who is to bear the blame in
case such security breaches occur and, most importantly, who is truly re-
sponsible at any given time to prevent such breaches from happening. The
analysis of the inner architecture of cloud networks and the mapping of
actors playing their roles across the cloud workflow only bring to surface
the need for such dedicated cloud computing legislation, which will not
cripple or render obsolete but it will rather help already existing IT laws
become more focused and effective upon application.
Data retention
One of the practices that thrived thanks to cloud computing but also be-
cause of modern challenges and policies such as economic regulation or
national security obligations is retention of data with the use of cloud
computing1036. Consequently, we are increasingly facing the challenge of
balancing between the development, implementation, and operation of re-
tention practices against civil liberties and other fundamental rights1037.
For the time being, regulatory approaches trying to uphold these funda-
mental liberties against such practices are largely based on the theory of
consent of the data subjects with regard to collection of data attributable to
them. This is the default point adopted in the GDPR as well1038 and it is,
in generally, regarded as the next big frontier in the quest for empowering
data subjects in their struggle to preserve their data. However, important
as these steps may be, they fail to recognize one elementary fact about da-
ta in the era of cloud computing: from the moment when data enter the
cloud, they are by default out of the data subject’s control1039. Therefore,
the burden of preserving the integrity of users’ data, of determining when
and under what conditions they could be handed over to third parties or
iii.
1035 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan (note 968).; Urs Gasser (note
959).
1036 Eoghan Casey, Handbook of digital forensics and investigation (2010); Reilly,
D., Wren, C., & Berry, T., Cloud computing: Forensic challenges for law en-
forcement. In Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST.)
1037 Paul Schwartz (note 155).
1038 See Chapter 4.
1039 Hassan Takabi, James B. D. Joshi & Gail-Joon Ahn (note 119).
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state authorities or to what extent they should make it permissible for third
parties to have access to users’ data needs to transferred to the actors facil-
itating the cloud computing business workflow. Of course, it is certainly
no harm for data subjects to maintain the prerogative of consent; however,
without rules that will define who among the various actors handling
users’ data on the course of a cloud-based computational procedure is
tasked with respecting users’ choice in terms of that consent, the front of
data retention will remain only partially regulated.
Consumer protection
The rate at which cloud computing services are becoming the mainstream
choice for virtually all groups of IT services consumers, from individuals
to big-scale enterprise users, has subsequently given rise to a series of con-
sumer protection issues in the cloud market1040. These concerns are main-
ly fueled in light of the fact that users of cloud services have to agree to
prefabricated terms and conditions that apply to the services they wish to
use. Additionally, it is common truth that communication between cloud
providers and consumers or the feasibility of existing consumer protection
laws to regulate these relationships are all characterized by information
and power asymmetries1041. Improvements on that front are also to be ex-
pected; to a certain extent they are bound to happen as consumers will be
pushing forward for their interests and will seek protection for them in
more concentrated manners. However, the asymmetry between service
providers and users of cloud services is most unlikely to cease to exist any
time soon, if it can, at all. Therefore, it is again on the front of regulation
of cloud computing per se where it is possible, via rules that will clarify
which cloud actor is responsible for which specific tasks and duties at
each time within the cloud business workflow, to partly outdo the differ-
ence of power observed between consumers and cloud computing service
providers. Yet again, the proposed cloud-specific rules are not meant to
substitute but, rather, to complement consumer laws with the aim of
achieving the best possible balance between the two ends of the cloud
market equilibrium.
iv.
1040 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan (note 968).
1041 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
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Intellectual Property
IP rights are of paramount importance on the cloud given that a great deal
of all digital content available on the cloud is subject to intellectual prop-
erty rules and can be of great financial value to right holders1042. From so-
cial media to the publication industry, the cloud hosts numerous activities,
either digital since conception or converted into digital formats in order to
adapt to modern demand, which involve materials subject to IP laws. The
exploitation of intellectual property in the cloud environment is often fer-
vently contested. For instance, low entry barriers for large-scale distribu-
tion of copyright protected content raises concerns about possible piracy
on the side of rightholders. Strengthening IP rights and putting in place
better enforcement mechanisms are among issues mentioned in most cloud
policy debates1043. While it is true that modernizing and reinforcing IP
laws can decisively contribute to better protection of relevant rights in the
times of cloud economy, protection will not be complete before establish-
ing rules that will define which of the cloud network actors are, at each
time, charged with upholding those rights. In fact, cloud computing regu-
lation should not stipulate just on cloud computing actors being deterred
from offending the rights of their users (among which IP rights as well)
but it should oblige them to actively take action towards better protection
of them.
Competition
Given the size and value of commerce and economic activity done on the
cloud, it goes without saying that competition law and affairs would be
stirred due to cloud technologies. In particular, the centralized nature of
cloud computing infrastructures, questions of ownership, antitrust and,
perhaps most importantly, interoperability issues have emerged1044. The
thorniest problems are thought to be contractual concerns (e.g., adhesion
forms of contracts), the lack of portability and conflicts between open and
closed standards. Needless to say, competition issues raised as a result of
v.
vi.
1042 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar (note
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1043 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
1044 Urs Gasser (note 959).
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the introduction of cloud computing are too vast a field to be discussed on
the sidelines of this study. However, it could be briefly argued that at the
heart of the quest for a better functioning and with fairer competition con-
ditions cloud market lies one predominant tool: interoperability. Given
that the cloud economy is, to a great extent, founded on the flexibility with
which users can go up or down on the amount of computational resources
they use at any given time depending on their needs, it only makes sense
that they should enjoy this flexibility not only within the resources of a
specific service provider but also when transiting from one to the other.
Cloud computing specific rules should definitely incorporate regulations
regarding the minimum interoperability standards cloud providers should
guarantee to their customers at all times and throughout the cloud business
workflow. In addition, interoperability will be even further advanced if
cloud computing laws are founded on similar principles on a cross-juris-
dictional basis contributing to the advancement of fair competition, for the
benefit of both service providers and customers, on a universal basis or, in
any case, on such an extensive level as possible1045.
Trade
Although steps are constantly made towards bringing down such measures
restricting free economic activity in the field of cloud computing world-
wide, there are still several such procedures or requirements that hinder
cloud business. For instance, there are several types of registrations cloud
companies have to go through in a given country before they can provide
services there (for instance, the EU-US Privacy Shield agreement that re-
placed the Safe Harbor agreement1046) that create trade barriers for cloud
providers or the harmonization of government procurement rules. It would
certainly be too optimistic or even unnecessarily bold to claim that merely
vii.
1045 Also refer to Chapter 11.
1046 The EU-US Privacy Shield is a framework agreement for transatlantic exchan-
ges of personal data for commercial purposes between the European Union and
the United States. One of its purposes is to permit US companies to more easily
receive personal data from EU entities under EU privacy laws meant to protect
European Union citizens. The EU-US Privacy Shield is a replacement for the
International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles which were declared invalid by the
European Court of Justice in October 2015 by virtue of judgment in Case
C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner.
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by introducing fundamental cloud computing laws such trade barriers
could be totally abolished1047. However, in so far as the rules governing
the functioning of the very cloud networks and their actors applicable in
each jurisdiction are based on common core principles, obstacles to cloud
computing business can be expected to be minimized.
Jurisdiction, applicable law, enforcement1048
In order to make the most out of economies of scale, cloud computing
heavily resorts to the flow of data across jurisdictional boundaries, be it at
the local, national, or regional level1049. As it has already been analyzed,
this potentially global flow of data naturally triggers questions of jurisdic-
tion, applicable law, and enforcement. It has also been argued that, bold as
that may be, it does not appear to be very realistic at this moment to move
any time soon towards a regime of global regulation of cross-jurisdictional
data flows1050. Even more, it is even questionable whether such a big leap
from the existing jurisdictional status quo for the cloud to a substantially
different, universalized one would make sense or whether it would be met
with positive feelings from all affected parties, even if we suppose that it
was achieved somehow. However, it is certain that jurisdictional frictions
would be significantly softened if rules that dealt with the cloud market
and the characteristics it and the entities active within it truly have are put
in force. As these rules are proposed to be primarily founded on the teleo-
logical perspective1051, they will definitely help to track down which actor
of a cloud business workflow was responsible for what function at any
given instance of the cloud workflow; once the entity upon which respon-
sibility or culpability is attributable is identified, answering the question of
jurisdiction and other neighboring topics will become an easier task.
viii.
1047 Margot Kaminski, Why trade is not the place for the EU to negotiate privacy
Internet Policy Review (2015.)
1048 See also Chapters 6 and 7.
1049 See Chapter 6.
1050 See Chapters 5 and 6.
1051 See Chapter 5.
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Compliance1052
Cloud computing providers need not only to abide by general laws, but
also to comply with an ever-growing body of very detailed sector-specific
regulations (e.g., regarding financial, educational, or health data) and mas-
ter the interplay among them, especially in instances of cross-jurisdiction-
al nature. Similar to what has been argued before with relation to jurisdic-
tion, rules regulating all that is happening on the internal aspect of cloud
networks will help determine at each time which is responsible for what
function during the computational process, thus making it easier to deter-
mine the entity responsible for upholding compliance requirements as
well.
Transparency
This is the challenge with which a regulation specialized in the cloud
could make a difference. Transparency and clarity are central concerns in
the wider cloud environment touching upon a wide range of issues from
contractual arrangements to regulatory approaches over a wide range of
applications and manifestations related to the cloud as a technological, or-
ganizational, and economical phenomenon1053. The proposed rules, which
are meant to primarily shed light and regulate what is actually happening
in the day-to-day function of cloud networks and the business workflow
that is made possible thanks to them, will decisively contribute to making
the broad picture around cloud computing clearer and more transparent.
By adopting rules that will help at each time to clear out who among a
cloud network’s actors is responsible for which of the events taking place
within the cloud workflow, not according to a standard description of du-
ties and tasks for each actor but as a result of an ad hoc analysis of pro-
cesses that are underway, actors that are taking part in them and what role
they are precisely carrying in any given time, chances augment that han-
dling and regulation of affairs on any given instance will be conducted in a
transparent and just manner.
ix.
x.
1052 See Chapters 6 and 7.
1053 Nicholas Platten (note 42).
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Responsibility and liability1054
The proposed rules governing the internal aspect of cloud networks and
the cloud business cycle will help, in a very similar manner to the one re-
lated to transparency, the need for fairer and more pragmatic allocation of
responsibility and liability on the cloud. The great variety of instruments
currently available in determining and allocating responsibility and liabili-
ty over any harmful incident involving cloud technologies will be de-
cisively better applied if reinforced by a set of rules on cloud computing
with the nature and principles proposed hereby. Instruments for determin-
ing wrongdoing1055 and liability in IT and, hence, in the cloud are numer-
ous, ranging from traditional approaches (criminal law, civil liability, and
risk insurance) to concepts such as corporate social responsibility. If cou-
pled with a set of governance principles on the very functioning of cloud
networks, their efficiency can do not worse than improve.
Infrastructure
As it has been earlier discussed1056 infrastructure of cloud networks,
which is naturally the raw material for building the entire cloud phe-
nomenon altogether, is needed in abundance as the use of the cloud
spreads. Therefore, cloud computing providers heavily invest in more and
more facilities of this kind across various geographical locations trying to
optimize as much as they can, at the same time, any relevant economies of
scale, i.e. by choosing locations for their server hubs which take advantage
of favorable energy and climate conditions or which are within jurisdic-
tions that offer attractive investment benefits for IT infrastructure
providers to lay out their facilities within their limits. These jurisdictions
do not necessarily belong to countries with generally well-developed and
robust IT laws. Therefore, establishing rules which will permit us to track
down responsibility all the way down to the infrastructure level can con-
tribute, via the teleological and the principle of extra-territoriality, to legal
safety overall in relation to using cloud technologies.
xi.
xii.
1054 Refer also to Chapter 7.
1055 Benoit Dupont (note 111).
1056 See Chapters 2 and 8.
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What challenges lie ahead in designing cloud computing regulation
rules?
In designing the proposed cloud computing regulations, lawmakers will
have to make many choices in response to several questions regarding the
cloud computing phenomenon and how several of its parameters should be
regulated. As per every law-making procedure1057, designing the bouquet
of cloud computing rules is a process with three distinct phases, namely
conceptualization, implementation and assessment1058. The challenges and
optimal ways to tackle them are discussed hereunder in light of the analy-
sis on the internal perspective of cloud computing.
Challenges in conceptualizing cloud computing regulation
Challenges during the conceptualization phase of cloud computing laws
are basic “horizontal” challenges law makers are confronted with when
considering the regulation of any technological innovation1059. In the case
of cloud computing, three appear to be the main challenges based on the
analysis so far: justification of law and regulation, trade-offs between poli-
cy objectives, and conflicts among the different roles held by governments
in relation to the cloud phenomenon.
– Justification
In every law-making process governments or, in general, legislative au-
thorities, have a certain range of mechanisms available to detect legal and
regulatory issues related the subject matter of the laws they are about to
design. As it is commonly admitted, what issues do finally make it onto
the legal and regulatory agenda greatly depends on the prevailing political
economy in which an issue, in this case cloud computing, emerges and
diffuses; accordingly, these conditions may vary across countries. As far
as the cloud is concerned, analysis1060 so far has demonstrated that, al-
though the two jurisdictions under examination in this study (i.e. EU and
f.
i.
1057 For an in-depth analysis of what risks building any system of laws inherently
carries as a process refer to: Alden Heintz, The Dangers of Regulation, 29 J
Communication 129–134 (1979.)
1058 Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor (note 956).
1059 John G. Palfrey & Urs Gasser (note 235).
1060 See Chapter 3.
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the US) may be following distinctly separate routes in the way they handle
IT and, in particular, data-related issues, in both of them there is a strong
momentum in civil society for taking decisive measures and adopting laws
that will clear out the current blurry picture when it comes to regulating
cloud technologies. This unanimous call for action should be heard by reg-
ulators and, apart from being a call for them to act, it can also serve as a
perfect tool in working on producing rules for the cloud that will be based
on common principles and will, therefore, be possible to be presented to
both jurisdictions with an increased likelihood of being met favorably and
embraced by all affected actors.
Moreover, on the outset of every law-making process, identification of
legal and regulatory issues through mechanisms such as horizon scanning
typically includes an assessment of the need for intervention, for instance
in case a market failure is looming or has already occurred. When it comes
to the cloud though, justification of law and regulation especially targeted
at it becomes more complicated due to the fact that there is plenty of anec-
dotal evidence but not much empirical data available yet on its precise im-
pact in a given area of concern1061. However, as analysis has shown al-
ready1062, while there are truly numerous regulatory tools touching upon
different manifestations or applications of cloud technologies, there still
remains a lot of insecurity and friction both among these various tools and
among different jurisdictions. The reason for that is that we are still miss-
ing the connecting substance among all these rules, i.e. we have yet to put
in place rules regulating the cloud itself. Once such rules come to exist,
and especially if a certain degree of universality is achieved in relation to
their founding principles, all pre-existing rules will blend better with each
other.
– Trade-offs
The wider field of IT regulation has been an area where, in the process of
designing laws, there is traditionally heated debate regarding tensions and,
not rarely, trade-offs among values that are attempted to be promoted and
1061 Primavera De Filippi, Primavera De Filippi & Luca Belli, Law of the Cloud v
Law of the Land: Challenges and Opportunities for Innovation, 3 European
Journal of Law and Technology 156–173 (2012); Deepak Puthal, B.P.S. Sahoo,
Sambit Mishra & Satyabrata Swain (note 837).; Neil Robinson, Lorenzo Valeri,
Jonathan Cave, Tony Starkey, Hans Graux, Sadie Creese & Paul P. Hopkins
(note 119).
1062 See Chapter 4.
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underlying policy objectives1063. In the case of cloud computing, such fric-
tion is clearly visible whenever lawmakers seek to establish or strengthen
frameworks aimed at enhancing consumer trust in cloud computing tech-
nology. For example, whenever an update process on privacy legislation is
underway, in Europe or in the USA, it always goes hand in hand with the
concerns that respective massive surveillance programs on behalf of states
pose on that privacy. This had been particularly true, for instance, during
the recently terminated negotiation process regarding the EU’s GDPR,
which faced a lot of turbulence in light of other legislative initiatives of
the European Commission focusing on the issues of health research or
banking to name a few1064. Actually, those parallel policies contradicting
the values of privacy and confidentiality of electronic communications,
among others, are usually targeting cloud computing services and
providers of them ‘incriminating’ them in the eyes of users for the harmful
events which they may have to eventually undergo. However, this often
leads to a blurry picture as to who is responsible for preserving safety and
security of data in the cloud, who is tasked with balancing between the ob-
jectives pursued by different laws which, however, aim to regulate the
same subject matter (e.g. data transfers). The proposed regulatory scheme
for cloud networks, which will put emphasis on clearing out which cloud
actor is tasked with what specific duties at each time throughout the cloud
workflow, will help to shed light also on the issues of responsibility for
abiding with the plethora of laws regulating individual manifestations or
uses of cloud computing. Moreover, the proposed set of principles for reg-
ulating the cloud should also touch upon the issue of superiority between
conflicting rules affecting the same areas of cloud-related activity1065
putting an end to the insecurities that still so manifestly exist despite an
1063 J. Hoover (note 988).
1064 For further analysis on the points of conflict between the GDPR and other regu-
latory initiatives of EU law refer to: Paul de Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou,
The new General Data Protection Regulation. Still a sound system for the pro-
tection of individuals?, 32 Computer Law & Security Review 179–194 (2016);
Dias, Renata Dalle Molle Araujo, The Potential Impact of the EU General Data
Protection Regulation on Pharmacogenomics Research, 36 Med. & L. 43–58
(2017); John Mark Michael Rumbold & Barbara Pierscionek, The Effect of the
General Data Protection Regulation on Medical Research, 19 Journal of medi-
cal Internet research e47 (2017); Alexander Roßnagel ed. (note 285).
1065 See also Chapter 11.
f. What challenges lie ahead in designing cloud computing regulation rules?
293
already wide range of legal tools attempting to deal with all outstanding
issues in the wider field of IT.
– Role conflicts
The third most important challenge that will expectedly come up when de-
signing laws regulating the cloud is, as it has become evident of the analy-
sis in this and the previous chapter, the conflict of roles that the same ac-
tors are tasked with at different instances of the cloud computing work-
flow. In fact, role conflicts occur not only with regard to actors of the net-
work but also on behalf of governments, in the sense of legislative, regula-
tory or executive bodies1066. An extensive review of broad cloud comput-
ing strategies implemented by governments around the world indicates
that governmental bodies typically play more than one role in relation to
the cloud1067. In fact, on most occasions, governmental organizations are
simultaneously users, regulators, coordinators, promoters, researchers,
even service providers within the context of cloud computing. This double
pool of conflicts from the part of cloud actors and governmental authori-
ties alike, calls for immediate settlement in the context of a regulatory
framework for the cloud. As it has been argued earlier, putting in place
rules that will answer the question of who is responsible for what within a
cloud network not based on specific applications of the cloud, as case
studies, but in a generic, role-description based manner, will decisively
help in clearing out conflicting situations as these. To the extent that this is
achieved, it will be beneficial not only for reinforcing the sentiment of
trust to the law from users of cloud computing but it will also further en-
courage adoption of the cloud from stakeholders both domestically and in-
ternationally.
Challenges in implementing cloud computing regulation
Beyond the conceptualization phase, drafting rules for the cloud is a pro-
cess which is also possible to stumble upon a series of challenges most rel-
evant to the implementation of these rules. Bearing in mind the analysis so
far, three such challenges seem particularly noteworthy: problems with re-
ii.
1066 Stefanie Leimeister, Markus Böhm, Christoph Riedl & Helmut Krcmar (note
975).
1067 A. Froomkin (note 322).
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gard to definitions, timing issues, and the challenge of appropriate tool se-
lection.
– Metaphors and definitions
In any case of drafting rules for an innovative or unprecedented phe-
nomenon, lawmakers and regulators typically resort to analogies or
metaphors to understand and describe it1068. However, metaphors have the
capacity to dictate regulatory thinking at the conceptual level and then in-
fluence approaches to the law at the implementation level. Similarly, the
definitions used to describe this new phenomenon that is to be regulated or
certain aspects of it can affect the way we approach these laws. So far,
regulators wishing to define cloud computing in the context of any laws
relevant to manifestations of it, confronted with the high degree of techni-
cality and the fluidity in the cloud computing environment, have chosen
not to develop their own technical definitions, but instead resort to defini-
tions set forth by standard setting organizations. One such definition,
which has been already discussed earlier in this study1069, is the NIST
cloud computing definition that was the proposed in the US Cloud Com-
puting Act of 20121070, which sought to establish a new type of violation
involving unauthorized access to computer systems in the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act1071. The proposal was met with criticism from legal
scholars for its definitional vagueness1072. And this, despite the fact that
the NIST definition of cloud computing is generally regarded as one of the
most technically accurate regarding the cloud to date1073. Following the
analysis presented so far, it is strongly recommended that a future regula-
tory framework for cloud computing should be based on a definition that
will not only describe what cloud computing does, from a technical per-
spective, but also explain its dual nature as a concept, i.e. that it is not just
about the external manifestations we see of it but also about the way the
1068 Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor (note 956).
1069 See Chapter 4.
1070 “S. 3569 — 112th Congress: Cloud Computing Act of 2012.” www.Gov-
Track.us. 2012. November 8, 2016 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/
s3569.
1071 Refer also to Chapter 6.
1072 Goldman E., The Proposed "Cloud Computing Act of 2012," and How Internet
Regulation Can Go Awry, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman
/2012/10/02/the-proposed-cloud-computing-act-of-2012-and-how-internet-regul
ation-can-go-awry/#7b0b6424113a; lastly accessed on 11/8/2016.
1073 See Chapter 4.
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underlying technology and hardware are organized around certain actors
to construct, all together, a dynamic and continuously changing business
workflow. In this way, the subsequent rules will not only reflect on the ex-
ternal but also on the internal aspect of cloud computing dealing with the
whole range of cloud-related issues calling for regulatory arrangement.
– Timing
Another critical question inherent with every law under development is
the timing in which designated rules will intervene to settle the issues they
refer to. In particular, when it comes to laws referring to rapidly changing
areas of technology, determining the right timing when the negotiated pro-
visions will apply is a critical factor for the effectiveness of them1074. As a
result, lawmakers and regulators need to carefully consider timing issues
when attempting to strike a balance between the creation of a friendly en-
vironment for cloud service providers on the one hand and safeguarding
users on the other. Ideally, the relevant actors use a broad range of analyti-
cal tools in this process, including an assessment of the maturity of the
technology, standards, and markets with strong network effects1075, to
name the most crucial ones. Throughout this study, it has been repeatedly
argued that, while laws on the applications made possible thanks to cloud
computing technologies usually adopt a punitive or repressive approach
trying to describe in what way could harmful effects from malpractice
with these applications could be limited, cloud computing regulation
should adopt a primarily proactive approach focusing on who is charged
with what functions and duties in that context throughout the cloud net-
work. In this manner, it is expected that affected entities will be better
aware of their duties and the preparations required to live up to depending
on the role(s) they are playing within a cloud network, thus increasing the
chances for smooth and transparent function of the cloud market and mini-
mizing the odds for harmful events or spillovers thereof.
– Tool Selection
Last but not least, one key implementation challenge regulators invariably
face when designing a law is to select the appropriate tool that is best suit-
ed to solve the regulatory issues or legal problems that had been pinpoint-
1074 Paul M. Schwartz (note 157).
1075 Gabriela Zanfir ed., What Happens in the Cloud Stays in the Cloud, or Why the
Cloud's Architecture Should Be Transformed in 'Virtual Territorial Scope'
(2013.)
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ed and led to the formulation of a said piece of legislation1076. Truth be
told, the fact that so far law making in the field of IT has been focusing on
particular manifestations of IT technologies has resulted, for the moment,
in lack of data which does not permit to immediately understand the con-
tours of the problem of regulating the cloud itself in detail1077. Conversely,
on the side of remedies, matching problems with tools repeatedly turns to
be complicated by the fact that data about the performance of a given rem-
edy in a specific context rarely exist in advance. In any case, given that we
are talking about a sector with so many overlapping and interconnected
phenomena, the use of a remedy tool with regard to each of them should
align with the mix of policy instruments chosen by regulators for neigh-
boring phenomena. Necessarily, putting in place and selecting the right
tools requires considering a number of factors including political, techni-
cal or market contexts, to name a few. In response to this challenge, the
proposed regulatory framework on the cloud should be constructed not
with a view to replacing existing tools and remedies but with the aim of
supplementing them, helping, particularly, to clear out the picture as to
which remedy is more suitable and at whom among the different cloud ac-
tors it is addressable at any given time.
Projecting challenges in the assessment phase of a regulation on the
cloud
In the context of every law drafting process the latest step of work is to
make a projection of the negotiated rules being applied and assess what
will be the actual status quo in the field they aim to regulate after they en-
ter into force. With relation to a potential law regulating the cloud the fol-
lowing are the main challenges regulators need to make an estimate about
for the post-application period.
– Measures of success
The most common front where assessment challenges arise in law-making
is that of establishing criteria with which it is possible to measure whether
a law has been successful and at what extent1078. It is a fact that among
different jurisdictions there is no generally accepted and stable set of crite-
iii.
1076 Urs Gasser (note 959).
1077 Benoit Dupont (note 111).
1078 Urs Gasser (note 959).
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ria to evaluate the performance of various tools lawmakers and regulators
have at their disposal across different regulatory contexts. In some cases,
such criteria might focus on parameters such as coerciveness, directness,
automaticity, and visibility1079. In others, criteria such as effectiveness, ef-
ficiency, and flexibility might rather be used1080. What is more, while at
the moment a law is adopted everyone agrees that there should be constant
evaluation of its effectiveness and, after a relative period of time since its
introduction there should be an assessment as to the necessity of any mod-
ifications to it, more often than not these priorities atone or do not get
much attention at all. Beyond instruments, it is often not clear what suc-
cess means for a piece of legislation, in particular with respect to the out-
comes of technology regulation. As it has been analyzed1081, for instance,
in one jurisdiction success for a law regulating data transfers can mean
making it as conditional as possible to let any such transfer happen, while
in another it can mean having corrective tools available for anyone that
may suffer any kind of damage from one such transfer to amend it once it
occurs. Moreover, the complexity of such normative questions regarding
the result of regulatory interventions and whether it can be evaluated posi-
tively or negatively only increases where multiple tools regarding distinct
but definitely adjacent manifestations of a wider phenomenon are at work
simultaneously, or where a variety of instruments are used to pursue dif-
ferent and, at times, even conflicting policy objectives, as discussed be-
fore1082. It is possibly still too premature to know how regulating the very
core of the cloud computing phenomenon will affect the overall function-
ing of the IT field. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the analysis so far and
the fact that the proposed rules regarding the cloud from its internal per-
spective are not meant to replace but to supplement and fortify already ex-
isting legislation on the most important cloud-based phenomena and appli-
cations, two indexes could already serve as measurements regarding the
success of cloud laws: on the one hand, the extent at which frictions over
which jurisdiction takes prerogative over the others are alleviated. On the
1079 Coglianese, C., Measuring Regulatory Performance: EVALUATING THE IM-
PACT OF REGULATION AND REGULATORY POLICY, OECD, Expert Pa-
per No. 1, August 2012, available at https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-polic
y/1_coglianese%20web.pdf (lastly accessed: 11/8/2016.)
1080 Id.
1081 See Chapter 6.
1082 See Chapter 5.
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other hand, given that the proposed principles on cloud regulation are
meant to harmonize the effects of laws of different jurisdictions by re-
specting, at the same time, the different approaches each of these take on
the same issues, a measurement of success for the proposed regulatory
principles can be the degree at which the protective effect achieved within
one jurisdiction is also deemed to be satisfactory under the standards of
the other. If these two measurements do not reach adequate values, then
even further refinement will be in order.
– Collateral effects
Regulation in general and all the more so regulation of such innovative
phenomena as IT technologies can lead to collateral effects1083. A distinc-
tive example of this type of challenge are the side-effects of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act in the US1084, which was enacted aiming –
among others – to put in place additional layers of protection of copyright-
ed works, but has been arguably used in ways totally unintended by the
legislator. In the case of rules regulating the cloud from the internal per-
spective, the most likely collateral effect is the one most common with ref-
erence to any piece of IT legislation, i.e. the possibility that it may fail to
comprehend the way technology will evolve and become soon ineffective
or create legal voids that could be exploitable in unintended manners1085.
However, this is a possibility that can never be totally taken off the table;
the soundest advice IT regulators should always bear in mind is that rules
referring to such dynamic phenomena as IT technologies require from
them constant high alert and a keen eye to spot whenever the time has
come for the next update. Besides, the fact that the proposed rules are not
meant to extend to external manifestations of the cloud but touch only its
internal aspects guarantees that, so long as cloud computing remains the
standard facilitating IT technology, the rules on it can only work to the
benefit of both technological progress and users’ interests at the same
1083 Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor (note 956).
1084 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is a US copyright law imple-
menting two 1996 treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WI-
PO). It criminalizes production and dissemination of technology, devices, or ser-
vices intended to circumvent measures (commonly known as digital rights ma-
nagement or DRM) that control access to copyrighted works. It also criminali-
zes the act of circumventing an access control, whether or not there is actual in-
fringement of copyright itself. In addition, it heightens the penalties for copy-
right infringement on the Internet. Pub. L. 105-304; 112 Stat. 2860 (1998.)
1085 Chris Reed (note 363).
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time. The aim is to regulate the cloud not in order to disrupt it but in order
to better streamline its capacities and channel them in ways that will maxi-
mize their positive while decreasing their negative potential.
– Ability to learn
Regulating such a state-of-the-art phenomenon like cloud computing, al-
ways calls for an assumption of uncertainty. The cloud computing legal
and regulatory environment is characterized by high degrees of technical
complexity and fast changing market conditions, to name only a few of its
volatile aspects1086. These combined with the rest of the conceptual, im-
plementation, and assessment phase challenges bring to the surface the
need for regulatory systems to incorporate feedback channels, and mech-
anisms of self-assessment and correction1087. Putting in place such safe-
guards is anything but trivial for the longevity of cloud computing regu-
lation. Options so far have included sunset clauses, periodic reviews, and
consultation mechanisms1088, but often these prove to be either relatively
crude or not adequately flexible to live up to the speed of evolution of
high-end technologies and corresponding market dynamics; the long-last-
ing review process of technology-relevant European Union legislation, on-
ly recently verified through the labyrinthine process of adoption of the
GDPR is indicative thereof. Adopting rules on the cloud with the features
and generic nature proposed in this study will not solve this challenge per
se but will definitely set in motion a very crucial process towards the cor-
roboration of IT law as an independent legal discipline. Rules focusing on
the internal aspect of cloud networks could serve as the missing link that
will ignite the chain of events that will offer to IT laws as a body of legis-
lation the systematization and coherence they are currently missing, as it
will be argued in the conclusions of this study.
1086 See also Chapters 2 and 8.
1087 J. Hoover (note 988).
1088 Coglianese op cit n 128 supra.
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Principles for regulating the cloud (3); the
adoption of cloud computing regulation as the
big leap forward from governing to governance
in IT law
Introduction – scope of this chapter
Reference has already been made in earlier parts of this study1089 to the
need for cloud computing and the regulation of it to do the transition from
a regime of governing to one of governance, more in touch with the real
nature and features of the cloud phenomenon. In this chapter, following
the analysis focusing on the technical and organizational/workflow aspects
of the cloud, attention is paid to how this transition towards a new regula-
tory understanding regarding cloud computing can be set in motion and
what are the fundamental concepts it should be based on. Moreover, con-
crete regulatory principles that will facilitate this transition are proposed
for adoption by major jurisdictions with regard to the cloud phenomenon,
again not with a view to homogenizing the way the cloud is legally dealt
with but to making sure that, while respect will continue to be paid to the
specificities and particularities of each jurisdiction and legal tradition, ulti-
mately all major jurisdictions will work towards achieving comparable re-
sults/effects from the way cloud computing is regulated.
Doing laws based on the local and global experience: the differences in
approach and the need to combine both perspectives in the case of
cloud computing
State and all other regulators, of a lower or higher level, have to deal with
an increasing number of policy matters that are defined by what is often
described as a global, borderless nature. On the other hand, when called to
produce laws that will be used for regulating these matters, those regula-




1089 See Chapters 5 and 6.
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edge they already have or to which they have access to and the objectives
they wish to achieve through these regulations1090, in terms of the results
they hope to get back from applying these laws and the extent, geographic
and material one, in which these laws will be applicable. This issue of be-
ing tasked with the production of laws applicable to a limited geographic
area but having the potential to affect or touch upon issues that do affect
the lives and activities of practically every law subject worldwide has been
in the centre of attention of prominent scholars1091, several of whom com-
ing from the liberal movement. In particular, the tradeoff between regulat-
ing on the local and global level and the respective local or global knowl-
edge upon which this rule making process is based has been at the centre
of attention of Friedrich Hayek and his program1092. In Hayek’s bipolar
construction, on the one side lies ‘the scope of the administrative state’s
regulatory jurisdiction; this is the large-scale question of government ver-
sus markets’1093. The second level is ‘the internal organization of the regu-
latory bureaucracy, within the area committed to the administrative state’s
regulatory jurisdiction’1094.
On each of the two sides of the equilibrium lie respective but substan-
tially differing sources of knowledge, information, experience and exper-
tise1095. In particular, on the one side there is the scope of the administra-
tive state with its internal organization. On this side, Hayek puts emphasis
on the benefits of local knowledge and adaptation to the contingencies of
1090 J. Goldring (note 258).
1091 This issue is continuously discussed in legal scholarship. For a thorough
overview on it and its aspect which are of closer relation to this research, refer
to: Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 The American
Journal of Comparative Law 699–724 (1991); Giandomenico Majone, Policy
Harmonization. Limits and Alternatives, 16 Journal of Comparative Policy Ana-
lysis: Research and Practice 4–21 (2014); Antony Anghie & C.G Weeramantry,
Legal visions of the 21st century: essays in honour of judge Christopher Weera-
mantry (op. 1998); M. J. Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data
Flows: Privacy Protection or Non-Tariff Trade Barriers, 10 Law & Pol 1055–
1105 (1978); Alfred Aman, A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Re-
form: Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 2 Indiana Journal of Global Le-
gal Studies 429 (1995) 429–464 (1995).
1092 Friedrich A. von Hayek, The road to serfdom (2005); Friedrich A. von Hayek
(note 884).
1093 Friedrich A. von Hayek (note 1092).
1094 Id.
1095 Adrian Vermeule ed. (note 884).
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time and place, but fails to do justice or downplays a major tradeoff: that
centralized inclusive regulation is indispensable for epistemic coordina-
tion1096. As classic liberal theory teaches1097, ‘spillovers, externalities, and
lost opportunities for economic synergy may arise not only because of
conflicts of interest and problems of collective action, but also for epis-
temic reasons’: in the chain of a production process for laws on the cloud,
this translates into actors (i.e. legislators) with thick localized information
who, confined by this short perspective, may be myopic about what other
actors of the chain (i.e. the actors actively comprising the cloud computing
workflow) are doing. In the end, a major challenge for any kind of law, no
matter how extensive is the range of its geographical validity, is not just
effective command-and-control, but also epistemic coordination and the
creation of common knowledge and measures that ‘dispel the local my-
opia of market actors’1098.
In view of this double challenge for any kind of law, the question rises
how all the relevant but also ample knowledge could be collected and co-
ordinated in order to serve as the raw material for efficient, pragmatic and
to-the-point laws. According to Hayek, the administrative state itself, with
its range of institutions can take up the task of ‘aggregating thick local
knowledge, including the tacit, practical knowledge from daily experi-
ence’1099 which is so crucial for the production of efficient legislation.
Taking the case of the European Union as an example, the EU Parliament
itself stands as a body of representatives with local knowledge from real
life experience from different parts of Europe, while the various adminis-
trative agencies carrying some degree of competence on a given subject
matter often incorporate actors with industry-specific or area-specific
skills and information. The administrative state, which largely coincides
with what we perceive as the (conventional) regulator, possesses much
more than abstract or statistical technocratic expertise; every state struc-
ture, be it a national, federal or intergovernmental, even an international
1096 Michèle Lamont, Rethinking Expertise. By Harry Collins and Robert Evans.
Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 2007. Pp. 153. $37.50, 115 American
Journal of Sociology 569–571 (2009.)
1097 Adrian Vermeule ed. (note 884).
1098 Id.
1099 Friedrich A. von Hayek (note 1092).
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one, has developed a representative bureaucracy devoted to the gathering
and exploitation of local knowledge1100.
In issues so complex as information technology and the cloud, there is
heated debate as to which regulator is better qualified to do laws for them.
There have been scholars who have argued in favor of local regulators and
others who favor national or federal ones1101. As it has been argued
throughout the course of this study, there is no right or wrong choice with
regard to this issue. Actually, regulating the cloud is not an issue of who is
better qualified to do it but rather of how it will be done and what it will
aim for. In fact, actual state practice from national or federal states, proves
that, absent some constitutional restrictions, regulatory bodies from all
levels can intervene and regulate on most matters so that the subjects in-
volved in each regulatory affair (for example, the actors that were present-
ed in earlier parts of this study when it comes to cloud computing1102) can
be constrained by state regulation as well as federal, in the case of federal
states, or intergovernmental, as it happens, for instance, with EU law1103.
Actually, provided that there is efficient coordination, in a number of do-
mains federal or intergovernmental regulation may serve for clearing the
way for state regulation that will ultimately contribute to regulatory uni-
formity, in order to reduce legal uncertainty.
In light of these, it must be made clear that the existence of multiple
levels of regulators and regulations in no way undermines the importance
of the administrative state’s function to operate through command-and-
control regulation1104. It is just that, in complex matters, such as the ones
with which the law has to deal with in today’s post-modern reality, this co-
ordinating function1105 of regulation may often be pursued through pre-
dominantly informational and epistemic measures1106 instead of classic
command-and-control rules.
Consequently, while the Hayekian construction succeeds in recognizing
the two sides of actors when it comes to regulation prepared by the admin-
1100 Adrian Vermeule ed. (note 884).
1101 M. Gillen (note 415).
1102 See Chapter 9.
1103 Id.
1104 Adrian Vermeule ed. (note 884).
1105 Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory
State, 09 Emory University School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Re-
search Paper Series 578–649 (2009.)
1106 Id.
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istrative state, it stopped before realizing the importance of local knowl-
edge towards efficient regulation, most likely due to the fact that compli-
cated regulatory phenomena such as cloud computing were largely not a
reality until a couple of decades ago. However, IT and cloud computing
are perfect case studies to start off from Hayek’s position and, after com-
bining it with the principles of the theory on knowledge and the law1107, to
arrive in a modern formula that will guarantee the production of equally
or, even better, more efficient regulation in the future.
Nevertheless, at the same time, Hayek’s bipolar structure serves to con-
ceptualize the competing pools of actors in the field of regulation and law
making, in order for us to have the complete picture of dynamics that
should be taken into account and need to be compromised in order for
laws to actually work and achieve real results in the end. In particular, any
law for a phenomenon so dynamic as the cloud cannot only aim at taming
the forces of the market in favor of local knowledge about the needs that
should be entertained from a particular set of rules. Actually, the market is
only one of the institutional mechanisms for generating and then aggregat-
ing local knowledge1108. But it would be reckless to stress, from the one
side, the importance of local knowledge for concluding efficient laws, and,
at the same time, argue that only market mechanisms are good enough for
collecting and aggregating it1109. Instead, one must carry out a fair institu-
tional comparison between, or among, all institutional possibilities for
contributing to the creation and maintenance of efficient laws. Specifical-
ly, and contrary to the voices putting forward the irrelevance of obsoles-
cence of it, the regulatory state itself can still be justified as one of the key
mechanisms for aggregating local knowledge. Similarly, as it has been re-
peatedly argued throughout this study, in the field of cloud computing
regulation achieving the optimal results is not a question of choosing who,
among competent potential regulators, does better or the best laws. Rather,
what it is really needed is to coordinate among all these competent regula-
1107 I. Augsberg, Informationsverwaltungsrecht: Zur kognitiven Dimension der
rechtlichen Steuerung von Verwaltungsentscheidungen (2014.)
1108 D. Dyzenhaus & T. Poole, Law, Liberty and State: Oakeshott, Hayek and
Schmitt on the Rule of Law (2015.)
1109 For additional considerations on the issue of how it is best to aggregate know-
ledge for regulating the cloud, refer also to the analysis on the theory of ‘law
and knowledge’ and how it could be used as a valid method to construct a cloud
regulatory framework as outlined in Chapter 7 of this study.
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tors, to agree on elementary common principles that will define all the
pieces of laws they may bring out and to make sure that, in the end, they
will all work towards the same end result: a pragmatic and as timeless as
possible regime of sound governance instead of an ever anxious to catch
up with new standards regime of governing.
The next point of friction in the debate about how to build efficient
laws for the cloud refers to the nature these laws should have, i.e. whether
they should be designed with a broad and generic perspective in mind or
whether they should be developed on an ad hoc basis, following actual de-
velopments within a regulator’s area of competence the challenges and
outstanding issues of which they would attempt to settle. In the theory of
the administrative state as it has been promoted in the USA1110, these two
genres of law are described as synoptic and contextual laws, respective-
ly1111. Although the terms are not unanimously adopted, they are the most
illustrative ones in capturing the antithesis in thinking behind the style and
philosophy of laws each of them represents. It also needs to be underlined
that, of course, in reality there is no such clear-cut dividing line between
the two types of laws; this dichotomy is more of a conventional scheme
than a depiction of reality, in which there is expectedly a continuum be-
tween the two extremes1112 and various degrees of synoptic or contextual
elements in each piece of legislation. However, the scheme is useful in or-
der for the possibilities that each path or type of law offers to be appreciat-
ed and comprehended.
If we would need to name one scholar as the leading proponent of syn-
optic laws, Justice Stephen Breyer of the US Supreme Court would proba-
bly be the most suitable choice. Throughout his scholarly path, Breyer has
gone as far as expressing the idea that regulating risk via laws has become
such a complicated challenge in modern societies that in effect it requires
1110 H. M. Collins, Tacit and explicit knowledge (2013.)
1111 Adrian Vermeule ed. (note 884).; D. Dyzenhaus & T. Poole (note 1108).. For
further details on the antithesis between synoptic and contextual laws and the
broader reasoning behind generic versus ad hoc approaches in scientific dis-
course, refer to: Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, When
Does Coordination Require Centralization?, 98 American Economic Review
145–179 (2008); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight
of the Regulatory State, 106 Columbia Law Review 1260–1330 (2006).
1112 Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the vicious circle. Toward effective risk regulation,
vol. 1992 (1993.)
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regulators who possess global knowledge1113. In his view, for any regu-
lation to be a working one, ‘it should achieve to reflect and take into ac-
count an overview of all socially or economically relevant risks for the
subject matter it touches upon; it should attempt to present them in order
of priority and it should regulate them just to the point at which the net
social costs of regulation are equal to the benefits, but no more’1114.
On the opposite side of synoptic regulation lies uncoordinated, socially
wasteful regulation by a vast number of partially-informed and only to-a-
certain-degree competent agencies and bodies. However, such a dispersed
regulatory body is expected, and to an extent it has already been proved
so, to suffer from three main drawbacks1115:
– tunnel vision1116, a kind of obsessive focus in which regulatory agen-
cies go as far as eliminating the entire amount of the particular risk
within their jurisdiction, even if the costs of doing so far exceed the
benefits;
– random agenda selection, which refers to the tendency of uncoordinat-
ed agencies to devote resources to regulating risks on different grounds
than a ranking of expected social benefits; and
– Inconsistency, a condition in which uncoordinated agencies regulate
similar risks differently or different risks similarly.
Such a picture could be observed overall currently with the myriad pieces
of law regulating different aspects of cloud-facilitated IT applications and
processes, due to the fact that there is still no common basis with regard to
regulating their actual facilitator, i.e. the cloud. The problem occurs indeed
not only within the same jurisdiction (i.e. in the case of federal states
where both federal and regional or local bodies have concurrent compe-
tence) but also in the case of intergovernmental jurisdictions, such as the
EU. As it has been observed, with the case of the American administrative
state in mind: “decentralized organizations have a natural advantage in
adapting decisions to local conditions, since the decisions are made by
managers with the best information about those conditions. However, such
organizations also have a natural disadvantage since the manager in charge
of one division is uncertain about the decisions made by others.”1117
1113 Id.
1114 Id.
1115 Michèle Lamont (note 1096).
1116 Adrian Vermeule ed. (note 884).
1117 Id.
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However, as it has been explained, absolutely synoptic or contextual
laws do not exist and all the more so, absolutely synoptically or contextu-
ally organized administrative structures do not exist either. Despite the as-
sertions of both camps, neither can claim that they possess by privilege
full rationality or absolute expertise; rather, bounded rationality affects
both decentralized and centralized decision making1118. In a centralized
orientation, bounded rationality manifests itself in a ‘one size fits all’ poli-
cy. In a decentralized arrangement, bounded rationality is traced as a lack
of awareness of synergies across subdivisions. Instead, just as it was the
case with the mechanisms for collecting and aggregating knowledge, law-
making entities of all levels can be useful and have a role to play in effi-
ciently regulating cloud computing. What is important in order for them to
succeed in this aim is to coordinate among them so that they don’t overlap
with each other.
In summary, the distinction between local and global knowledge as well
as the one between synoptic and contextual legislation is essential for un-
derstanding the issues of knowledge production, collection and aggrega-
tion as well as the topic of rule-making from all its aspects and extremes.
As it has been demonstrated, the way regulatory bodies arrange how they
collect and aggregate information as well as how they coordinate among
themselves in order to define areas and subfields of competence ought to
be a central agenda item in the debate and efforts for setting up a prescrip-
tive and proactively oriented legal and political theory across a variety of
topics and definitely with regard to cloud computing. Hayek’s views,
which served as the starting point for this discourse, may be directly rele-
vant to these questions, but at the same time they have also turned out to
be largely untenable. Regulation of complex issues such as the cloud can-
not be left to just one type of actors relevant with the phenomenon, be
them the market or regulators only. The market is definitely an important
aggregator of information, including local knowledge but, at the same
time, an imperfect one; on the other side of the administrative state con-
struction lies another type of actors, equally essential but imperfect in
themselves, i.e. all the different kinds of administrative authorities compe-
tent for the subject matter of a certain legislation, in our case all bodies
that deal, one way or another, with cloud computing. All these entities do
have and they will continue to have a meaningful role to play in the strive
1118 Stephen G. Breyer (note 1112).
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to achieve efficient cloud regulation. Therefore, among the tasks of those
that will be assigned to draft cloud computing laws should not be to try to
prioritize the role and significance of certain bodies against others or, even
more, to legislate that only certain among them are competent but some
others are not. Instead, the task of a future body of cloud computing laws
should be to coordinate the activities and regulatory priorities of all con-
current governing authorities of the field so that, in the end and while
showing respect to the legal traditions and particularities of the environ-
ment within which each of them rules, the desirable effects of advanced
legal certainty, coherence and market safety will be achieved for the cloud
domain on an as universal level as possible.
The ability of law to learn and evolve; how to achieve law evolution in
the case of cloud computing
Legal theory suggests in multiple ways that one of the cornerstone features
of laws is their dynamic nature1119; their capability to change and evolve
following respective social and political influences. As human societies
progress or, anyway, develop economically, technologically and culturally,
new challenges and disputes come to surface. As a rule, lower courts and
other types of law applying bodies (e.g. arbitrators or independent authori-
ties) decide on cases in light of existing legal rules1120; however, the re-
sults they achieve and the quality of the solutions proposed with their de-
cisions eventually do not live up to changing political, social and cultural
realities. It is precisely that moment when legislatures, rule-making agen-
cies or higher courts are called to respond by modifying the legal rules or
applying them differently, making sure that the results of their decisions
will conform to the new realities1121.
It is generally accepted that there are two ways in which the effect of a
rule can be modified, specifically by
c.
1119 John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A positive theory of statutory interpreta-
tion, 12 International Review of Law and Economics 263–279 (1992.)
1120 John T. Noonan (note 665).. For more scholarly analysis on the ways in which
the effect of a rule can be modified as well as a succinct reply to L. A. Hart’s
approach refer to: Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law. A Reply to Pro-
fessor Hart, 71 Harvard Law Review 630–672 (1958).
1121 John T. Noonan (note 665).
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– changing the rule itself, for example, by making amendments to pre-
conditions or modifying listed exceptions to the rule, or
– changing the meaning of the rule’s constituent concepts1122.
Most scholars refer to the first type of change as ‘change in the rule’s
structure’ and to the second type as ‘change in the meaning of the rule’s
terms’1123. Change in legal rules and their concepts are essential elements
for achieving the much-cherished dynamism of law, a feature that is be-
coming more and more crucial in today’s continuously changing
world1124.
Nevertheless, despite the indispensability of change for both legal
concepts and rules, the way in which each of the two progress and are
modified is not identical. For starters, change in neither of them can be
one-sided; it is rather organized in a manner that legal philosophers stan-
dardly call ‘open textured’1125, as it is not defined by necessary and suffi-
cient conditions which are universally valid over their domain of applica-
tion. Instead, according to Herbert Hart’s theory of law, “legal concepts
have a ‘core of settled meaning’ in which there is little debate over inter-
pretation and a ‘penumbra’ in which interpretation is debatable. Legal
rules derive their dynamic nature in part through the dynamic, open-tex-
tured nature of the terms used in the rules”1126. Of course, evolution does
not affect only on the level of drafting (i.e. with regard to how regulators
deal with them) but also on the level of interpretation of their meaning.
Consequently, not only do “rules change when new prerequisites, excep-
tions, or conclusions arise, but also when new interpretations of terms
used in the rule are made as cases are decided and rules are applied”1127.
In light of the above, it becomes evident that in the field of cloud com-
puting, as in many other fields, improving regulation is not only a matter
of replacing existing laws with newer ones because older rules have been
found to have become obsolete. Laws and overall legal certainty are also
improved by putting in place basic regulation that will help us interpret
and apply pre-existing legislation in a more coherent and in touch with
1122 Id.
1123 Robert B. Ahdieh (note 1105).
1124 Stephen G. Breyer (note 1112).
1125 Tomasz Zurek & Michał Araszkiewicz, Modeling teleological interpretation
(2013.)
1126 H. L. A. Hart (note 664).
1127 John T. Noonan (note 665).
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technological reality manner. In addition, improvement is also achieved by
agreeing on the fundamental concepts and principles that should be at the
core of all executive laws across different jurisdictions in order for law
subjects to enjoy, as much as possible, comparable levels of protection
with reference to an issue which is of a genuinely borderless nature.
The process of legislators and bodies applying the law is often paral-
leled to a learning system1128. In the end, it becomes clear that rules and
their constituent terms change in light of the experience of deciding new
cases or dealing with novel phenomena (when on the law-making level).
However, there are fundamental differences in how legislatures, agencies
and courts can effect, through their practice, this change in legal rules.
Legislating bodies and agencies are the actors in a position to effect struc-
tural changes to laws1129. Courts process and evolve rules and definitions,
too, thus they also effect structural changes, but beyond that, a court also
has the capacity to change the meaning of a rule’s constituent terms as it
applies the rule in deciding a new problem1130. In several parts of this
study we have seen several legal procedures before courts which have
pointed out the need for IT laws to evolve and update themselves in view
of developments in actual life and technology. Such occurrences of court
decisions on cloud-related matters which point to a need for further refine-
ment of cloud computing regulation have also existed in recent years1131,
further strengthening the call for adoption of shared fundamental princi-
ples on cloud computing regulation that will facilitate the transition from a
regime of governing the cloud within each and every jurisdiction to one of
cloud governance on a cross-jurisdictional and as geographically broad as
possible basis.
These arguments regarding learning as an integral part of the process of
law evolution and reform would not be complete without a few observa-
tions with regard to the inherent differences between a law learning pro-
cess and one of some other discipline, such as physics or chemistry or of a
1128 Kevin D. Ashley & Edwina L. Rissland, Law, learning and representation, 150
Artificial Intelligence 17–58 (2003.)
1129 KIIT University ed., 2015 International Conference on Computational Intelli-
gence & Networks (CINE.)
1130 Id.
1131 Namely, C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (note
417) as well as Case C‑131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Es-
pañola de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, Case
C-131/12 (note 486).
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machine learning program1132. In fact, a law learning process is different
from a machine learning program in the sense that the latter may discover
a new law of physics, for example, out of instances of its application but
does not and cannot create one. On the contrary, a learning process in the
context of a law’s application is not only limited to observing facts with a
view to discovering the rules that explain them but it can also make use of
the knowledge gained through these observations in order to create laws
that will determine how the instances under observation could evolve. And
actually, this evolution does not need to be identical to what has been ob-
served so far; it can rather be essentially different.
While this observation could be the starting point of a philosophical
discourse of considerable depth regarding how laws are evolving through
and because of everyday practice and the knowledge accumulated out of
it1133, it does not suffice to explain the complex constraints on courts, and
even on legislatures, in formulating and adjusting legal rules1134. Lawmak-
ers are by definition and at an always accelerated pace challenged with ac-
commodating developing ethical norms, economic and political principles,
social policies, public expectations, past commitments and decisions, lan-
guage-related conventions, and technological advances1135. These process-
es1136 of discovering legal rules, subjecting them to rigorous scrutiny with
regard to the above complex criteria, and evaluating the tradeoffs they ef-
fect can differentiate from one jurisdiction to the other and this is abso-
lutely expected if differing legal traditions are taken into account. How-
ever, in essence, formulating legal rules is a process of discovering what
will work in accommodating these criteria, not creating arbitrary norms
out of nothing without consequences. Therefore, depending on the legal
sector that is each time under focus, rule-making cannot be a laboratory
process, ‘sterilized’ of any kind of influence from neighboring or general-
ly important legal orders, let alone when their subject matter extends well
1132 International Workshop on Computational Autonomy (2003.)
1133 I. Augsberg (note 1107).
1134 Robert B. Ahdieh (note 1105).
1135 Kevin D. Ashley & Edwina L. Rissland (note 1128).
1136 For more extensive analysis on the types of process of law making and amend-
ment, refer to: Edward H. Levi & Frederick F. Schauer, An introduction to legal
reasoning (2013); Ronald Dworkin, Law's empire (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, ON
ANALOGICAL REASONING, 106 Harvard Law Review 741–791 (1993); Scott
Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning. Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force
of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 Harvard Law Review 923–1028 (1996.)
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across the conventional margins among various jurisdictions. This interde-
pendence is becoming all the more decisive in dynamic topics such as
cloud computing. Insisting that the body of laws governing the cloud in
one jurisdiction can be totally sealed against the expectations of its sub-
jects falling under the competence of different legal orders but being po-
tentially affected by the said body of rules as well, directly or indirectly,
does more harm than good. Most importantly, it degrades the quality of
the overall learning system through which constant law modification and
update is possible. In the end, if IT laws are to remain relevant and im-
prove their livability in view of the lightning speed at which the phenome-
na they address are changing, they need to prioritize towards a governance
regime that will conserve legal cohesion in an as broader as possible area
of application. And cloud computing regulation, as the body of rules that
will govern the foundations of IT, is the ideal starting point for this change
in perspective to be set in motion.
How proportionality and teleological reasoning can help cloud
computing regulation make IT laws overall more efficient
Teleological reasoning is one of the oldest and most established norms in
law making and interpretation1137. Proportionality is a relatively newer
concept yet it has gained considerable relevance particularly in light of the
ever more complex phenomena calling for regulation across conventional
jurisdictional borders1138. These two norms combined can make an actual
difference in both legislation and adjudication in the field of cloud com-
d.
1137 Teleological reasoning is a term used by multiple disciplines to refer to a whole
system of thinking which attempts to describe things in terms of their apparent
purpose, directive principle, or goal. Its name stems from the word ‘teleology’
(from Greek telos, meaning end or purpose). For more details with regard to
how teleology has been applied in law, refer to: Donald H. Berman & Carole D.
Hafner, Representing teleological structure in case-based legal reasoning: the
missing link (1993). For further insights into the teleological interpretation of
laws refer to: Aharon Barak & Sari Bashi, Purposive Interpretation in Law
(2011); Frank B. Cross, Theory and practice of statutory interpretation (2012.)
1138 Proportionality is a general principle in law which spans several special (alt-
hough related) concepts. The concept of proportionality is used as a criterion of
fairness and justice in statutory interpretation processes, especially in constitu-
tional law, as a logical method intended to assist in discerning the correct balan-
ce between the restriction imposed by a corrective measure and the severity of
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puting. The reasoning behind such an argument stems from the very
essence of legislative action and the forces driving it. In details, according
to an established argumentation of which Giovani Sartor is a champion,
“legislative action can be guided not only by constitutional action-norms,
but also by constitutional goal-norms, which are meant to govern the leg-
islator’s teleological reasoning (indicating what values should be ad-
the nature of the prohibited act. Within criminal law, it is used to convey the
idea that the punishment of an offender should fit the crime. Under international
humanitarian law governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict, propor-
tionality and distinction are important factors in assessing military necessity.
The proportionality test was first developed in the High State Administrative
Courts (Oberlandesgericht) in Germany in the late 19th century, and was applied
to review actions by the police. The concept has been greatly enriched within
European Union law, in which there are generally four stages to a proportionali-
ty test, namely,
there must be a legitimate aim for a measure
the measure must be suitable to achieve the aim (potentially with a requirement
of evidence to show it will have that effect)
the measure must be necessary to achieve the aim, that there cannot be any less
onerous way of doing it
the measure must be reasonable, considering the competing interests of different
groups at hand.
Definition derived from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportionality_(law)
(lastly accessed on 11/29/2016).
For more background information on the concept of proportionality, refer to: P.
P. Craig & G. de Búrca (note 287)..
Most recently, proportionality is a key consideration in the discovery process,
and has been extensively applicable to the wider area of e-discovery, where it
has been attributed with significant cost-savings. Already, it is considered that
proportionality will be of particular significance to new and developing areas of
law, such as the law of legal technology. With regard to this point, read more
at: Klaus Schmidt & Alejandro Laje, The Proportionality and Solidarity Princi-
ples and Their Impact on Privacy Laws in German Jurisprudence, 5 Laws 27–
38 (2016).
For further details on the concept of proportionality as fundamental principle of
law, refer to: Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in
EU Law, 16 European Law Journal 158–185 (2010); Robert Alexy, On the
Structure of Legal Principles, 13 Ratio Juris 294–304 (2000); Evelyn Ellis, The
principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe (1999); E. Thomas Sullivan
& Richard S. Frase, Proportionality principles in American law. Controlling ex-
cessive government actions (2009); Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian
and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 University of Toronto Law Jour-
nal 383–397 (2007).
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vanced), rather than to limit the range of its admissible outcomes”1139. Ad-
justing this thesis in the field of IT law, one could claim that IT legislation
and particularly any that focuses on fundamental elements of telecommu-
nication technologies such as the proposed cloud computing regulatory
principles, should not only care about settling unresolved issues at any
given time that they arise but it should be constructed with the ultimate
broader status quo that is hoped to be achieved in the field through it in
mind. In addition, right-norms are increasingly proving to be of equal
function as goal-norms with regard to legislators and public authori-
ties1140. This is increasingly so in the IT sector, where, as it has been al-
ready demonstrated in earlier parts of this study1141, there is increasing
pressure on legislators on behalf of the public to modify existing or con-
ceptualize new IT laws taking into account not just the need for fluent
functioning of the market but also for upholding the general public’s calls
for better privacy, safety and security in their use of IT technologies.
As a result, any legislative review, especially if it refers to areas of law
in which the rights of law subjects are so closely dependent with reference
to their protection to the goals prioritized by legislators, must assess, de-
sign and implement any legislative and administrative action by “evaluat-
ing the proportionality (the teleological appropriateness) of legislative
choices”1142. To this end, legislators nowadays and those that will deal
with cloud computing regulation, in particular, should be directed in their
work by the notion of reasonableness, an idea wishing to promote mutual
institutional deference with the aim of ultimately achieving collaboration
without overlapping: general legal theory suggests that “a margin of em-
pirical and axiological appreciation should be left to legislators, even
when constitutional values are at issue”1143. Similarly, cloud computing
regulators need to work towards rules governing the cloud that will not
only focus on settling the issues arising out of each particular application
of cloud technologies only but rather they will aim to be of a long-lasting
1139 Giovanni Sartor, Doing justice to rights and values: teleological reasoning and
proportionality. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 18 Artif Intell Law 175–215
(2010.)
1140 Id.
1141 See Chapter 3.
1142 Id.. For more on this notion refer to: Elen Stokes (note 888).
1143 Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor (note 956).. For more refer also
to: Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., Reasonab-
leness and Law, vol. 86 (2009.)
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and generic nature, as much as possible, so that the further-reaching goals
of legal security and coherence of protection for all types of law subjects
within the broader IT sector are achieved. This proposal for drafting cloud
computing laws with a teleological mindset, if put forward across jurisdic-
tions, helps us to further elaborate on the nature of cloud computing laws,
which need to be inspired by a spirit of proportionality as well so that fric-
tions and collisions among legal orders are softened as much as possible.
Useful experience from other fields of law where cross-jurisdictional
alignment has already been achieved to a substantial degree (for instance,
from the field of trade law or the law of the sea) can also assist this pro-
cess of integrating the teleological and proportionality methods deep into
cloud computing law-making. Last but not least, given that the cloud ter-
rain still is at this moment only loosely and case-based regulated, it is a
unique opportunity to work on cloud regulation inspired by the teleologi-
cal reasoning right from the beginning facilitating the establishment of a
regime of governance over one of jurisdictionally fragmented governing in
the sector.
How technology itself can help establishing a sound system of
governance in the field of cloud computing
The idea of utilizing technology in order to protect data against the risks
posed to them by technology itself has been discussed for years and it ac-
tually forms part of the whole cloud computing technological mindset1144:
the cloud was put forward as a successor to previous technologies for han-
dling data processes, among others, thanks to the fact that it left a lot of
room for both technology gimmicks that would optimize data processing
as well as others that would enhance the safety and security standards un-
der which this would be conducted. Of course, the whole idea of making
use of technology’s powers against its malice has been put forward with
varied tension and it has even reached the extreme of arguing that, “if
threats to and violations of data protection are factually impossible, then
there is no need to impose legal restrictions”1145. Needless to say, there is
no need to choose between extremes; the alternative to too much regu-
e.
1144 David S. Wall (note 661).
1145 Gerrit Hornung (note 735).
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lation does not need to be no regulation at all. However, technology can
indeed be a great asset in an effort to move from traditional restrictions en-
compassing obligations and prohibitions to a new regulatory approach fo-
cusing on proactivity and due diligence without the need for a breach that
calls for punishment or repair, as it is currently the case. In fact, as
Roßnagel put it back in 2001, “by adopting and executing normative re-
quirements as to the use of personal data, law and technology complement
each other and form an ‘alliance’ to protect personal rights”1146, privacy
and integrity of IT technology and cloud computing as a whole.
Collaboration between law and technology on the front of privacy, se-
curity and integrity of communications online is becoming increasingly
important as traditional regulatory instruments are often unable to cope
with the challenges of modern data processing1147. Many of those long-es-
tablished IT rules, being tied to the conventional enforcement authorities
of national states, lose a considerable amount of their effectiveness in the
fluid social sphere of the internet1148. Under these circumstances, effective
data protection in today’s cloud-dominated IT landscape cannot be guaran-
teed by legal instruments alone. Instead, a mixture of up-to-date, proac-
tively oriented and precautionary regulations along with suitable techno-
logical assets and the series of specialized laws already in place is the key
to achieving the best possible level of integrity, safety and security in the
vast amount of cloud-facilitated applications. As data processing becomes
pervasive, privacy enhancing technologies are increasingly important and
an indispensable tool in the effort towards establishing a sound system of
governance with regard to cloud computing and the entire environment of
applications around it. Actually, the idea that technological support is in-
dispensable in sealing data against the risks they face from technology-as-
sisted processing is so strongly supported that in certain areas of comput-
1146 Alexander Rossnagel, Allianz von Medienrecht und Informationstechnik? Ord-
nung in digitalen Medien durch Gestaltung der Technik am Beispiel von Urhe-
berschutz, Datenschutz, Jugendschutz und Vielfaltschutz; Dokumentation der
Stiftungstagung (zugleich EMR-Workshop), der Alcatel SEL Stiftung für Kom-
munikationsforschung, des Instituts für Medienrecht (EMR), der Landeszentrale
für politische Bildung (LpB) Baden-Württemberg, am 10. Mai 2001 im Landtag
Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart, Bd. 24 (2001.)
1147 R. K. Lippert & K. Walby, Governing Through Privacy. Authoritarian Libera-
lism, Law, and Privacy Knowledge, 12 Law, Culture and the Humanities 329–
352 (2016.)
1148 M. Friedewald & R. J. Pohoryles (note 119).; Alexander Rossnagel (note 1146).
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ing it appears as a sine qua non. Specifically, in ubiquitous computing1149,
it appears1150 to be “a misperception to believe that it is possible to secure
personal privacy and informational self-determination without technolo-
gies that provide anonymity, pseudonymization and transparency in a user-
controlled way without hampering the user in his or her everyday busi-
ness”1151. Such technologies are already available and they could not only
be used in reinforcing generic cloud computing laws of the nature and
scope that have been analyzed in the previous chapters, but they could also
make possible privacy-friendly settings in cloud-based systems and appli-
1149 Ubiquitous computing (or "ubicomp") is a concept in software engineering and
computer science where computing is made to appear anytime and everywhere.
In contrast to desktop computing, ubiquitous computing can be exercised using
any device, in any location, and in any format. A user interacts with the compu-
ter, which can be in many different forms, including laptop computers, tablets
and terminals in everyday objects such as a fridge or a pair of glasses. The un-
derlying technologies supporting ubiquitous computing include Internet, advan-
ced middleware, operating system, mobile code, sensors, microprocessors, new
I/O and user interfaces, networks, mobile protocols, location and positioning
and new materials. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubiquitous_computing; lastly
accessed on 11/29/2016)
Ubiquitous computing is also described as pervasive computing, ambient intelli-
gence, or "everyware". Each term emphasizes slightly different aspects. Several
experts suggest that an evolution of the concept of ubiquitous computing is also
the notion of Internet of Things, when primarily concerning the objects invol-
ved. Ubiquitous computing touches on a wide range of research topics, inclu-
ding distributed computing, mobile computing, location computing, mobile net-
working, context-aware computing, sensor networks, human-computer interac-
tion, and artificial intelligence. For more information on ubiquitous computing,
refer to: Eva Nieuwdorp, The pervasive discourse, 5 Comput. Entertain. 13
(2007); Adam Greenfield, Everyware. The dawning age of ubiquitous comput-
ing (2006); Stefan Poslad, Ubiquitous computing. Smart devices, environments
and interactions (2009).
1150 Giovanni Sartor (note 1139).; For additional information refer also to: Elgar
Fleisch & Friedemann Mattern, Das Internet der Dinge. Ubiquitous Computing
und RFID in der Praxis : Visionen, Technologien, Anwendungen, Handlungsan-
leitungen (2005); Alexander Roßnagel, Tom Sommerlatte & Udo Winand, Digi-
tale Visionen. Zur Gestaltung allgegenwärtiger Informationstechnologien
(2008.)
1151 Gerrit Hornung (note 735).. In addition with reference to this point,
read: Alexander Roßnagel, Datenschutz in einem informatisierten Alltag
(2007); Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling and the rule of law, 1 IDIS 55–70
(2008).
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cations, facilitate the much promoted opt-in principle1152, make possible
the configuration of personalized user-settings for routine data processing,
speed up and optimize automatic deleting processes, permit the deploy-
ment of personalized identity management or transmit systems, organize,
aggregate and document declarations of consent that any data subject may
have issued for certain types of data processes etc.
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that, if the precautionary per-
spective is supposed to be the one with most relevance to a governance
regime with a character as generic as possible in the field of cloud com-
puting, technology-based sealing and protective measures are an invalu-
able supplement to cloud computing regulation. Besides, it should not be
forgotten that arranging a precaution-oriented regulatory landscape with
regard to the cloud will, in the future, be increasingly relevant since the
growing amount of data processed via cloud networks, in the form of big
data collected amass via IoT systems, respectively increases the risk that
huge amounts of data subjects become identifiable, even though until re-
cently such identification was not possible1153.
Last but not least, it must be stressed out that any concept for data pro-
tection and technology-assisted cloud computing regulation needs to be
designed by having two target groups in mind: producers of the respective
technologies, as they were analyzed above1154, who need to be legally
obliged to ensure actual availability of the said technology, and users, that
is, the various actors within the cloud workflow as they have been previ-
ously analyzed1155, with the aim of forcing them to actually put these mea-
sures in practice. Both target groups need to have clear guidelines from
regulators for the development and application of privacy-friendly tech-
1152 The opt-in principle in privacy law is a concept appearing in several jurisdic-
tions and pieces of laws regulating aspects of privacy and refers to the active
and affirmative consent of user and data subject to submit itself to the terms and
conditions under which the data-involving processing at hand takes place. For
more on the principle and its essence, refer to: Siani Pearson (note 728); Omer
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisi-
ons, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 63–69 (2011); Eve M. Caudill & Patrick E. Mur-
phy, Consumer Online Privacy. Legal and Ethical Issues, 19 Journal of Public
Policy & Marketing 7–19 (2000); Alfred Kobsa, Privacy-enhanced personaliza-
tion, 50 Commun. ACM 24–33 (2007.)
1153 Alexander Roßnagel (note 1151).
1154 See Chapters 8 and 9.
1155 See Chapters 8 and 9.
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nologies. At the same time, making official the adoption of such technolo-
gies, as an indispensable asset towards the establishment of the new gov-
ernance-oriented regime in the field of cloud computing, will encourage
actors of these groups to actually invest resources and effort in developing
and implementing such technologies. It is up to regulators’ bravery to
make the body of cloud computing laws as relevant as possible at this
point, by going as far as concretizing future-oriented criteria for the design
of technology that may be even directly derived from cloud computing
regulation1156. What is more, cloud computing laws could even provide
business and growth opportunities or even incentivize the use of such
technologies.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, much as the cloud has been
a liberalizing force for IT markets per se, market forces alone are not a
sufficient force for the development and spreading of PETs and, in gener-
al, technological applications aimed at enhancing the integrity of cloud
networks. There are several reasons for this and, as usually with every-
thing regarding the cloud, economies of scale are a primary one. In other
words, technology is as a rule designed with a view to responding to cer-
tain functional requirements. Contrary to what the average non-technically
mind may think, enhancing privacy is not, from a technical point of view,
a functional requirement in itself1157. The most important (and legitimate,
as we are talking about actors of an economic activity) aim of actors
throughout the cloud workflow is the maximization of profit. In view of
that, optimum data protection, the integrity and maximum coherence of
the network are as relevant as demand of the network’s offerings on the
market continues to exist. If this demand is lowered, this may quickly be-
come a counterforce for the technology tweaks discussed here, which
could end up being irrelevant in the design process because they may ei-
ther increase or they may not reduce costs. Therefore, much as cloud regu-
lation could be benefited from technology assets in its effort to make the
passing from a regime of case-based governing to generically established
governance, it should not take this collaboration between law and IT for
granted; rather, it should take positive action and institutionalize it.
1156 Alexander Roßnagel, Tom Sommerlatte & Udo Winand (note 1150).
1157 Gerrit Hornung (note 735).; Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information
Privacy Law, 118 Yale Law Journal 868–890 (2009.)
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The key to achieving a sound system of governance in cloud computing
regulation: legal interoperability and its significance as a concept in
transnational law
Interoperability is a fundamental element of the entire IT sector and cloud
computing, in particular. Today’s IT networks are so highly interconnected
among them that there are devices which are not built at all to function
properly on their own, but must interact with other elements of software or
hardware1158. Actually, by today’s IT standards, it is even possible that a
device that cannot interoperate with other products with which consumers
expect it to do so to be considered essentially worthless1159.
Maintaining the position which has been at the core of this study from
the beginning, that regulating the cloud is a fundamentally interdisci-
plinary issue, it is now time to see not only how law should adapt to tech-
nological standards in order to efficiently govern cloud computing but also
how and if legislation could profit from technological state-of-the-art.
With this approach in mind, it is proposed that the concept of interoper-
ability should extend beyond its purely technical dimension and make an
important contribution to the development of transnational IT law, in gen-
eral, and cloud computing regulation per se. Departing from the techno-
logical context of interoperability, there have been scholars who have
brought forward the concept of cultural interoperability1160; this idea is
now time to be further transplanted in the legal discipline, in which there
have been already some voices championing for legal interoperability, in
the sector of IT law, in particular. Legal interoperability should be, in other
words, one of the core elements in the nature of laws that will be designed
for governing the cloud.
Looking to define what legal interoperability constitutes of one needs to
go back to the original concept of technical interoperability. Although no
universal or unequivocally accepted definition of technological interoper-
f.
1158 KIIT University ed. (note 1129).
1159 Ian Watson, The universal machine. From the dawn of computing to digital con-
sciousness (2012.)
1160 Amedeo Santosuosso & Alessandra Malerba, Legal Interoperability as a Com-
prehensive Concept in Transnational Law, 6 Law, Inn Tech 51–73 (2014.)
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ability really exists, two distinct components have been largely recog-
nized1161:
– syntactic interoperability, which refers to the ability of diverse systems
to communicate with each other and exchange data;
– semantic interoperability, which denotes the ability to interpret and use
those data and pieces of information in a significant way, useful to the
end user.
Mutatis mutandis, in the field of IT law interoperability is as efficient as
each of these two elements are entertained, which means that:
– syntactics become all the more coherent as the legal discipline learns to
communicate better with other sciences and exchange know-how and
knowledge with them;
– semantics improve as the legal discipline learns to interpret and use the
knowledge and know-how it receives from other sciences in such a
way that they can help it with its goal to produce better rules, more
suitable for the actual challenges of the IT reality.
In the context of technology, there are several ways in which syntactics or
semantics can be improved, both technical and legal ones. For instance,
intellectual property (IP) licensing agreements (as an example of a legal
tool) and the use of open standards (as an example of a technical tool) are
just two of the various methods in which the above components can be in-
tensified and become more apparent1162. Following this logic, legal inter-
operability in the context of cloud computing regulation does not need and
should not be a one-direction process, i.e. the legal sector only learning
from the technical one. Much as legal rules need to be adapted to the tech-
nological status quo of the cloud, once put into force, if they have been
designed taking into account how technology is and where it is heading at
the time of their inception, can also point the way of technological ad-
vancement by broadening the route for aspects of this advancement that
are believed by tech experts to be beneficial for the industry and end users
or setting limits to other types of future progress which are feared to have
a potentially derailing or adversary effect.
Nonetheless, interoperability does not receive a carte blanche in its
technical and nor should it be given unlimited freedom in its legal dimen-
sion. As much as it is true that IT systems interoperability is an essential
1161 eHealth Governance Initiative, DISCUSSION PAPER ON SEMANTIC AND
TECHNICAL INTEROPERABILITY (2012.)
1162 Amedeo Santosuosso & Alessandra Malerba (note 1160).
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step forward, and there are numerous advantages (such as innovation,
competition, flexibility and openness) which have been greatly boosted
thanks to it1163, there are many drawbacks that have been pointed out as
well. In fact, IT scholars have expressed their concerns in relation to is-
sues of security and privacy, as well as about the risk of excessive homo-
geneity1164 or the so-called ‘lock-in problem’1165. These are only a few in-
dicators that revolutionary or groundbreaking as technical interoperability
may be, it cannot be left to go unabated and without limits. Similarly, legal
interoperability should not be adopted unconditionally nor should it be left
to function beyond control in the cloud computing law making process
and any other IT law making process for that matter. As it has been argued
before, the legal discipline should maintain the upper hand and this can be
not only protective for the final degree of efficiency of cloud computing
laws, it can even be beneficial to the pace at which these laws will gain in
efficiency overall.
Far-fetched as it may seem, the idea of legal interoperability is not an
unrealistic one and the field of cloud computing regulation may actually
be one of the most suitable sectors for this concept to be put into practice
first. As a matter of fact, the conception of law as technology, which has
been already analyzed in the course of this study1166, can serve as a feasi-
ble frame for legal interoperability. That is to say, if it taken for granted
that “political power or jurists can (as the theory of law as technology
does) easily handle law, it should also be true that they could make law
interoperable (if they wanted it)”1167. It goes without saying that the
question is more complex and extends far beyond the aims of this study.
However, as it will be argued in the conclusions of this analysis, one of the
benefits of legislators actually settling down to deal with the challenge of
cloud computing regulation can be that this so unique task will actually
constitute a first and bold step towards bringing to the center of attention
1163 John G. Palfrey & Urs Gasser, Interop. The promise and perils of highly inter-
connected systems (2012.)
1164 Id.
1165 John G. Palfrey & Urs Gasser (note 235).
1166 See Chapters 4, 5 and 8.
1167 Amedeo Santosuosso & Alessandra Malerba (note 1160).
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not only the need for horizontal but also for vertical interoperability1168.
As to why IT and cloud computing law, in particular, could be an ideal
starting point for putting interoperability at the heart of the rule making
process, for now it is enough to recall the teachings of Carl Schmitt who
was one of the first legal theorists that expressed the view that “law in
modernity is another technology”1169.
Last but not least, interoperability should of course not be interpreted
only in relation to other disciplines or sectors of law but it should also
have an interjurisdictional meaning. Having in mind the current status quo
with regard to jurisdiction in cloud computing issues and the questions
that the current regime leaves unanswered, as these were analyzed earli-
er1170, interjurisdictional interoperability in cloud computing regulation
should be constructed with the aim of explaining and encompassing the
following aspects:
– answer why currently the way the cloud is regulated is neither unified
nor uniform, in space and time (fragmentation) and what it needs to be
done to achieve at least minimum working uniformity without pushing
for unrealistic (and unnecessary) unification.
– answer why relevant IT laws are currently not hierarchically organized
in a coherent way and how cloud computing regulation could con-
tribute to that direction.
– it should always save room for flexibility for itself and not develop in a
necessarily directional manner, as a crucial role in the field of IT and
the cloud will always be played by spontaneous developments, be them
unforeseen technological advancements or applications of current tech-
nologies which do not fit any of the known technical models till that
time.
– it should develop taking into account all the different actors taking part
in the wider cloud computing cycle, either as integral actors of the
1168 The issue of vertical vs. horizontal interoperability of laws, in particular IT
ones, is a vast one and extends beyond the scope of this analysis. However, for a
brief introduction to the issue, refer to: Xenofon Kontargyris, From effective to
efficient regulation of ICT (2): the big leap towards embracing vertical, apart
from horizontal, interdisciplinarity, available at: http://www.juwiss.de/88-2016/
(13 September 2017) (lastly accessed on: 09/13/2017.)
1169 Jens Meierhenrich, Oliver Simons & Friedrich Balke, The Oxford Handbook of
Carl Schmitt, vol. 1 (2015.)
1170 See Chapter 5.
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cloud workflow1171 or on a cross-border basis1172. The differences of
them in nature and legitimacy need to be reflected in the wording and
spirit of cloud computing laws.
– interjuridictionally oriented cloud computing laws need to be pro-
cessed always having in mind that they will continuously form part of
a highly technified global environment.
A brief summary of the trends on privacy regulation through time in a
global context; the transit to a cloud computing regulation governance
regime is not a free fall into the unknown
From the beginning and across several parts of this analysis we have ex-
tensively talked about the various regulatory approaches on privacy and
which of them managed to surface as the prevailing ones in major jurisdic-
tions through time. Although emphasis was mostly given to the most re-
cent concepts of privacy, i.e. the ones that were influenced or even initiat-
ed by the arrival and gradual establishment of IT, the idea of privacy in
relation to different types of communication among people has been on
the table since much longer and there are several exemplary references to
that in previous parts of this study. It is beyond the scope of this project to
make a detailed history review of the concept of privacy; yet, given that it
is the one idea that had dominated regulatory and policy-making thinking
with regard to IT technologies for a long time and, despite the fact that it
may have lately been partially overshadowed by newer concepts of securi-
ty or consent, it still remains among the pillars of IT regulation, it is worth
summarizing the main trends about it. One more reason for doing so is
that it will help us realize that the transition or, more precisely, the intro-
duction of the proposed governance regime for cloud computing technolo-
gies alongside the rest of specific laws already in place for particular ap-
plications of them is no free fall from the sky; rather regulators and
scholars have already suggested elements of the proposed regime in their
discourse so far, just in a scattered manner. What needs to be done now is
for competent regulatory and law-making bodies to gather all these ideas
which are dispersed throughout literature and policy debate, bring them to-
gether, supplement them with the original perspectives that have been pre-
g.
1171 See Chapter 9.
1172 See Chapter 6.
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sented in previous chapters of this analysis and build up the much-needed
fundamental common governance principles on cloud computing regu-
lation.
To begin with, the four prevailing ways of defining privacy over the
years since the concept was introduced as one of the main challenges with
regard to any kind of interpersonal communication are1173:
– the non-interference concept1174
– the limited accessibility concept1175
– the privacy as information control concept1176
– a fourth concept incorporating various elements of the other three pro-
posals but limiting the applicability of the idea of privacy to intimate or
sensitive aspects of people’s lives.
Each of these generic conceptions of privacy has found more or less wel-
coming ground across various jurisdictions and has served as the raw ma-
terial for building the respective sets of laws on privacy regulation. It goes
without saying that there was a varying degree in which each of these
concepts had remained pure or undergone adaptations to reflect on each
jurisdiction’s views and long-held values on the issues relevant laws were
set to settle each time. Out of all major jurisdictions and the main manifes-
tations of them through time, there have been of course specific instances
which stand out for their effectiveness, their outreach as well as their pro-
gressiveness. Among them, the German data privacy regime is often cited
by many as one of the most successful1177. Although by the standards of a
considerable number of scholars it is thought to be too rigid, one can hard-
ly deny that the German privacy regulatory apparatus has traditionally fea-
tured a comprehensive, well-founded legislative platform with a solid con-
stitutional footing and several progressive features, such as a legal require-
ment that organizations appoint internal privacy officers1178. Another of
these elements exemplary of how German legal discourse has treated the
notion of IT privacy with a clearly forward-thinking nature at certain mo-
1173 L. A. Bygrave (note 137).
1174 It is regarded by many as the oldest conceptualization of privacy. Originally, it
was suggested in: Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Priva-
cy, IV Harvard Law Review 193–220 (1890.)
1175 A reference text for this concept of privacy is the following: Ruth Gavison, Pri-
vacy and the Limits of Law, 89 The Yale Law Journal 421–471 (1980.)
1176 L. A. Bygrave (note 137).
1177 Ulrich Dammann & Spiros Simitis (note 169).
1178 Anne Arendt, Ulrich Dammann & Spiros Simitis (note 742).
CHAPTER 10. Principles for regulating the cloud (3); towards governance in IT law
326
ments (although it did not prevail in the end) is the principle of ‘systemic
data protection’ (‘Systemdatenschutzprinzip’)1179. Brought on the table as
early as the beginning of the 1990s, this notion suggested the integration
of data privacy concerns already in the design and development of infor-
mation systems architecture, a line of thinking which surprisingly fits very
well with many of the modern challenges posed by cloud computing tech-
nologies. Needless to say, promoters of that principle did not have in mind
the cloud-based IT landscape we are faced with nowadays; even so, it is
very interesting and useful to see that a regulatory framework such as the
one described here would not be an unfounded or reckless move from a
legislative point of view, just as it is no such one from a technical perspec-
tive. Regulatory thinking has already demonstrated remarkable forward-
ness and open-mindedness and it is not at all beyond its capacity to take
the big leap and introduce a set of regulatory principles of common under-
standing such as the ones proposed in this study. Of course, what will
make the big difference this time and what constitutes a substantial origi-
nality compared to the past is that the proposed cloud computing gover-
nance framework is based on a proactive and precautionary approach
rather than on a corrective or remedial one.
Making a long-lasting governance regime a choice not a necessity
To sum things up, there have been numerous different approaches on pri-
vacy, security and other neighboring concepts that have been cited
throughout this extensive analysis which has been attempting to discern
h.
1179 For an analytical overview on the Systemdatenschutzprinzip and the ways it has
lately been discussed or suggested that it could be utilized in the context of the
German data protection regime, refer to: Martin Rost, Standardisierte Daten-
schutzmodellierung, 36 Datenschutz Datensich 433–438 (2012); Marit Hansen,
Datenschutz nach dem Summer of Snowden, 38 Datenschutz Datensich 439–444
(2014); Volker Lüdemann, Alfred Scheerhorn, Christin Sengstacken & Daniel
Brettschneider, Systemdatenschutz im Smart Grid, 39 Datenschutz Datensich
93–97 (2015); Steffen Kroschwald, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung in der
Cloud. Datenschutzrechtliche Bewertung und Gestaltung des Cloud Computing
aus dem Blickwinkel des Mittelstands (2016); S. Jandt, S. Kroschwald, A.
Roβnagel & M. Wicker, Datenschutzkonformes Cloud-Computing, in Cloud-
Services aus der Geschäftsperspektive, 207–266 (Helmut Krcmar, Jan Marco
Leimeister, Alexander Roßnagel & Ali Sunyaev eds., 2016.)
h. Making a long-lasting governance regime a choice not a necessity
327
among the whole lot and bring together only the ones crucial or relevant to
cloud computing. There may be equally many others less relevant to the
focus point of this project but still totally important approaches to different
aspects of IT regulation. A significant number of them are also clearly
progressive, inspired by liberal teachings in the fields of philosophy, hu-
man rights, economics or other fields. And all these progressive approach-
es together make a clear point towards the direction of a liberal govern-
mentality1180.
There have already been indications that particular regulatory bodies
are beginning to realize the importance of regulating IT technologies not
with a view to correcting any harm done as quickly as possible but with
the aim of preventing it from happening as efficiently as it gets1181. One
could say that on the regulatory front which focuses on how cloud net-
works should be designed things are already half a step ahead1182, with the
notion of ‘privacy by design’ quickly gaining ground. In this context, “pri-
vacy is to be thought-through ahead of time, that is, ‘designed’, ‘set’,
‘planned’.”1183 It involves techniques and technologies that fashion priva-
cy in new forms and ‘packaging’ and they even come up with ways to
commercialize the various levels of it, beyond the basic one, as commodi-
ties1184. As its supporters champion, privacy by design may apply to “IT
systems, accountable business practices, and physical design and net-
worked infrastructure,”1185 bringing to surface its remarkably wide and
growing scope.
This is almost certainly the most advanced and forward-thinking speci-
men of IT-related regulatory approach that has been conceptualized so far.
Yet, for the time being, it is limited on the technical design aspect of the
1180 Kristina Irion (note 220).
1181 Jean-Christophe Graz & Andreas Nölke, Transnational private governance and
its limits, vol. 51 (2008.)
1182 Elen Stokes (note 888).
1183 R. K. Lippert & K. Walby (note 1147).
1184 Peter Hustinx, Privacy by design. Delivering the promises, 3 IDIS 253–255
(2010); A. Cavoukian, Privacy by Design; The 7 Foundational Principles, avail-
able at: https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/7foundationalprin
ciples.pdf.
1185 R. K. Lippert & K. Walby (note 1147).
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whole matter1186. The time is now to benefit from this future-oriented
thinking that is gradually gaining strength on the technology or technical
regulation front and expand its spirit to the entire spectrum of cloud com-
puting regulation1187. Agreeing or researching and bringing together the
best of what EU or US law and practice has to offer with regard to han-
dling specific aspects of the cloud phenomenon and fortifying all these
with the decisive yet clearly science- and fact-based ideas that have been
analyzed on the course of this analysis will not be some reckless act but
rather a strategic step ahead. Most importantly, it will give a decisive push
towards the direction of cultivating a long-lasting, coherent and generic
governance regime that it can come up with answers to many more chal-
lenges than the already existing ones which will be a choice and not neces-
sity.
Can the transatlantic divide on privacy be bridged? Why the extensive
use of cloud computing technologies makes the call for convergence an
urgent one?
Having extensively analyzed the issue of cloud computing regulation with
a particular focus on privacy regulation in the cloud from the perspectives
of EU and US law, we have already reached the conclusion that better
regulation on these issues does not necessarily mean that one law (or legal
culture) should succumb to the other. Instead, it is more of a process
whereby the two jurisdictions will agree on common goals or shared
weaknesses and venture on seeking ways in which they could pursue the
former or tackle the latter.
For starters, it can be argued without reservation that differences be-
tween the two systems of laws are often overstated, while mutual interests,
especially on the part of law subjects and the civil society of are over-
looked. As a matter of fact, none of the two regimes in its present form is
perfect: EU law still provides ground for intrusions on privacy in the name
of national security, and thus may be less protective than it is often as-
i.
1186 For an indicative example of how old the observation of greater technical in
comparison to legal advancement in the field of IT is refer to: Aron Mefford,
Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 211–237 (1997.)
1187 M. Gillen (note 415).; David S. Wall (note 661).
i. Can the transatlantic divide on privacy be bridged?
329
sumed. At the same time, existing legal safeguards in the US are clearly
insufficient in light of the revealed technological capacities of agencies
such as the NSA over the last years, yet those revelations have prompted
all three branches of government in the States to reassess NSA practices
and relevant regulations in place, while they have also mobilized civil so-
ciety1188. And as anxiety about privacy increases in the US, concerns
about national security have dramatically risen in Europe following the se-
ries of terrorist attacks in several European cities over the last years. At
the end of the day, the EU and the US may well be converging more than
diverging with respect to national security surveillance and the great ma-
jority of measures taken in that front typically involve surveillance of data
and communications largely hosted and facilitated by cloud computing.
Nobody denies that thanks to the relevant body of EU law, the CJEU
has developed extensive case law in the field of privacy and data protec-
tion, establishing itself and the European Union as the leading jurisdiction
in the field1189. However, at the same time, the EU data protection regime
features a number of weaknesses and derogations which dilute its overall
capacity to protect privacy rights1190. For starters, the EU data protection
framework permits member states to restrict the rights granted to data sub-
jects in the Data Protection Regulation for broad reasons of national secu-
rity, defense or public security1191. This is a natural consequence of the
division of competences between the EU and member states: the EU has
only restricted authority to legislate in the field of security, and has already
adopted a considerable range of measures coordinating law enforcement
activities of the member states, or establishing EU counter-terrorism and
security policies1192. However, under Article 4.2 TEU, “national security
1188 See also Chapter 3.
1189 See also Chapter 3 and 4.
1190 David Cole & Federico Fabbrini (note 32).
1191 Such reasons as grounds for restricting the applicability of the General Data
Protection Regulation are to be found in several provisions of the GDPR, most
notably in: cl. 16 pream. and Art. 23 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) (note
25).
1192 V. Mitsilegas, European union and internal security. Guardian of the people?
(2014); Tridimas, T., & Gutierrez-Fons, J. A. (note 217); Alexander Roßnagel,
Datenschutzfragen des Cloud Computing, in Wolken über dem Rechtsstaat?
Recht und Technik des Cloud Computing in Verwaltung und Wirtschaft, 19–52
(Alexander Roßnagel ed., 2015.)
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remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”1193 As a result, this
contradiction creates potential room for undermining of the overall protec-
tions granted by the Regulation which cannot be so easily quantified a pri-
ori given that the measures which may put it in question could as well
stem from national and not European law. What is more, although there
are minimum common rules for personal privacy established in the
ECHR1194, Europe’s other major text regulating fundamental rights and
freedoms besides the body of EU law, national rules demonstrate signifi-
cant variations, with certain states providing advanced protection for pri-
vacy, while others lag behind. The GDPR aspires to cure this imbalance,
yet the loopholes it potentially leaves for national legislators to divert from
its core provisions still allow suspicion as to whether the status quo of pri-
vacy will be unanimous throughout the Union to flourish1195.
Second, European data protection law is unlikely to place any serious
obstacles to surveillance operations of EU member states conducted out-
side the EU (including infrastructure facilities, such as storage installa-
tions empowering cloud services). In accordance with the principle of loy-
al cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) EU Treaty1196, EU law sets limits
to the actions of the EU member states’ intelligence agencies in other EU
member states1197. On the contrary though, it remains silent on member
states’ surveillance outside the EU1198. The picture does not get any clear-
er by the ECHR either, as neither that set of rules imposes significant lim-
its on surveillance outside a member state’s borders.
1193 The Treaty on European Union (TEU), C 115/13, 2008.
1194 Federico Fabbrini, Fundamental rights in Europe (2014.)
1195 On the broader issue of room for national derogations to the rules of the GDPR,
see W. Gregory Voss, Looking at European Union Data Protection Law Reform
Through a Different Prism. The Proposed EU General Data Protection Regula-
tion Two Years Later, 17 Journal of Internet Law 1–3 (2014); Rothenberg, M.,
Jacobs, D., Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New Framework of
the European Union, 36 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol 606–652 (2013); V. Chang, Deli-
very and Adoption of Cloud Computing Services in Contemporary Organizati-
ons (2015); S. Meachem, Cloud With a Chance of Regulation, 57 ITNOW 18–
21 (2015); Alexander Roßnagel ed. (note 285).
1196 “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which
flow from the Treaties.”; The Treaty on European Union (TEU), C 115/13,
2008.
1197 David Cole & Federico Fabbrini (note 32).
1198 David Cole & Federico Fabbrini (note 32); V. Mitsilegas (note 1192).
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Equal obscurity remains on the European Court of Human Rights (EC-
tHR) front. Europe’s top court for fundamental rights violations has re-
peatedly interpreted Article 8 ECHR, which grants a right to private and
family life, as incorporating a right to data protection1199 as well. Never-
theless, the ECtHR has never directly dealt with the case of surveillance
operations exercised outside Europe and against foreign persons1200. Con-
sequently, the ECtHR has yet to extend any Article 8 ECHR protection to
a foreign national outside the jurisdiction or control of a contracting state.
In conclusion, while the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU
data protection legislation undoubtedly establish a comprehensive frame-
work to safeguard privacy in the era of digital communications and the
cloud, states still have discretion with respect to national security surveil-
lance1201. Consequently, while strong protections are in place within the
geographical margins of EU law as well as in many cases with consider-
able elements of externality, neither EU law nor the ECHR for the time
being seem to be able to constrain EU member states’ surveillance of for-
eign nationals beyond their borders. This grey zone though leaves enough
room for undermining people’s privacy rights, especially when it comes to
operations targeting data which are being handled via cloud computing,
where the link for determining jurisdiction always stands on thin air, as we
already discussed1202.
Turning to the US, one has to admit that US law does not have any kind
of systematized body of rules remotely resembling the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation, while existing constitutional precedents tend to give
the government a relatively free reign with respect to data collection, par-
ticularly when it is done in the context of surveillance operations such as
the NSA programs. But on further reflection, differences between the US
and the EU may not be as stark as commonly thought. Especially when
one focuses on the issue of surveillance activities.
Following US constitutional law, the US government has since long for-
mulated two doctrines as legal basis for the constitutionality of its agen-
cies’ surveillance activities. The first stipulates that the Fourth Amend-
1199 L. A. Bygrave (note 137).
1200 David Cole & Federico Fabbrini (note 32).
1201 Maria Tzanou, The EU as an emerging 'Surveillance Society'. The function
creep case study and challenges to privacy and data protection, 4 ICL Journal
(2010.)
1202 See also Chapter 6.
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ment does not protect information that individuals share with “third par-
ties.”1203 As a result, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the US gov-
ernment or any of its agents from obtaining such information, as long as
they do so from the third party with whom the individual has shared such
details.
Second, US courts have ruled that at least in certain cases the Fourth
Amendment does not govern US officials’ search of a foreign national’s
home abroad1204. This ruling, academic analysis finds, also includes
search and seizure operations aimed at digital data of foreigners which are
maintained on facilities away from US jurisdiction1205.
To sum up, US law recognizes and protects privacy, both as a constitu-
tional, Fourth Amendment matter, and as a statutory matter.1206 For the
most part, though US privacy laws are most protective when the govern-
ment seeks to collect information within the US, about US citizens or per-
manent residents, nothing is explicitly stipulated with reference to digital
surveillance operations aiming foreign nationals abroad; the only excep-
tion to this rule is certain discussions which have been provoked by con-
cerns that such surveillance might intercept communications of foreign na-
tionals where US citizens were also involved.
In light of the analysis above as well as in several other parts of this
study, it seems that the issue of efficient protection and regulation of pri-
vacy and cloud computing is not suitable for proclaiming outright winners
or losers between EU and US law; on the contrary, both legal systems
have their strong and weak points, while they both leave considerable
room for uncertainty when it comes to the protection of data of subjects
which are foreign to their jurisdiction and the instance affecting their data
takes place outside their geographic area of competence as well.
There are a number of very strong policy arguments why data protec-
tion and overall cloud regulation should be better coordinated between Eu-
rope and America. It is beyond the scope of this study to consider politi-
cal, defense or military reasons why better coordination in regulating the
1203 See also Chapter 3.
1204 David Cole & Federico Fabbrini (note 32).; see in particular: United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 259 (1990.)
1205 Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at risk. The new government surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment (2007); Orin Kerr (note 231).
1206 See also Chapter 3.
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cloud is desirable1207. But it needs to be pointed out that there are also
strong economic interests for both the EU and the US to support a transat-
lantic coordination in the field of cloud computing regulation. The US and
the EU are the biggest trading partners in the world1208. At the same time,
the rise of digital economy creates powerful incentives for them to en-
hance interconnectivity between their markets as well as between the laws
that deal with any issues they might arise. The field of cloud computing
regulation is probably the fundamental regulatory discipline where this co-
ordination should begin from.
1207 For extensive analysis on these reasons that make better coordination between
EU and US on the issue of cloud regulation refer to: David Cole & Federico
Fabbrini (note 32); Johannes Thimm, Inseparable, but not equal. Assessing
U.S.-EU relations in the wake of the NSA surveillance affair, 4/2014 (2014.)
1208 Refer also to Chapter 3.
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Conclusion
The driving forces that make the need for cloud computing regulation a
pressing one
Throughout this analysis, it has been stressed out that cloud computing, as
a pioneering way of taking advantage of the best data processing technolo-
gies have to offer, calls for a fresh look into the regulatory tools governing
the wider IT phenomenon. These new regulatory frameworks do not need
to be viewed as a substitute for current laws but rather as their natural but
urgent successor, an original take on the IT governance starting from the
cloud phenomenon as the core element of information technology and
dealing with it from a broad, generic perspective, thus laying the general
legal principles upon which any specialized IT legislation could be safely
and with continuity developed in the future.
There may well be critical voices of this idea, i.e. the need for a regu-
latory framework focusing on the cloud as the foundation of information
technologies and communication; yet, numbers and data from both the
computer and legal science fronts suggest otherwise. In fact, latest numeri-
cal data suggest that the range and abundance of uses of cloud computing
are growing at an exponential rate over the years, fueled recently by the
push given to data industry by big data-related applications. Actually, ana-
lysis of the types and diversity of big-data centered uses of cloud compu-
ting indicates that technology is evolving so fast that is it driving the
cloud’s evolution at a pace much faster than any regulatory attempt from
the existing ones could possibly effectively tame1209.
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1209 Chaowei Yang, Qunying Huang, Zhenlong Li, Kai Liu & Fei Hu, Big Data and
cloud computing. Innovation opportunities and challenges, 10 International
Journal of Digital Earth 13–53 (2016); Divyakant Agrawal, Philip Bernstein,
Elisa Bertino, Susan Davidson, Umeshwas Dayal, Michael Franklin, Johannes
Gehrke, Laura Haas, Alon Halevy, Jiawei Han, H. V. Jagadish, Alexandros La-
brinidis, Sam Madden, Yannis Papakonstantinou, Jignesh Patel, Raghu Rama-
krishnan, Kenneth Ross, Cyrus Shahabi, Dan Suciu, Shiv Vaithyanathan & Jen-
nifer Widom, Challenges and Opportunities with Big Data 2011-1 Cyber Center
Technical Reports (2011); Divyakant Agrawal, Sudipto Das & Amr El Abbadi,
Big data and cloud computing. Current state and future opportunities 530–533
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At the same time, statistical analysis on the research done so far on
cloud computing and extensive literature review on available resources on
the broad topic reveal that the legal aspects of the cloud phenomenon re-
main largely unexplored. This is not so much because there is not conside-
rable output on the legal and ethical challenges posed by the cloud already
but rather because many of its technical feasibilities remain at a nascent
level but tend to gain attention and develop at lightning speed once they
gain the research communities attention. In particular, according to con-
tent analysis conducted for 236 scholarly journal articles published be-
tween 2009 and 2014 with the aims of
– Identifying possible trends and changes in cloud computing over the
six years of the survey,
– comparing publishing productivity of journals about the cloud comput-
ing subject, and
– guiding future research about cloud computing
the results of which were published in 2016, the majority of cloud compu-
ting research output is about “cloud computing adoption” (19%), followed
by the “legal and ethical issues” of cloud computing (15%). However, at
the same time it was observed that numerous technical aspects of the
cloud, which had remained mostly unexplored until recently are picking
up pace really fast once they attract researchers’ and industry’s attention.
For example, technical issues such as “cloud computing for mobile appli-
cations” and the “energy consumption dimension of cloud computing”,
which were found to be among the least explored and researched topic
areas at the beginning of the study, started growing at a remarkable pace
once they became hot topics for the cloud industry and relevant to the
existing or upcoming cloud-based applications1210. (4%) are the least at-
tention grabbing themes in the literature. However, “cloud computing for
(2011); Mauro Andreolini, Michele Colajanni, Marcello Pietri & Stefania Tosi,
Adaptive, scalable and reliable monitoring of big data on clouds, 79-80 Journal
of Parallel and Distributed Computing 67–79 (2015); Marcos D. Assunção, Ro-
drigo N. Calheiros, Silvia Bianchi, Marco A.S. Netto & Rajkumar Buyya, Big
Data computing and clouds. Trends and future directions, 79-80 Journal of Par-
allel and Distributed Computing 3–15 (2015.)
1210 Merve Bayramusta & V. Aslihan Nasir, A fad or future of IT? A comprehensive
literature review on the cloud computing research, 36 International Journal of
Information Management 635–644 (2016). For further information regarding
the vast research questions and opportunities around the cloud which still re-
main unexploited, refer also to: Marc Fouquet, Heiko Niedermayer & Georg
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mobile applications” and “energy consumption dimension of cloud com-
puting” themes have become popular in the last two years, so they are ex-
pected to be trendy topics of the near future. Another important finding
was that the majority of the articles indexed during the study were publis-
hed by engineering, information systems or technical journals such as “IT
Professional Magazine”, “International Journal of Information Manage-
ment” and “Mobile Networks and Applications” which means that legal
aspects of the cloud have until largely been collateral points of research
focused on cloud computing and there is still ample room for dedicated le-
gal analysis on cloud computing1211.
At the same time, technical research into more advanced ways to moni-
tor cloud environments is evolving at full speed paving already the way
for applications and tools that can be deployed to track activity or optimi-
ze use of cloud networks in ways totally novel to what is known for the
time being and what has been taken into account by regulators when writ-
ing existing laws for cloud-enabled applications1212.
Carle, Cloud computing for the masses, in Proceedings of the 1st ACM work-
shop on User-provided networking challenges and opportunities, 31 (Paulo
Mendes ed., 2009); Rekha Saluja, Cloud Computing: Challenges and New De-
velopments, 5 International Journal of Science, Engineering and Computer
Technology 173–176 (2015); Nabil Sultan, Cloud computing. A democratizing
force?, 33 International Journal of Information Management 810–815 (2013);
Mladen A. Vouk, Cloud Computing – Issues, Research and Implementations, 16
CIT 235–246 (2008.)
1211 Merve Bayramusta & V. Aslihan Nasir (note 1210). For further details on the
multiple research aspects posed by cloud computing and its widespread use ac-
tors sectors of economy refer to: Gerald Münzl, Michael Pauly & Martin Reti
eds., Cloud Computing als neue Herausforderung für Management und IT
(2015.)
1212 Guilherme Da Cunha Rodrigues, Rodrigo N. Calheiros, Vinicius Tavares
Guimaraes, Glederson Lessa dos Santos, Márcio Barbosa de Carvalho, Lisandro
Zambenedetti Granville, Liane Margarida Rockenbach Tarouco & Rajkumar
Buyya, Monitoring of cloud computing environments, in Proceedings of the 31st
Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 378–383 (Sascha Ossowski
ed., 2016). For additional resources on the future trends in technical tools for
monitoring and managing cloud resources and networks, refer also to: Georgios
Tselentis, Towards the future internet. Emerging trends from European research
(2010); Jesús Montes, Alberto Sánchez, Bunjamin Memishi, María S. Pérez
& Gabriel Antoniu, GMonE. A complete approach to cloud monitoring, 29 Fu-
ture Generation Computer Systems 2026–2040 (2013.)
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For all these reasons, it is firmly believed that the systematic analysis
and collection under the same project of best practices, current trends and
proposals for a sound cloud computing regulation that was attempted
throughout the course of this study is an important one and could serve as
the starting point for regulators to put together in the near future much
more sound and better coordinated rules for the cloud-enabled IT land-
scape of today and tomorrow.
Overview of solutions and suggestions towards the development of
sound cloud computing regulation regimes
The following is a summary of the proposals made throughout this study
towards achieving cloud computing regulatory frameworks that will be
more in line with the speed and frequency in which IT is evolving nowa-
days and will also provide for greater certainty for legal subjects on a
cross-jurisdictional basis. It should be reiterated that the outcomes of this
analysis are based on the preconditions set for it already in its introductory
chapter. Moreover, given that the project is essentially a comparative ana-
lysis between norms and trends of two jurisdictions aiming not in proclai-
ming winners and losers but rather in bringing together best practices from
and for both of them, some of the following propositions may not struck
readers coming from one of the two schools of legal thought (i.e. the EU
and US one) as absolutely original or ground-breaking. Yet it needs to be
born in mind that this work has been meant as a synthesizing effort be-
tween the two jurisdictions it focuses on and, consequently, ideas which
may be standard practice in one jurisdiction can be essentially new ap-
proaches for the other and vice versa.
The summary of the proposals made over previous chapters of this ana-
lysis is structured under three categories, i.e. normative, governance and
policy ones.
Normative proposals
As normative are coined proposals which stem from theory of law and, ul-
timately, push towards the direction of cloud computing rules that will not
be understood simply as an additional set of laws for IT but rather as a set





– Currently, it is not uncommon that technological advancement may by-
pass regulatory prudence in the time between the initialization the con-
ceptualization phase for a law and the time it is concluded causing a
vicious circle. An exit from this pattern can only be achieved if cloud
computing regulation deviates from the norm currently followed by IT
laws that are largely ad-hoc formulated and takes a more technologi-
cally abstract yet intra-jurisdictionally systematic direction. In other
words, cloud computing regulation should not serve as a cure to tech-
nological implementations that may go wrong but should change its fo-
cus on making sure that the margin for accidents from cloud-enabled
technological applications (presently known or even forthcoming ones)
is limited to the biggest extent possible1213.
– Cloud regulation laws should refrain from undue restrictions. Experi-
ence and history indicate that in dynamic phenomena, such as cloud
computing, restrictive approaches usually either hinder progress or are
simply rendered invalid via a workaround. Consequently, it does not
seem meaningful to try to control what will happen next in a sector by
forbidding certain things from happening. The key to better regulation
is definitely not greater or unjustified restrictions1214.
– The legislators’ mindset should be towards fostering a predictable,
minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment. In fact, many
scholars agree that this should not be just the wish pursued with every
new adopted legislation but rather the primary goal future laws should
serve: ensuring that the regulated environment in which law subjects
will be let to act will be a simple-to-understand and opaque one1215.
– Given the prevailing legal doctrine regarding IT technologies and the
data tasks effectuated through them, the essential elements of an effect-
ive regulatory regime for the cloud should be transparency, availability
and accountability. Transparency is an important element in the strug-
gle to meet security, privacy or trust obligations, since it brings to the
forefront the (contractual) will of all cloud actors (be them users, ser-
vice providers, inspecting authorities etc.) to fulfil the globally accept-
ed privacy principles that will make up for a sound and secure cloud
environment. Availability arises as a prerequisite since in a sound gov-
ernance framework for the cloud availability for reporting and inspec-
1213 For more refer to Chapter 4.
1214 For more refer to Chapter 5.
1215 Id. See also Chapter 4.
b. Overview of solutions and suggestions towards sound cloud regulation regimes
339
tion of cloud actors is of prime importance as an assurance for applica-
tion of the commonly accepted privacy and security requirements. Fi-
nally, accountability is an important factor arising directly from one of
the main legal challenges with regard to cloud computing: namely that
commitments from parties to the cloud life cycle must be clear and en-
forceable in practice. This, in consequence, stimulates trust throughout
the cloud cycle and further intensifies the bonds between providers and
users of cloud services1216.
– Laws for the cloud, primarily those focusing on determining competent
jurisdiction, should be developed in the future having the theory of rea-
sonableness in mind. This, according to Lowenfeld suggests that any
set of rules developed with the aim of providing answers to the broad
issue of jurisdiction, at the end of the day, attempts to strike a compro-
mise between legal certainty and flexibility. The rules that may, at any
time, be adopted “need to be clear and definite enough to lead to an ac-
ceptable degree of legal certainty, but also flexible enough to cover un-
foreseen and complex situations, which suggests the need for a ‘safety
valve’ that allows jurisdiction not to be asserted even when technically
it could be”1217. This concept is intended to help resolve particular situ-
ations, typical among which are those when there is a jurisdictional
conflict between regulators in two sovereign states1218.
– Regulators tasked with developing laws for the cloud should work
bearing the external and internal perspective of every IT phenomenon
about to be regulated in mind. According to them, the external perspec-
tive brings to surface physical reality, and the internal perspective ex-
poses virtual reality. For instance, accessing a website on a browser
can be interpreted as either sending a request to a remote server that
sends back text and pictures (physical reality), or getting access to a
place where certain information is hosted (virtual reality). An internal
and an external viewer form two strikingly different understandings of
the same thing. When it comes to plain users, there can be those who
have an understanding of both realities simultaneously; technically
savvy users, with a certain level of awareness about technology can
very efficiently follow the external view along with the internal.
Nonetheless, the internet and cloud computing as its main facilitator
1216 For more refer to Chapter 7.
1217 Dan Svantesson (note 548).
1218 For more refer to Chapter 6.
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necessitate a choice between these two representations of reality. A us-
er may be aware of both realities at the same time, but will have to
choose to accept only one at a time when trying to understand online
experiences. On the contrary, while regulators, alone or with the assis-
tance of specialized advisors, may well be able to distinguish between
the two versions of the cloud reality, they cannot act so in extremis as
plain users: they need to come up with a set of rules of law which will
serve the interests, respond to challenges and, ultimately, strike a bal-
ance between both perceptions of the cloud computing phenomenon in
order for it to provide thorough and not partial answers1219.
– There are lots of different ways to deploy the same kind of infrastruc-
ture and this means that the (regulatory) challenges coming with one
type of cloud environment will not necessarily be the same with those
of another. For instance, a great deal of issues regarding privacy raised
by public clouds are non-existent or they are satisfactorily tackled
when the same resources are utilized to set up a private cloud comput-
ing network. However, the technical expertise, the mechanical skills
and the very materials (i.e. pieces of hardware) that are necessary in or-
der to build up either a public (with just the standard protection fea-
tures) or a private (with as advanced protection features as possible)
cloud ecosystem are, in essence, the same. In both cases, and in every
other in between, one will need pieces of the same kind of infrastruc-
ture, the same kind of information science and IT engineering knowl-
edge that will permit one to put those pieces of hardware into meaning-
ful working arrangements and, of course, even the features that will
differentiate them and make them stand apart from each other will be
based on the same technical principles and scientific intel that makes
the overall concept of cloud computing technology possible. Conse-
quently, it becomes evident that, despite the great variety in which
cloud services and networks appear on the market and the substantial
differences which might exist between all these variations of cloud en-
vironments, there is a common underlying connecting tissue that binds
them all, and that is the knowledge (of informatics, computing engi-
neering and other disciplines) related to them which is one and the
same. With these in mind, the challenge is not to homogenize IT laws
or pulverize jurisdictional particularities. It rather is to set common
1219 For more refer to Chapter 6.
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goals and establish rules that will contribute to their achievement. The
path towards achieving these goals can and will expectedly be differ-
ent, both because cloud computing manifests itself through various dif-
ferent arrangements and because two or more identical cloud networks
in different environments will naturally be treated in differentiated
manners according to the legal culture in each environment. However,
as long as the same purposes are pursued and, ultimately, materialize,
the path and the means need not be identical1220.
– Rules developed with the goal of regulating the cloud apart from
putting emphasis on clearing out which cloud actor is tasked with what
specific duties at each time throughout a cloud network’s workflow,
should also provide clear rules for shedding light on the issue of supe-
riority between conflicting rules affecting the same areas of cloud-re-
lated activity putting an end to the insecurities that still so manifestly
exist despite an already wide range of legal tools attempting to deal
with all outstanding issues in the wider field of IT1221.
– It is strongly recommended that a future regulatory framework for
cloud computing should be based on a definition that will not only de-
scribe what cloud computing does, from a technical perspective, but
also explain its dual nature as a concept, i.e. that it is not just about the
external manifestations we see of it but also about the way the underly-
ing technology and hardware are organized around certain actors to
construct, all together, a dynamic and continuously changing business
workflow. In this way, the subsequent rules will not only reflect on the
external but also on the internal aspect of cloud computing dealing
with the whole range of cloud-related issues calling for regulatory ar-
rangement1222.
– While laws on the applications made possible thanks to cloud comput-
ing technologies usually adopt a punitive or repressive approach trying
to describe in what way harmful effects from malpractice with these
applications could be limited, cloud computing regulation should adopt
a primarily proactive approach focusing on who is charged with what
functions and duties in that context throughout the cloud network. In
this manner, it is expected that affected entities will be better aware of
their duties and the preparations required to live up to depending on the
1220 For more refer to Chapter 8.




role(s) they are playing within a cloud network, thus increasing the
chances for smooth and transparent function of the cloud market and
minimizing the odds for harmful events or spillovers thereof1223.
– IT and cloud computing are perfect case studies to start off from
Hayek’s position on the regulatory state and, after combining it with
the principles of the theory on knowledge and the law, to arrive in a
modern formula that will guarantee the production of equally or, even
better, more efficient regulation in the future. Specifically, and contrary
to the voices putting forward the irrelevance of obsolescence of it, the
regulatory state itself can still be justified as one of the key mechan-
isms for aggregating local knowledge. Similarly, in the field of cloud
computing regulation achieving the optimal results is not a question of
choosing who, among competent potential regulators, does better or
the best laws. Rather, what it is really needed is to coordinate among
all these competent regulators, to agree on elementary common princi-
ples that will define all the pieces of laws they may bring out and to
make sure that, in the end, they will all work towards the same end
product: a pragmatic and as timeless as possible regime of sound gov-
ernance instead of an ever anxious to catch up with new standards
regime of governing1224.
– In the field of cloud computing, as in many other fields, improving
regulation is not only a matter of replacing existing laws with new ones
because older rules have been found to have become obsolete. Laws
and overall legal certainty are also improved by putting in place basic
regulation that will help us interpret and apply pre-existing legislation
in a more coherent and in touch with technological reality manner. In
addition, improvement is also achieved by agreeing on the fundamental
concepts and principles that should be at the core of all executive laws
across different jurisdictions in order for law subjects to enjoy, as much
as possible, comparable levels of protection with reference to an issue
which is of a genuinely borderless nature1225.
– Insisting that the body of laws governing the cloud in one jurisdiction
can be totally sealed against the expectations of its subjects falling un-
der the competence of different legal orders but being potentially af-
fected by the said body of rules as well, directly or indirectly, does
1223 Id. See also Chapter 4.
1224 For more refer to Chapter 10.
1225 Id.
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more harm than good. Most importantly, it degrades the quality of the
overall learning system through which constant law modification and
update is possible. In the end, if IT laws are to remain relevant and im-
prove their livability in view of the lightning speed at which the phe-
nomena they address are changing, they need to prioritize towards a
governance regime that will conserve legal cohesion in an as broader
as possible area of application. Cloud computing regulation, as the
body of rules that will govern the foundations of IT, is the ideal starting
point for this new regulatory perspective to be set in motion1226.
– Cloud computing regulators need to work towards rules governing the
cloud that will not only focus on settling the issues arising out of each
particular application of cloud technologies only but rather they will
aim to be of a long-lasting and generic nature, as much as possible, so
that the further-reaching goals of legal security and coherence of pro-
tection for all types of law subjects within the broader IT sector are
achieved. This proposal for drafting cloud computing laws with a tele-
ological mindset, if put forward across jurisdictions, helps us to further
elaborate on the nature of cloud computing laws, which need to be in-
spired by a spirit of proportionality as well so that frictions and colli-
sions among legal orders are softened as much as possible. Useful ex-
perience from other fields of law where cross-jurisdictional alignment
has already been achieved to a substantial degree (for instance, from
the field of trade law or the law of the sea) can also assist this process
of integrating the teleological and proportionality methods deep into
cloud computing law-making. Last but not least, given that the cloud
terrain still is at this moment only loosely and case-based regulated, it
is a unique opportunity to work on cloud regulation inspired by the
teleological reasoning right from the beginning facilitating the estab-
lishment of a regime of governance over one of jurisdictionally frag-
mented governing in the sector1227.
– Substantial integration of the spirit of the ‘Systemdatenschutzprinzip’
in future laws for the cloud. Brought on the table as early as the begin-
ning of the 1990s, this notion suggested the integration of data privacy
concerns already in the design and development of information sys-





with many of the modern challenges posed by cloud computing tech-
nologies1228.
Governance proposals
As governance proposals are coined those that do not explicitly need addi-
tional regulations but could already fit with existing IT laws; however,
they imperatively must be taken into account when cloud computing laws
are designed in the future:
– The GDPR invests a lot on a priori over a posteriori regulation, which
is in principle of course better. Notwithstanding, it still interprets a pri-
ori protection as a range of procedures and checklists data controllers
have to go through before any specific data processing and not as some
clearly formulated, aim-oriented general principles which will make
clear the level of protection that is to be maintained at all times during
a data processing cycle irrespective of how this will be achieved by
any given data controller. In other words, what we need for a data pro-
tection regime looking to the future is not more forms or compliance
questionnaires; the real challenge is to let everyone know under what
quality standards data are expected to be processed and let them then
decide how to achieve them, knowing that, should they fail, equally
clear repercussions will be faced1229.
– Pre-cloud facilities were designed with a primary objective to get the
data processing done in a clearly laid-out and secure manner. Cloud-
based facilities are constructed with the primary aim of getting data
processing done in an as user-friendly as possible manner and with a
priority on optimizing economies of scale for the provider but also the
user of the cloud infrastructure. This change of focus resulted in the se-
curity of the processing not being possible to be taken for granted any-
more. From a status quo where it was enough to know what role each
of the actors participating in a data processing sequence held in order
to be able to identify their responsibilities and duties, we are today in a
situation where the data processing workflow is geographically and re-
source-wise dynamic and spread-out across the cloud facility, hence
ii.
1228 Id.
1229 For more refer to Chapter 4.
b. Overview of solutions and suggestions towards sound cloud regulation regimes
345
calling for a different approach that will guarantee security and trans-
parency throughout the processing workflow1230.
– It is suggested that the cloud industry be reorganized based on an end
to end accountability approach. This approach will lead the greater sec-
tor to be arranged over a continuum or spectrum of parties, of whom
only those that indeed process data at some point through the data life
cycle will be considered as potentially culpable. Additionally, this ac-
countability will not be vague nor will it only be affirmed when a
wrongdoing occurs. It will, instead, have varying degrees of obliga-
tions and liabilities, directly analogous to the position of the party in
the cloud cycle, the scope it is supposed to be serving and the process-
es for which it is fair to be held responsible. This approach would not
only bring the actual responsible parties to the forefront of culpability
but it would also contribute to the quest for achieving a more appropri-
ate balance between commercial and privacy considerations in light of
the complex and dynamic nature of today’s cloud computing indus-
try1231.
– Effective data protection in today’s cloud-dominated IT landscape can-
not be guaranteed by legal instruments alone. Instead, a mixture of up-
to-date, proactively oriented and precautionary regulations along with
suitable technological assets and the series of specialized laws already
in place is the key to achieving the best possible level of integrity, safe-
ty and security in the vast amount of cloud-facilitated applications. As
data processing becomes pervasive, privacy enhancing technologies
are increasingly important and an indispensable tool in the effort to-
wards establishing a sound system of governance with regard to cloud
computing and the entire environment of applications around it. Actu-
ally, the idea that technological support is indispensable in sealing data
against the risks they face from technology-assisted processing is so
strongly supported that in certain areas of computing it appears as a
sine qua non. Specifically, in ubiquitous computing, it appears to be “a
misperception to believe that it is possible to secure personal privacy
and informational self-determination without technologies that provide
anonymity, pseudonymity and transparency in a user-controlled way
without hampering the user in his or her everyday business”. Such
1230 Id.
1231 For more refer to Chapter 6.
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technologies are already available and they could not only be used in
reinforcing generic cloud computing laws of the nature and scope that
have been analyzed in previous chapters, but they could also make pos-
sible privacy-friendly settings in cloud-based systems and applications,
facilitate the much promoted opt-in principle, make possible the con-
figuration of personalized user-settings for routine data processing,
speed up and optimize automatic deleting processes, permit the deploy-
ment of personalized identity management or transmit systems, orga-
nize, aggregate and document declarations of consent that any data
subject may have issued for certain types of data processes etc1232.
Policy proposals
The last set of recommendations includes policy proposals, i.e. specific
measures that can be taken within each jurisdiction as well as on a cross-
jurisdictional basis towards bringing the suggestions from two previous
categories into effect:
– Future privacy laws should stipulate broad categories of uses and ser-
vices involving data, certain of which will also be permissible without
or with only limited, standardized safeguards. For riskier applications
involving data, future regulatory schemes should articulate ground
rules for how data users will determine the dangers of a particular data
use or service and determine thereafter what measures best avoid or
mitigate them1233.
– EU data protection law creates for itself an ever-wider space of materi-
al and territorial scope. The same can generally be said for any juris-
diction, in principle: every legal order is inherently striving to impose
itself as much as possible over others wishing to secure for its subjects
an as extended as possible (physical as well as material) vital space of
legal security. This, however, respectively increases the chances for
conflicts among jurisdictions. Therefore, the need for coordination
among different legal orders grows even more important so that fric-
tions and jurisdictional uncertainty are avoided, as much as possible.
Shifting the focus from data processing as a particular activity to cloud
iii.
1232 For more refer to Chapter 10.
1233 For more refer to Chapter 4.
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enabled processes involving data in general and developing cloud com-
puting regulation rules through this generic perspective will offer a
much more suitable ground for common understanding among differ-
ent legal orders1234.
– The binary distinction between controllers and processors, sitting right
now at the heart of the regulatory scheme utilized to decide on cloud-
related issues, is unsuitable for a cloud computing environment and
should be abolished. Alternatively, a wholly new principle of end to
end accountability needs to be introduced, one that would run through
the cloud business chain and will constantly hold the different actors
accountable for their share of duties in the broader task of making sure
the cloud cycle runs smoothly1235.
– The relationship between the two pools of laws, i.e. the already exist-
ing and abundant one of laws regulating cloud-based applications and
the currently nascent or almost non-existent but needed one of rules
regulating the cloud per se, should not be hierarchical but rather com-
plimentary: enriching the latter should be done in a way that will fur-
ther boost the efficiency of the former1236.
– In every law-making process governments or, in general, legislative
authorities, have a certain range of mechanisms available to detect le-
gal and regulatory issues related to the subject matter of the laws they
are about to design. As it is commonly admitted, what issues do finally
make it onto the legal and regulatory agenda greatly depends on the
prevailing political economy in which an issue, in this case cloud com-
puting, emerges and diffuses; accordingly, these conditions may vary
across countries. As far as the cloud is concerned, although the two ju-
risdictions under examination in this study (i.e. EU and the US) may be
following distinctly separate routes in the way they handle IT and, in
particular, data-related issues, in both of them there is a strong momen-
tum in civil society for taking decisive measures and adopting laws
that will clear out the current blurry picture when it comes to regulat-
ing cloud technologies. This unanimous call for action should be heard
by regulators and, apart from being a call for them to act, it can also
serve as a perfect tool in working on producing rules for the cloud that
will be based on common principles and will, therefore, be possible to
1234 For more refer to Chapter 6.
1235 Id.
1236 For more refer to Chapter 9.
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be presented to both jurisdictions with an increased likelihood of being
met favorably and embraced by all affected actors1237.
– Any concept for data protection and technology-assisted cloud comput-
ing regulation needs to be designed by having two target groups in
mind: producers of the respective technologies, who need to be legally
obliged to ensure actual availability of the said technology, and users,
that is, the various actors within the cloud workflow, with the aim of
forcing them to actually put these measures in practice. Both target
groups need to have clear guidelines from regulators for the develop-
ment and application of privacy-friendly technologies. At the same
time, making official the adoption of such technologies, as an indis-
pensable asset towards the establishment of the new governance-ori-
ented regime in the field of cloud computing, will encourage actors of
these groups to actually invest resources and effort in developing and
implementing such technologies. It is up to regulators’ bravery to make
the body of cloud computing laws as relevant as possible at this point,
by going as far as concretizing future-oriented criteria for the design of
technology that may be even directly derived from cloud computing
regulation. What is more, cloud computing laws could even provide
business and growth opportunities or even incentivize the use of such
technologies1238.
Future challenges – insights for further research
As it has been demonstrated, big data constitute the latest wave in the tsu-
nami-like development of modern information technologies. Being a phe-
nomenon which has been around only for a handful of years, they have
grown exponentially and managed to play a decisive role in the final shap-
ing and spirit of IT laws as new as the EU’s GDPR. However, technologi-
cal progress is relentless and, just as the world tries to process all the chal-
lenges big data have brought about, further waves of change are already
looming on the horizon. The Internet of Things (IoT), the growth of which
was, to a large extent, propelled by the success of big data, is quickly ex-
panding in multiple directions beyond personal data. And just as the range
c.
1237 Id.
1238 For more refer to Chapter 10.
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of IoT applications multiplies so does its interrelation with the cloud1239
and the challenges raised1240. For instance, soon it will become clear that it
is not only important that the data collected on the cloud via IoT installati-
ons are safe and sealed from malpractice but that the metadata that will be
produced as the output of processing activities carried out on the cloud are
equally reliable, solid and accurate1241. Moreover, the proliferation of IoT
applications and systems already challenges long-held legal perceptions in
the field of IT, such as the illegality of hacking; there are already voices
indicating that in the face of the diversity of IoT installations and the wide
range of dangers that may be associated to them, even hacking should be
considered a possibility under regulated circumstances1242.
In conclusion, the issues dealt with on the course of this research are so
dynamic that they could turn it into a never-ending project, should we
wish to cover every single aspect and type of challenges cloud computing
poses for IT law. Without being able, in the duration and with the con-
straints of a single PhD term, to provide answers to all questions, it is
hoped that the points raised and the solutions proposed throughout this
analysis will serve as a driving force for more pragmatic and more durable
IT laws in the future, in an effort to maximize the benefits from the gallop-
ing advancement of technology for all types of actors, from users to ser-
vice providers to regulators to the law itself and the security and sentiment
of safety it should convey to its subjects.
1239 Everton Cavalcante, Jorge Pereira, Marcelo Pitanga Alves, Pedro Maia, Roniceli
Moura, Thais Batista, Flavia C. Delicato & Paulo F. Pires, On the interplay of
Internet of Things and Cloud Computing. A systematic mapping study, 89-90
Computer Communications 17–33 (2016.)
1240 Jatinder Singh, Thomas Pasquier, Jean Bacon, Hajoon Ko & David Eyers,
Twenty Security Considerations for Cloud-Supported Internet of Things, 3 IEEE
Internet Things J. 269–284 (2016); Christopher Rees, Who owns our data?, 30
Computer Law & Security Review 75–79 (2014); Niels Fallenbeck & Claudia
Eckert (note 932); Birgit Vogel-Heuser, Thomas Bauernhansl & Michael ten
Hompel eds., Handbuch Industrie 4.0 Bd.4 (2017.)
1241 For an example of beyond the norm cloud-based application which poses un-
precedented regulatory challenges with regard to massive data exchanges and
processing refer to: Fruzsina Molnár-Gábor & Jan O. Korbel, Regulierung neuer
Herausforderungen in den Naturwissenschaften – Datenschutz und Datenaus-
tausch in der translationalen genetischen Forschung, in Messen und Verstehen
in der Wissenschaft. Interdisziplinäre Ansätze, 151–171 (Marcel Schweiker,
Joachim Hass, Anna Novokhatko & Roxana Halbleib eds., 2017.)
1242 Ido Kilovaty, Freedom to Hack SSRN Journal (2017.)
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